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Introduction
In the almost fifty years since his death, the name Fred M. Vinson has
all but disappeared from public awareness and consciousness. This work
is intended to bring the life and times of a dedicated public servant back
to the surface for examination and study by present and future genera-
tions of Americans. He was, above all, a true believer in government and
public service. Vinson never doubted for a moment that the highest call-
ing for an American was serving in government—federal, state, county,
or municipal. For more than thirty years, he demonstrated that convic-
tion, starting out as a part-time city attorney for his tiny hometown of
Louisa, Kentucky, and rising to the top levels of all three branches of
national government, a feat that few have equaled. He obviously en-
joyed the fame and acclaim he received from public service, but more
pleasing to him than any personal glory was the good that government
could do for the "folks back home." From his first day in Congress to
his last day on the Supreme Court, Vinson never lost sight of the fact
that he had been entrusted with the high privilege and responsibility of
serving the people. Sometimes he excelled at it and sometimes he fell
short of expectations, but never did he shrink from his duties or give
them less than, as he might put it, his dead-level best.
The values and beliefs he maintained for a lifetime were those he
inherited as a child of the rugged but nurturing hills and valleys of east-
ern Kentucky. The legacy of tenacious but kind and considerate fore-
bears instilled in Vinson a burning desire to succeed—but not at all costs.
He played by the rules and expected others to do the same, and he ac-
cepted defeat, not willingly but nonetheless with grace and without ran-
cor. The praise and best wishes from both sides of the aisle that greeted
Vinson upon his departure from the House of Representatives were fit-
ting tributes to a politician who paid more than just lip service to the
spirit of bipartisanship. He was a Democrat with a capital D and also a
democrat with a small d. Although Vinson believed deeply that the prin-
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ciples and policies of his party best served the interests of the common
citizen, he believed even more strongly that government was required to
act and move ahead. He was a pragmatist who focused on the problem
at hand with no fixed ideological or philosophical position but rather
with a belief that solutions would present themselves after a thorough
study of the matter and after open, honest, and harmonious debate. He
was fond of saying, "Things go better when you don't get hot and both-
ered."
Vinson's calm and steady hand helped steer the country through
such monumental crises as the Great Depression, World War II, the post-
war economy, and the Cold War. Although a fiscal conservative and or-
thodox in his economic thinking, Vinson recognized that the desperation
of the Depression required the bold measures initiated by Roosevelt and
his New Deal. He dutifully enlisted for the front lines, shouldering much
of the responsibility for finding the financial muscle for programs that
powered people out of despair and destitution. His most enduring legis-
lative achievement was his work on the Social Security Act of 1935.
Vinson's unselfishness and willingness to serve were apparent during
the war years when he readily gave up lifetime tenure on the federal
bench to take on a number of difficult and demanding assignments for
Roosevelt and Truman. As the country's economic czar during the war,
Vinson's decisions on prices and wages touched every American. He
used his power wisely and judiciously, winning the respect of even those
he ruled against. The reputation he earned as a skilled negotiator and
reconciler of conflicting views led President Truman to turn to him in
the mid-1940s when the Supreme Court was bitterly divided by intense
infighting that had become public and was hampering the court's ability
to function. It was Vinson's final call to duty, one that was a work in
progress when he died.
The record book is replete with Vinson's imprint as legislator, ad-
ministrator, and jurist. The laws and decisions that he crafted are given
the extensive treatment they deserve in this work, but—because the
measure of a person is more than what can be recorded in the archives of
official proceedings—here too are the personal and human sides of Fred
Vinson. Experts can quibble about and debate the lasting value of the
public side of the Vinson ledger, but there can be little argument that the
personal side is one that stands the test of time and one that offers sound
guidance to those who choose to enter public service.
Although he could command the ear of presidents, foreign leaders
and dignitaries, and captains of business and commerce, Vinson never
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lost connection with the man on the street, even after moving into the
cloistered and rarefied chambers of the Supreme Court. He gladly wel-
comed old friends from Ashland, Morehead, and other Kentucky towns
who would drop by for a visit. And his guests did not feel they had
committed a serious breach of protocol if they addressed him as Fred
instead of Mr. Chief Justice. A photographer assigned by Parade maga-
zine to take the chief justice's picture for the cover recalled that he was
nervous to be photographing such a prominent official but that Vinson
immediately put him at ease. "It's comforting to know that the man you
are waiting to photograph is a 'down home' sort who makes plain people
feel at home," he said of his encounter.1
Vinson would have considered unseemly the practice that is so com-
mon today of public officials who use their service in government as a
gateway to riches in the private sector. When presented with his one
opportunity to cash in, he turned it down because he thought it would
tarnish the image of the Court. He essentially lived paycheck to pay-
check, just like millions of his fellow citizens. In fact, he was in debt
much of the time while he was in Congress because he paid for his
primary and election campaigns largely out of his own pocket. He even
fell behind on mortgage payments a time or two when he was in the
executive branch.
Obviously, then, in the way of tangible assets, Vinson left little be-
hind. On a broader scale, his heritage is immensely rich, though impos-
sible to measure. How do you assess the impact of the time, attention,
and wise counsel that he dispensed so freely to family, friends, and strang-
ers engaged on a street corner or through the mail? Whenever he had the
opportunity, Vinson extolled the virtues of a career in public service,
and his exhortations may have caused a thousand Vinsons to bloom in
city halls, state houses, and federal offices throughout the land.
A father wrote Vinson shortly after the end of World War II seeking
his advice about what his son and his nephews should do after being
discharged from the military. Vinson, not surprisingly, suggested public
service. "Government service—elective and appointive—holds many
satisfactions," he wrote. Foremost, Vinson said, was "the all-important
feeling of accomplishment in the public interest."2 When the teenage
boys of the Brooklyn-Queens Political Society wrote Vinson in 1947
while he was chief justice to praise his work and let him know that they
were "really interested in politics and government," Vinson responded
that the letter "touched [him] deeply." "[It is] truly a great thing," he
continued, "for the boys and girls of today to take an active interest in
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good government, because it is to you that we must look for the future
of America and our democratic system of government. I know that you
will do everything in your power to preserve and protect it."3
Vinson did his part to preserve and protect. Asked to summarize
Vinson's career, Willard Pedrick, who had worked for him as a law clerk
on the circuit court and as an assistant in the economic stabilization
office, said a fair assessment required going beyond just viewing his
tenure as chief justice, which tends to get disproportionate attention and
low marks. "He was so much more than that," Pedrick said, citing his
extensive and significant service in the House, in two administrations,
and on the lower court. "I don't think that we can expect the man who
was one of the greatest decathlon performers to also be the world's great-
est pole vaulter. In terms of the public servant, this was a great man, a
man devoted to his country, a man who gave everything he had to the
country and who served with distinction in every branch of federal gov-
ernment."4
CHAPTER 1
A Long Journey from "Jail"
In the fall of 1948, President Truman confronted gloomy prospects both
at home and abroad. He was all but counted out in his race against Re-
publican Thomas E. Dewey to retain the White House, and Cold War
tensions had escalated because of the Soviet Union's blockade of Ber-
lin. Seizing on a suggestion by two young campaign aides, Truman de-
cided the time was ripe for bold action on the international front, action
that, if it was successful in easing the tension, might also reverberate to
his advantage in the election. So on October 3 the president called his
good friend Fred M. Vinson, then chief justice of the United States, and
asked him to undertake a peace mission to Moscow. Truman believed
the deep-seated suspicion and distrust that existed between the two na-
tions were caused in part by poor communications. He hoped that Vinson,
who had a well-deserved reputation for being able to calm troubled wa-
ters, could, in a face-to-face meeting with Joseph Stalin, open a channel
of constructive and ongoing dialogue. Truman wanted Vinson to give
the Soviet leader "a better understanding of our attitude as a people and
of our nation's peaceful aspirations for the whole world." He said, "I
had a feeling that Stalin might get over some of his inhibitions if he
were to talk with our own Chief Justice."1
During World War II and the turbulent postwar period, turning to
Vinson had become a habit in Washington. So much so that he became
known as "Available Vinson" because of his willingness to tackle diffi-
cult assignments for President Roosevelt and then for President Truman.
He was, according to one pundit, "the trouble shooter who could be
relied upon to step into a sticky situation and, by a blend of shrewdness,
geniality and a talent for stressing areas of agreement, resolve a conflict
or at least smooth the ruffled feathers of the antagonists."2 Vinson's re-
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markable string of troubleshooting assignments began in 1943 when
Roosevelt asked him to take the position of economic stabilizer and lead
the administration's effort to hold down inflation during World War II.
Even though Vinson had to relinquish his lifetime appointment as a judge
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, he readily
agreed to accept, saying to Roosevelt simply, "You're the commander in
chief."3 Later, the president put Vinson in charge of planning for the
country's postwar years by naming him director of the War Mobiliza-
tion and Reconversion Office. Shortly after Truman became president,
he made Vinson his secretary of the Treasury, a position that not only
kept Vinson at work on the knotty problems of the U.S. economy but
also required him to map out strategies for dealing with economic re-
covery on a global scale. Truman again sought Vinson's steady hand in
1946 when he appointed him chief justice in the hope that he could
unify a feuding and fractured Supreme Court.
Obviously, saying yes came naturally to Vinson, especially when
summoned to duty by the president. When Truman proposed the Mos-
cow venture, however, Vinson's inclination was otherwise. He told
Truman, "As Chief Justice I must decline. But if you make it as a presiden-
tial request, I shall have a clear duty to comply." Truman did just that,
saying, "I am sorry Fred, to do this to you, but in the interest of the
country and the peace of the world I am compelled to request you to
go." Vinson responded, "I'll be ready in a few days."4 Because of his
strongly held belief that justices should refrain from activities outside
their duties on the Court, especially in an election year, Vinson insisted
that if he undertook the assignment he would have to resign from the
Supreme Court and not be reappointed.
In the end, the Vinson mission was scrapped because of the forceful
opposition to it by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who feared
that such unilateral action would undermine the Western unity that had
been forged to contend with the Berlin blockade. Nonetheless, once again
Vinson had demonstrated his willingness to answer the call, even if it
would, as in this case, mean stepping down from one of the highest and
most powerful positions in government.
Acceding to a president's plea during a national crisis is understand-
ably all but inevitable, but Vinson found it difficult to turn aside any
request for help, regardless of its nature or who sought it. Vinson's gen-
erosity and unfailing kindness were traits he inherited as a son of the
rugged hill country of eastern Kentucky, and he never shed them even as
he scaled lofty heights in all three spheres of national government. The
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Vinson is honored in his hometown of Louisa on July 11, 1951. (Courtesy of Special
Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
Vinson clan long had a reputation for being "ready to do a kind act or
charitable deed to any who might stand in need."5
When Frederick Moore Vinson was born on January 22, 1890, in
the small, neighborly town of Louisa on the banks of the Big Sandy
River, his roots in the region were already well established by his Anglo-
Saxon ancestors on both branches of the family tree.6 On the maternal
side his lineage extended back to the venerable Samuel Ferguson Sr.,
who settled in Tazewell County in southwestern Virginia in 1772 and
moved north into the Big Sandy Valley in the early 1800s. The early
Fergusons were farmers, merchants, timbermen, and owners of large
tracts of land, but in subsequent generations Fergusons increasingly
turned to law and politics. The Vinsons would follow a remarkably similar
path to prominence.
Fred Vinson's paternal great-grandfather, James, made his way into
the Big Sandy Valley at the turn of the nineteenth century from his na-
tive South Carolina. James Vinson was part of the great westward mi-
gration of pioneers who crossed mountains and navigated rivers to stake
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out their places in the rich bottomland of the river valleys in the foothills
of Kentucky and present-day West Virginia.
Carving a new life out of the forbidding terrain and the raw wilder-
ness embedded in pioneers like the Vinsons distinctive characteristics
and values that were to be part of an enduring legacy to their descen-
dants. Because they lived on isolated homesteads, families in the Big
Sandy were by necessity close-knit and self-sufficient. Their rugged
existence also made them resourceful, disciplined, and determined.
James and Rhoda (Sperry) Vinson, settling on the Virginia side of
the Big Sandy River around 1812, laid claim to several hundred acres of
dense forest and began the arduous task of clearing the land for farming.
They were soon helped in their labors by their eight sons and two daugh-
ters. This second generation of Vinsons—Democrat in politics and Chris-
tian in their faith—firmly planted the family as one of the region's most
prominent and influential. One son, Lazarus, who was Fred Vinson's
grandfather, went into the timber business after acquiring large tracts of
land on both the Kentucky and the then-Virginia sides of the Tug Fork
near what is now Louisa. Other brothers, most notably William, Samuel,
and Lafayette, also became entrepreneurs and owners of much land in
the Big Sandy Valley.
The next generation of Vinsons, while continuing to be involved in
business activities, also branched out into the legal profession, banking,
and politics. The second James Vinson, Lazarus's son and Fred's father,
fittingly was one of the family's political pioneers. He had followed his
father into the timber business, but his interest in the enterprise eventu-
ally waned, and he looked for a way out of the rigors of rural life; he
found it for a time through politics. In 1885, at the age of twenty-nine,
Jim Vinson was elected jailer of Lawrence County, Kentucky, and he
moved his wife, Virginia, and their three children—daughters Lourissa
and Georgia and son Robert—from the farm into the town of Louisa.
Five years after the move, the couple's fourth and last child, Frederick
Moore, was born. In later years, Vinson, who spent a lifetime associated
with the law—either arguing it, making it, or interpreting it—liked to
startle people by claiming that he was "born in jail." His actual birth-
place, however, was the jailer's newly built eight-room, two-story, red
brick home on the courthouse square, not the jail, which was a small
separate building in the back.
Nevertheless, life in Louisa for the spirited, inquisitive, and impres-
sionable young Vinson took on added luster and meaning because of the
environment in which he was raised. The courthouse square in the small,
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Although he liked to joke that he was "born in jail," his birth actually took place in the
family's residence, not the jail, which was a small separate building in the back. Vinson's
father was the jailer in Louisa at the time. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University
of Kentucky Library.)
quaint southern river town was the locus of activity at the turn of the
twentieth century, and it was Fred's playground. He romped under the
sycamores and maples in the courthouse yard, experienced the pageantry
of the traveling circuit court judge, lawyers, and others trooping to the
county seat for trials, and listened to the drama unfolding before the
bench from his perch in a courthouse window. As a son of the county
jailer, Fred also was able to get even closer to the action. The circuit
judge at the time, Stephen Gerard Kinner of Catlettsburg, a friend of Jim
Vinson's, occasionally let Fred sit beside him on the bench while court
was in session.7 In addition, the judge, as well as the commonwealth
attorney and other lawyers, boarded at the Vinson home, and they al-
lowed him to listen in to their conversations, which naturally were liber-
ally sprinkled with discussions of the law and politics. Although this
youthful experience did not necessarily foreordain Vinson's career, it
clearly planted a seed.
Fred's courthouse surroundings also provided him with an early
opportunity to demonstrate the kindness that would come to be such an
indelible trait. Fred and his older brother Bob roamed freely through the
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jailhouse and frequently befriended the inmates. When aunts and uncles
visited the Vinsons, the boys would plead for money to buy tobacco for
the men in jail. In one instance, young Fred's sympathy for one inmate
got carried away, even in the eyes of the would-be beneficiary. It hap-
pened when he was four years old. Fred, recalling the incident years
later, said, "There was a prisoner to whom I took a liking. I decided he
didn't belong in jail. He hadn't told me he wanted out, but I made up my
mind I'd help him escape. I got hold of my father's hatchet, and one day
when no one was looking, I walked up to his cell and slipped it through
the bars to him." The prisoner, though, was an unwilling participant in
the plot. Calling out to Fred's father after the youngster had departed, he
said, "Jim, here is a little present your boy just gave me. I figured you
would like to have it back" (172).
The man's reaction was in part an indication of the respect prisoners
held for Jim Vinson, who treated his wards fairly but ran the jail with an
iron hand. Bob Vinson said his father "could be a tough man to cross. He
was as strong as an ox; he'd take no guff from anybody" (182).
Firm but fair also described the Vinson home. "I was reared in a
rather disciplinarian household—justice, but discipline," Fred Vinson
said. "My parents were serious folk. They both considered life as an
obligation toward God, country and family." Vinson thought his mother
in particular had a profound effect on his life: "She was an omnivorous
reader and well-informed. She believed in duty and service. She planted
in me a deep regard for religion, respect for law, and faith in a good
cause." Vinson said his mother taught her family "to do the proper thing
without expecting any reward save the knowledge that we had done the
right thing" (186).
Virginia Vinson's great influence with the children—especially with
Fred, the youngest—may be traced to 1895, when she was forced to as-
sume increased responsibility for raising the family because of a tragedy
that shattered the rhythm of the Vinson household. Jim's father, Lazarus,
or Uncle Lace as he was widely known, was found robbed and murdered
under a bridge near Catlettsburg, where he had traveled to collect money
due his timber business. By this time Jim was town marshal and had moved
his family from the jailer's residence to a frame house close to the banks
of the Big Sandy. He resigned that position and devoted most of the next
three years to searching for the killers, leaving the affairs of the family
in Virginia's hands. Once the suspects were apprehended, their trial in
Catlettsburg and convictions took another three years, and during this
period Jim was again away from home much of the time.
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Fred, who had gone through the formative years of age five through
age eleven in the near-absence of his father, was well on his way to
maturity. He started school the year of his grandfather's murder and
quickly established himself as a star pupil, an eager learner with an al-
most photographic memory and unusual powers of concentration. His
first teacher, Margaret Hatcher, said she recognized his brilliance and
ambition from the beginning, adding that he "couldn't bear to let any-
body get ahead of him."8 Older brother Bob recalled that at home Fred
would sprawl out on the floor, poring over his school work while whis-
tling softly through his teeth. At night he studied by the glow of an oil-
burning lamp because the Vinson house was without gas, and electricity
did not arrive in Louisa until 1923.
Fred excelled in school and spent hours at the public library devour-
ing books, magazines, and newspapers, but he was far from being just a
bookworm. Though spindly and asthmatic as a child, he nonetheless
tackled sports on the sandlots—football and baseball in particular—as
energetically and effectively as he did homework. According to his
brother, he was "noisy as hell in a ball game" and a stickler for the rules.
A shortstop in baseball and quarterback in football, Fred was "a natural
leader—scrappy, aggressive and sure of himself."9
His youthful zeal and consciousness carried over to the odd jobs he
held to help out the family, whose finances were naturally strained by
Jim Vinson's absence. Fred did his part by selling and delivering the
Sunday edition of the 5/. Louis Post Dispatch, the Saturday Evening
Post, and a weekly newspaper called Pennsylvania Grit. He was espe-
cially attentive to his job of peddling Grit, and it was an experience that
he long remembered.
Upon receiving his stack of Grits each week, Fred eagerly read the
current issue cover to cover, which enabled him to discuss its contents
with prospective buyers. When a judge boarding at the Vinson home
chided him that he should not be selling a publication filled with "damned
old Yankee nonsense," Fred won the judge over as a subscriber by per-
suading him that the paper contained news and information that he would
find interesting. Years later, another young paper-peddler won over then-
congressman Vinson by triggering his fond memories of selling Grit. A
young boy named Billy Bagby, of Grayson, wrote asking if Vinson would
buy a subscription to the Ashland Independent to help him win a prize in
a sales contest. Vinson already subscribed to the Ashland newspaper,
but he sent seven dollars to the youngster for an additional subscription.
When he got the request, Vinson explained in a letter to Bagby, "my
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mind turned back thru the years when I was a little boy selling news-
papers and I can remember now every regular subscriber. I sold the
Pennsylvania Grit and made 2 cents on each sale, so I made up my
mind that I wasn't going to let you miss getting a subscription from
me, even tho' it did cost a few dollars and even tho' I already had
subscribed to it."10
Fred's budding entrepreneurial activities in Louisa were interrupted
in 1902 shortly after he turned twelve years old, when his family moved
about twenty-five miles north to Catlettsburg; there Kentucky, West Vir-
ginia, and Ohio meet where the Big Sandy empties into the Ohio River.
Jim Vinson, having spent a great deal of time in Catlettsburg during the
trial of the men charged with his father's murder, became attracted to
the city and decided it was the best place to live and raise a family.11
Thus the lively river town was the Vinsons' home for two years while
Jim tried his hand at yet another venture.
Jim Vinson was not without resources, even though his six-year cru-
sade to avenge his father's death naturally was costly. He owned the
family farm and timber business, which had continued generating in-
come. Jim was therefore able to purchase a ten-room hotel called the
Price House in Catlettsburg, which he remodeled into a boardinghouse
and renamed the Vinson House; he and Virginia operated the facility
until they sold it and returned to Louisa in 1904.
Although Fred had to start high school in new surroundings, he
adapted quickly, becoming, in the words of one of his teachers, "very
popular here."12 In later years, Vinson, warmly recalling attending school
in Catlettsburg, credited his English teacher there with awakening "in
me the real pleasure that is incident to school work. I always liked con-
tests and the spirit of interest created in the diagram work in your gram-
mar class did much to awaken me."13 Vinson's settling in was effortless
in part because being in Catlettsburg, county seat of Boyd County, was
in at least one sense like being back in Louisa. The Vinson House ca-
tered mainly to the same sort of courthouse clientele that had boarded
with the Vinsons in Louisa when the circuit court came to town, includ-
ing Judge Kinner. The judge, as he had done earlier, frequently let Fred
sit beside him on the bench while he presided. And again, Fred listened
with fascination when nightly conversation at the Vinson House turned,
as it invariably did, to discussions of lawsuits, court proceedings, and all
kinds of other legal matters. In later years, discussing the effect of this
atmosphere on his decision to pursue law, Vinson said, "I suspect that it
may have been the challenge of the subject and the deep enjoyment
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these men seemed to derive from the law, that might have had some
influence upon me."14
The dominant force for Fred in his career decision, however, and in
most things, for that matter, was his mother. "Her influence in my life
was very great," he said. "In the first place, her deep love and confi-
dence in me are known to everyone. She believed in me, and fought my
battles and desires to secure an education" (185).
Back in his hometown in 1904, Fred completed his secondary edu-
cation at Louisa High School and was quarterback of the 1906 football
team that crowned its undefeated season with a 12-0 win over arch rival
Ashland High School. After graduating from high school, he enrolled
for two years of study at Kentucky Normal College, a nonaccredited
teacher training school that had relocated in Louisa after its facility in
Prestonsburg had been destroyed by fire. Although Fred had no desire to
be a schoolteacher, attending Kentucky Normal was a convenient and
inexpensive way for him to continue his education. The school, which
charged a dollar a week for tuition, emphasized learning by rote and
reasoning. Students were drilled repeatedly in such core subjects as
English, Latin, German, mathematics, history, philosophy, and biology.15
Fred, with his drive and nearly photographic memory, flourished at Ken-
tucky Normal, graduating valedictorian in the class of 1908.
Vinson was quarterback of the Louisa High School football team that went undefeated
in 1906. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
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Vinson, third from right, was valedictorian of his 1908 graduating class at Kentucky
Normal College. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
The president and founder of Kentucky-Normal, Walter M. Byington,
recognizing that his school was limited in what it could do for this gifted
student, was eager to have Fred attend a university, where his full intel-
lectual promise might be reached. He was able to persuade Centre Col-
lege in Danville, Kentucky, a private liberal arts college known for its
academic excellence, to accept Fred as a senior on a probationary basis
(84). Even so, Vinson had to come up with money for tuition and living
expenses to take advantage of this opportunity, a prospect made more
difficult by the economic depression that wracked the country in 1908.
This financial hurdle was cleared when Dr. Morton G. Watson, a
Louisa physician, banker, and local Democratic Party stalwart, arranged
a loan of four hundred dollars for Fred. His oldest sister, Lourissa, who
was insistent that Fred attend college, took in washing so she could help
with his expenses. Miss Lou, as she was generally known, sent him five
dollars a week; in return, Fred, ever the stickler for detail, mailed back a
weekly report on how the money was being used.16 Dr. Watson's crucial
intervention in his behalf was something Vinson long cherished. While
in Congress, Vinson wrote in a letter to Dr. Watson's brother, "Were I to
live beyond my allotted space, I could not repay him for the help he gave
me in the formative years of my life." Vinson was not referring only to
the monetary assistance, as he made clear in this passage: "It was to
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your brother that I turned for counsel and advice in the early days of my
school life and it was he who strengthened my purpose to arrive at an
honorable position in life."17
When Fred arrived at Centre College, located in the stately Ken-
tucky Bluegrass, in September 1908, he made his first impression on
fellow students by his appearance. It was still vivid nearly forty years
later to classmate George L. Alley, who described Vinson as a "tall,
slender, beak-nosed, black-haired, taciturn mountaineer."18 Once the
young man from the foothills of eastern Kentucky settled in, though, he
made just as unforgettable impressions through his academic achieve-
ments and athletic prowess. Another classmate, John Diederich, who
became an Ashland attorney and Republican national committeeman,
said Vinson "entered into practically all the various college activities;
he studied and played hard; in fact he was most aggressive in every-
thing."19 Lawrence Hager, later editor and publisher of the Owensboro
Messenger and Inquirer and a Vinson confidant, recalled that Fred "al-
ways sat up on the edge of his seat, anxiously awaiting and seeming to
invite questions. I was in practically all of Fred Vinson's classes at Cen-
tre and don't recall that he missed a single question asked him."20
It is not surprising, then, that by the end of his senior year at Centre,
Vinson was at the head of his class, compiling a 97 percent average in
course work that consisted of astronomy, constitutional law, economics,
English, Greek, Greek literature, history, mathematics, physics, and
Spanish.21 At that time his grade average was the highest ever attained
by a student since the college's founding in 1819, and it earned Vinson
the coveted Ormond Beatty Alumni Prize of fifty dollars. The 1909 col-
lege yearbook, Cardinal and Blue, attesting to Vinson's scholarship, noted
alongside his class picture, "Vins knows all his books off by heart. He
can recite any lesson he's had since the beginning of the year, word for
word as it is in the book. Just tell him the page and line you want him to
begin on, and that's all you have to do except stop him (and that's the
hardest part)."22
To Vinson, college was "a test by fire" and an opportunity to dem-
onstrate one's true measure, a latter-day challenge of the sort his ances-
tors confronted in taming the thick frontier woodlands a century before.
Vinson's prescription for success in college was to remain true to one-
self and not go along with the crowd. "When a young man enters col-
lege he is thrown, to a large degree, upon his own resources and ofttimes
one with a weak character considers it is necessary for him to do things
in order to be one of the boys and not show that he is unaccustomed to
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such things," he wrote to a young man going off to Centre in the 1920s."
The "weakling succumbs to temptations because it is the course of least
resistance," but those who resist construct "a stronger character with
which to wage the battle of life." He closed by advising, "Don't do any-
thing that you would not do if you were at home."23
Vinson was also determined to prove, in the course of his "test by
fire" at Centre, that his talents transcended the classroom. Playing base-
ball, a passion of his since childhood, was a natural extracurricular ac-
tivity; he also played varsity basketball. But trying to be what in today's
parlance is called a student athlete did cause Vinson anguish over whether
he should divert attention from his studies. In fact, his friend Hager said
he had difficulty persuading Fred to return to the 1909 Centre baseball
team after he quit to devote more time to his courses. He did return, and
for three seasons was Centre's star shortstop—two as team captain.
Diederich, who played on the 1909 and 1910 teams, said what Vinson
"lacked in weight, he made up in spirit and fight; he pulled many a game
out of the fire by his superb fielding and timely hitting."24
Vinson believed that a decision forced upon him in the spring of
1909 while a member of the Praying Colonels baseball team marked the
transition from boyhood to manhood for him. The team was scheduled
for a week's trip to Virginia and North Carolina ending on the eve of
Vinson (second row, third from right) on Centre College's 1909 baseball team. (Centre
College yearbook.)
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Vinson family portrait. In the front row, from left to right, are his brother Robert, his
mother Virginia, and father James. Vinson is flanked by sisters Lourissa, left, and Geor-
gia, right.
final examinations. Vinson said he "wanted to go so bad I could taste it,"
but he had also promised his mother that he would win the aforemen-
tioned Ormond Beatty Prize. Another student was close to him in class
ranking, and any misstep during finals would cost him top honors. "I
finally decided to make the trip and win the prize as well or break a
hamstring," Vinson said. He took his books with him, studying on the
train and between games; he passed the finals as fluidly as he had fielded
and batted the ball during the road trip and, of course, kept his promise
to his mother.
After obtaining his undergraduate degree in 1909, Fred entered
Centre's law school in accordance with his mother's wishes, but he con-
tinued playing baseball and even flirted for a time with the idea of mak-
ing it a career.25 During the summers he earned money to help pay for
his education by playing throughout Kentucky and West Virginia, and in
the spring of 1911, just before graduating from law school, he actually
signed a contract to play professionally for Lexington in the Blue Grass
League.
In the end, however, the influence of Virginia Vinson prevailed. As
Fred put it, "I loved baseball, but I did not continue in that field." He
said he loved his mother more and that he "had confidence in her judg-
ment that I ought not get side-tracked from the legal profession."26
As might be expected, Vinson stayed on track during law school,
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Vinson, upper right, on the 1911 Centre College basketball team. (Centre College year-
book.)
finishing the two-year program as the leader of his class with a grade
average of 98.5 percent. He won both the Jacobs Junior and Senior Law
Prizes for his top grades and the Bobbs-Merrill Prize in his senior year
for preparing the best legal brief. His achievements are even more re-
markable considering that he held various part-time jobs and continued to
be heavily involved in extracurricular activities. He worked as a teaching
assistant in history and mathematics at the college, as law librarian, as a
special tutor, and as a teacher in the college preparatory school in Danville.
In addition, he was an editor of the law school's journal, the Basilisk;
president of the Deinologian Literary Society; president ofYe Round Table,
a discussion group; an officer in the Proctor Knott Debating Society; and
a member of Phi Delta Theta fraternity. He was on the baseball team both
of his years in law school and on the basketball team his last year.
Fred had packed in all he could in the tight space of three years at
Centre because it was his nature, as he explained in a letter to a friend,
"to speed up things. I have been hurrying all my life. In school I felt I
had to get out in a hurry and, as a matter of fact, on account of the money
situation did have to speed it up." After college, Vinson added, he was in
debt and "had to hurry in order to get that paid off, but more particularly
because of wanting to ripen into a lawyer quickly."27
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At the age of twenty-one, his formal education completed, Fred M.
Vinson returned to Louisa to practice law. His time at Centre, Vinson
readily acknowledged, had been crucial in building a foundation for what
was to come. When he arrived at Centre, Vinson said, "I was painfully
shy and suspicious of anyone who wasn't kin to me." However, the people
of Danville and the faculty and students at Centre "treated me like a
person, wooed me out of myself, and taught me to let go and try my
wings in varied activities. Above all, I learned to love and enjoy people.
Without that life is pretty empty and vain."28
In the ten-year period from 1911 to 1921, Vinson continued spread-
ing his wings, but his pace was less frenzied than it had been at Centre
when he was driven by the need to prove his mettle in that "test by fire."
Now it was time to settle in and enjoy the fruits of such arduous efforts.
In his law practice—first in partnership with Forrest Lee Stewart, an
older, well-established Louisa lawyer, and then on his own—Vinson built
a reputation as an honest, hard-working attorney, handling the typical
small-town workload of deeds, negligence cases, and wills. He also ac-
quired a reputation as the town's best checker player, according to W.E.
"Snooks" Crutcher, a towheaded youth in Louisa at the time. Crutcher,
who later became publisher of the Morehead News and several other
eastern Kentucky papers, noted that throughout his life Vinson was de-
termined to be the best at whatever he tried, even if it was just checkers.
He reigned as the king of the checkerboard at John Justice's barber shop,
where he waged many hard-fought duels with the shop's shoeshine man,
also an accomplished player. The matches, of which Vinson generally
won two out of three, always drew a crowd because they were consid-
ered "the best game in town," Crutcher recalled.29
Besides checkers, Vinson also frequented the barber shop to indulge
in the twenty-five-cent special, which consisted of a hot bath, a haircut,
hair tonic, a shave, and a massage. Crutcher said it was the usual prac-
tice of Vinson and other "sporty men in Louisa" to bring fresh clothes to
the barber shop and then change into them after being treated to "the
works."
Vinson's sole try for public office during the decade came in 1913
when he persuaded the Louisa city council to make him city attorney.
An older attorney in town, Henry Sullivan, also wanted the position, but
Vinson, who was dogged in every pursuit, made the council an offer it
could not refuse. He promised to forgo the fifty-dollar-a-month stipend
the job paid and instead be compensated by collecting the five-dollar
attorney fee levied in criminal cases in police court.30 By a margin of
16 / Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky
one vote, Vinson was elected city attorney, a position he held for only
one year. During this period Vinson also tried his hand in commerce,
becoming a silent partner in a short-lived wholesale grocery business
concern, and he played shortstop for Louisa's semiprofessional team.
Crutcher, who was batboy and water boy for the team, noted that Vinson
"played baseball with his brain as much as with his physical body." He
studied opposing pitchers so he could advise his teammates "whether
the other pitcher had a curve ball, fast ball or so forth and whether he
was wild and should be waited out."31 Vinson's semipro playing days
lasted until 1916.
For the next five years, with the exception of the war years, Vinson
mainly concentrated on his law practice. When the United States en-
tered the war in Europe in 1917, Vinson registered for the draft but was
rejected twice for being underweight. He then became active on the home
front, giving public speeches to promote government bond drives and
Red Cross appeals as well as donating liberally from his own modest
earnings to such causes.32 By August of 1918, he was judged suitable for
service and was sent to Camp Zachary Taylor south of Louisville for
basic training. In late October Vinson was assigned to officer training
school at Camp Pike in Arkansas, but before he was able to complete the
course, the war ended; he was discharged in early December and re-
turned to Louisa. Although his stay in the military was brief, the impres-
sion Vinson made on at least one fellow trainee at Camp Taylor was
long-lasting. "The short session of army life was enjoyable . . . and I
have always counted myself fortunate in having had the pleasure of know-
ing you," Harry E. Ritter of Cincinnati wrote to Vinson nine years later.
"Notwithstanding the fact that I have not seen you since the day I was
transferred from the old 9th Company Depot Brigade, you very often
play prominently in my periods of reminiscence."33
When he launched his political career in earnest three years after his
discharge, Vinson demonstrated that he could captivate voters in much
the same way as he had his fellow soldier. In 1921 he was elected com-
monwealth attorney for the thirty-second judicial district of Kentucky,
an area comprising Lawrence, Elliott, and Carter counties. In winning
in this nominally Republican district, Fred had help from someone he
and his brother Bob had befriended during their youthful days as jail-
house patrons. "Our kindness to those men wasn't always bread cast
upon the waters," Bob said. He explained that he and Fred used to slip
tobacco to an inmate named Bob Neace, who had been charged with
murder but was acquitted during his trial by reason of self-defense. "He
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told me he'd never forget us," Bob recalled. By the time Fred ran for
commonwealth attorney as a Democrat, Neace had become an influen-
tial figure in local Republican politics. Bob went to him to remind him
of his pledge. "I told him that Fred—no question about it—was the best
possible candidate, and would make us all proud of him some day. And
I asked Neace if he'd vote for Fred and ask his friends to do so. Neace
did so."34 The intervention apparently helped. Fred won by a margin of
857 in a race that had gone to the Republican candidate in the previous
election by more than 1,250 votes.
At the time, commonwealth attorneys could hold office and con-
tinue practicing law, so Vinson conducted the state's business and his
private practice from the same offices in a Louisa bank building. "Snooks"
Crutcher, who had been batboy for the town's baseball team, became
Vinson's office boy and protege. It was one of the most exciting experi-
ences of his life, said Crutcher. His main task was to clean the offices
every day, but he also had the opportunity to witness the parade of local
and state politicians filing in to see Vinson and was able to soak in
Vinson's discussions of cases and courtroom strategies.35
As the state's prosecutor for the three-county district, Vinson be-
came known as a hard worker with a good legal mind and an advocate
who argued his cases "with bulldog tenacity." Occasionally, though, his
fervency got the best of him. For example, an argument between Vinson
and another lawyer before Judge Allen N. Cisco of Ashland got so per-
sonal and vindictive that the judge imposed a five-dollar fine on each
and even threatened to lock them up. As he was lecturing the two young
attorneys, the judge noticed tears streaming down Vinson's face. A few
minutes later Vinson arose, paid his fine, and humbly apologized to the
court.36
Vinson liked to use humor and ridicule when defendants in the as-
sault and homicide cases he prosecuted pleaded self-defense. In his sum-
mations, he told juries a story about two drunkards taking a dead man to
a bar, propping him up between them, and ordering drinks. When their
binge was over, they left and told the bartender their friend would pay
the bill. When the bartender asked the dead man to pay and got no re-
sponse, he hurled a bottle at his head. The police arrived, found the dead
man and the broken bottle, and arrested the bartender for murder. "And,"
Vinson would tell juries, "the bartender pleaded self-defense, loudly
protesting that the deceased, with rage in his eyes, had rushed towards
him with a bottle."37
It was obvious at the time, according to Crutcher, that Vinson was
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destined for higher political office. He recalled political leaders "from
all over the county and neighboring counties" visiting Vinson to urge
him to run for Congress. When he was ready to pursue that next political
plateau, two trials in particular proved beneficial, because they made his
name more widely known in the region. The most publicized proceed-
ing Vinson prosecuted during his two-year tenure as commonwealth at-
torney was the Duvall-Biggs murder case of 1922. Several relatives of a
Grayson, Kentucky, physician, who had been murdered, were charged
with seeking revenge on the alleged killer by hiring a professional hit
man named Dominique Guerdini from the Chicago Black Hand gang to
settle the score. The target of the plot was fired on from an ambush but
was not killed. Thereafter, Guerdini and four members of the Biggs family
were arrested and charged with attempted murder. As a result of Vinson's
prosecution, both Guerdini and Jack Biggs, the slain man's brother, were
sentenced to eight years in prison. The court of appeals reversed Jack
Biggs's conviction and in doing so delivered a stinging critique of
Vinson's closing statement to the jury in the Biggs trial. In his summa-
tion, Vinson had said the Biggs family had threatened him and Guerdini.
The appeals court, however, asserted that there was no evidence in the
record to support such a claim and concluded that Vinson "was . . .
flagrant in abusing the license allowed to attorneys in arguing their
cases."38
The other celebrated trial was also a murder case, but Vinson handled
this one as part of his private practice. It involved two West Virginia
state policemen who were charged with murdering a Louisa man. The
man's father, a prominent and wealthy Louisa businessman, wanted his
hometown lawyer to help with the prosecution because of his confi-
dence that Vinson could win convictions. According to Crutcher, the
financial arrangement was especially enticing. Vinson was paid $5,000
for just agreeing to take the case, and he was to receive $1,000 for each
year of imprisonment he could get the jury to award, $25,000 if the
policemen got life, and $50,000 if they got the death sentence. The father's
faith in Vinson was well placed, since he won guilty verdicts and the two
men were sentenced to twenty-one years each in prison; as a result Vinson
received $21,000 in addition to the up-front payment.
With a measure of financial stability and some fame as well, Vinson
was now in a good position to cash in by seeking a higher elective of-
fice. But before he embarked on such a course, he had a more personal
ambition in mind. Vinson was one of several suitors competing for the
affection of attractive, bright, and lively Roberta Dixon, the only daugh-
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ter of prominent Louisa businessman Robert Porter Dixon. Although
Fred grew up playing with the four Dixon boys, his relationship with
Roberta, eight years younger than he, was sometimes rocky. Once when
he was home from Centre College, he saw her riding in her pony car-
riage that she was about to outgrow, and Fred teased her by suggesting
that she get out and let the pony ride. Her reaction, she said later, was
one of indignation toward "that fresh college boy."39
Frosty relations had also existed between Fred and his future father-
in-law, because they belonged to rival factions in local Democratic poli-
tics. Dixon, who had been Lawrence County clerk for three terms and
chairman of the county Democratic Party, had attempted to block Fred's
election as city attorney; likewise, Vinson opposed Dixon when he was
up for Louisa postmaster.
Past clashes notwithstanding, Fred ultimately won Roberta's heart
and her father's blessings. The wedding, which took place on January
24,1923, in a private ceremony in the Dixon home, "was a case of a boy
and a girl wiping out a non-shooting feud," Vinson said.40 It was front-
page news in the local newspaper, the Big Sandy News, which noted that
after an extended honeymoon on the East Coast, the couple would re-
turn to live in Louisa.
The couple's stay in their apartment on Main Street, however, would
be brief. Before the year 1923 was out, Fred M. Vinson began a journey
that would propel him from the shores of the Big Sandy to seats of
power and influence in Washington, D.C.—first in Congress, then in the
executive branch, and finally at the summit of the nation's judiciary.
Although he spent much of the rest of his life in the nation's capital,
Vinson never strayed far from the values and traits of his eastern Ken-
tucky roots. He was fiercely proud of being a son of the Big Sandy and
credited whatever success he attained to his upbringing there and to the
legacy of the region's settlers. In a welcoming speech at the 1927 county
fair and homecoming in Louisa, Vinson said the greatness of the Big
Sandy "lies in the character of the people who felled the forests and
populated its territory." It was these God-fearing, law-abiding pioneers,
"of strong, sturdy stock, with minds clear and visions unimpaired," who
opened the way for future generations to take "their proper places in the
CHAPTER 2
The Capitol as His Oyster
"It's right amusing to think about Vinson when we went to Washing-
ton," recalled the wife of Vinson's chief aide, Hubert Hutton, in an inter-
view more than fifty years after she and her husband rode with
Congressman-elect Fred M. Vinson and his wife, Roberta, aboard the
Chesapeake and Ohio number two train from Louisa to the nation's capi-
tal. "We were like four little lost ducks or something up there on the
Hill. We went up to tour around, to see where the Capitol was," Althea
Hutton said. "I suppose Mr. Vinson thought it looked like an oyster and
he would take it."1
As was his wont, Vinson did try to take Congress by storm, but his
ambitions were throttled by the hard realities of the day: Republicans
controlled both houses of Congress and the White House; he was a Demo-
crat from a small state; he was assigned to three relatively minor com-
mittees (pensions, public lands, and flood control); and the prevailing
political mood of complacency in the country, ushered in by Harding's
return to normalcy and continued under Coolidge's presidency, was a
restraint on legislative activism. The period after World War I and be-
fore the depression has been called "a comparatively quiet time" in na-
tional politics as a passive president "made no effort to get his legislative
program adopted by Congress, being content merely to submit it in the
traditional messages and let the legislature take it or leave it."2
Although presidential quiescence might have been the order of the
day at the White House, it was not in Vinson's nature, as he had demon-
strated during his days at Centre College, to be a shrinking violet, even
when he found himself in unfamiliar surroundings. He felt comfortable
being in Congress from the outset of his service there in 1924. In a sense
it was like being back on campus, in that Congress resembled the all-
male, clannish, and competitive atmosphere that had brought out the
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best in Vinson. In Congress, as at Centre, Vinson studied hard to master
mounds of details on a wide assortment of subjects, and he amazed col-
leagues with his uncanny ability to recite complex and detailed infor-
mation on the spot. This genius for mathematics and statistics eventually
won him recognition as the foremost expert on taxation in the House.
The clubbiness of Congress was reinforced for Vinson by his resi-
dence at the Congress Hall Hotel, located across the street from the
House office building. Home to about one hundred members of Con-
gress and their families, the hotel had two dining rooms with reserved
tables for residents and a large ballroom where dances were held every
Wednesday and Saturday night.3 Vinson's favorite form of entertain-
ment at Congress Hall, though, was playing bridge. Writing to old friends
from Louisa about his resumption of the game after arriving in Wash-
ington, Vinson said, "I was green at it, to some extent, but finally re-
freshed my memory."4 For a time Vinson even continued playing baseball,
holding down his old position of shortstop during the annual game be-
tween Democratic and Republican members of the House.
Vinson's chance to advance through the ranks, as is often the case in
politics, was the result of happenstance. The sudden turn in his career,
which propelled him from his position as a state prosecutor in a pocket
of eastern Kentucky to the halls of Congress, had its genesis in the 1923
Democratic gubernatorial primary. Ostensibly, the race was between J.
Campbell Cantrill and Alben W. Barkley, both congressmen at the time,
but the real contest was the struggle for power between the two main
factions of the state Democratic Party, divided in part by the issue of
pari-mutuel betting. Barkley, who opposed racetrack gambling, had the
support of the faction that included Louisville Courier-Journal owner
Robert Worth Bingham. The wing of the party backing Cantrill, a pari-
mutuel supporter, included Bingham rivals James B. Brown, who owned
the Louisville Herald-Post, and Desha Breckinridge, owner of the Lex-
ington Herald. Cantrill won the nomination, but he died within a month
after the primary, leaving the party without a candidate for governor.
The subsequent selection of a replacement by the Democratic State Cen-
tral and Executive Committees, controlled by forces opposed to Barkley,
was virtually dictated by Brown. "That fact meant that factionalism would
remain an issue and that the nominee would be an anathema to Brown's
enemy, Bingham."5 Vinson, who cast his lot with the Brown-Breckinridge
wing of the party, by extension also became anathema to Bingham and
the Courier-Journal.
The party's candidate for governor now was William J. Fields, a
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veteran congressman whose nineteen-county Ninth District included
Vinson's home county of Lawrence and several neighboring ones in the
Big Sandy Valley. When Fields vacated his seat after decisively winning
the 1923 governor's race, Vinson seized the opportunity to move up to a
bigger political playing field with characteristic zeal. He was ambitious,
and he savored an electoral battle in much the same way that he had
relished competition on the athletic field. Vinson often compared poli-
tics with sports, believing that each required careful preparation, hard
work, and a will to win. He also felt that the fight must be clean and that
contestants had to play by the rules. "There is always consoling reward
in defeat when the battle waged was clean fought," he said.6 Vinson, of
course, never intended to lose. He remarked to a friend about his cam-
paign to succeed Fields, "I am in this fight with both feet, and while I
have not been making a great lot of noise, I have been working the situ-
ation out as thoroughly as I can."7 His diligence paid off: he was the
unanimous choice of a district committee to be the party's candidate in
a special election being held to fill Fields's unexpired term. He then
crushed Republican W.S. Yazell of Maysville on January 12, 1924, by a
vote of 15,681 to 5,822, or about 73 percent of the total vote cast.8 Vinson
won every county in the district, but the results from his community
were the most gratifying of all. "No matter what the future may hold in
store for me, success or failure, I will always have the vote of Louisa
and Lawrence County in the Special Election to visualize and warm my
heart," he wrote to a supporter.9
Less than three weeks after his victory in the special election,
Vinson's small entourage, which also included his mother, Virginia, and
Eva Price, who had worked for Roberta's family and was to be the live-
in housekeeper for the Vinsons, was bound for Washington. Over the
next thirty years, Vinson rode the rails countless times between Wash-
ington and the Big Sandy, but doubtless no journey ever matched the
thrill of the one that began on that morning of January 29, 1924. Two
days later, with wife and mother at his side, Fred M. Vinson, who had
just turned thirty-four years old, was sworn in as the newest member of
the Sixty-eighth Congress.
The day after his swearing in, Vinson was on the job, busily reply-
ing to stacks of mail from constituents, writing friends to report on his
activities since his arrival, and poring over documents and reports to get
up to speed on issues before the House. In a letter to Louisa hardware
dealer and friend Ernest Shannon, he wrote, "I have been working pretty
keen and don't know whether I can go quite as strong as I have been
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going or not. Didn't get supper last night until 8:15.""'Vinson was in a
hurry, as usual. In part, his haste to harness the details of his new respon-
sibilities was in keeping with his need to speed things up. But he was
also under pressure to make a mark quickly, because he would have to
face voters again later in the year. Anticipating opposition in the party's
August primary, he set about lining up his campaign structure after be-
ing in Washington less than a month. In a letter to one county official,
Vinson wrote, "I am making preparations for the fight in August and
would like to know whether or not you would be my Campaign Man-
ager in Bracken County." Explaining his strategy, Vinson said, "While it
is thought by many that Mr. [Ryland] Musick will not run I want to start
early on the organization so that we can put him on the shelf if he does
attempt it."11
Vinson's need to establish a political identity for himself quickly
was aided by the decline of strict party discipline, which by the time he
entered Congress had given way to the "force of localism in American
politics," a change that "reflected the growing diversity of interests in a
pluralistic society."12 Thus, rather than being bound to vote for mea-
sures designed to carry out platform pledges, members could instead
give more weight to how their votes would play back home. This devel-
opment, which House Speaker Tip O'Neill would encapsulate years later
in his famous maxim that "all politics is local," was of particular impor-
tance to Vinson because of the strong Republican nature of his district
and because it coincided with his own belief that he should vote in ac-
cordance with the majority views of those in his district. Explaining his
view of his role in Congress to a constituent, Vinson wrote, "As long as
I am permitted to represent the great people of the Ninth District it will
be my purpose to accurately interpret the prevailing sentiment and reg-
ister their wishes with respect to legislation by the votes which I cast in
Congress."13
Vinson got a taste of what was in store for him as a member of the
minority party after casting his first vote on the floor of the House. He
voted against a proposal to reinstate some jobs in federal land offices in
several states, "but as usual, it carried," he wrote in another letter to
Shannon.14 But Vinson, bursting with ambition and ability, was not de-
terred. He was determined to make his presence known, and he chose to
do so by positioning himself as a staunch defender of the "little" people
against the privileged. It was a sure-fire strategy given the tenor of the
times. The Teapot Dome scandal over the secret leasing of oil reserves
on public land to private companies, which was first revealed to the
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general public during Vinson's freshman year in Congress, had become
a symbol of power, influence, and corruption. There were also "revela-
tions of the distribution of some $250 million in graft in the Veterans
Bureau and of corruption in the Office of the Alien Property Custo-
dian."15 By staking his claim to populism, Vinson was not merely en-
gaging in political expediency; rather, he was acting on long-held beliefs.
He enunciated his political philosophy in a stump speech: "I am a Demo-
crat saturated with the idea that the party of Jefferson is the party of the
people, thoroughly imbued with the notion that the Democratic Party
and the principles upon which it stands represent the best interests of the
people." He added, "Since I arrived at the age of accountability—and
even before—I was told that the Republican Party sponsored laws that
legislated money into the pockets of the few, whereas the Democratic
Party had for its foundation rock—equal rights for all and special privi-
leges for none. I am a Democrat by birth, family, and of choice."16
Once in Congress, Vinson saw Andrew Mellon, Coolidge's secre-
tary of the Treasury, and his tax reduction plan for the wealthy as ample
evidence that his descriptions of the two major political parties were
exact. Mellon, the third-richest man in America, was consumed by the
pursuit of wealth and constituted "the dominant symbol of the marriage
of high finance and government."17 Vinson had been in Congress only
two weeks when, ignoring the time-honored tradition that new mem-
bers should remain on the sidelines until they are more seasoned, he
rose to make a twenty-minute speech concerning the tax reduction plan,
which was at the time the biggest item on the legislative agenda. Mellon,
in much the same vein as modern-day "trickle-down" economic theo-
rists, sought to reduce taxes on the rich as a way of stimulating the
economy. Vinson, however, characterized Mellon's proposal as a scheme
for the "ultrarich" that would only "create more wealth for themselves
and their posterity." He urged Congress to adopt an alternative tax re-
duction plan submitted by John Nance Garner, Democratic representa-
tive from Texas, which Vinson said would benefit "the people."
The speech was well crafted and an early demonstration of the ease
with which Vinson discussed and deciphered complicated tax issues.
His presentation even included tax tables that he had devised based on
Garner's plan showing the tax savings for those with incomes under
$50,000 and the extra taxes paid by those whose incomes exceeded
$50,000. Vinson also laced his address with humor and ridicule, and he
managed to get in an aside about Teapot Dome. In a pointed reference to
the clumsy explanations being offered for the sudden wealth of Interior
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Secretary Albert Fall after he granted leases on public lands to big oil
companies, Vinson said that people often got confused when talking
about large sums of money. For example, Vinson said, $68,000 became
"in the minds of some to be six or eight cows." This was the yarn spun
by the manager of Fall's ranch, who insisted he was misunderstood when
he told someone about a gift from oil magnate Harry Sinclair. It was not
$68,000 (sixty-eight thou), but "six or eight cows." Vinson also turned
the tables on Republican congressman John Tilson of Connecticut, who,
in presenting the Mellon proposal to the House, had belittled those in
the lower income tax brackets as "squawkers." Vinson delighted in point-
ing out that in Kentucky there were only 45 people who were not
"squawkers," or those benefitting from Mellon's plan, but there were
69,451 "squawkers" in the state who would gain under the Garner pro-
posal. Then, noting the political import of this imbalance, Vinson said
that if the Coolidge administration continued its "reactionary work in
the interests of 'big money,' all of the good Republicans in Kentucky
will be squawking under the 'rooster,'" a symbol of the Democratic
Party.18
Turning to Mellon, Vinson likened the Treasury secretary to the car-
toon character Andy Gump, whose mood fluctuated between despair
and mirth depending on his shifting financial fortunes. "Andrew of the
Treasury," Vinson said, could be just as mercurial in assessing the
country's financial condition. He said when the bonus bill for veterans
was up for passage, Mellon pleaded with Congress not to pass it be-
cause "the Treasury was depleted." But then "the magician of the Trea-
sury waves his wand, and it is full to overflowing" when there is
legislation "to reduce the taxes of the ultrarich" (2619).
Vinson's speech might not have made much of a dent in the tax
reduction debate, but it did foreshadow Vinson's legislative career in
several ways. The speech signaled that he intended to make tax issues a
main focus of his time in Congress; that he would diligently do his home-
work; and that he was prepared to play hardball, using wit and sarcasm
when it suited his purpose. Perhaps most important, the speech won him
the notice of Garner, who had long made taxation his specialty. He wel-
comed having a confederate with Vinson's grasp of complicated tax
matters as well as someone who could ridicule Mellon, something that
Garner himself delighted in doing. When he became Democratic floor
leader later in the 1920s, Garner included Vinson as part of a small in-
side group "which planned party strategy and tactics in the House."19 It
was an impressive group considering that three of its members, includ-
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ing Garner himself, would eventually become Speakers of the House.
The other two future Speakers that Garner included in his small circle
were fellow Texan Sam Rayburn and John W. McCormack of Massa-
chusetts. Over the years, they too formed close professional and per-
sonal relationships with Vinson.
To make sure that his Ninth District constituency was fully in-
formed about his efforts to defend the "little people," Vinson had fifty-
five thousand copies of his maiden speech reprinted and mailed
throughout the district. One recipient of the mailing, J.H. Testor of
Gilmore, Kentucky, praising the speech in a letter to Vinson, said that
it was "so clear and convincing and of such force of logic that it clearly
demonstrates and exposes the primary object of the Mellon tax bill
and at the same time fully illustrates the wisdom and soundness of the
Democratic tax bill."20
Vinson had little trouble in gauging the direction of political winds
back home when another prominent issue came before Congress in early
1924. This was a bill to restrict immigration from all regions of the
globe except western Europe. In his speech on the subject, Vinson no
doubt reflected the racial bigotry that permeated the country and his
district, which was overwhelmingly populated by Anglo-Saxon descen-
dants. He asserted the superiority of the "old" immigrants of English,
Irish, Scottish, and French stock to the new wave of "undesirable for-
eign hordes, fleeing from an overpopulated Orient, or war-ridden east-
ern and southern Europe." Vinson said that whereas the early immigrants,
because of their shared beliefs and values, were able to forge America
into "the greatest nation on the globe," the "new" immigrants were hav-
ing a divisive effect. "In the vast centers of population we have a
Chinatown; we have a Ghetto; a Japanese settlement; the Czechoslova-
kia, Lithuania, Greek, and Polish colonies and so on ad infinitum," Vinson
said, adding, "Water will not mix with oil, neither will peoples of di-
verse habits, traits and characteristics."21
The House debate on restrictive immigration gave Vinson an oppor-
tunity to score even more points with constituents when he and Repub-
lican representative Fiorello LaGuardia of New York squared off in a
caustic exchange. LaGuardia, fiercely proud of his Italian ancestry and
resentful at the suggestion of Anglo-Saxon supremacy, responded to
Vinson by disparaging the mountains of Kentucky as a place lacking in
schools and job opportunities. He added that an immigrant living in the
mountains of Kentucky would have no chance of being assimilated "be-
cause he will have no opportunity there to learn much of our institu-
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tions. He would certainly have no opportunity there to learn and see a
good example of law and order and law enforcement" (6130).
Vinson, naturally, leaped to defend his state's reputation, saying that
"no finer American type can be found in these United States than those
who populate Kentucky.... From the attitude of the gentleman I am led
to believe that he has never visited our state; that he is ignorant of the
real conditions in Kentucky; that he does not understand the worth of
her great people." He continued, "I challenge the statement of the gentle-
man in respect of the illiteracy of the mountain folk in our state; and if
the gentleman would come with me among my mountain people I feel
sure that he would retract and strike from the Record the maligning
remarks in respect of her great citizenship" (6135-36).
Predictably, Vinson's ardent defense was roundly praised by fellow
Kentuckians and widely reported in newspapers back home. One sup-
porter wrote, "I sincerely believe it strengthened your support wonder-
fully in the Ninth, and heard a great many of the voters in Fleming,
Rowan, and Montgomery counties express themselves as being behind
you, owing to the fact that you made the extemporaneous speech."22 It
was a "masterful reply to Mr. LaGuardia," the chairman of the Demo-
cratic Party in Fleming County said in his letter. "I am exceedingly proud
of the way you are representing the Old 9th."23 In his reply to one corre-
spondent, Vinson said, "It certainly makes me tired to hear people talk
about Kentucky when it is shown that they know nothing about her and
her people." He said such people "think we wear horns, and when I run
across a fellow with that attitude, I want him to know mine are sharp, at
least as sharp as I can make them."24
In addition to standing up for "the people" against the ultrarich and
for Kentucky against haughty New Yorkers, Vinson took up the cause of
veterans, a constituency he was to champion throughout his legislative
career. The first opportunity for him to show his allegiance to this group
came during the spring of 1924 when Congress debated measures to
reward World War I soldiers with a bonus to make up for the skimpy pay
they had received and to increase the pensions for veterans of earlier
wars. President Coolidge opposed these measures on the grounds that
many states had already granted bonuses to veterans and that the nation's
budget could not withstand such a drain on the treasury. Coolidge was
not alone in his opposition. A group known as the Ex-Service Men's
Anti-Bonus League lobbied Congress to reject the compensation bill,
saying that "good business and steady employment will get us more
than any possible bonus." The Anti-Bonus League also claimed that "the
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noise for the bonus comes from a very small minority. The vast majority
of ex-service men are practically indifferent."25
Vinson dismissed the Anti-Bonus League as a tool of the moneyed
interests in New York City and the East. In response to one pleading
from the group, he wrote, "Instead of protesting against this measure, it
occurs to me that your masters should grovel in the dust, if need be, in
petition to the ex-service men in the world war for them to receive this
small token of esteem in which they should always be held."26 Taking to
the House floor on March 15, 1924, Vinson urged that the bonus pro-
posal, known as the Adjusted Compensation Act, be changed so that
veterans could receive a cash award instead of getting paid-up insurance
policies that permitted recipients to borrow up to one-quarter of the value
of their insurance. Claiming that the amount to be paid out was infini-
tesimal compared with the country's financial resources, Vinson said a
cash bonus would be "a symbol of appreciation of the wealthiest coun-
try in the world to its defenders."27 His efforts on this occasion failed,
but Vinson, so sure of the merit of this cause, persevered, and his view
ultimately prevailed twelve years later.28
In yet another display of populist sentiment, Vinson sided with la-
bor in the debate over legislation that would have changed the way dis-
putes between railroads and their workers were handled. Responding to
a letter he received about bills sponsored by Republican Sen. Robert B.
Howell of Nebraska and Kentucky's Alben Barkley, then a member of
the House, Vinson said, "It will be a pleasure to support any legislation
looking toward the securing of fair and reasonable rights for the 'men in
overalls.'"29
Howell and Barkley proposed replacing a nine-member labor board,
established by the 1920 Transportation Act to settle worker complaints,
with four so-called adjustment boards, which would attempt to resolve
minor labor disputes, and a five-member board of mediation and con-
ciliation, which would hear appeals of adjustment-board decisions and
handle major work-related disagreements. Railroads opposed the Howell-
Barkley bill because they felt it gave unions too much power by allow-
ing them to nominate one-half of the members to the four adjustment
boards. Vinson, rejecting that objection, noted that railroads had equal
representation on these boards and that any decision of an adjustment
panel could be appealed to the superior board, composed of five mem-
bers from the public nominated by the president.
Vinson conceded that Howell-Barkley favored labor more than it
did the railroads, but he felt such a tilt was justified because he consid-
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ered the 1920 act as prorailroad. He also backed the measure because,
he said, the industry officials with whom he discussed the bill "admit
that the present Act with the present Labor Board is not functioning.
They further admit that in scores of instances railroad companies have
refused to obey the findings of the Labor Board."30 An old friend from
Louisa who was a railroad union official wrote to express his "fondness
for you for voting right on, the Howell-Barkley Bill." The writer, who
addressed his letter to "My Dear Friend Freddy," also chided Vinson
about the hapless Washington Senators baseball team. "Guess you and
yours are always in the grand stand when your 3rd raters play at home.
If it was not for Walter Johnson I do not know whether I would spare the
time or not to see them."31
Although Vinson's committee assignments—pensions, public lands,
and flood control—were not the sort of plums that normally yielded
great notice, he nonetheless was pleased with his assignments given the
fact that he had come into Congress after composition of the commit-
tees had already been determined. Vinson was especially happy with his
assignment to the Public Lands Committee, which at the time was ex-
amining the claim of the Northern Pacific Railroad that it was entitled to
nearly 3 million acres of wilderness in the Pacific Northwest under an
1870 federal land grant. Coming as it did in the wake of Teapot Dome,
the investigation appeared to have the makings of another scandal in-
volving corporate exploitation of public property. Vinson saw it this way.
Writing to a constituent about the Northern Pacific land grant, he said,
"Its history since 1864 is a long trail of influenced legislation always
inuring to its [Northern Pacific Railroad's] benefit."32 In a letter to home-
town friend Ernest Shannon about the issue, he said, "I am in love with
my work upon the Public Lands Committee, as it's a real law-suit; no
doubt about that."33 The Northern Pacific matter was finally resolved in
1929 when legislation was enacted that removed the disputed land from
the grant and placed it under the protection of the Forest Service.
As important as speeches on the House floor and committee work
were in establishing his credentials as a worthy public servant, Vinson
knew that the primary barometer of his job performance would be how
well he attended to the needs, little and large, of the people back home.
He left no doubt that he intended to perform this duty as diligently as his
others. To one constituent Vinson wrote, "It has been my purpose to give
thorough consideration to the wishes of my people in the Departmental
work [casework] and I am very glad that in most instances I have been
able to secure the result sought."34 Responding to a letter from a friend
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in Louisa, Vinson wrote, "[I] noticed your statement 'keep your sleeves
rolled up to help us.' I was pleased to know that you realized that they
were always rolled up and didn't have to be rolled up."35 Although the
era of big government, ushered in by Roosevelt's New Deal, was still
nearly a decade away, people in the early 1920s nevertheless looked to
Washington and their congressmen to help solve problems. As fellow
Kentuckian and future Supreme Court colleague Stanley Reed wrote to
Vinson when requesting information about changes in the bankruptcy
law, "the wants of constituents flow on forever."36
If the flow ever bothered Vinson, it did not show; keeping with up
the steady stream of letters from constituents and other correspondents
was such a high priority for him that he spent five thousand dollars of
his own money to supplement his secretarial staff with additional steno-
graphic and clerical help. Requests flowing into Vinson's office ranged
from the routine to the complex, from the trivial to the traumatic: county
agents requesting farmers' bulletins published by the government; the
unemployed wanting government jobs; government workers dismissed
for various reasons trying to get reinstated; ex-servicemen seeking to
have dishonorable discharges reversed; parents of an asthmatic boy want-
ing weather information for the southwestern states; school children
asking for the names of Cabinet members; and a woman seeking com-
pensation for damages Union soldiers caused to a hotel she and her hus-
band owned in Louisa during the Civil War.
Supplicants also frequently sought personal donations from Vinson
for various purposes, and he tried to comply even if he could only afford
a few dollars. Many of these requests were from churches seeking money
for new pews, church repairs and additions, and even to supplement a
minister's annual salary of $3,000. Vinson gave $25 for the minister's
salary. He also pledged $50 to fund-raising efforts to build a dormitory
at what was then Lees Collegiate Institute in Jackson and another $50 to
help fund a campaign to get Mammoth Cave designated a national
park. Beginning in 1924, Vinson received annual requests from octo-
genarian Henry M. Hutchinson of Elkfork for a birthday present. For
his eighty-first birthday in 1924, Vinson sent a knife as requested and
then checks for $2 in following years. He was asked for a $50 loan by
one correspondent, though Vinson could only send a check for $25 "in
view of the present status of my bank account."37 On another occa-
sion, Vinson was unable to help a woman seeking to raise $100 to buy
her daughter a piano. In his typical gentle way, Vinson responded that
he had "found it necessary to deny myself the pleasure of making con-
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tributions of this character, much as I would like to do so were I finan-
cially able to do it."38
Vinson's benevolence also was evident in his correspondence to in-
dividuals whose troubles he had seen reported in the local press. For
example, he wrote to a pastor in Louisa, "I notice in the News that you
have been confined to your home several days by illness. I trust... your
condition is materially improved and that you will soon be restored to
your normal condition."39 To a woman in Mt. Sterling, Vinson wrote, "I
saw in the Sentinel-Democrat where you had suffered a painful burn,"
adding that he hoped "no serious results will ensue therefrom."40 Vinson
was also solicitous when a colleague in the Kentucky House delegation,
Tenth District Republican John W. Langley, encountered difficulties.
Besides contracting an illness, he had been found guilty of selling and
transporting whisky illegally. Writing to thank Vinson for his expres-
sions of concern and good will, Langley said he had known members of
the Vinson family since boyhood, and "while they have practically all
been on the other side from me politically, they have been my warm
personal friends, and I have always held the memory of our friendship
in the highest esteem, just as I do now the knowledge of yours."41
Naturally, letters also flowed between Vinson and his family. He
was eager for news from home and could never get enough letters from
his parents, in-laws, and friends. "Roberta got a letter from her mother
today which was full of a lot of news, and I certainly wish we would
receive letters more frequently," he wrote to his mother.42 The corre-
spondence with family included the usual tidbits about sickness and
health, work, travel, and the weather, as well as the expression of joy
and sorrow that are inevitable in the cycle of life. Vinson was ecstatic
with the birth of Frederick junior on April 3, 1925. He wrote to a friend
about his newborn son, "That boy of mine is a hum-dinger. I have given
up all notion of practicing law, attending Congress, or attempting to
realize any ambition that may be smoldering within my heart. That boy
has buffaloed me. Honestly, I just love him to death. I can sit and hold
him by the hour or watch his every movement with real genuine joy."43
As the health of his father started to deteriorate in early 1927, Vinson
wrote his mother that a visit to Hot Springs, Arkansas, "would be a great
trip for him. The question of diet would help, the change of scenery,
etc., and moderate baths would be of great benefit to him." Vinson told
his mother not to worry about costs, because he "would be more than
glad to meet all of the expenses incident to his trip."44 Jim Vinson did
seem to respond to the therapy at Hot Springs, but back in Louisa in
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early June of 1927 he suffered a stroke while at the post office, lapsed
into unconsciousness, and died a few days later at age seventy-one.
On occasion, Vinson's letters home contained items of a more prac-
tical or political nature. Vinson's father-in-law, Robert Dixon, told him
in a letter of a land purchase he was making with Ernest Shannon and
offered to let Vinson in on the investment. "Of course, I want in on that
deal if you boys are good enough to let me in," Vinson replied.45 In one
letter to his mother, Vinson advised her how best to handle the sale of
some property. In another he asked her to do some spadework in case he
was opposed for renomination: "Go to my office and look in the big
drawer on the right-hand side of the chair usually occupied by me and
get the pencil tablet sheets upon which appear the names of all those
persons who voted at my special election," he requested.46 Vinson was
upset at the prospect of opposition in the party's August 1924 primary,
because he felt his freshman performance in Congress had been strong
enough at least to ward off a challenge from within. His pique is obvi-
ous in an exchange of letters with his friend Dick Chiles, a Mt. Sterling
attorney, about the probable primary race against Ryland C. Musick of
Breathitt County. "At times I get thoroughly disgusted with the political
game," Vinson said in one letter.47 And when Chiles wrote that in his
candid opinion Musick "will make a strong candidate,"48 Vinson re-
sponded with self-pity: "I have worked mighty hard to serve the district.
. . . Most of the work not being of a legislative nature. I find that my
friends misunderstand me, and that hurts."49
But Vinson was not one to brood for long. Regardless of the chal-
lenge or difficulty he faced, he did what he had to do. Writing to his
father-in-law, Vinson said, "I have bought a mimeograph machine and
we intend to turn out the stuff here enough to beat Mr. Musick. It will be
our aim to spread more ink than his blotters can absorb."50 He certainly
made good on that claim. In a letter to a supporter, Vinson noted that his
office was sending out "sixty thousand Immigration speeches within the
next few weeks and also same number of speeches on Kentucky. Ten
thousand letters will go out next week to the veterans of the World War."51
He also blanketed the district with a "My dear friend" form letter that
outlined the reasons he should be the party's choice in the primary. Vinson
noted his electoral prowess in the special election by sweeping the dis-
trict, carrying even the traditionally Republican counties of Lawrence,
Boyd, Carter, Greenup, and Lewis. Furthermore, he wrote, "I have tried
hard to perform true service. Hundreds of people who have made re-
quests of me know that this statement is true." Vinson also reminded
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voters that when the good name of Kentucky "was attacked in the slan-
ders of the New Yorkers, I faced them on the floor of the House, and did
my best to put them to shame." He said the main question to be an-
swered in the primary was, "Are you satisfied with my record in Con-
gress?"52
When the first session of the Sixty-eighth Congress adjourned in
early June, Vinson was free to return home to discuss that record face-
to-face with voters. He hit the campaign trail that summer in a Model T
Ford loaded down with campaign posters and three-by-five candidate
cards, which carried his picture and election information on one side
and a laudatory editorial from the Big Sandy News on the other. Happily
by his side on these electioneering jaunts was "Snooks" Crutcher, his
loyal office boy when he was commonwealth attorney. Crutcher called
the experience "the greatest thing that ever happened to me in my boy-
hood. I sat on back porches and listened to him discuss the race with the
leading politicians of each county. Of course, all of this was fascinating
and I guess my only regret then was that I wasn't old enough to vote for
Fred Vinson."
Crutcher's recollections of his travels provide an instructive view of
Vinson the campaigner. He recalled that Vinson "had a great ability to
get his point over whether he was talking to a farmer, a miner, a store-
keeper or one of the county or courthouse political leaders." Vinson's
"memory for names and faces was perhaps his greatest asset in politics
throughout his life." It was an asset that Vinson worked hard to perfect,
Crutcher said, noting that as they traveled between stops he would hear
Vinson "mumbling to himself in his assimilation of faces and names."
He described how Vinson schooled himself: "Say a fellow was named
George Wilson, he would say to himself, 'George Wilson, he's a farmer
and usually votes Republican, wears overalls, almost bald, wife's name
Mary, two daughters in grade school, one little boy.'" Crutcher said Vinson
repeated the facts until they were embedded in his memory. "And you
could just bet your last dollar that if Fred Vinson saw George Wilson or
Mrs. George Wilson again that he would remember them and he would
call him or her by their first name."
Vinson stopped at every crossroads store in the district, "sort of the
meeting place of the community" and "of course the best place to cam-
paign," Crutcher recalled. While the candidate was busy politicking at
these stops, Crutcher made sure campaign material was displayed and
distributed. He always asked store owners for permission to put up some
Vinson posters and was never refused. "I always put the posters in the
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best places and I secured them real good as Mr. Vinson had instructed
me to do," Crutcher said. He also passed out candidate cards to every-
one in the store and left a stack of thirty or forty beside the cash drawer.
In addition, Crutcher was responsible for getting posters nailed to road-
side trees and poles. "I would jump out of the car and scramble up the
bank and tack up a poster," he said. "I generally tacked up one on each
side of the tree or the post so that you could see them both ways."
Crutcher noted that Vinson made "at least one speech in every court-
house in the district and sometimes we'd return to one county four or
five times, particularly if he thought he was having trouble or if he could
strengthen his position." Most of the campaign trips were daylong ex-
cursions, but when it was not possible to get back to Louisa, Vinson
insisted on paying for rooms at a boardinghouse or hotel instead of ac-
cepting the invitations he received to stay at someone's home. He felt
that if he accepted the hospitality of one family, others whose offers he
could not then accept might feel slighted. "That was one of his cam-
paign rules," Crutcher said.53
The long, hot summer of campaigning paid off. Vinson won more
than 70 percent of the primary balloting and outpolled Musick in every
county but three—Musick's home county of Breathitt and Montgomery
and Robertson. In the fall Vinson was elected to his first full two-year
term in Congress by defeating his Republican challenger, George
Osborne. He had a vote total of 45,899, or 54.5 percent of the total cast,
compared with Osborne's 38,295, or 45.5 percent. Although this race
was considerably closer than the special election earlier in the year,
Vinson nonetheless was gratified because he had bucked the Republican
tide that returned President Coolidge to the White House and increased
the GOP majorities in both houses of Congress. Coolidge carried Ken-
tucky over Democratic challenger John W. Davis, and the state would
now have two Republican senators for the first time in history when
political newcomer Frederic M. Sackett of Louisville defeated incum-
bent Democratic senator A.O. Stanley. "Things certainly went to rack,"
was Vinson's blunt assessment about the election. "It is remarkable that
the Republicans did not make greater gains in Congress in view of the
landslide," he wrote to a friend. "We are hoping to gain control in 1926.
As you know, they only captured twenty-three seats from us in the
House."54
The chairman of the Fleming County Democratic Party, writing to
congratulate Vinson, said he had not written sooner "on account of be-
ing depressed" with the election results. He listed several factors that he
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thought contributed to Coolidge's victory in Kentucky and the overall
poor showing of Democrats: "We had no money. The Republicans had
all that they could use. I had only $60.00 at my disposal to finance our
Campaign. On account of the KKK we had the assurance of the sup-
port of the colored voters, which they did not deliver, but voted the
straight Republican ticket as usual. The KKK also supported the Re-
publican Ticket."55
Although the election had been a disaster for Kentucky Democrats,
Vinson, by bucking the GOP tide, had again demonstrated his potency
at the polls. In less than a year's time, he had faced voters of Kentucky's
Ninth Congressional District on three occasions—in a special election,
a primary, and a general election—and each time he had won by deci-
sive margins. This achievement did not go unnoticed. In early January
1925, a commentary in a newspaper published in Mt. Sterling called
People and Politics included Vinson in its list of up-and-coming Demo-
cratic politicians in Kentucky who might be ripe for picking as the party's
nominee for governor. Though flattered by the suggestion, Vinson, as
the year 1925 began, was more than happy to be returning to his duties
as Ninth District congressman and to continue building on his budding
reputation as an earnest and effective member of the House.
His efforts in that regard suffered a minor setback in early 1925,
however, when he took to the floor to recite a bit of doggerel he com-
posed after reading a newspaper account about President Coolidge's use
of a mechanical hobbyhorse in the White House for exercise. As Vinson
started to read his poem, entitled "Cal's Hobby Horse," Republican Rep.
Robert Luce of Massachusetts objected, contending that it was a breach
of House rules for a member to ridicule the president. Democrats, in-
cluding Alben Barkley of Kentucky, responded that there was no prece-
dent for denying Vinson the floor. After more heated debate, Republican
Rep. Bert Snell of New York, the presiding officer, ruled that Vinson
could continue. Here are samples of Vinson's poetic effort:
The "hobby horse," 'tis easily seen,
Is as silent as its master;
It trots and canters in one spot,
The "jockey" urging it faster.
But, unlike the horses of old Kaintuck,
Unexcelled for their vim and vigor,
The White House steed will never buck,
And mar the President's "figger."
The Capitol as His Oyster / 37
The reaction to Vinson's poetry was swift and scornful. "It was a
very ill considered effort on your part, one committed in the poorest
possible taste," one person wrote.56 From another critic Vinson heard,
"Shame on a chosen representative of a people, to so far forget the dig-
nity of his position, as to stoop to such a level as you have exhibited in
this."57 Vinson's friend Howard Gumm of Ashland wrote that "a number
of your Republican admirers and constituents are miffed at your comic
stuff. Personally I think your poem had poor meter and again it didn't
mean anything. I am still for you but be yourself Freddie, be yourself."58
Chiles B. Van Antwerp, a constituent from Farmers, Kentucky, wrote, "I
cannot see how such behavior can either increase your own prestige or
that of the state, and district you represent. Such extraneous utterances
have no rightful place in our supposedly dignified legislative halls."59 In
his reply to Van Antwerp, Vinson said he did not think he should be
judged too harshly "for poking a little fun" at the president. After all, he
wrote, "in our little town, the town-folks cuss the Mayor and the City
Council. They, together with the folks who live in the rural districts,
cuss the county Judge and the Fiscal Court. Everybody cusses the State
Legislature, the Governor of the State, and the Congress of the United
States." He also noted that in Woodrow Wilson's last days "the Con-
gressional Record is filled with bitter, caustic communication of him;
statements that he was feigning illness, which held him up to the coun-
try as a liar and a hypocrite."60
The fallout from this incident, though, was brief and inconsequen-
tial. In fact, Vinson's first-year performance in Congress so impressed
party leaders in the House that they tapped him for assignments to larger
and more powerful committees. In the Sixty-ninth Congress he was as-
signed to Military Affairs, a major committee, and in the Seventieth
Congress he won appointment to the Appropriations Committee, one of
the big four in the House. These assignments gave Vinson the opportu-
nity to deal with the more important and complex issues before the House,
and he soon demonstrated that he was clearly up to the task. The "Hobby
Horse" episode notwithstanding, Vinson proved that he did have a seri-
ousness of purpose. He put in long hours of study on the issues before
his committees, crafted legislative proposals, and worked in harmony
with Republicans to get bills passed.
Vinson's assignment on Military Affairs put him in the thick of the
raging national debate in the mid-1920s—precipitated by Gen. William
Mitchell—over the role and future of military aviation. Mitchell, the
controversial champion of air power, had openly accused military lead-
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ers of incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable con-
duct by failing to develop aviation adequately for national defense. He
was court-martialed, found guilty of insubordination, and resigned from
the service. Nevertheless, Mitchell was in a sense vindicated, because
his case spurred the Coolidge administration and Congress to action.
The president, reacting to heightened public concern over the state of
American aviation, appointed a board to investigate Mitchell's charges
and to plot a course for the orderly development of the nation's air
transportation, both military and commercial. The recommendations of
this panel, known as the Morrow Board for its chairman Dwight Mor-
row, essentially became the blueprint for the congressional debate that
followed. Legislation, which eventually was enacted in July 1926,
mapped out a five-year, $150 million expansion program for army and
navy aircraft and personnel and created new assistant secretaries for
aviation in the Departments of War, Navy, and Commerce.
Vinson's work on this legislation drew effusive praise from Repub-
lican W. Frank James of Michigan, chairman of the House Military Af-
fairs Committee. He said, "No gentleman on this committee has spent
more hours in the study of the problems than has he. No member has
missed fewer hearings than he; no member has made any harder effort
to get to the bottom of every problem." In drafting the five-year pro-
gram, James continued, Vinson "showed again and again his good judg-
ment and mental keenness. His speech on the bill was one of the best
made on the subject. It certainly was evidence of his mastery of the
subject, which could come only by untiring efforts."
James had such respect for Vinson's knowledge and skills that he
went against the political grain when he named five members from Mili-
tary Affairs to a joint subcommittee with Naval Affairs to study the issue
of aircraft procurement. Custom called for James to name three Repub-
licans and two Democrats, but he felt so strongly that Vinson should be
on the joint panel that the delegation from Military Affairs became three
Democrats and two Republicans. "I am proud that I selected Vinson,"
James said. "Not only from other members of the committee have I
heard most laudable statements, but I sat . . . in the closing two weeks of
deliberations, and I know that no person had a stronger grasp upon this
situation and the work before them than did he."61
Because of his acumen on the subject, Vinson drafted and intro-
duced legislation creating an Aircraft Procurement Board consisting of
assistant secretaries of the War, Navy, Commerce, and Post Office De-
partments to plan and coordinate all aircraft purchases by the federal
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government. James, calling Vinson's bill "a most important piece of
legislation," said the measure would save money, but more important, it
would prevent a repeat of what happened at the beginning of World War
I when the United States was unable to expand aviation production
quickly enough to satisfy wartime demands. Continuing his salute to
Vinson, James noted that when discussing Vinson's proposal "with a
most distinguished gentleman of this House, he remarked to me that this
bill was one of the most sensible pieces of legislation that he had seen in
many a day." Howard E. Coffin, who was a member of the Morrow
Board, also praised the legislation. "It's a fine job," he wrote to Vinson,
noting that the heretofore haphazard ways aviation matters were handled
prevented Congress from obtaining dependable information and often
engendered distrust and misunderstandings. The creation of a central-
ized purchasing board, Coffin said, "will provide the Congress with a
definite and authoritative point of contact with all phases of aviation,
both governmental and civil."62
During this period Vinson was also interested in military purchases
of a more down-to-earth nature, namely horses. Even at the dawn of the
air age, the old-fashioned cavalry and horse-drawn artillery were still
important components of the army in the 1920s. When he realized that
no permanent legislation existed for the War Department to purchase
the animals for its Remount Service, Vinson, representing a state re-
nowned for its thoroughbreds and other desirable breeds, gladly offered
a remedy.
His bill, which became law, not only gave the War Department au-
thority to buy horses to be used in training cadets at West Point and in
ceremonies; it also permitted purchases for breeding purposes. This fea-
ture of the legislation resulted in a successful partnership between gov-
ernment and the public. The Remount Service loaned out high-quality
stallions—thoroughbreds were used extensively—to farmers and small
breeders, giving them an opportunity to improve their stocks. The pro-
gram ensured that the military had a ready supply of horses that met its
rigid requirements and that horsemen had a way of increasing their earn-
ings by producing a better grade of livestock. The popularity of this
arrangement was evident: by early 1927 there were more than fifteen
hundred requests on a waiting list for stallions.
The cause of veterans, an issue Vinson had staked out as one of his
prime concerns in his first year in Washington, continued to occupy a
great deal of his time and efforts during the 1925-1929 period. In the
Sixty-ninth Congress, he assisted in writing legislation, which Coolidge
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signed, adding $19 million to the budget to increase the pensions of
Spanish-American War veterans. His most involved and protracted work
on veteran-related legislation in the middle to late 1920s involved trying
to get a veterans' hospital located in Kentucky. Writing to the commander
of the American Legion of Kentucky, Dr. S.C. Smith of Ashland, Vinson
reported, "I have been appearing before the Committee and the Sub-
Committee handling this measure, and will leave no stone unturned to
get Kentucky included."63 Vinson and other Kentucky congressmen pre-
vailed only after fighting for the facility in four sessions of Congress
and overcoming the opposition of the chairman of the House Veterans'
Affairs Committee and the indifference of Gen. Frank T. Hines, director
of the Veterans Bureau, forerunner of today's Department of Veterans
Affairs. "A united delegation made it possible for this work to have
been accomplished," Vinson said. "It was secured without the approval
of General Hines and without the O.K. of the Budget. Congress responded
to the needs of our soldiery."64
Naturally, when projects of this type are proposed, communities in
the state designated for the federal largess—a $2.5 million, 250-bed
complex in this instance—lobby hard to have it land on their turf. Thus,
Vinson received correspondence from representatives of chambers of
commerce, veterans' groups, and other organizations throughout Ken-
tucky pleading their case for the new hospital. In response to one peti-
tioner, a director of the Carrollton chamber, Vinson said that although
he would be pleased if the hospital was located somewhere in his Ninth
District, he felt "that politics and influence should not play any part in
the selection of the site." He said the facility "should be located at the
point where it will best serve the afflicted veterans of our country."65 As
it turned out, the veterans' hospital was built in 1931 on a 290-acre ex-
panse of farmland outside Lexington. The facility, serving patients from
throughout Kentucky and several surrounding states, originally treated
war veterans suffering from all types of maladies but eventually con-
fined its work to the treatment of nervous and mental disorders.
Dr. Smith, head of the American Legion in Kentucky, wholeheart-
edly supported Vinson's efforts to get the veterans' hospital for the state,
but he was opposed to a provision in the legislation that required the
Veterans Bureau to provide free hospitalization and treatment to veter-
ans of any war. "I think it very commendable to make it mandatory that
any indigent ex-service men be treated, but feel that it would be class
legislation of a very vicious type, to make it mandatory to hospitalize
those who are able to pay, regardless of the nature or type of disability."66
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In response, Vinson wrote, "I do not like to disagree with my friends
. . . but I think there is an obligation on the part of the Government to its
veterans." He felt the provision was needed because he knew of "hun-
dreds of cases that are actually service connected, but are unable to be
proved to the satisfaction of the Bureau." Furthermore, Vinson was not
worried that the system would be abused or overloaded. Writing to Smith,
he said, "I don't know how you Doctors feel about hospitalization, but
we fellows on the out-side want to stay away from them as long as we
can." In closing, Vinson wrote, "I may be wrong about it, but I would
rather the Government hospitalize several times as many who are not
entitled to it, than to refuse those who are in fact entitled."67
As proud as he was of his work on behalf of veterans, Vinson felt
that the greatest accomplishment of his first stint in Congress was his
effort to provide federal assistance to Kentucky after spring rains devas-
tated a large area of the state in 1927. At the time there was no precedent
for the federal government to appropriate money to rebuild roads and
bridges damaged in a natural disaster. Vinson helped establish that pre-
cedent. Along with congressional colleagues from Kentucky and Gov-
ernor Fields, Vinson argued forcefully and successfully that the
devastation in the state caused by the deluge in late May of 1927 mer-
ited federal assistance. Flooding in twenty-seven counties, including eight
in Vinson's Ninth District, caused the deaths of nearly one hundred
people, left several thousand others homeless, and forced nearly twenty
thousand workers out of their jobs. Damage to homes, coal mines, busi-
ness property, railroads, roads, and bridges was estimated at $57 mil-
lion. More than four hundred bridges and twenty-five hundred miles of
highway in the affected counties were destroyed or greatly damaged.
These counties, Vinson noted, having already reached their constitu-
tional limits on bonded indebtedness, lacked the financial wherewithal
to repair their infrastructure. Ultimately, Congress was persuaded to
appropriate nearly $2 million to Kentucky, an amount that was matched
by a state appropriation. "This fight occupied several months, and I can
say with pardonable modesty that I was in the forefront of the battle,"
Vinson said. "My heart runs over with the warmth of joy when I antici-
pate the benefits that will come to those now living in the flood area and
to persons yet unborn resulting from this effort."68
Vinson was also gratified by his work in Congress on matters af-
fecting water transportation and the coal industry, obvious interests to
him because of his district's location along the Big Sandy and Ohio
Rivers and the economic importance of mining in eastern Kentucky. He
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was especially pleased about his role in getting Congress to adopt the
"recapture clause" when it authorized private companies or individuals
to build bridges over navigable waters. This provision meant that own-
ership of privately constructed bridges was transferred to the public af-
ter construction costs were recaptured and investors received a fair return.
"It was a far-reaching step, protective of the public," Vinson said (5133).
The first use of the recapture clause was in a bill Vinson introduced that
authorized a bridge crossing the Big Sandy at Catlettsburg. An attorney
in Huntington, West Virginia, writing to a friend about this develop-
ment, said, "I feel that our getting this Bridge Bill through the House
was almost entirely due to the efforts of Mr. Vinson." He added that
although he knew Vinson was a man of ability, "I was somewhat sur-
prised to find how much standing and influence he has gained in Con-
gress in such a short time."69 In rapid succession Vinson also steered
through Congress legislation for six other bridges in his district: two at
Ashland, two at Maysville, one at Augusta, and one at South Portsmouth.
Vinson was also instrumental in preventing the Corps of Engineers
from carrying through on its plan to abandon improvements to locks
and dams on the Big Sandy River and on the Tug and Levisa Forks near
Louisa. The corps felt the project was not worth the cost, citing the lim-
ited volume of commercial traffic on these waterways and the fact that
railroads paralleled both the Tug and Levisa Forks. Vinson responded
by publishing an eight-page pamphlet in the fall of 1925 entitled "Pro-
test against the Abandonment of the Big Sandy River Improvement." In
it he argued that repairs and enhancements to the area's system of locks
and dams would spur increased use of water transportation not only by
the large coal fields nearby but also by an oil refinery at Catlettsburg and
by the area's nascent brick and tile industry. Noting the vast savings
possible in shipping commodities by river compared with rail, Vinson
said, "The people of the Big Sandy valley are entitled to benefits which
would accrue to them in the cheapened transportation of its products in
virtue of water transportation."70 Vinson and his supporters won this
round, but by 1950 the corps once again claimed modernization of the
Big Sandy uneconomical and subsequently suspended locking services
on the river.71
In yet another show of support for water transportation and the coal
industry, Vinson, in a speech on the House floor, advocated approval of
a $2 million appropriation to recondition coal-carrying boats for use in
export trade. Calling such an investment a "tremendous benefit to all
coal-producing sections," he said the renovations to the vessels would
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increase trade to the East Indies, the Mediterranean, and South Ameri-
can ports by many million tons of coal.72
As the election season of 1928 dawned, Vinson should have had
every reason to feel confident in being returned to the House for what
would be his third two-year term. During his time in Washington, he had
compiled a solid record of service and achievement by conscientiously
attending to the demands of his position. Vinson, though, was looking
beyond just winning another term in Congress. Another victory at the
polls would solidify his rising-star status in the party and make him a
strong contender for higher office, most likely a run for governor. Such
an eventuality, of course, assumed that he would win his race and that he
could gain the support of both wings of the fragmented state party. On
both scores, Vinson had reason to be both optimistic and concerned.
He knew that the party could unite in the interest of winning. Vinson
saw it firsthand as campaign manager for Alben Barkley's successful
race for the U.S. Senate in 1926 against incumbent Republican Richard
P. Ernst when the two factions put aside their differences. This tempo-
rary truce apparently resulted from Barkley's pledge not to push the
contentious pari-mutuel issue if elected.73 The deep divisions resurfaced
a year later during the party's gubernatorial primary. Democrats once
again were split by the issue of pari-mutuel betting, and again rival news-
paper publishers supported different candidates. Former governor J.C. W.
Beckham, a foe of racetrack gambling, had the backing of the Bingham
faction; pari-mutuel supporters, including newspaper publishers
Breckinridge and Brown, lined up behind Robert T. Crowe, who was
state auditor and former speaker of the Kentucky House. Vinson also
supported Crowe, but he said it was out of friendship, not because of the
pari-mutuel issue, which he dismissed as not being all that important.
When Beckham defeated Crowe, Vinson, who placed a high premium
on party loyalty, made a number of speeches in behalf of Beckham's can-
didacy against the Republican nominee, Flem Sampson. "It is no effort
for me to whole-heartedly support the nominee of my party," Vinson said
in one speech. "I am a Democrat. I believe in party unity. Loyalty and
gratitude are part of my religion."74 Other Crowe supporters, most notably
Breckinridge of the Lexington Herald and Brown of the Louisville Her-
ald-Post, were not so willing to bury the hatchet, choosing instead to op-
pose their party's nominee.75 With the Democratic party again so divided,
it was hardly surprising that Sampson won by a comfortable margin.
Vinson's attempt at peacemaking drew only scorn from the other
side, according to Clay Wade Bailey, a reporter who covered the state
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capital for the Kentucky Post. He informed Vinson that Percy Haly, a
leader in the Bingham faction, had said that "your speeches in the recent
campaign for J.C.W.B. were only speeches for yourself and really hurt
Beckham. He seemed to credit you with having higher political ambi-
tions, and his whole tenor seems to be that of an obstructionist." For his
part, though, Bailey assured Vinson that "anything I hear said about you
will be reported to you, as I hope to be counted as your friend."76
With party paralysis apparently still in the offing, Vinson shifted his
attention to a more pressing matter—his own reelection. Here, the pros-
pects certainly appeared to be more favorable. He had, after all, cap-
tured nearly 60 percent of the vote in 1926 while devoting much of his
attention to managing Barkley's campaign for the Senate. He had also
easily dispatched two primary opponents, and his Republican challenger
in the fall, Elva R. Kendall, a farmer and public accountant from Carlisle,
was little known and had never held elective office. His friend newspa-
perman Bailey confidently wrote after the primary that "the District is
sure to roll up a good, big, Democratic majority for both yourself and Al
Smith."77 The political ground had shifted swiftly under Vinson in two
years' time, however, and he lost his seat to Kendall by nearly six thou-
sand votes. Vinson, so dominant in previous elections, lost in twelve
Ninth District counties, including his home county of Lawrence. His
defeat may have been inevitable, because he had to run on a ticket headed
by the Democratic nominee for president, New York governor Alfred E.
Smith, a man reviled in many sections of the country, the South in par-
ticular, for his ties to the Tammany Hall bosses, his opposition to prohi-
bition, and above all his Roman Catholic religion.
Vinson, usually so cautious when it came to his election campaigns,
assumed an uncharacteristically blithe attitude in the fall of 1928. He
might have had a better chance of escaping the Smith albatross had he
devoted more time to his own reelection effort instead of working on
Smith's campaign as a vice chairman in the party's regional office in St.
Louis. Besides keeping him out of the state for long periods of time, this
position also had the effect of indelibly linking him to a figure that so
many of his constituents considered anathema. Vinson had ample warn-
ing that Smith's candidacy might cause Republicans in his district to
vote the straight party ticket instead of splitting it to vote for him, as
many typically did, and might also cost him among Democratic voters.
Thomas R. Underwood, managing editor of the Lexington Herald,
wrote Vinson in early September with a gloomy assessment of his pros-
pects in Montgomery County, a county he had easily carried in 1926. He
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told Vinson that one hundred Democrats in one church in Mt. Sterling
"are going to bolt against Smith on the dry question and may vote against
you also." He added that "the argument that they are using against you
is that you have turned wet or you would not be so strong for Smith."78
In a letter a few days later, the party chairman in Boyd County, Davis M.
Howerton, gave another pessimistic report, about his county and neigh-
boring Greenup County, again counties that had gone for Vinson two
years earlier. He told Vinson that "400 members of the South Methodist
Church at Ashland had signed the pledge to vote for Hoover. The Ashland
Daily Independent has come out editorially for Hoover and its news
columns are being colored so as to advertise and promote his candidacy
in every way." He added that the "Hoover Women's Club in Greenup . . .
has as many Democratic women as Republican." Although Howerton
was still confident that Vinson could win, he nonetheless appealed to
him to return to Kentucky to campaign on his own behalf. He reminded
Vinson "that in accordance with your policy of safety first your race
must not be overlooked."79 The pastor of the First Baptist Church in
Catlettsburg, W.C. Pierce, wrote to scold Vinson on the issue of prohibi-
tion, saying, "It is a matter of deep regret to me and to hosts of others
that have supported you in the past that you are standing in the present
campaign as you are. I have supported you in the past with the convic-
tion that you were dry and could be depended on as true to the dry prin-
ciple." He closed with, "Why did you desert us?"80
Vinson had not deserted the prohibitionists, but his position on this
white-hot issue was clouded not only by his allegiance to Smith but also
by some erroneous reporting in the New York World and reprinted in the
Western Recorder, a publication of the Kentucky Baptists. The com-
ments in the article attributed to Vinson scoffed at the notion that reli-
gious leaders held such sway over their flocks that they could lead them
into voting against Democrats on the issue of prohibition alone. Vinson
denied ever making such comments, a claim supported by others present
during Vinson's brief conversation with Charles Michelson of the World.
Michelson wrote to Vinson, "I am deeply distressed that I appear to
have misquoted you, but of course on your recital of the matter that
must be the case."81
In a letter to the Western Recorder to set the record straight, Vinson
said, "I have always been, am now, and will continue to be, an ardent,
active advocate of prohibition. I am not just politically dry; I was dry
before I entered the political arena." He noted that he had led the fight in
his home county for statewide prohibition and had never failed to vote
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dry in Congress. Vinson added, "Not only am I dry in theory, but I am
dry in practice."
Turning to his support of Smith, the antiprohibitionist, Vinson ex-
plained that as a member of the Democratic party "because of birth,
tradition and choice" and as a "commissioned officer in its ranks," he
was duty-bound to support the party's nominee and platform. He said,
however, that he would not be persuaded by Smith's views to change his
position: "I will never vote to repeal the 18th Amendment nor to weaken
the Volstead or any Prohibition Enforcement Statutes."82 Four years later,
when Franklin Roosevelt was the party's nominee and the Democratic
platform called for repeal of prohibition, Vinson would backpedal from
that Shermanesque declaration.
Vinson's protestations in 1928 notwithstanding, he could not with-
stand the Hoover juggernaut. The Republican nominee carried 94 of the
state's 120 counties, and five Democratic congressmen, including Vinson,
were defeated. On election night, Vinson was in his law office in Louisa
when he was called to the telephone for news from a neighboring county.
"Looks bad, eh?" Vinson asked. He hung up, turned to those gathered in
his office and calmly remarked, "I'll be damned if I'm not beat."83
And so he was, for the first and only time in his political career.
CHAPTER 3
Rapid Recovery and Rise
Fred Vinson had no intention of just fading away. He hated to lose, and
his personal code of honor required that a defeat be avenged. Beyond
pride, though, were other reasons. He had unfinished business, such as
the passage of a bonus bill for veterans. Most important of all, he de-
sired a return to Washington because he had found his calling in public
service. He summarized his feelings about serving in government in
extended remarks he placed in the Congressional Record on his last day
as a member of the Seventieth Congress, March 1, 1929: "Many people
think that a public official serves merely for the salary. . . . That is far
from true." The greatest reward, he said, "is the knowledge that his work
is well done; that his efforts will benefit the people; that his labor will
make better the land in which we live and perpetuate the institutions of
which we are so proud." Vinson's remarks, which mainly covered what
he considered his achievements during his time in Congress, in effect
signaled the start of his campaign to reclaim his House seat in 1930. He
made that clear in his concluding comments: "In retiring from office, it
is not my purpose to relinquish interest in public affairs."1
Vinson left Washington in the spring of 1929 and returned home to
eastern Kentucky to resume a full-time law practice, but his thoughts
never strayed too far from again being the representative of the Ninth
District. The likelihood of that happening rose as the roaring twenties
gave way to the roiling thirties. The stock market crash in 1929 was the
dark harbinger of the Great Depression, which would convulse the coun-
try for much of the coming decade. President Hoover, who had won the
White House in a landslide in 1928, became for many the most reviled
figure in the land, seeming cold and comatose to the catastrophic condi-
tions of the country. The dramatic reversal of fortune for the president
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and the party in power, the Republicans, naturally increased the possi-
bility of Democratic gains in the off-year elections of 1930.
Vinson, who would have run for Congress in 1930 regardless of
favorable prevailing political conditions, approached the race in his typi-
cal plotting and careful way. He did not want his intentions to be known
until he felt the time was right. Explaining his strategy to a supporter in
late 1929, Vinson said he wanted to announce "as late as possible, mainly
on the account of the fact that I am practicing law, and being an an-
nounced candidate, always cuts in on the do-re-mi, which is a necessity
of life." Nevertheless, Vinson did not want to delay too long, because
that might mean competition in the primary, "which is a lot of worry
and costs lots of money."2
Concern over having the wherewithal to finance his comeback and
earn a decent living led Vinson to move both his law practice and his
family, which by 1930 included sons Fred junior, nearly five years old,
and Jimmy, still a toddler, to Ashland, thirty miles north of his home-
town of Louisa. Ashland, as the largest city in the district, provided higher
visibility to his candidacy and more opportunities for his legal practice.
In Ashland, Vinson easily formed a circle of friends drawn from the
city's legal and business elite who would aid him politically and profes-
sionally. These acquaintances included prominent attorneys John
Diederich, who had been a classmate at Centre College, and Simeon
Willis, a future Kentucky governor; Paul Blazer, founder of Ashland
Oil, a gas and oil exploration and production company that grew into a
diversified Fortune 500 business; Ben Williamson, a businessman who
had served in the U.S. Senate; and B.F. Forgey and James T. Norris,
publishers of the Ashland Daily Independent.
Vinson's best-laid plans to avoid a primary fight in 1930 were dashed
when two challengers emerged. Ironically, one opponent was former
governor William J. Fields ("Honest Bill from Olive Hill"), an erstwhile
political ally whose move from Ninth District congressman to governor
had paved the way for Vinson's first run for Congress in 1924. The other
challenge came from commonwealth attorney William C. Hamilton of
Mt. Sterling. Vinson, always piqued by primary opposition, was espe-
cially agitated by having to battle for a nomination that he felt should
have been his by default because he "went down for my party" in the
GOP juggernaut of 1928. Privately, he disparaged his opponents as fair-
weather opportunists who had declined to run for Congress two years
earlier when "it looked like rain" but wanted into the action now that "it
looks like the sun will shine."3 Publicly, though, he stayed to the high
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road, saying in a statement opening his campaign that the "race should
be based upon the official records of the candidates, and their qualifica-
tions for the service—performance rather than promises. Nothing will
be said or done by me in this campaign that will weaken our party."4
For his part, Fields, who represented the strongest challenge to
Vinson, was not reticent to play hardball. In his opening campaign ad-
dress in Owingsville on June 7,1930, he criticized Vinson as being overly
ambitious and more concerned with achieving personal recognition and
glory than serving the needs of the Ninth District. In this regard, Fields
said, Vinson caused his own defeat in 1928 by seeking and accepting a
campaign position with the national party instead of concentrating his
time and efforts at home. "Vinson sought every available honor, chased
every rainbow in the political sky to the neglect of the district until he let
it go Republican," Fields said. Furthermore, he warned that if Vinson
was returned to Congress, he would quickly leave that office to run for
governor in 1931. "In other words Mr. Vinson is running a double header
with full intentions of discarding the Congressional engine just as soon
as he can reach Frankfort."5
When the primary balloting was tallied, it was clear that the organi-
zation Vinson had built up among Ninth District Democrats during his
five years in Congress and had maintained since his defeat was as solid
as ever. He won overwhelmingly with 17,903 votes, coming out on top
in fifteen of the nineteen counties. Fields finished a distant second with
6,016 votes, and Hamilton had 4,417 votes. The November election,
which pitted Vinson against the man who had defeated him two years
earlier, Republican Elva R. Kendall, was proof positive that Vinson's
political prowess had been restored. He swamped Kendall by a margin
of nearly 14,000 votes—42,671 to 28,850—and won every county in
the district but Carter and Lewis.
Among those rushing to congratulate Vinson on his resounding vic-
tory was Texas congressman John "Jack" N. Garner, the House minority
leader with whom Vinson had formed a close friendship during his pre-
vious stint in the House. Garner had sensed—correctly as it turned out—
that the Democrats would take control of the House once the political
lineup of the Seventy-second Congress was settled. After the 1930 elec-
tions, Republicans still held a 218 to 216 advantage over Democrats, but
as a result of deaths in the following months and the special elections
that filled the vacancies, Democrats gained control of the House by a
margin of 219 to 214. "As you know," Garner wrote Vinson, "the great
ambition of my life has been to serve as Speaker, and I sincerely appre-
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ciate your kind tender of assistance in aiding me in the materialization
of that ambition."6 Responding, Vinson said, "It is almost unthinkable
that anyone would oppose you, but it is always best to keep our weather
eye open." Vinson felt that seven in Kentucky's Democratic delegation,
which now numbered nine, could be counted on to support Garner, though
he noted, "Gregory (William) and Gilbert (Ralph) will probably be alright,
but they are rather uncertain quantities, when it comes to playing the
game." With Democrats holding a majority in the House for the first
time since 1919 and Garner as Speaker, Vinson's second tenure in Con-
gress was destined to be markedly different from his first, when, as he
told Garner, he "chafed over inaction during the five years I served."7
Inactivity would not be a problem for Vinson over the next six and a
half years. It became apparent as soon as the Democratic caucus met in
early December of 1931 to organize the House that Vinson had been
identified by the Democratic leadership as an up-and-comer who was
worthy of being entrusted with considerable responsibilities. As an indi-
cation of this, he was given a spot on the all-important Ways and Means
Committee, an unusual action because his service in Congress had been
relatively brief and nonconsecutive. The committee, which is the start-
ing place for all legislation dealing with revenue and taxation, was cer-
tain to be in the thick of things throughout the thirties as Congress
grappled with the most severe and sustained economic depression in the
nation's history. His work during this period on Ways and Means and as
chairman of a special subcommittee on taxation earned Vinson the repu-
tation of being one of the country's leading experts in tax and fiscal
matters.
Before Vinson started down the road that led to such esteem, he
seriously contemplated taking a detour in his political career toward the
governor's office in Frankfort. The new Congress would not convene
until more than a year after the 1930 election—December 7, 1931—so
Vinson had plenty of time to study his options.8 He had been encour-
aged to enter the gubernatorial race in 1927 but had decided it would not
be in the best interest of the state's Democratic party for him "to muddy
up the waters."9 Now, as another election cycle neared, he clearly was
drawn to the idea of running for governor in 1931, as his opponent in the
primary, William Fields, had prophesied. Less than a week after his elec-
tion in 1930, Vinson wrote James A. Thompson, editor of the Bracken
Chronicle in Augusta, that he was "feeling the matter out for the Gover-
norship. In fact, I think it is in splendid shape for me."10 To Richmond
newspaper publisher Keen Johnson, himself a future governor, Vinson
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stated frankly, "I want to be Governor," but clearly he was proceeding
cautiously. "I really want to know that the folks are behind me, and want
me to run before I enter the lists," he told Johnson, adding, "I am 'watch-
fully waiting.'"11
Throughout the early weeks of 1931, Vinson continued sounding
out friends and party officials about the wisdom of entering the race. In
correspondence with Jouett Shouse, chairman of the national party's
executive committee, he expressed concern that giving up his congres-
sional seat might cost Democrats the chance to take control of the House.
"Possessed with a personal ambition to be the Governor of our State, I
believe that I could be nominated and elected," Vinson wrote. "Yet, I
could never forgive myself, if, with a few days' dead-lock, it would cause
the loss of the organization's fight. Hence, I am between two fires."12 In
his response, Shouse said, "I don't believe you should let this question
(organization of the House) be compelling in your decision." More im-
portant to Shouse was "the propriety, at least the political wisdom" of
being elected to Congress "and then becoming a candidate for another
office before one has even taken his seat."13 The exchange with Shouse
seemed to cool Vinson's ardor for the race after all. Shortly thereafter he
wrote to Maja Eudaley, secretary of the Democratic State Campaign
Committee, that he was not "very hot to run. In fact, I am happy to be
out of the campaign rather than in it."14 To Thompson, the Augusta news-
paper editor, Vinson said, "I would really like to be Governor, and I
believe I could get the nomination in a primary or a Convention. But I
was elected to Congress, and I am going to serve there."15
As he assumed his duties in the House in early December 1931,
Vinson might well have thanked his lucky stars that he was in Washing-
ton, not Frankfort, where events and enemies gnawed "away the foun-
dations of Laffoon's administration from the beginning." The new
governor, Democrat Ruby Laffoon, a judge from Madisonsville, faced a
mountain of economic difficulties piled high by the spreading depres-
sion. He was bogged down almost immediately by a host of nightmarish
and intractable problems, including a shortfall in state revenues of more
than $11 million, rising unemployment, banks and municipalities near-
ing financial collapse, and a swelling number of Kentuckians in desper-
ate need for the basics of food, clothing, and shelter. The political front
was just as stormy for Laffoon, with many of the waves being churned
by his own lieutenant governor, the ambitious A.B. "Happy" Chandler.
From the very beginning of Laffoon's term, Chandler took every oppor-
tunity to challenge and undermine the governor and devoted "his ener-
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gies and the facilities of his office to full-time politicking."16 He had his
sights set on becoming Kentucky's next governor, but having made an
enemy of Laffoon and his forces, he knew that advancement would be
blocked by the governor if the party convention system remained in
place. So when Laffoon went out of the state in early 1935, Chandler, as
acting governor, called the legislature into special session to consider
adopting party primaries. Although his gambit encountered some snags,
the change was made, and Chandler, who won his party's gubernatorial
nomination and then the election in 1935, was on his way to becoming
one of the state's most powerful and colorful politicians of all time.
To help battle the ravages of the depression, Laffoon and countless
other state and local officials like him looked to Washington, but the
prevailing economic orthodoxy of the time, which was embraced by the
Hoover administration, was that there was little the national govern-
ment could or should do about the economy except to keep its own fi-
nancial house in order. The keys to economic recovery, the president
reasoned, were the prudent management of federal finances and a bal-
anced budget. Nevertheless, as the depression worsened, Hoover was
willing to try initiatives such as the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, which Congress, including Vinson, supported. The RFC was de-
signed to stimulate domestic production and consumption by making
low-interest loans to banks, railroads, insurance companies, and agri-
cultural organizations. When such remedies proved inadequate to make
much of a dent in the nation's crisis, the president veered to the left and
signed in July 1932 a massive $2.1 billion relief bill that included $1.5
billion to finance public works construction of income-producing projects
and $300 million in loans to states for direct relief.
At the beginning of the Seventy-second Congress in December 1931,
Vinson was in an even more parsimonious mood than Hoover, but by the
summer of 1932 his passion for fiscal restraint likewise had ebbed. In
House debate over the relief bill, Vinson said, "There are those who do
not agree that hungry and starving Americans should be cared for by the
Federal Government. I would not counsel such legislation except in ex-
tremis." He noted that the "Glass-Steagall banking bill, and many other
bills, have been brought upon this floor and passed," but "everything
that has been done to this good hour has failed to start the wheels rolling
in the right direction."17
Vinson, though, was still fixated on balancing the budget and reduc-
ing government spending when a constituent wrote in the spring to com-
plain that the national government "is spending a constantly increasing
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sum each year" and "will have spent an amount exceeding comparable
figures for 1927 by over ONE BILLION TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY DOLLARS."18
Vinson replied, "I am doing my dead-level best to cut the cost of Gov-
ernment in every reasonable manner possible." Noting that he led the
fight in Ways and Means to reduce spending, he said, "I do not think
there is a question but what the Budget could well be reduced one bil-
lion dollars, but that could only be done after a complete study of the
situation by Congress. We have not had the co-operation of the Execu-
tive Department looking toward the cut. In fact, every one has insisted
that their's must not be cut."19
Taking his argument to the full House, Vinson asserted that Hoover's
proposed fiscal 1933 budget could be even more frugal. "No more whole-
some thing could go to the country than that Congress was cutting ap-
propriations, the executive departments saving money, all of which would
mean a lessened burden upon the taxpayers of our nation," Vinson said.
He claimed that 10 percent, or $242 million, could be cut from Hoover's
proposed budget of $4.1 billion, whereas the administration claimed
that at most only $125 million in savings could be achieved. "The coun-
try demands, and rightfully so, that the expenditures of government must
be decreased," Vinson said. "It is a source of genuine regret to me that
when the executive branch . . . has a real opportunity to practice what
they have long preached, they are not willing to assume their share of
the responsibility."20
One economy measure Vinson advocated, to no avail, was consoli-
dating the administration of the military into a unified department headed
by a secretary of defense with Cabinet rank; there would also be assis-
tant secretaries for war, the navy, and aviation. He estimated that the
consolidation would save $50 million to $100 million a year. In addi-
tion, Vinson said, there would be a "material increase in the efficiency
of the national defense service if there was a single driver at the wheel."
Discussing his proposal on the House floor, Vinson said his experience
on the Military Affairs Committee "fully acquaints me with the failure
of the Army and Navy to coordinate in their functioning for national
defense." The love of power, jealousies, and animosities caused con-
flicts between the army and the navy whether the country was at war or
not, Vinson said. "During the war the Army and Navy were in competi-
tion for the purchase of the same steel. They wrangled over priority of
shipment. For many years they have been haggling over the jurisdiction
of the defense of a coast line, arguing whether the Air Corps of the Army
or the Navy had the duty of coastal defense."21
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Vinson's fiscal fluctuations during 1932 were most apparent in the
area of taxation: he supported on the one hand a sales tax of 2.25 percent
and staunchly defended tobacco against increased taxes on the other.
Vinson joined with twenty-three of his colleagues on the Ways and Means
Committee in the spring to pass what was called a manufacturer's ex-
cise tax, which meant that consumers would pay the sales tax on the cost
of the finished product, not on the retail price. Food and inexpensive
clothing were to be exempt. It was estimated that the measure, whose
lone opponent in the committee was Democrat Robert L. Doughton of
North Carolina, would generate nearly half of the $1.24 billion needed
in new revenue to balance the 1933 budget. The tax proposal created a
storm once it reached the full House, and a bipartisan bloc, led by Re-
publican Fiorello H. LaGuardia and Doughton, defeated it, reviving in-
stead the wartime surtaxes on wealth. Vinson did an about-face on the
sales tax, voting with the majority to strike it from the revenue bill.
There was no retreat on his part, though, when the issue was lower
taxes on tobacco, which was grown on small plots by hundreds of farm-
ers in Vinson's Ninth District and, of course, was Kentucky's premier
cash crop. He used his chairmanship of two Ways and Means subcom-
mittees in 1932 to defend tobacco against additional taxation. He first
made his case for tobacco as head of a five-member panel that crafted an
alternative budget bill to the Hoover administration's proposal, which
called for a one-cent tax increase on a pack of cigarettes, from six cents
to seven cents. Vinson was able to persuade the subcommittee, the full
Ways and Means committee, and the House to eliminate the higher ciga-
rette tax. Explaining the action to a radio audience over Washington,
D.C., station WJSV, Vinson said, "We are convinced beyond doubt that
the point of saturation in tobacco taxes has been reached, if not passed."
Calling tobacco "the largest and most dependable tax source for Uncle
Sam," Vinson noted that tobacco taxes would account for one-fifth, or
$434 million, of the revenue collected by the federal government in fis-
cal 1933, far exceeding individual and corporate income taxes combined.
"The federal government has a direct interest in the consumption of
cigarettes," Vinson said, adding that the treasury collects three dollars
for every fifty packs sold.
Increasing the cigarette tax, Vinson said, "would bring into action
the law of diminishing return, which in everyday parlance simply means
killing the goose that lays the golden egg." Higher taxes mean decreased
sales, he explained, noting that yearly per capita consumption in the
thirteen states that added their own tax to the federal levy was 431 ciga-
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rettes compared with 975 cigarettes per capita for the country as a whole.
Decreased consumption "means a decreased price for the farmer's prod-
uct," Vinson said. "Only when there is a demand for his product can a
fair price be secured." Lastly, smokers pay enough in taxes, Vinson said,
adding, "A man using one pack per day already pays a tax of $21.60 a
year to his government. With the additional one cent per pack his tax
would be $25.50 per year." This tax, he said, "is more than the income
tax required of a married man with a wife and three children, under
existing law, who has a net income of $7,000."22
Writing to thank Vinson for his efforts, D.P. Newell, cashier at the
State National Bank in Maysville, said, "We folks here greatly appreci-
ate the fight you have made in Washington and particularly your assis-
tance in blocking the additional tax on tobacco."23
Vinson got another opportunity to make his case for tobacco in 1932
when he chaired a subcommittee appointed to study double taxation, or
the imposition of taxes on the same thing by federal, state, and local
governments. In a July 6 national radio address on the subject, he said
the "present tax burden is oppressive," adding that "city, county, state,
and nation will tax anything that will yield returns. It is a permitted right
in law, but an unjust exercise in application." He said the committee
hoped, by studying the duplication, overlapping, and lack of coordina-
tion in the tax system, to find ways "to lessen the burden of taxation. In
no sense are we seeking new taxes."
Conveniently, Vinson used tobacco to illustrate the problem of double
taxation, noting there was a federal tax of 6 cents on a pack of twenty
cigarettes and that thirteen states had "invaded this tax field." Arkansas,
for example, levied a 5-cent tax, raising the cost of a pack of cigarettes
in that state to 15 cents compared with 10 cents a pack in states where
there was no additional tax. The combined federal-state tax yield of 11
cents on a pack of cigarettes "is 2,100 percent more than the average
price the farmer received for its tobacco content," Vinson said. He added
that the reverse is also true: that is, that the federal government tapped
sources previously the domain of state and local governments. "In the
recent revenue bill, for the first time, the federal government invaded
the gasoline field, which had heretofore been subject to state taxation
only," Vinson said, noting the imposition of a one-cent-a-gallon federal
tax. "This invasion was made because of the attractiveness and certainty
of yield—which is far from justification of the act."24
A childhood friend from Louisa, then living in Los Angeles, wrote
Vinson that she was "thrilled because at last I am going to hear your
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speech on the tax question of which every-one seems to be so interested
nowdays." She added, "I've seen your name in our papers every now &
then & listened in a few wks. ago to the ball-game [the annual baseball
game between House Democrats and Republicans] in which you were
playing. They said Vinson at the plate & mentioned that you weighed
190 lbs."25 Vinson wrote in reply that it was "good to know that old
friends were listening in, even though the miles separated us. I have
been working mighty hard this session. It has been the most strenuous
session that we have had for many years. However, I feel that I have
accomplished some things that will be of real benefit to my District and
State."26
In releasing the subcommittee's study at the end of 1932, Vinson had
no illusions that its findings would lead to sweeping reforms. Instead he
held out modest expectations that the report would "aid in the scientific
study of our tax problems and throw some light on what the public re-
ceives for their tax dollars" and should serve as a "basis for the intelligent
discussion of the subject of double taxation."27 Although the report called
on federal, state, and local governments to eliminate duplication of taxes,
it pinpointed reducing the cost of government at all levels as the best way
to achieve tax reform. The report said a more equitable distribution of the
tax burden and its ultimate reduction could come through "a judicious
curtailment in expenditures."28 The subcommittee found 326 instances
of duplicate taxation between the federal government and state govern-
ments, an inflated figure because the gas tax, imposed by 48 states, 1
territory, and the District of Columbia, was counted as 50 duplications.
Total tax collections for 1931 amounted to $9.5 billion, with federal
taxes accounting for $2.4 billion, state taxes nearly $2 billion, county
taxes $958 million, city taxes nearly $3 billion, and other local taxes
$1.2 billion. This put the per capita tax bill for Americans in 1931 at
$77.53.29
Vinson also demonstrated support for tobacco through his work on
a voluntary allotment plan contained in legislation proposed in the wan-
ing days of Hoover's presidency. The scheme would have provided a
price-support system for farmers of various commodities, tobacco in-
cluded, who voluntarily limited their production. Under a bill passed by
the House, farmers would have been paid from a fund created by excise
taxes levied upon the manufacturers of their products, for example, ciga-
rette companies for tobacco, meat packers for hogs, and textile mills for
cotton. Vinson's main contribution to this legislation was to get the par-
ity price for tobacco changed. Originally, it was to be equal to the aver-
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age price over the 1909-1914 period, or 10.5 cents a pound. Under his
amendment to the bill, the period used was changed to 1909-1918, which
raised the average price to 14.5 cents.
Raising objections to the legislation in a letter to Vinson, one Ken-
tuckian wrote, "I have discussed the proposed plans for agricultural re-
lief with a great many intelligent people, and the almost unanimous
opinion is that the Domestic Allotment Plan, or any similar plan is abso-
lutely unsound." The writer opposed the plan because he believed it
would result in higher prices for consumers because manufacturers would
simply pass along their increased costs and because the plan "would be
very difficult to administer thoroughly or justly."30 In his reply, Vinson
countered that the proposal would have a rippling effect throughout the
economy. "If you can get an increased price to the farmer, they will have
increased purchasing power, increased purchasing power means increased
production of the manufactured article. That means wages for men with
which to purchase commodities. You can buy the farmers products and
other manufactured products and you have an endless chain." Acknowl-
edging that some might think the proposal "very radical," Vinson added
that "we are in an unusual condition and unless something is done to
increase purchasing power, there is no hope for us."31
The House passed the allotment plan in the lame-duck session of
the Seventy-second Congress, but the Senate failed to act upon the mea-
sure. Farm relief would have to wait for Roosevelt and his New Deal.
Coal, another vital Kentucky commodity that had fallen on hard
times, also commanded Vinson's attention in 1932. In arguing that the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930 be amended to stimulate foreign trade,
Vinson blamed higher duties imposed by the legislation for causing ca-
lamity in the state's coalfields, and he chided Republican Charles Finley
of Kentucky's Eleventh Congressional District for supporting Hawley-
Smoot. "I am astounded that he could defend the . . . tariff bill or his
party for acts . . . that have so detrimentally affected his district. He
represents a great coal district. Its money crop is coal. This great indus-
try in Kentucky is paralyzed, lying prostrate . . . with thousands of the
constituents of the gentleman . . . at this moment hungry for work and
food." He noted that "American commerce has been shut out from many
markets of the world" because other countries raised their own tariffs in
retaliation for Hawley-Smoot. Therefore, Vinson said, it was "of the high-
est importance to secure a lowering of foreign tariff barriers, repeal of the
retaliatory tariff measures in order that our commerce, the products of the
farm, mine, and factory, might again move in the channels of world trade."32
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Vinson's efforts in behalf of the beleaguered extended to veterans as
well. His inherent zest for fiscal restraint evaporated when the issue
concerned cash bonuses for World War I veterans, an issue he began
campaigning for during his earlier time in Congress and one he contin-
ued championing until he achieved success in 1936. In 1932, with 2
million veterans out of work, Vinson pushed for immediate full pay-
ment of the previously authorized adjusted service certificates, which
were paid-up life insurance policies collectible in 1945. Such an action
would have required the issue of $2.5 billion in treasury notes, some-
thing the Hoover administration adamantly opposed, as did a host of
expert witnesses testifying before the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee. "If you are not going to couple this measure with a scientific control
of the currency . . . then I would say that it is a dangerous thing to
embark on," warned Dr. Williford I. King of New York University. He
added, "I can see immediately somebody else will want $5,000,000,000
for roads and somebody else will want $10,000,000,000 for unemploy-
ment and there will be no end to the demands to put out money."33 Pro-
fessor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University agreed, saying, "The
minute you break from gold . . . the force of your resistance is greatly
weakened because if you issue $2,500,000,000 and then go off the gold
basis, why not issue two billion more for the farmers, for this class, and
the other class?"34 The governor of the Federal Reserve Board, Eugene
Meyer, said, "The debasing of the currency will, of course, create dis-
trust and disorganization of business, and evils and difficulties so great
in comparison with any that we are now suffering from that I hesitate to
contemplate them." He foresaw Gresham's law—good currency being
driven out by inferior currency—as one effect. "That was the reason for
the great flow of gold to the United States from all over the world in the
early nineteen twenties and the middle nineteen twenties," Meyer said.
"They had inferior currency, and gold left them, and it went to the only
important country having a stable, sound currency."35
Vinson was in the forefront of a heated House debate on the cash
payment issue during mid-June of 1932. He said opponents of the legis-
lation "paint a picture of havoc and near chaos" should the measure be
enacted. "I would remind them that we have already arrived at the brink
of ruin. We have reached this point without any urge from this legisla-
tion." Many of the measures that Congress passed to aid the economy—
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Glass-Steagall, among
others—had helped, Vinson said, but "they are superficial palliative treat-
ment of the disease without getting to the roots of the disease. This mea-
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sure, in my judgement, goes at the basic conditions underlying our weak-
ened economic structure."
To critics concerned about the gold standard, Vinson said, "They
would enshroud the gold dollar with the cloak of divinity and declare to
be heretics all those who would not worship at its shrine. They would
have the country believe that the currency of this country is backed by
gold and that money not so protected is 'fiat' money." But, Vinson noted,
"We do have money without gold reserve." He then proceeded to sup-
port his statement: "On March 31, 1932, our total outstanding currency
was $5,459,085,385. Our total gold reserve held by the Treasury and the
Federal reserve bank was $3,594,694,087. In other words, the currency
outstanding in excess of the total gold reserve was $1,864,391,298." He
then noted that national-bank notes, totaling $700 million, had no gold
reserve and that federal reserve notes required only a minimum of 40
percent in gold reserve. "My friends," Vinson said, "the fact that the
gold reserve of this country will support expansion of the currency ad-
mits no argument. The mere statement of the amount of gold used as the
reserve of the Federal reserve notes shows beyond contravention that an
expansion of currency can be had."
Continuing, Vinson said, "There is never any argument about how
to get money or where to get it when the direct interests of the big inter-
ests is involved. When human rights become involved, then immedi-
ately the vested interests strike out, hitting in every direction all those
who stand in their way." He said the $26 billion in war expenses, the $3
billion to war contractors, $2 billion to the railroads after the war, and
the billions of dollars to European nations in the form of war debt reduc-
tions "certainly inclines me to the idea that this Nation could pay the
adjusted-service certificates."
In closing his fifteen-minute speech, Vinson, who throughout had
relied upon cold, hard facts and figures to carry his argument, made a
stirring appeal to the emotions. "I can not, in my mind and heart, for-
get the boys of yesterday who were the proud defenders of our flag,"
he said. "How many billions of dollars has this country taken from
them in their physical and mental inability to pursue their hopes and
their ambitions?" Soldiers, Vinson said, "did not serve for monetary
reward. Patriotic fire stirred their breasts; love of country imbued them
with a world-admired zeal." Veterans were told that "America would
ever be grateful" for their sacrifices, but now "in a matter which they
are much interested, their names would be defamed, their motives at-
tacked." To applause, Vinson ended by saying, "Before you attack them
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in this forum, boys, remember who they are—lest you forget; lest you
forget."35
The House approved the bonus bill by a vote of 209 to 176, but the
Senate overwhelmingly rejected it 62 to 18. Even if the measure had
cleared both bodies, it almost certainly would have been vetoed by Presi-
dent Hoover.
Veterans from every state had traveled to Washington in the sum-
mer of 1932 to lobby for the bonus bill, and although many departed
once the outcome was decided, some ten thousand stayed on to press
their cause. Their continued presence and agitation led Hoover to order
the eviction of the so-called Bonus Army, which troops under an over-
zealous Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur accomplished with a barrage of tanks,
guns, and tear gas. This rout of a helpless, ragtag band of veterans added
to the public's perception that Hoover and his administration cared little
about the needy and was a major factor in his defeat when he ran for
reelection in the fall.
As Vinson contemplated his own reelection prospects that summer,
he had to be buoyed by a telegram he received on July 13 from his
brother-in-law Robert Dixon, then working in Frankfort as secretary to
the Workmen's Compensation Board, informing him that "Clay, Watson
and Stevens [all of whom had filed to oppose Vinson in the primary]
have withdrawn. These withdrawals have been acknowledged and their
names stricken from book in secretary of states office."37 Vinson's relief
over being spared a primary fight, which would have saved him money
and allowed him to spend more time with his family and his law prac-
tice, was short-lived. A few weeks later came the devastating news that
Kentucky's congressional redistricting law, enacted after the 1930 cen-
sus resulted in the loss of two seats in the House of Representatives, had
been declared unconstitutional by a panel of three federal judges; they
ruled that the new districts were not contiguous and did not equally
distribute the state's population. The effect of the decision, which came
only days before the August 6 primary, was to force congressional can-
didates to run on an at-large basis to be nominated and elected.
Instead of having no opposition, Vinson now found himself vying
for one of the nine nominations in the statewide Democratic primary
with twenty-six other candidates. With precious little time to mount the
meticulous type of campaign he preferred, Vinson nevertheless did the
best he could. He blanketed the state with a form letter that highlighted
his experience and growing influence in Congress and appealed for sup-
port in the name of fairness for his region of Kentucky. Noting that his
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district encompassed twenty counties and nearly three hundred thou-
sand people, Vinson said unless he was nominated, "this vast territory
and great people will not be represented on the ticket."38 Vinson's ef-
forts were helped by favorable newspaper editorials. One in the Cynthiana
Democrat, under the headline "Remember Vinson," urged Harrison
County voters to "search out the name of Congressman Fred M. Vinson,
which they will find eighteenth down the list of twenty-seven congres-
sional candidates, and stamp opposite his name."39 The Carlisle Mer-
cury published a similar opinion with the headline, "Vote First for Vinson
for Congress." The paper said that "the Democrats of Nicholas owe the
cause of able representation in Congress a debt that they should repay
by voting for Fred Vinson."40 "Vinson should be returned to Congress
without fail," said a piece in the Bracken Chronicle, complete with
Vinson's picture and a headline that read, "Has Earned the Support of
All Loyal Democrats."41
Other Vinson supporters also did what they could. A few days be-
fore the primary, a Vinson supporter in Bath County informed him, "The
soldier boys are 100 per cent O.K. and have done a good deal of work in
the short time they had since it became known that you would have to
engage in a state wide primary." Another confidant, writing to apprise
Vinson of the situation in western Kentucky, said, "I am going to do all
I can and wish you success. However, do not expect too much as there
seems to be considerable displeasure on the part of the people and they
may not vote."42 One western Kentucky resident, a Hopkinsville banker,
did intend to vote, but before he made any commitments, he had some
questions for Vinson. The questions mainly concerned economy and
efficiency in government. For example, he asked Vinson, "What is your
position on the question of consolidation of Bureaus and abolishment of
others in order to reduce the number of Government employees?" To
this, Vinson replied, "The Congress would have abolished many agen-
cies and consolidated others, if they had had any help from President
Hoover. I favor businesslike administration." The banker also wrote, "If
my memory serves me right, you voted against the recent Bonus Bill,
for which many of us thank you."43 His memory, of course, was faulty,
but Vinson, normally so quick to correct any error in fact, let this one
slip by without comment, undoubtedly worried about losing any poten-
tial voter in the risky statewide race.
The results of the campaign that Vinson and his allies put together
in a matter of days convincingly demonstrated that his popularity and
appeal stretched the breadth of the Bluegrass. He finished first in the
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field of twenty-seven with a total of more than 100,000 votes. In a letter
of congratulations, a Murray State geography professor wrote, "I had
students and friends working all over western Kentucky for you and
Jack May [who finished second to Vinson with more than 97,000 votes].
I talked [about] you two so much that your names became a by-word in
many homes of this region." He closed by saying, "Your election in
November is assured. This is a Democratic year; Roosevelt will be our
next president."44
Vinson took to the hustings to make sure the professor was right in
his prophecy. In reporting on his frenetic campaign activity to House
Speaker Garner as election day neared, Vinson noted, "I have spoken in
ten of the eleven (old) Congressional Districts, and have covered more
miles and made more speeches in Kentucky than anyone in this cam-
paign." In four weeks leading up to the election, Vinson wrote, "I have
not been home but three nights." He told Garner, "Everything looks
good in Kentucky," adding, "I may be wrong but I believe it is going to
be record breaking."43
It was. Democrats captured all of the nine congressional seats, and
Vinson led the pack with 575,191 votes. Roosevelt won in 95 of the
state's 120 counties, polling nearly 60 percent of the vote, and Alben W.
Barkley was reelected to the U.S. Senate, the first time a Kentucky sena-
tor had won reelection in forty-two years. Vinson and the eight other
Democrats would be at-large representatives of the state when the Sev-
enty-third Congress went into session on March 9,1933.46 But when the
next congressional elections were held, two years later, they would be
according to the 1930 redistricting plan, which the U.S. Supreme Court
eventually declared valid. This meant that Vinson would run in 1934
and 1936, his last races, as Eighth District representative.
He was still representing the old Ninth, though, when he returned to
Washington for the last lame-duck session of Congress, which met from
December 5, 1932, to March 4, 1933. With the curtain about to ring
down on the repudiated Hoover administration and poised to rise for the
greatly anticipated Roosevelt presidency, Vinson should have been able
to revel in the moment. Out with old and in with the new, however, proved
far more vexing than he could have imagined. In the lame-duck session,
he had to cast a vote that put him at odds with a long-held position, while
in the aborning Seventy-third Congress, he opposed the new president's
economic recovery bill that slashed government spending. Vinson was
ready with ample explanation and justification for his actions, but that
did not make the fallout from these decisions any easier to handle.
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Little had been expected to happen in Washington while the nation
waited for Hoover to depart and Roosevelt to ascend. Certainly nothing
of any consequence happened on the economic front. Congress did, how-
ever, take up the hot-button issue of repealing prohibition, which had
been called for in the Democratic Party's 1932 convention.
Having to vote on this matter undoubtedly was a bitter pill for Vinson,
whose stand on repeal had corkscrewed suddenly from his long-held,
unequivocal opposition to support of congressional action in February
1933 that sent to the states the Twenty-first Amendment, repealing the
Eighteenth. As late as his 1930 campaign for Congress, Vinson was still
taking the pledge. He reaffirmed his position on September 9, 1930, to
the president of the Association against Prohibition Amendment, who
had asked him whether he favored repeal. He replied: "It is a pleasure
for me to answer the question for you. My answer is 'No.'"47 When
others wrote to question Vinson's fidelity to the cause, he was quick to
state his allegiance. For example, on October 10, 1930, Vinson, in a
response to Rev. W.C. Pierce of Catlettsburg, said, "I have never given
anyone any right to believe that I have changed my attitude upon prohi-
bition from that which I had long [held] before I ever entered political
life." He added that "without equivocation" he was dry and "would op-
pose any effort to weaken the enforcement statutes affecting prohibi-
tion, and would oppose the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment."48
Less than two years later, shortly after repeal won nearly unani-
mous approval at the Democratic National Convention, Vinson again
responded to a letter from Reverend Pierce about prohibition. This time
he had a different answer, and he acknowledged "that my statement to
you will not be pleasing." He delivered the news obliquely, using un-
characteristically strained and formal phrasing in his letter, which indi-
cated his discomfort in being forced to disclose that he had switched
sides. Vinson never directly declared support for repeal; rather, he re-
cited the fact that he had taken an oath as a congressional candidate
"before the action of the Convention" to support the party's principles
and policies. "The Democratic platform adopted at Chicago is the state-
ment of the principles and policies of that Party," Vinson said, adding, "I
am standing upon that platform in accordance with the oath that I have
taken." Furthermore, he pointed out that if elected as an at-large repre-
sentative in 1932, he would have a statewide constituency to consider.
"As such, it is my sworn obligation as well as an implied Party obliga-
tion to express the sentiment of the people whom I represent." As one
indication of that sentiment, Vinson noted that the Kentucky delegation
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at Chicago voted unanimously for the repeal plank in the platform. Lastly,
Vinson justified his position by saying that the "enforcement of prohibi-
tion has completely broken down. The Nation is in the most critical
condition of its history. The people are demanding changed conditions."49
Vinson was not one to change positions on issues lightly, especially
on one that had been such a touchstone. He valued consistency in him-
self and others, but he also could put party loyalty ahead of personal
considerations, especially in the critical year of 1932 when all signs
pointed to a Democratic sweep. To Vinson, having the party in control
of national government far outweighed any concern he might have felt
for the fallout that was sure to result from repudiating a long-held posi-
tion. His commitment to being a team player is obvious in a letter he
wrote to a political ally on the eve of the national convention. Although
he was discussing the need to make the selection of a permanent con-
vention chair as harmonious as possible, the sentiments expressed might
just as easily be used to explain his turnabout on prohibition. "We have
the Republicans on the run the worst that I ever saw, and we will elect a
president, hands down, if we do not mess things up at Chicago." He
added, "As a Democrat, desirous of winning, I do not want any more
mistakes made than we can possibly help.'"50
Vinson's dream of Democratic domination, of course, was realized.
When the Seventy-third Congress opened, Franklin D. Roosevelt was in
the White House, and Democrats, in control of the legislative branch for
the first time since 1916, held substantial margins over Republicans in
both chambers—60 to 35 in the Senate and 311 to 116 in the House.
Vinson would be at center stage in the formative years of the New Deal,
helping to shape such landmark legislation as Social Security and tak-
ing on the difficult assignment of wringing out more tax dollars to fund
the administration's adventuresome and expanding efforts to revive the
economy. He was in lockstep with Roosevelt on just about everything
that came before Congress from the spring of 1933 until his departure
more than five years later for the federal bench. His devotion to the New
Deal was so deep that he even introduced the House version of the
president's court-packing plan, a scheme so transparent and brazen in
its attempt to corral the Supreme Court that it was roundly criticized by
even some of Roosevelt's most loyal guard in Congress. About the only
time Vinson parted company with the president was over the issue of
funding for veterans. Unhappily for Vinson, the first parting of the ways
on this matter came only one week after Roosevelt's inauguration.
CHAPTER 4
The Loyal Lieutenant
Opposing Franklin D. Roosevelt in the early, heady days of his adminis-
tration, a time when most Americans saw him as the savior come to lift
the country out of the despair of the Great Depression, bordered on sac-
rilege. "People are looking to you almost as they look to God," one
person wrote to the White House a few days after the president's inau-
guration on March 4, 1933.1 The weather on that Saturday—cold and
gloomy—matched the country's dire economic condition. Millions had
lost their jobs, their homes, their savings, and their futures. In the new
president, though, "tens of millions of frightened Americans found a
much-needed tonic in the self-assurance and strength that FDR pro-
jected."2
Roosevelt had promised the country a New Deal and he wasted little
time in trying to achieve it, calling Congress into special session five
days after taking office to act on his sweeping legislative agenda. The
first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration set the standard by
which the activities and accomplishments of future presidents in their
first days in office would be judged. None before or since can match
Roosevelt's prodigious record. His first one hundred days, according to
a summary of that special session in the American Political Science Re-
view, were "unparalleled for the speed and discipline with which Con-
gress was brought to face and finish its task, for the political adroitness
and firmness of the presidential leadership, and for the extraordinary
importance and far-reaching effects of the legislation enacted."3
By the time Congress adjourned on June 16, 1933, exactly one hun-
dred days after convening in special session, it had written into law four-
teen major pieces of legislation designed to deal with the banking crisis,
unemployment, hunger, homelessness, farm relief, business and indus-
trial recovery, conservation, securities fraud, energy needs, and the bud-
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get deficit. America was transformed in those exhilarating days from
March to June, not only as a result of the specific measures enacted, but
just as significantly because confidence and energy had been restored to
the nation. "It's more than a New Deal," Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's sec-
retary of the interior, said. "It's a new world. People feel free again.
They can breathe naturally. It's like quitting a morgue for the open
woods."4
Fred Vinson was in the front lines battling for the president's New
Deal revolution with one big exception—Roosevelt's Economy Act,
which was his plan to reduce federal spending by $500 million. Vinson,
normally a champion of such frugality, opposed this particular measure
because it would slash $400 million from payments to veterans. Vinson
was not alone in his opposition. The Democratic caucus in the House
decided to withhold its support, and when the bill reached the House
floor, ninety Democrats besides Vinson voted no, including such liber-
als as Wright Patman of Texas and John McCormack of Massachusetts.
The Economy Act still passed by a comfortable 266-138 margin. When
he went home the evening after the House vote, Vinson said to his wife,
Roberta, "I committed political suicide today."5
Vinson was wrong about his fate, though. Far from being relegated
to a political wasteland, over the course of the next five and a half years
he found his stock as a legislator and politician steadily rising in Wash-
ington and in Kentucky. Time and again, he demonstrated his value to
Roosevelt, the New Deal, his state, and his district. While taking on
difficult legislative assignments that were national in scope, mainly find-
ing the money to finance the New Deal, Vinson never lost sight of taking
care of critical back-home issues, aiding tobacco farmers and the coal
industry in particular. If he had chosen to remain in elective office in-
stead of accepting a position in the federal judiciary in 1937, eastern
Kentuckians almost certainly would have continued reelecting him to
his seat, or his career might have veered into a successful run for the
U.S. Senate or for governor. Had he remained in the House, he no doubt
would have ascended to a leadership position, logically as majority leader
under his close friend Sam Rayburn, who first became Speaker in 1940
and who considered Vinson practically indispensable to the functioning
of Congress.
In early 1933, however, Vinson understandably was feeling very
dispensable after his vote on the Economy Act. Defending his opposi-
tion in the name of veterans was a hard sell because many, including
some veterans themselves, believed pensions for war service were un-
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warranted. But even if they could be justified, the belief was that veter-
ans should still be willing to accept reductions in benefits if everyone
else in the country was being asked to sacrifice for the sake of economic
recovery. It was Vinson's unhappy lot to be cast as a turncoat and a tool
of the veterans' lobby. The charges cut him to the quick, and he flared
back at those who dared question his decision, even friends and political
allies.
Vinson was put on the defensive as soon as the news of his vote
reached Kentucky. The Louisville Courier-Journal, the state's most
prominent and widely circulated daily newspaper, led the charge. Be-
cause Vinson and Courier publisher Robert Worth Bingham were from
opposing factions in the state Democratic party, criticism from that quar-
ter was not unexpected. Still, Vinson was stunned by the vociferousness
of the attack. In an editorial headlined "Assassin's Bullets," the paper
accused Vinson and the three other Kentucky congressmen who opposed
Roosevelt's budget-cutting proposal—Virgil Chapman, A.J. May, and
Finley Hamilton—of "desertion of their duty to their President and to
their country." In addition, the newspaper said the four had "chosen to
represent not the body of their constituents, but the gratuity-clinging
veterans and the Federal employees who rebel against the economies to
which all others are subjected."6
He was accustomed to taking shots from predictable sources like
the Courier-Journal, but Vinson obviously was stung when darts flew
from friendlier quarters, as his exchange with Ashland businessman and
supporter Walter Mayo illustrated. In a "My Dear Fred" letter, Mayo
wrote, "When we picked up the paper Sunday morning we were shocked
at your vote on the Economy Bill. Our first place to go was to Bible
Class at Methodist Church where it was the sole discussion before and
after class. Not a voice was raised in your defense."7
In a huff, Vinson responded, "Your letter wounded me," adding that
Mayo had "jumped at conclusions, indicted me, found me guilty and
executed me without an opportunity for hearing, just because the Cou-
rier-Journal, who has wanted to operate on me for a long time, reached
an editorial conclusion—mind you, the conclusion of one man—that I
was not standing in with the President."8 Actually, it was Vinson who
had jumped to conclusions, as Mayo gently pointed out in a later letter.
Vinson had assumed, wrongly as it turned out, that Mayo had been in-
fluenced by the stinging opinion in the Louisville paper.
Answering Vinson, Mayo pointed out that he had not seen the Cou-
rier-Journal editorial when he first wrote; he was merely responding to
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the news of Vinson's vote as reported in the Ashland Independent. "If
you feel wounded you have taken the letter just opposite to what we
intended," Mayo wrote. "It is easy to be a fair weather friend and send
only roses. Tried to be a friend in time when you needed them but guess
our efforts turned into a cactus."9
A friend in Cynthiana informed Vinson that his "vote on the
President's economy bill Saturday has stirred up a lot of Hades around
here."10 Similarly, V.V. Adkins, another friend and supporter in Ashland,
wrote to tell Vinson that the "comments on the streets" were running
against him. Adding his own assessment of the situation, Adkins said
that "the world war boys through concentration and organization have
absolutely taken charge of congress, and I believe that this bill was the
only way to break an absolute dirty draft upon the treasury of the United
States."11
Desha Breckinridge, a scion of one of Kentucky's most distinguished
families and a man Vinson greatly admired and respected, politely eased
into his displeasure over Vinson's position. "I feel sure there is no need for
me to tell you that I treasure implicit confidence in your intellectual integ-
rity and courage," wrote Breckinridge, longtime editor and publisher of
the Lexington Herald, noted horseman, and a leader of the party faction
to which Vinson belonged. Still, he said he regretted that Vinson had
let himself become captive to the special interests of veterans: "You
are . . . a representative of all the people, not a faction of the people."
He said he had been opposed to pensions and bounties for veterans
"since as a college lad, when visiting my father in Washington, I saw
the subserviency of congress to the greed of the Grand Army of the
Republic." He would make exceptions, of course, for "those whose bod-
ies were mutilated or health impaired as a direct result of service."
Breckinridge, noting that as a veteran he was entitled to a pension and
free hospital care, said, "I can see no possible justification for the nation
caring for me because I served in the Spanish War, when I had no ill
effect from that service."12
The tone of other correspondence that Vinson received was far more
harsh and carried threats of political retribution. For instance, J.C.
Courtenay of Anchorage wrote that Vinson's vote was "a disgraceful
sacrifice . . . to political expediency." He added, "You no doubt think
you were looking after the interests of World War veterans. I am one of
them who saw service overseas, and I am very sorry indeed that I voted
for you last November. Furthermore, I shall remember this unpatriotic
conduct at the next election and see that all with whom I come in contact
The Loyal Lieutenant / 69
remember it too."13 An Owensboro correspondent wrote, "My reason
for writing is that I want to fix your name in my memory so that I will
know what to do if I ever see it on any ballot handed to me."14 In a testy,
one-sentence response, Vinson wrote, "Just to advise you that I have a
good memory also."15 John C. Hatcher, of Ashland, also warned Vinson
that he would turn from a supporter to an opponent if Vinson ever again
veered from backing Roosevelt. "I want to tell you candidly and truly
that if this happens again I certainly will use my moral influence to
eliminate you from the Democrat party, even if I have to vote a Repub-
lican ticket. The people demand that you get on the job and give us a
new deal."16
Vinson and Joe T. Lovett, editor of the Ledger & Times in Murray,
had a particularly nasty exchange over the issue. "Sorry you saw fit to
knife your President and your country on the Economy Bill," Lovett
wrote, adding, "You have made a great political mistake and your vote
on this measure makes it impossible for me ever to support you again on
any ticket or platform."17 Vinson shot back: "I charge your statement
that I 'knifed my President' on the so called economy bill as an untruth.
Because an editorial [Courier-Journal] reached an erroneous conclu-
sion as to my intentions and purpose, you go off half-cocked and blindly
follow their thought."18
Lovett raised the stakes in his next letter. "Embroiled in the morass
of your gross error you seem convinced that you must make a complete
ass of yourself," he wrote. "Neither the Courier-Journal nor any other
newspaper voices or sponsors my political convictions." Noting his ser-
vice in France during the war, Lovett said, "I utterly detest demagogues
of your ilk who will gut the treasury to feather your own political nests
by granting pensions to tin-soldiers who served a few months in camp."
He continued: "There are a few veterans, Mr. Vinson, who cannot be
bought. You had a right to vote as you damn please in Congress; we have
a right to vote as we damn please at the polls. You have signed your
political death warrant, now rant and rave until you make your former
supporters vomit with disgust."19 Vinson, obviously not wanting to pro-
long the exchange, wrote a brief letter in response, saying in part, "I
want to be careful not to say anything to which you may take personal
exception, as you seem to be some 'ranter and raver' yourself."20
In defending his vote to less vociferous critics, Vinson argued that
past pledges to veterans bound him to oppose the measure, that the pro-
posal was pension reform disguised as emergency budget-cutting, and
that the Courier-Journal misconstrued his position in its editorial sim-
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ply because the paper was out to get to him. In one letter Vinson wrote,
"I have made pledges repeatedly that I would be friendly to the interests
of veterans of all wars. I have lived up to that pledge to the letter."21 In
another he wrote, "The job I have to do is to do the best I can with such
experience and limited sense as I possess, but they will have to hunt a
long way before they find some jay-bird that can say I broke faith with
him."22 Saying that the real intent of the Economy Act was to reform the
pension system, Vinson wrote to a friend that although Civil War veter-
ans and their widows would not be affected by the legislation, "the power
was given to rewrite all other veterans legislation of every kind and
description. Instead of a 15% cut, in many instances you would have
had 100% cut. The Spanish War Veterans would have been required to
prove their cases service connected, even though at the time the pen-
sion was granted such was not the case."23 In blaming the Courier-
Journal for causing the criticism that coursed his way, Vinson wrote to
Breckinridge, "It is clearly demonstrated to me again that which I have
frequently observed—the helplessness of one from the maligning
tongue of slander."24
Amid the tumult also came letters of comfort and support. A friend
from Louisa wrote, "I desire to tell you that you have not only not lost
any prestige down in your old home town but stand 100% as one of the
four Kentucky Congressmen who kept their word, and, boy we are 100%
for you any time, any where and for anything."25 Another supporter wrote,
"I want to compliment you on your loyalty to your constituents. Person-
ally I believe you have gained many votes by the stand you have taken
on the economy measure. I am a Republican, but have always voted for
you when you was running, also my wife and close friends, both per-
sonal and business, and I control quite a number of votes here."26 An
attorney in Mt. Sterling wrote Vinson to let him know "that all of your
friends have not deserted you. I know that it took much more real hon-
est-to-goodness COURAGE to vote your honest convictions on this mea-
sure, than it possibly could have taken to have followed the majority."27
The economy bill passed both houses of Congress in just two days
after it was introduced, but the strain and stain of the debate lingered for
Vinson. He could not resist taking parting shots at Bingham and the
Courier-Journal and at a fellow Kentuckian in the House, John Young
Brown, who had also attacked Vinson's vote. In an extension of remarks
on the issue in the Congressional Record, Vinson said his "vote upon
this measure has been misunderstood, even to the point that disloyalty
to the President of the United States was charged in the Courier-Journal
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and Times. In short words, such a charge is a malicious, willful, dam-
nable lie."28 He noted that there was opposition to the bill in the Senate,
from both Democrats and Republicans, but that no "character assassina-
tion of them has appeared upon the pages of his newspapers. The fact
that his name appeared before them being nominated for the Ambassa-
dorship to England probably closed his mouth in attacks upon them."
Vinson charged Brown with flip-flopping his position, having first voted
in caucus to bind Democratic members to supporting an amended ver-
sion of the bill that would have restricted cuts in veterans' benefits to 25
percent and then changing his mind to oppose the proposal. "Every
member of the Kentucky delegation voted to bind the bill with said
amendment," Vinson said. "Brown alone changed his vote."29
A few days later, the Vinson-Brown feud erupted on the House floor.
Brown drew first blood when he accused Vinson of inserting his ex-
tended remarks in the Congressional Record for "essentially no purpose
other than to promote his own future" in Kentucky. "This gentlemen has
spent $225 of the taxpayers' money to explain a vote of his, so that in the
future he can get votes by virtue of this explanation of this vote," Brown
said. He added that if Vinson sent a copy of his speech to every voter in
his district it would cost taxpayers $3,240.78, and the cost would be
$29,166.99 if copies went to every voter in the state. Brown, defending
Bingham against Vinson's charge that "his papers are unfair to him per-
sonally, and have always been," noted that "on the very day he was
making that attack Judge Bingham, upon the front page of his paper,
was carrying an article, 'Vinson Seeking Amendment to Aid Burley in
Farm Measure.' What more propitious place could he have found to put
this speech favorable to this gentlemen."
Naturally, Vinson was ready with a rejoinder, responding partly in
patronizing fashion. He said he wanted "to apologize to you for the lack
of understanding of the new Member from Kentucky" when he claimed
sending copies of the speech to Kentucky would cost taxpayers more
than $29,000. "You all know that if any speeches are sent out by me I
will have to pay the entire cost of printing," Vinson said, adding, "He
displays the same kind of misunderstanding that he has shown through-
out his whole political experience." He then turned to Brown's com-
ment on the House floor that anyone opposing the Economy Act was
disloyal to the president: "Loyalty is part of my religion, and I resented
the charge of disloyalty to my President, because no man in this House
will stand by him longer or suffer more for him than will I." He added,
"Wait until the storm clouds hover low, wait until support of the Presi-
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dent may not be so popular, and then see the young gentleman from
Kentucky take cover, as he always does."30
By the time Vinson faced voters again in 1934, the acrimony over
his vote on the Economy Act had not completely faded, and he con-
fronted an even bigger challenge in his bid for reelection. Kentucky law-
makers were again fiddling with the composition of congressional
districts, and Vinson's Eighth District had been targeted for change. A
Democratic state legislator friendly to Seventh District congressman A.J.
"Jack" May proposed taking four Democratic counties from Vinson and
giving them to May, making his district more safely Democratic. It was
a move that Vinson felt would guarantee his defeat. "I understand they
are trying to put me out of Congress," Vinson wrote to a friendly state
senator in early 1934 as he began his campaign hundreds of miles away
in Washington to head off the redistricting attempt. "I would appreciate
anything that you can do," Vinson said to the state senator, "and believe
that if you could go to bat on this matter, you can protect the interests of
the Democratic Party in Kentucky, and, incidentally, my own personal
interest."31 As the legislative tug of war proceeded, Vinson maintained a
steady stream of correspondence with his supporters in the state capital
and was prepared to travel to Frankfort if it became necessary. His pres-
ence was not required, as it turned out. He had enough support in the
state legislature and even from the governor to beat back redistricting.
On the morning of March 16, 1934, Vinson received a telegram from a
friend in Frankfort informing him, "Successful in defeating all efforts
of redistricting."32 Another supporter wrote that day, "You are in luck.
Several were gunning for you but you had some real friends looking
after your interests," specifically mentioning state representative C.L.
Cropper of Burlington. "This Cropper boy was at the top in the House,
none better. He did some very effective work for you and was at all
times watching."33
The good news from the redistricting fight was tempered for Vinson
by the fact that he would again confront a primary challenge from Wil-
liam Fields, the erstwhile friend turned foe who had opposed him in the
1930 Democratic primary. Fields managed to poll 32 percent of the vote
in 1934, a better showing than in 1930, but Vinson was too formidable,
winning with more than 67 percent of the vote and taking every county
in the twenty-county district except two. In the fall, Vinson was side-
lined much of the time because of an illness, which required a two-week
hospital stay and a minor operation. In a form letter to supporters about
his situation, Vinson urged them to work extra hard in his behalf, say-
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ing, "I am compelled to depend upon you, in this campaign, more than
ever" because "of my being unable to campaign in my usual vigorous
fashion." Although his reelection appeared certain, Vinson warned "that
feeling of confidence must not ripen into over-confidence."34 Despite
being hobbled, Vinson rolled to an impressive win, beating his Republi-
can opponent in every county but two while amassing nearly 60 percent
of the total vote.
That Vinson never allowed himself to be lulled into overconfidence
is illustrated by his actions in the year following his overwhelming 1934
victory and a year before he would be up for reelection in 1936, which
turned out to be his final campaign. In the 1935 Democratic primary for
governor, he actively supported Thomas Rhea, chairman of the state
highway commission, against then lieutenant governor A.B. "Happy"
Chandler. "It is just simply a question of self preservation with me,"
Vinson wrote to a friend, explaining his involvement with Rhea's cam-
paign.35 "I know that the fellows who are wholly behind the Chandler
candidacy, namely the Louisville newspaper crowd, would make it hard
for me along any line that I may decide to go if they can." Vinson's
lingering bitterness toward the Courier-Journal for its scathing criti-
cism of his vote on the Economy Act is apparent in another letter. Writ-
ing to a political ally in Mt. Sterling, he said, "It may be that I oughtn't
to have such a good memory but it will be at some future date before I
would support the Courier Journal crowd as I can't keep from remem-
bering an editorial that they shot at me back in March 1933."36 When his
man lost, Vinson, ever the loyal party man, did support Chandler, but
mainly because he believed that a Republican victory in an off-year elec-
tion would damage Roosevelt's reelection chances in 1936. For example,
in his standard stump speech during the 1935 campaign, which was more
of a testimonial to the president than an endorsement of Chandler, Vinson
said, "The November election in Kentucky means much to the national
campaign. The stakes in a governor's race in Kentucky are large. How-
ever, the Presidential stakes are much more valuable." The election of a
GOP governor, he said, "simply means the placing of powerful weapons
and ammunition . . . in the hands of the enemies of the Democratic
national administration." The arsenal stayed in Democratic hands in 1935
as Chandler won handily over the Republican challenger, King Swope.37
The outcome of Vinson's finale in elective politics in 1936 was never
in doubt, although, much to his annoyance, he still could not escape
having opposition in the primary. "It certainly is the devil to have to
have primary trouble every two years!" Vinson wrote to a supporter. "I
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should be thankful, I take it, that it does not come every year."38 His
hapless intraparty rival, however, was reduced to winning three precincts
in the entire district and received only 16 percent of the vote compared
with Vinson's whopping 84 percent. In the general election, campaign-
ing as an ardent Roosevelt supporter and New Dealer, Vinson beat his
Republican opponent by nearly 60 percent to 40 percent, almost identi-
cal to the president's margin of victory in Kentucky over the GOP presi-
dential candidate, Alf Landon.
Aligning with Roosevelt, at least until the recession of 1937, was a
sensible strategy for politicians, but Vinson proved that opposing the
popular president was not an automatic death sentence. He readily ac-
knowledged in campaign speeches that he and Roosevelt disagreed on
the issue of veterans' legislation, a rare policy dispute between the two.
Vinson had been pushing for immediate cash payments of the adjusted
service certificates to World War I veterans for many years, and Roosevelt,
just like presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover before him, saw bo-
nuses for war veterans as an extravagant expenditure the government
could not afford, especially at a time when the economy was still wob-
bly. The president, like his three predecessors, tried to blunt bonuses
with his veto power. It worked for him in 1935 when the Senate failed to
override his veto of a bill sponsored by Texas congressman Wright
Patman that would have provided for immediate cash payments to vet-
erans. As soon as Congress convened the next year, Vinson introduced
his bill that again called for veterans to receive cash bonuses, which
amounted to an expenditure of about $2.5 billion. Another veto by
Roosevelt was promised and delivered, but this time both houses of
Congress overrode the president, and Vinson finally won his most pro-
tracted legislative battle. Conditions for passage were more favorable in
1936 than in the previous year. The two major veterans' groups, the
American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which had backed
competing proposals the previous year, joined to support Vinson's bill,
as did the Disabled American Veterans. In addition, 1936 was an elec-
tion year, making it more difficult for incumbent legislators to oppose
the influential and united veterans' lobby.
Ray Murphy, national commander of the American Legion, wrote
Vinson in early 1936 to thank him "for the magnificent work you did
which made possible the passage of the Adjusted Service Certificate
payment bill." He added, "Your complete knowledge of the subject, your
evident desire to forego any personal pride of authorship, your final
framing of the bill . . . which was the basis for final passage of the Act,
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your diplomacy and tact were all of such extraordinary quality as to
cause me to marvel and to be eternally grateful."39 Frank N. Belgrano
Jr., former head of the Legion, said in a letter to Vinson, "No one knows
better than I the time and effort you put into the fight last year, and that
because of the stand you took the payment of these certificates was made
possible in the first 21 days of this session of Congress."40
Vinson's electoral hold on his district also stemmed from the tried
and true method of paying close attention to the needs and concerns of
the folks back home. During this period of hard times, Vinson did what
he could to improve conditions in Kentucky; he was especially active in
supporting two of the state's most important commodities—coal and
tobacco. He managed floor debate in the House on the Bituminous Coal
Act, which had sought through regulation to correct some of the dire
conditions in the coalfields, including appallingly low wages, overpro-
duction, and cutthroat competition. The act created local boards that
would set minimum prices for coal and provided for collective bargain-
ing so that miners could negotiate for better wages and working condi-
tions. After the Supreme Court ruled the legislation unconstitutional in
1936, Vinson and others started drafting new legislation to address the
Court's contention that the Coal Act infringed upon the power of the
states and was an unconstitutional delegation of power to people outside
of the government. A revised coal bill, then known as the Guffey-Vinson
Coal Stabilization Bill, passed the House but fell victim to a filibuster in
the Senate.
Vinson's efforts did not go unrecognized, however. John L. Lewis,
president of the United Mine Workers and a man sparing in words of
praise, nonetheless was extremely complimentary of what Vinson had
tried to accomplish. "Your masterful handling of the measure on the
floor . . . has evoked the admiration of every one familiar with the
fight," Lewis wrote. He added, "Your broad personal sympathies and
comprehensive understanding of the problems of the workers in the
mining industry has caused our people to regard you as one of their
loyal champions."41
Vinson, not deterred by defeat, came back in early 1937 with the
redrafted Guffey-Vinson Coal Bill, which restored much of the original
Coal Act except for the labor provisions that had been invalidated by the
Supreme Court. The measure eliminated the local district boards that
the Court said were an unconstitutional delegation of powers, creating
instead a new Bituminous Coal Commission appointed by the president
with powers to fix minimum prices for coal. The bill also established a
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consumers' counsel, which reported directly to Congress. The Guffey-
Vinson bill won congressional approval in less than five months' time
and was signed by Roosevelt in late April 1937. Lewis said the legisla-
tion meant "rational stabilization" of the industry instead of the "ruth-
less and devastating competitive practices which have debauched the
industry for decades, sweated labor and removed the industry as a source
of tax revenue for the government."42 Vinson later called this legislation
one of his prime achievements in Congress.
Likewise, Vinson was proud of his efforts in behalf of the state's
struggling burley tobacco farmers, who had seen their income drop from
$71 million in 1929 to $31 million three years later.43 Tobacco, like the
six other crops targeted for rescue under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, suffered from overproduction, which caused the lower prices. The
Triple A, enacted in the hectic first hundred days of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, sought to raise farm prices by getting farmers to agree to
cut back their production. In return, the government paid participating
farmers a subsidy that would be funded through taxes imposed on the
processors of the seven commodities. Vinson worked out the tables for
determining tobacco processing taxes, and he returned to Kentucky sev-
eral times for meetings to help plan how the program was to be imple-
mented in the state. He was also deluged with correspondence from
growers with questions about AAA. The desperate conditions of grow-
ers in the state are made clear in a letter from a farmer in Augusta,
Kentucky, trying to scratch out a living for his family of five on disabil-
ity payments for war injuries and four acres of tobacco. "I am compeled
to put a roof on my home which is in a very bad shape. $50.1 owe $50
for food already consumed by my family. Taxes $18. Food for my fam-
ily for a year is about $240. Coal about $25. Interest on $700 with F.L.B.
[Federal Land Bank] $35.1 never spend one cent unless it goes derect
for the benefit of my family. I havent supported an Automobile for five
years. My family and I walk where ever we go even if it is five or six
miles."44
In his response, Vinson informed the farmer of a recent change that
broadened the scope of AAA, adding, "I trust that this new option will
be of benefit to you. I have been working on the tobacco situation for a
long time, and feel that I have been able to do some real good in this
connection."45 Later, Vinson claimed that his efforts under Triple A re-
sulted in subsidy payments of $21 million to burley tobacco growers in
the state in the two years before the legislation was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in 1936.46 After AAA was invalidated, Con-
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gress quickly enacted substitute legislation known as the Soil Conserva-
tion and Domestic Allotment Act, which also paid farmers to decrease
production, although the money had to come from sources other than
the outlawed processing taxes. Vinson, as a member of a special com-
mittee from the tobacco growing states, sponsored an amendment that
created a pool of more than $15 million from customs fees that was used
to pay benefits to tobacco farmers.
Reducing taxes on tobacco continued to be on Vinson's legislative
agenda during the mid-1930s. Actually, Vinson believed "there ought to
be no tax on tobacco products."47 Realizing that that was an impossible
dream, he tried his best to at least get the taxes reduced. In 1934, as
chairman of a Ways and Means subcommittee on tobacco taxation, he
steered through his panel a recommendation for an across-the-board re-
duction of 40 percent in all tobacco taxes. The full committee adopted
the proposal, but it failed to pass Congress. Vinson's efforts the follow-
ing year to get the 40 percent tax cut enacted met the same fate. None-
theless, he again impressed those who saw him in action. One industry
veteran, who had been a buyer, warehouseman, and grower, commented,
"I thought I knew considerable about the tobacco situation but Vinson
indicated in the way he handled the hearing of the tobacco tax that he
has absolute mastery of the tobacco question."48
Vinson believed his tax reduction proposal was a win-win situation
for all concerned—the grower, the manufacturer, and the consumer.
Smokers would get their cigarettes at a reduced cost, spurring demand
for the manufacturers, who in turn would buy more burley from farm-
ers. Obviously, the government would lose tax revenue, but Vinson felt
the loss would be more than offset by the political gains to be won. In a
letter to James A. Farley, one of the president's closest political advis-
ers, Vinson estimated that the tax cut would mean a loss to the federal
government in fiscal 1935 of between $50 million and $75 million, which,
he said, "would not be of vital consequence, in view of the fact that it is
not contemplated that the Budget will be brought to balance in that year."
The vital consequence of the proposal, however, as Vinson made clear
to Farley, was political. He noted that there were 432,000 tobacco farms,
3 million people directly dependent on tobacco for their livelihoods,
and millions of consumers. The political payoff would be from smokers
who would "know that under President Roosevelt's leadership, he is
getting to him an essential pack of cigarettes for some two and one-half
to five cents per pack less than that which he would have had to pay,
except for President Roosevelt's attitude toward him," Vinson wrote.49
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Whereas all segments of the burley belt could obviously get behind
lowering taxes, another initiative that Vinson strongly supported—the
creation of a federal system for grading and inspection of tobacco sold
at auction—was not unanimously endorsed in Kentucky. In its editorials
on the subject, the Lexington Herald, a paper normally in agreement
with about any position taken by Vinson, opposed the measure, also
known as the Flannagan Bill, on the grounds that it was a waste of tax-
payers' money on a system that farmers neither wanted nor needed. In
one opinion piece, the paper said, "It is the belief of the farmers that the
bill really has for its purpose the eventual destruction of the open auc-
tion system of marketing."50 Another editorial a few days later warned:
"The real danger is the lurking prospect of a government-enforced co-
operative. This would mean eventual government control on a far larger
scale than the AAA has ever proposed."51 In a letter to Thomas R.
Underwood, the paper's general manager and a good friend, Vinson,
noting that it was "a very unusual situation not to be battling on the
same side with you," addressed the editorial's point that a governmental
grading system was unnecessary because tobacco companies have
trained, experienced, and well-paid buyers, who, in effect, grade the
tobacco when they make their bids: "These trained, experienced and
well-paid buyers, it seems to me would decide every doubt against the
farmer insofar as the price they paid for his tobacco is concerned. They
are employed by the Buyers and, as loyal employees, they would cer-
tainly protect the interests of the purchasers—the farmer has nothing to
say about it."52 Vinson prevailed on the issue of federal grading and
received in acknowledgment of his efforts four pens that the president
had used in signing the bill.
With the ravages of unemployment rife in the land and people in-
creasingly looking to the federal government as the great beacon of hope,
Vinson naturally was besieged by supplicants. For a variety of reasons,
he often could do little more than write a letter of recommendation or
provide advice on the application process. There were, for example, too
many people competing for too few jobs. To a woman from Carlisle
who wrote seeking "clerical work in some department in Washington,"
Vinson responded, "It is a difficult matter to secure a position of this
character at long distance, and I hesitate to suggest your coming to Wash-
ington, because even then, there is no assurance that an appointment can
be secured. There are hundreds of applicants for every available job."53
Answering a request from a friend to find a job in the Library of Con-
gress for his daughter, Vinson noted that there were more than twenty-
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nine thousand applicants for jobs in the library and that even Kentucky
senator Barkley, who was chairman of the Library Committee in the
Senate, had not been able to get anyone a job there. "I certainly would
be happy to help your daughter secure a position," Vinson wrote, "but it
has been impossible for me to place anyone in the Library of Congress."54
Vinson's ability to help job seekers was also limited by Civil Service,
which filled positions through competitive examinations. An Ashland
man, upon learning that the Alcoholic Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue
Service was adding one hundred workers to its enforcement staff, wrote
Vinson asking if he would "endorse me for one of the jobs as you know I
can get the solid endorcement of the Democratic organization of Boyd
county and any other county in our district if necessary."55 Vinson's reply
noted "that the only prospective employment offered by that division will
be to storekeeper-gaugers, and that, as you know, is under Civil Service."56
Vinson was also hampered by the dictum from Harry Hopkins,
Roosevelt's chief administrator who was responsible for pouring bil-
lions of dollars into public works programs employing millions of work-
ers, that there must be a separation between relief and politics.
Responding to a letter from an Ashland resident, Vinson wrote, "The
local relief work is totally in the hands of the local committee or those
persons assigned by them to do it. Members of Congress and Senators
haven't any control over it and our recommendations are not desired. I
can say to you frankly, that if I had had anything to do with it, there
would have been lots of things done differently."57 He complained in
particular about his lack of influence with the Civil Works Administra-
tion (CWA), a short-lived enterprise that spent about a billion dollars
and employed more than 4 million people in early 1934 to build or im-
prove roads, schools, airports, and playgrounds as well as to undertake
other public works projects. To accomplish the Herculean task of mobi-
lizing such a massive workforce in a short time, the organization of
CWA was by necessity decentralized, meaning that decisions on whom
to hire and what work was to be done were made at the local level.
Vinson felt that, at least in parts of his district, Republicans had seized
control of local CWA committees and were using their positions of power
for political purposes. "In my home county of Boyd," he wrote to a
friend, "the CWA has two Republicans in charge of the employment,
one of whom is a very bitter, partisan political leader. I believe that Mr.
Hopkins, the Federal Administrator, is getting his eyes open. He has
been fully informed of the situation in Kentucky, but to date, there has
been no change in his policy with reference to politics."58
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A constituent in Catlettsburg wrote Vinson that Hopkins's nonparti-
san approach to relief had only turned "the emoluments and the benefits
over into the hands of the enemy, under the ruling of 'No politics in this
deal,'" and had disheartened middle-class Democrats who "have been
the backbone of the democrat party." From his vantage point as the owner
of a grocery store that dispensed federal supplies, the correspondent
said he had "witnessed many wrongs" committed by the local relief
office, He told of one farmer who appeared to be prospering but never
failed to be on the list of those qualifying for government food supplies.
"Old men who are his neighbors, almost destitute, totter up to my desk
to see if their names are on the list and go away disappointed. Is it an
accident, that this favored man is a republican politician among the lower
class." Another unworthy recipient described in the letter was a "ranting
Republican ward healer" who, although in perfect health, "got his sup-
plies regularly and his vouchers every week and he would bring his mis-
tress with him to the store to spend the voucher." By contrast, the
storekeeper said, "My nearest neighbor is an old man in the eighties, an
Ohio River Pilot, a life time democrat, out of a job forever. He worked
and paid for a home but he can't eat it. He does not belong to the high
class, neither does he belong to the lower class, he is of the middle class
and can get nothing, but on rare occasions, a one pound package of
LARD, or in other words an insult, from the relief office."59 To the man's
letter of indignation, Vinson responded, "I agree with you that the Demo-
crats are not in control in either the relief work or the unemployment
end of it. Ever since the State failed to match federal money, it has been
in the hands of the Republicans. They did not let the Senators or Con-
gressmen have anything to do with the recommendations of the men in
charge of it, either State, county or cities."60
Vinson experienced the same frustrations with the Works Progress
Administration, an even more ambitious, expensive, and long-term public
works undertaking than its predecessor agencies, CWA and FERA (Fed-
eral Emergency Relief Administration). An Ashland woman wrote to
ask his help in getting employment with one of the WPA-sponsored
sewing centers in the state, which hired women to make garments for
their own families and for other needy families. In responding, Vinson,
who by this time had left Congress and was a federal judge, said, "I
must frankly say that if I were in the House I could do very little . . .
because of the fact that at all times before I went on the Bench we were
constantly kept advised that there was no politics in WPA and that as
Members of Congress it wasn't our job to hire or fire the non-relief
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persons or to appoint or remove the relief persons in WPA. I can say
truthfully that I never placed a single, solitary person on the relief rolls
of WPA while I was a member of the House."61 Though upsetting to him
in one regard, Vinson's avowed lack of influence-peddling with the WPA
at least spared him from being branded, as was Senator Barkley, as hav-
ing used the WPA for political purposes.52
One relief activity during this period that proved to be more fertile
ground for Vinson was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a pro-
gram that put young men to work restoring and improving public lands
and forests through such measures as soil conservation, reforestation,
construction of national parks and dams, and wildlife protection. Vinson's
district had about one-half of the more than forty CCC campus located
in Kentucky, and he fought hard to keep them open as long as possible
because of the economic boosts they gave to surrounding communities.
For instance, he telephoned the White House upon learning of the planned
closing of one camp to plead that it should remain open. "I never did
have enough camps to start with and there have been one or two already
discontinued," Vinson said, adding, "I am very anxious for this one to
be kept going for a while."63
For all its good works, the CCC was but a temporary fix on the
landscape, passing out of existence in 1942 after a highly productive run
of nearly ten years. Vinson joined with others in legislative efforts to
find more lasting solutions to the manifold problems in the environ-
ment, specifically flooding and water pollution. For Vinson, flood con-
trol became a priority when much of the state was deluged in 1927; it
resurfaced on his agenda in 1934 when a portion of his district was hit
by floods and again in the disastrous winter of 1937, when flooding of
the Ohio River resulted in hundreds of deaths and property damage of
some $200 million in Kentucky. In the aftermath of the 1937 floods,
Vinson was elected chairman of a flood relief subcommittee composed
of House members from flood-prone areas. His group explored various
means of financing a comprehensive, long-range program of flood con-
trol by such means as a national sales tax or broadening the base of
income taxes. Congress ultimately, however, took a more modest, piece-
meal approach that year, passing legislation to construct emergency flood
walls at various points along the Ohio, including Louisville, Paducah,
Covington, and Russell.
In a measure that foreshadowed heightened national concern over
clean air and water by thirty years, Vinson and Barkley sponsored legis-
lation in 1937 for controlling water pollution. Their bill, which finally
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passed Congress in 1938 after Vinson had departed for the federal judi-
ciary, was a modest $ 1 million proposal creating a water pollution con-
trol division in the U.S. Public Health Service, which would study the
problem of contamination in navigable waterways and tributaries and
make grants to states for studies, surveys, and other work in connection
with preventing and controlling water pollution. Surprisingly, given the
meager amount of money involved and the strong, bipartisan support in
Congress for this initiative, Roosevelt killed the measure by a pocket
veto. He objected to a single sentence in the bill that had recommenda-
tions for grants-in-aid going directly to Congress without presidential
review—interpreting this as legislative assumption of responsibilities of
the executive branch. The Cincinnati Times-Star, in a stinging editorial
rebuke of the veto, wrote, "By incomprehensive action on the Barkley-
Vinson bill, the President has slowed the gathering momentum of a
movement to clean up the filthy rivers from which our drinking water
comes. By no means has he stopped it."64
The disagreements over veterans' legislation and the water pollu-
tion bill were notable exceptions to Vinson's overall legislative record
as a Roosevelt stalwart. The revenue demands of the president's new
programs required an accelerated hunt for more tax dollars, either through
new levies or plugging loopholes or both. From his positions on the
Ways and Means Committee, a taxation subcommittee, and a joint House-
Senate panel on tax evasion and avoidance, Vinson carried out his march-
ing orders with skill and determination, earning in the process a lasting
and deserved reputation as the preeminent tax authority in the House.
Ironically, of course, Vinson had compounded Roosevelt's need for more
revenue through his successful push for cash bonus payments to veter-
ans, which added more than $2 billion to governmental expenditures.
The Supreme Court contributed to the administration's budgetary short-
falls as well when it struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, de-
priving the government of about $500 million in revenue.
Vinson also was in the president's camp for two of his most contro-
versial moves—to pack the Supreme Court and to reorganize the execu-
tive branch. The Court proposal, Roosevelt's scheme to increase the
number of justices after so many of his New Deal initiatives had been
struck down by a conservative majority on the Court, resulted in
Roosevelt's worst defeat in Congress. Vinson introduced the measure,
which the White House had unsuccessfully tried to masquerade as court
reform legislation, on July 6, 1937. Under the proposal, for every justice
who did not retire at age seventy, the president got to make an appoint-
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ment to the Court, which at the time meant that Roosevelt could have
appointed six more justices. After long and heated debate, the Senate
killed the bill in late July by recommitting it to committee, and it was
never debated in the House. Vinson maintained his interest in the con-
trivance nonetheless, sending the president a copy of a recently enacted
Georgia law that created emeritus status for the chief justice and associ-
ate justices of the state supreme court who retire at age seventy. Such
justices became members of an advisory appellate council and were
entitled to two-thirds pay for life. In thanking Vinson for the informa-
tion, Roosevelt wrote, "I was much interested in the copy of the Georgia
Statute relative to the Judiciary of that State, and am glad you brought it
to my attention."65 The president suffered another humiliating loss with
his plan to reorganize the executive branch to make it more efficient.
Coming as it did in the wake of the Supreme Court fight and the rise of
fascism in Europe and Japan, the proposal set off cries in Congress and
throughout the country that the president was trying to install himself as
a dictator. Efforts by Vinson and other Democratic leaders in the House
to pass a reorganization bill failed in April 1938 when it was rejected by
a narrow margin.
The failure of Congress to give the president what he wanted was an
oddity, certainly during his first term, when ideas from the White House
were transformed into law in a blur. Many of these signature New Deal
measures bore Vinson's imprints, including the Social Security Act of
1935, the most enduring and important legislative achievement during
this frenetic period.
Roosevelt made the issue of governmental assistance for the unem-
ployed, the elderly, and the uninsured a top priority in the summer of
1934 with the creation of the Commission on Economic Security. In
about six months' time, the commission, headed by Labor Secretary
Frances Perkins, had drafted a sweeping proposal first introduced into
Congress as the Economic Security Bill. Although he had a tough pri-
mary election to win that summer, Vinson did little campaigning, devot-
ing his time instead to "working out the complicated tax features of the
new social security legislation."66 He also returned to Washington sev-
eral times during the summer recess to meet with the members of the
commission and others involved in weaving a broad safety net for the
most needy.
Caring for the aged had long been of concern to Vinson, according
to his son, Fred M. Vinson Jr., who recounted a story of his parents
seeing an old man "all gnarled and ragged walking along the side of the
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road" while driving between Louisa and Ashland. Vinson, then just be-
ginning his congressional career, remarked to his wife, Roberta, "that
some day he was going to introduce legislation that would take care of
old people who could no longer work."67 Vinson did not get the opportu-
nity to actually sponsor Social Security legislation, but as a leading
member of the House Ways and Means Committee, he played a key role
in shaping the final form of the proposal that passed Congress and the
president signed on August 14,1935. He was the dominant influence on
Ways and Means during the committee's work on this legislation, ac-
cording to Thomas H. Eliot, who, as counsel for the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security, drafted the Economic Security Bill, later changed by
Ways and Means to the Social Security Act. In an Atlantic Monthly ar-
ticle commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Social Security,
Eliot noted that the progress of the proposal through the Ways and Means
Committee depended "on the behavior of one member as he first en-
tered the room. That one member was Fred Vinson. If Vinson, on enter-
ing, walked directly to his seat, said an amiable 'Good morning,' and
began perusing the bill, we were pretty sure of having a productive day.
But if he came in either scowling or whispering jovial stories to a couple
of his colleagues, the morning could be counted as lost."68
Vinson was in tune with some of modern-day political thought when,
predicting in early 1935 a vast surplus in the Social Security fund of $50
billion by 1980, he pondered using reserves to invest in such securities
as state, municipal, and county bonds. "But if they wanted to," Vinson
continued, "they could find plenty of other places to invest it. They could
make loans to industry, or to home owners, or they could expand the
functions of our present Reconstruction Finance Corporation."69
Arthur J. Altmeyer, an assistant secretary of labor and chairman of a
subgroup of the Committee on Economic Security known as the Techni-
cal Board, said Vinson and Jere Cooper of Tennessee were the most
influential members in shaping the Social Security proposal as it made
its way through the Ways and Means Committee. "Congressman
Doughton, the chairman [of Ways and Means] introduced the bill at the
request of the administration, but I don't think [he] necessarily under-
stood what the bill was about," Altmeyer said. "But these men [Vinson
and Cooper] worked at it very conscientiously and understood every bit
of the bill as it was hammered out in the committee. So they were very
important then and later." Altmeyer, later appointed a member of the
Social Security Board and widely credited with getting this complex
and unprecedented program up and running, said he got crossways with
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Vinson and Cooper over the matter of patronage. "I just didn't realize
how strongly members of Congress felt they should be consulted in
making appointments," he said. "I failed to discuss key appointments . . .
with the result that I found I had deeply offended these two men." Con-
cerning Vinson, he said, "I had to refuse to appoint a man as personnel
director who had no qualifications for the position. We offered him a
position as office manager in Louisville, but he declined that; so Mr.
Vinson was never satisfied that I had given him appropriate consider-
ation to his views. And he felt as one of the influential supporters of the
legislation, his view should have been taken more seriously."70
Vinson's work was also praised by Edwin E. Witte, executive direc-
tor of the Committee on Economic Security, who was often called "the
father of social security." In a letter responding to Vinson's request for
information on social insurance plans in other countries, Witte wrote,
"Permit me again to express the deep appreciation of our Committee for
your valiant efforts in behalf of this measure."71 Speaking on the twenti-
eth anniversary of the Social Security Act, Witte included Vinson on his
short list of politicians responsible for getting the proposal enacted into
law. "Academic people are prone to give all the credit for social reforms
to their original proponents," Witte said, "but, clearly, more should go
to the men in public life, who risk their political future in championing
and enacting these measures and to administrators who make the pro-
grams work."72
Vinson undoubtedly performed his greatest service to Roosevelt and
the New Deal as a congressional spearhead in revenue and tax legisla-
tion. In his quest to expand the government's treasury, the president
tried with limited success to shift the tax burden to the wealthiest indi-
viduals and corporations. In part, the president embarked on this course
in response to the so-called thunder on the left, radical schemes such as
Huey Long's Share Our Wealth movement to redistribute wealth and
power. One administration proposal resulting from this approach was a
graduated surtax on corporate income that had not been distributed as
dividends, a levy the president thought would achieve tax reform while
adding about $620 million in new revenue.73 Roosevelt believed that
companies purposely retained their profits instead of paying dividends
as a way of shielding stockholders from income taxes. In addition, he
felt that surpluses gave these companies an unfair business advantage,
making it easier for them to attract capital for expansion and thereby
increase their market share. A corporation that paid out all of its profits
in cash dividends was not liable to the tax. The task of putting specifics
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to the president's plan fell to Samuel B. Hill of Washington, chairman of
the Ways and Means subcommittee on taxation, and Vinson, his right-
hand man. To Vinson, called by the New York Times "one of the most
influential leaders in drafting the pending measure," the legislation would
bring equity to the system of taxation. "All business profits should bear
their just share of Federal taxes whether held in the enterprise or distrib-
uted to the beneficial owners," he said. Existing law, Vinson continued,
"has been ineffective in preventing the retention of earnings in corpora-
tions controlled by wealthy individuals," and although Congress had
attempted reform from time to time, "the evil has been a growing one."74
The evil seen by opponents of the proposal, mostly Republicans,
although some Democrats were in opposition as well, was the
administration's proclivity for taxation rather than reduced spending.
They charged the White House with "spending hundreds of millions of
dollars unnecessarily, wastefully, extravagantly and politically."75 It also
was argued that the measure would be destructive to business and that
Congress had no right to use its power of taxation to tell businesses how
they should operate. Furthermore, opponents called the proposal "a huge
Chinese puzzle" that no one really understood. Vinson countered this
point in House debate, saying that the bill was comprehensible to any-
one who took the time to try to understand it. But he evoked smiles from
Republicans when it took him more than an hour to explain the details
of the proposal. Roosevelt eventually got his undistributed profits tax,
although he had to settle for a watered-down version. Even then, the
Revenue Act of 1936 "was probably the most dramatic closing of a tax
loophole ever to be undertaken in an election year."76
Roosevelt wanted even more, as he made clear in his reelection cam-
paign and in a message to Congress after his resounding victory in 1936.
Congress created a special Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoid-
ance in response to his call for a stepped-up assault on loopholes that the
wealthy, or "economic royalists" in the president's term, used to avoid
or lessen their tax bills. Vinson, who had become chairman of the Ways
and Means subcommittee on taxation after Sam Hill left Congress in
1936, was named to the panel. Hearings throughout the summer of 1937
uncovered a multiplicity of abuses and schemes used by the upper class
to avoid taxes, one of which was the personal holding company, also
known as incorporated pocketbooks. Through this device, some of the
richest people in the country could reduce their individual surtax rates
by incorporating various sources of personal income, gaining deduc-
tions in the process that would not otherwise be available to them. Though
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perfectly legal, the practice was ridiculed under the glare of congres-
sional and press scrutiny as a blatant example of how the privileged
could manipulate the system to their advantage. It was front-page news
when the joint committee named names, sixty-seven in all, including
such recognizable figures as Andrew W. Mellon, a former secretary of
the Treasury; Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of General Motors; William S.
Paley, head of CBS; and Jacob Ruppert, owner of the New York Yan-
kees. Congress acted quickly on proposals emanating from committee
hearings, and by the end of the summer the president was able to sign
the Revenue Act of 1937. Although the legislation did not give Roosevelt
the "evasion-proof tax system he had wanted, it did close a number of
loopholes and made it more difficult to escape tax burdens through per-
sonal holding companies.
In the next stage of the president's continuing tax reform crusade,
Vinson assumed an even more prominent role as chairman of a Ways
and Means subcommittee charged with examining the whole field of
taxation and recommending changes for the overhaul of the nation's tax
structure. However, the climate in Congress for making substantive
changes in tax law during the 1937-1938 period, especially if it meant
higher corporate taxes, was now less favorable. By this time a recession
was under way, and the business lobby had a more a sympathetic hear-
ing in Congress with its argument that Roosevelt's taxes, particularly
the hated undistributed profits tax, had been responsible for causing the
economic slump by discouraging investment. When the subcommittee
began its work in early November of 1937, Vinson said the matter of
taxing retained earnings was the top priority for study. "We are looking
into the idea of relieving the sufferings and hardships of the tax," he
said.77 The panel's open-ended probe also extended into such realms as
capital gains, estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes.
The subcommittee's deliberations, which took three months, pro-
pelled Vinson into the national spotlight. As proposals were offered,
debated, discarded, or adopted, he was the source news reporters most
often relied upon to explain what had transpired in the highly technical
and complicated process of fashioning tax reform legislation. Vinson's
comments and analyses became a staple of front-page stories in the New
York Times, and he was widely quoted in other daily newspapers, weekly
news magazines, and business periodicals. The editor of the Saturday
Evening Post asked Vinson, as "the recognized authority of the Con-
gress on the income tax," for his comments on a reader's observation
that the tax system was grossly unfair to those whose earnings were
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crowded into just a few years. The reader cited the example of a busi-
ness owner who, after spending a lifetime building up the concern, sells
out at a profit, but the income tax he must pay is for the year in which
the business sold. The reader also questioned the tax treatment of an
author who might have no income during a six-year period of planning
and writing a book but who would be taxed only when income started
rolling in from royalty payments and sale of motion picture rights.
"Clearly," the person wrote, "were justice done, the treasury should ap-
portion this income over the whole number of years occupied in produc-
ing and in marketing the book."78 In his response, Vinson noted that the
example of the business owner selling out was wrong because Congress
changed the law in 1934 so that the percentage of tax owed on capital
gains decreased the longer a property was held. To the second example,
Vinson said devising a scheme to tax work done in planning and writing
a book would be "administratively impossible."79 He said there was no
basis in law to levy a tax upon study or the work done in planning and
writing a book, adding that the government could not tax mental pro-
cesses or physical labor, only the income derived from such activities.
Vinson had to give a lesson on capital gains to another editor, but in
this case it was in response to an editorial that made it appear that he
was pushing for a change in capital gains at the behest of the country's
"forty-three" millionaires. The writer said the proposal from Vinson's
subcommittee would permit someone in high-income brackets "to cut
his capital-gains tax on a $100 quick profit from $76 to $3O."80 Re-
sponding, Vinson pointed out that the writer erred in using the $76 as the
amount of tax owed when actually it would be the figure upon which a
tax is based on a capital asset held for two years. Of more concern to
him, though, was the writer's assertion that he was looking out for the
interests of millionaires and "not worried at all about the millions of
ordinary taxpayers." He said, "I have a record which I want to leave to
my children of representing the folks rather than those who are some-
times termed 'the privileged' and I know that your great paper doesn't
want to do injustice to one whose record at no time and in no sense has
been that of a reactionary."81 Vinson's attempts to educate the media and
in the turn the public about the complexities of the business taxation
proposals contained in the Revenue Act of 1938 also involved making
addresses on nationwide radio broadcast, a technique so skillfully em-
ployed by the president. However, it is one thing to engage listeners in
an intimate "fireside chat" and quite another to attempt to connect with
a mass audience when the discourse is filled with a litany of corporate
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net income figures and the bewildering array of the different percent-
ages that apply.
Another result of Vinson's sudden national prominence was the flood
of letters he received from people all over the country asking for consid-
eration of their positions on the sundry tax issues. A great deal of the
correspondence concerned a proposed additional tax of 20 percent on
retained earnings of family-owned or closely held corporations. Thruston
B. Morton, later a U.S. senator from Kentucky, writing in behalf of his
family's venerable flour milling business, Ballard & Ballard Company
in Louisville, argued that such a measure would put his firm at a com-
petitive disadvantage and force it to merge with a larger corporation.82
Being allowed to accumulate surplus capital during the good times pro-
vided the means for the company to survive the bad times, Morton said,
noting that when thousands of factories were idle during the depression,
"this company guaranteed and paid its men for five full days work each
week regardless of orders and regardless of whether the mills ran or
not." He added that retained earnings also enabled the company to con-
tinue "its charitable munificence in times when most needed" and to
survive "the disastrous Ohio river flood." Had the proposed tax been in
effect during those years, Morton said, "none of this could have hap-
pened." He added that Ballard was in need of rebuilding its reserves so
that it could modernize and expand.83 A Cincinnati bank president, iden-
tifying himself as "an old Louisa boy," wrote to urge the repeal of the
undistributed profits tax. If continued, he said, "it would practically dis-
embowel all these Companies in the course of time, big and little, and
take away their very life-blood; thousands of them need now to retain
what they have earned this year."84
The owner of a furniture store in Kansas City, Missouri, wrote that
if the proposed profits tax were enacted, he would "dissolve the corpo-
ration. I will not stand for this unjust tax when I have given all of my
best years and efforts to building this business." Noting that during the
depression his operation had lost an average of twelve thousand dollars
a year, he said, "Now that our business is better, I am leaving in the
business every dollar I make. This is necessary to build up the depleted
capital."85
A hardware dealer in Detroit wrote that his business managed to
keep most of its employees throughout the depression and had never
closed down for a day, but only because it "used up all our working
capital and borrowed from friends and relatives some thirty thousand
dollars." He added that although earnings had improved, "due to expan-
90 / Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky
sion in business and with no working capital left, we have been forced to
pay not only our local and federal taxes in installments, but have had to
sell our receivables at usurious rates in order to operate." His business,
he said, needs "numerous items in equipment, purchase of which would
furnish employment all along the line and allow us to compete profit-
ably with our larger competitors." He said he was willing to do his "share
in carrying the cost of government, but you surely must realize that any
business must have working capital in order to exist."86
The chairman of Crane Company in Chicago said his firm would
not have survived the depression had it not been for a liberal surplus:
"We were using the surplus to keep the organization together and the
men off the dole It is apparent that a surplus acts as a balance wheel
to carry a company over bad times and benefits the wage earners by
saving their jobs and the stockholders by preserving their property."87
A friend who was the owner and publisher of daily newspapers in
Huntington, West Virginia, neighboring city to Vinson's Ashland, wrote,
"If the recommendations of your committee . . . are enacted we face
very dark prospects for the future. You will force thousands of small
businesses, which have been efficiently operated and which paid bil-
lions of taxes into the governmental coffers, to go broke or dispose of
their holdings. At the same time you allow big business, giant corpora-
tions with hundreds of thousands of stockholders to go on without pen-
alty."88 In his response, Vinson said he was convinced "that no great
burden would come from the imposition of this tax" because it would be
assessed only on that portion of net income that is left after certain de-
ductions were applied. He also questioned whether large numbers of
companies would be affected. "There will be comparatively few," Vinson
said. "In my judgment there will be between 350 and 600 corporations
coming under the term of the provisions."89 His objective, Vinson said,
was to ensure that the government received the optimal amount of tax
revenue from corporate earnings, adding that the tax proposal would
correct a disparity between widely held corporations, which pay the
normal corporate tax and then shareholders pay a tax on their dividends,
and closely held firms, which were subject to the corporate tax only
when earnings were not distributed as dividends.
No doubt Vinson was cheered when he received a letter from a man
in Pittsburgh on this issue that began, "Accept please my enthusiastic
congratulations upon your committee's proposals in re Close Corpora-
tions." This correspondent, calling the security holder in a closely held
firm "the forgotten man," said the rights that shareholders have in large
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and publicly traded corporations are denied to the stockholder in closely
held companies. Such a stockholder, the writer said, "finds himself...
in a tough spot at best" because the owner-manager "by devious and
varied means—and I speak with experience—was usually able to hold
its earnings down and hold them free from distribution and the Govern-
ment did not always receive its fair share of taxes from this source."90
Vinson also heard from those concerned about other tax proposals
under consideration. An executive of a company that made dominoes
and checkers asked for relief from what he called the "unfair and un-
just" 10 percent excise tax his firm paid on its products. He added, "Re-
cently Japan has entered this field, and it is needless to tell you that we
are not able to meet this competition unless we are relieved of this 10%
excise tax."91 The president of Rutgers University, Robert C. Clothier,
wrote of his concern that high gift taxes had hurt the endowments of
colleges and universities to such an extent that "unless some means can
be found to change the trend, the future of our institutions of higher
learning is most precarious."92 A woman in Boston also wrote to Vinson
about the gift tax, complaining that she bore an unfair tax burden be-
cause she supported her children and their families with income from a
trust fund. "Does it seem fair to levy an additional tax because I choose
to divide my income with my children instead of spending it all upon
myself?" she asked. "Every cent declared in my gift tax return has al-
ready been heavily taxed in my income tax return for the same year."93
In a "Dear Fred" letter, an attorney in Ashland objected to Vinson's idea
Vinson, Sam Rayburn, and Harry Truman at a barbecue, May 1938. (Courtesy of Spe-
cial Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
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for a withholding income tax on wages, a cornerstone of today's system
but untried as yet in 1937. "It would seem to me that employers have
enough on their hands now with their own taxes, governmental regula-
tions, continual labor agitation and all these social security taxes, too,"
the attorney wrote. "To add to the employer the burden of doing the
private and personal bookkeeping for each one of his employees looks
to me to be the last straw."94 Vinson replied that he was "trying to bring
in taxpayers who were not paying income taxes and make certain of
collection and, at the same time, relieve the smaller taxpayers from fil-
ing income tax returns."95 His proposal applied only to taxable salaries
up to five thousand dollars.
The report of Vinson's subcommittee, which was nearly one hun-
dred pages long and contained sixty-three recommendations, became
the framework for the Revenue Act of 1938 and marked Vinson's final
major endeavor as a member of the House. Even before his panel com-
pleted its work, Vinson had been nominated and confirmed as a judge
on the federal appeals court for the District of Columbia. He delayed
taking his new position, however, until he could shepherd the proposed
tax reform through Congress. It proved to be a rocky road. Although the
subcommittee's proposals were adopted virtually intact by the full Ways
and Means Committee, key portions of the bill were eviscerated in the
full House and Senate. The legislation ultimately enacted clearly dem-
onstrated that Congress had paid heed to the business community's ar-
gument that reducing taxes was the way back to economic health. The
undistributed profit tax was substantially lowered and targeted for elimi-
nation in 1939; the special tax on closely held corporations was dropped;
and the tax on capital gains was lowered. The president denounced the
bill, but he let it become law without his signature, realizing that a veto
most likely would have been overridden.
The House dispatched final debate on the Revenue Act of 1938 in
about an hour and turned the remainder of the session into a tribute to
Fred M. Vinson. To applause, representatives of both parties spoke at
length about Vinson's service in the House and their regret at his leav-
ing. Republicans offering warm words included Allen Treadway of
Massachusetts and Frank Crowther of New York, both members of the
Ways and Means Committee; and Thomas Jenkins of Ohio. Treadway,
who had led the fight against the 1938 revenue bill, nonetheless ex-
pressed admiration for its chief architect, Vinson. Calling him a "con-
structive legislator," Treadway said Vinson provided the type of able
and productive service that had endeared him not only to the "member-
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ship of our great committee, which he has ornamented so highly, but
with the entire membership of this body."96 Crowther said it was "dur-
ing the long, dreary, laborious, and tiresome hours of committee work"
that he grew to love and respect Vinson. "That is where I learned why he
was here, and why after his masterful service in this House he has been
elevated to a high judicial position" (6692). Jenkins, noting that he and
Vinson were neighbors and longtime friends, said his only regret was
that the president did not "place him on the Supreme Court bench, where
he belongs. I hope the time may come .. . when he might reach the top
in the judiciary as he has reached the top in the legislative branch" (6693).
Among the Democrats paying tribute to Vinson were John
McCormack of Massachusetts, a Vinson colleague on Ways and Means
and a future Speaker of the House; Robert Doughton, chair of Ways and
Means from North Carolina; majority leader Sam Rayburn of Texas,
also a future Speaker; and Speaker William Bankhead of Alabama.
Vinson, said McCormack, "spoke and voted in an independent and cou-
rageous way—not responsive to a false public opinion, but casting his
vote and expressing his views along the lines which he considered to be
for the best interests of his people—for the best interests of our country"
(6695). Doughton said Vinson had been "a tower of strength in the ardu-
ous duties which have fallen upon our committee during the past few
years," and he had "ceaselessly labored to ascertain the facts and to
bring about the enactment of tax legislation giving equality of treatment
to all" (6697). Rayburn, whose campaign for majority leader had been
managed by Vinson, spoke of the value of their professional and per-
sonal relationships, saying, "Few things in my life have come into it that
have meant as much to me as this fine man and the fine friendship he has
given me" (6698). Bankhead said that while it was sad that Vinson's
"very brilliant and very distinguished legislative service" was ending,
"all of us are comforted by the fact, and deeply comforted by the fact,
that he will continue his public service in another tribunal" (6698).
CHAPTER 5
Vinson's Transition from
Legislator to Jurist
When Fred Vinson was sworn in as associate justice of the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,1 on May 12, 1938, at the
age of forty-eight, it was a big transition for the Kentucky politician
who had served twelve years in Congress and achieved great heights in
legislative leadership. Vinson's devotion to his legislative responsibili-
ties was so strong that more than five months elapsed between his con-
firmation for the circuit court and his swearing in. The delay was the
result of Vinson's desire to steer the tax bill to passage in the House of
Representatives. In his farewell address to the House, he urged adoption
of the conference report on the tax bill, which was agreed to the same
day.
Roosevelt wanted Vinson to stay in Congress until the tax bill was
passed, but there was a legal question whether he could do so after being
confirmed as a circuit court judge. The president discussed this matter
with Attorney General Homer Cummings. Subsequently, Golden W. Bell,
assistant solicitor general, drafted a lengthy legal opinion on the sub-
ject, which recommended that the president delay issuing the commis-
sion to Vinson "until the time he expects to render himself ineligible as
a member of Congress by taking his oath of office as a judge."2
Vinson's elevation to the circuit court was seen by virtually all ob-
servers as a reward from Roosevelt for his strong support for the
president's legislative proposals, including some of the more unpopular
measures such as the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and the court-
packing bill. Roosevelt, however, was primarily interested in his own
agenda, and Vinson's appointment served the president's goals extremely
well.
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Following his reelection in 1936, Roosevelt devised strategies to
deal with what he considered to be a constitutional crisis resulting from
the Supreme Court's invalidation of a number of New Deal policies.
The most visible strategy was his court-packing scheme for the Supreme
Court. A less visible approach focused on the composition of lower fed-
eral courts, that is, district courts and the circuit courts of appeals. The
president was determined to appoint lower court judges, preferably
Democrats, who could be counted on to support New Deal measures.3
No one fit these requirements any better than Fred Vinson, a loyal, lib-
eral Democrat with a proven track record of supporting the president's
proposals. Vinson never lost his zeal for Roosevelt and his policies, a
view not held by all his colleagues. In 1940 Harold Stephens, a fellow
associate justice on the circuit court, expressed amazement that "Fred
can maintain his enthusiasm for F.D.R."4
Vinson's age was also a point favoring his appointment. Given his
obsession with getting rid of Supreme Court justices over age seventy,
Roosevelt felt compelled to select younger judicial appointees at all lev-
els. At forty-eight, Vinson was three years younger than the average
Roosevelt circuit court appointee.5
Other factors, no doubt, were also influential in FDR's decision to
appoint Vinson to the federal bench. He had been considered for a court
vacancy in 1934 and again in 1937,6 but at that time he was still a valu-
able asset to Roosevelt in the House. By 1938 the main components of
the New Deal tax reforms were in place. A business backlash, the reces-
sion of 1937-1938, and increasing congressional hostility to tax reform
spelled the end of Roosevelt's efforts to redistribute wealth through the
tax structure. Furthermore, with the clouds of war casting shadows on
the United States, FDR's attention began to shift more to international
concerns. Vinson now could be more useful to Roosevelt in the judicial
branch than in Congress.
In background and experience, Vinson was very different from the
men who served on the circuit court for the District of Columbia; none
of them had held an elective office. Most of them came with some pre-
vious judicial experience, and half of them came from the ranks of the
law professorate. These characteristics reflected Roosevelt's overall pat-
tern of staffing the circuit court. Approximately 61 percent of FDR's
appointees in his second term had prior judicial experience, thus provid-
ing the president with some basis for judging their support for his policy
agenda. Sixteen percent of Roosevelt's circuit court appointees in his
second term had been law professors, who, according to court scholar
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Vinson, top center, and his colleagues on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1940. In front are Harold M. Stephens, D. Lawrence Groner, chief judge,
and Justin Miller. Flanking Vinson are Henry W. Edgerton, left, and Wiley Rutledge,
right.
Sheldon Goldman, "could articulate a judicial philosophy that would
favor the New Deal and provide intellectual leadership on their courts
supporting economic liberalism." Only 12 percent of FDR's appointees
had been members of Congress.7
The chief justice of the circuit court was Lawrence Groner, a highly
respected jurist from Virginia who had been a district court judge for ten
years before his elevation to the circuit court in 1931. Although he was
a Republican, in 1938 Roosevelt had named him chief justice. His ap-
pointment came only after Attorney General Homer Cummings assured
FDR that Groner could "be ranked as a Liberal Republican."8
Groner's nomination to the chief justiceship came as part of a "pack-
age deal" in which Roosevelt was personally involved. The president
had written to Attorney General Cummings that a vacancy in the chief
justiceship of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
"clears the way for a disposition of the matter along the lines we origi-
nally discussed."9 The package entailed promoting Groner to chief jus-
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tice, appointing Henry White Edgerton, a liberal law professor from
Cornell, to the associate justice vacancy left by Groner, and appointing
Vinson to the vacancy created by the resignation of Associate Justice
Charles Robb.
Associate Justice Harold Stephens from Nebraska was next in se-
niority to Groner. Roosevelt appointed him to the circuit court in 1935
after a career that included serving as a prosecuting attorney, a state
judge, and a U.S. assistant attorney general. Stephens and Edgerton at-
tended Harvard Law school together and had maintained a close rela-
tionship ever since. Although Edgerton had worked briefly as a special
assistant to the attorney general, his main occupation was professor of
law at such prestigious schools as George Washington University, the
University of Chicago, and Cornell University.
The other two judges with an academic background were Justin
Miller and Wiley Rutledge. Miller, of North Carolina, was appointed in
1937, just a few months before Vinson. He had been a member of the
U.S. Board of Tax Appeals prior to his nomination. Before that he had
served as dean of the Law School at Duke University and at the Univer-
sity of Southern California. Rutledge was nominated to the circuit court
in 1939 after Congress passed an act in 1938 authorizing an additional
justice for the court. His appointment brought the total number of judges
to six. Like Edgerton and Miller, Rutledge brought to the court consid-
erable experience as a law professor. He had taught at Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis and at the State University of Iowa, where he was
also dean of the Law School. Rutledge's appointment completed FDR's
reconstruction of the circuit court for the District of Columbia.
Although Vinson did have legitimate credentials to serve as a judge,
including his previous experience as a practicing attorney and his posi-
tion as prosecuting attorney, the political nature of Vinson's appoint-
ment made him suspect in the eyes of some, including perhaps his
colleagues on the circuit court bench. Several months before Vinson
was appointed, Associate Justices Groner and Stephens, discussing a
vacancy on the court, had expressed concern about the kind of person
they might get as a colleague. "While the Attorney General indicated . . .
that he would do everything within his power to get a first class lawyer
appointed to the court," Stephens wrote to Groner, "he did not feel wholly
sure that he would be able to accomplish his own desires." Stephens
reported that Joseph B. Kennan, assistant to the attorney general, doubted
that "it would be possible to get a non-politician appointed [because]
jobs on this court were looked upon as plums and that some mediocre
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men had been put off in respect to other circuits with the statement to
their supporters that vacancies would be coming along on the United
States Court of Appeals." Stephens called the prospects "depressing."10
There is no record of Stephens's reaction to Vinson's appointment,
but the fact that Vinson had led the fight for the court-packing scheme
might have been a strike against him. Stephens was "unqualifiedly against
the President's program." He called it "a very grave mistake both from
the standpoint of the merit of the plan and from the standpoint of its
political effect."" Ironically, Stephens's close friend on the circuit court,
Henry White Edgerton, strongly endorsed the Roosevelt plan, because
"the present system has been, on the whole, harmful to the majority."
Edgerton supported a constitutional amendment forbidding any court to
hold any act of Congress unconstitutional and an amendment requiring
judges to retire at seventy.12
Although Vinson's circuit court brethren may have had misgivings
about his political connections, they were not reticent to make use of
those connections when it served their interests to do so. Two years after
Vinson left his judicial position and was head of the Office of War Mo-
bilization and Reconversion, Stephens sought his influence for a forth-
coming appointment to the circuit court. Stephens reported to Groner
that Fred "has talked with the President along the lines [we discussed]
. . . I am sure he has done the best he can do for us.13
If Vinson had any apprehensions about making the transition from
the legislative to the judicial branch, he did not openly acknowledge
that he did. After a few months on the job, Vinson was asked whether he
liked judicial work better than legislative work. He replied, "They are so
much alike that there is not much difference.... Making laws is more or
less a judicial procedure."14
There are indications that Vinson never completely severed his leg-
islative ties. Two members of the Washington Bureau for Newsweek wrote
in 1946 that Vinson never got used to the "cloistered atmosphere of the
federal bench." They claim that to relieve boredom he developed a "pay-
as-you-go" revenue plan based on a withholding tax and that he was
"frequently consulted by the Congressmen who pushed through the with-
holding tax bill."'5
Certainly the judicial life had advantages over legislative life for
Vinson, not the least being financial security. The necessity of cam-
paigning every two years for his seat in Congress had put a serious strain
on the family finances. A judicial career, with its guarantee of a lifetime
appointment, offered economic stability, even if the compensation was
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relatively modest. His annual salary increased from $10,000 to $12,500
with his court appointment.lfi
However, Vinson had to pay a price for that financial security. He
had to leave behind the excitement of partisan politics and colleagues
on both sides of the aisle who had held him in high esteem. No one was
more eloquent about Vinson's abilities than House Speaker Sam Rayburn.
"No man out of the 435 Members here could leave this House in my
humble judgment, and the House suffer a greater loss," Rayburn said. "I
have never served with a man of finer character, of greater patriotism or
of more outstanding ability than is possessed by the gentlemen from
Kentucky."17
One aspect of political life that Vinson had to forgo was that of
helping friends and constituents receive the benefits of government. Even
after donning his judicial robes, he received hundreds of requests from
constituents who did not understand that he could no longer help them.
Usually they sought help with getting a job or an appointment, and
Vinson's stock answer was that he was no longer in a position to help.
"I've withdrawn from the fray," he told one petitioner.18 He even had to
tell his mother-in-law that he could not do anything about her plea to
reduce the sentence of her son and Roberta's brother, Bob, who had
been jailed for a criminal offense. Vinson explained to her that the sen-
tencing judge's hands were tied. "I don't think that there is anything that
could be done even if the Judge did have the power to reduce the sen-
tence after Bob went away."19 The tone of Vinson's letter to his mother-
in-law suggested a slight irritation at being asked to intervene.
In a letter to another former constituent, who sought his help shortly
after he took his seat on the bench, Vinson reflected on his new job.
"The opportunity for real service presents itself here," he said. "It is
along different lines than that to which I have been accustomed, but I
like it."20 Although Vinson enjoyed a cordial and friendly relationship
with his fellow circuit court judges, he never had the kind of bonds with
them that he did with congressional colleagues like Sam Rayburn. As a
group these judges appeared to have amicable relationships, although
some were closer than others. Stephens and Groner, who served together
for several years before the others came, were especially close. Edgerton
and Stephens had a long-standing friendship prior to the latter's arrival
on the bench. A former law clerk, Willard Pedrick, who served Vinson
on the circuit court, said that Vinson was especially close to Chief Jus-
tice Groner and to Wiley Rutledge.21 Indeed, Vinson's tribute to Rutledge
after his death reflects his affection: "The fellowship which I shared
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with him on the bench and in the conference rooms on two courts was
made precious by his unfailing courtesy and good humor. To know of
Justice Rutledge was to admire and respect him. To know him was to
love him."22
As a body the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was growing in importance during Vinson's years there. Despite the fact
that many considered it to be the second highest court in the nation,
members of the court were sensitive to views to the contrary. In 1937
Stephens told Groner that he took exception to a comment by the attor-
ney general that the court ranked "below two or three of the circuits in
importance." Stephens recalled that when the appointment had been of-
fered to him, Attorney General Cummings had told him "distinctly that
he regarded it as the most important Federal court next to the Supreme
Court."23 Roosevelt himself wrote to a potential nominee to the court in
1937 that the "D.C. Circuit" has taken on wholly new importance in the
last few years—is now easily the second most important Federal court
in the country."24 One sign of the circuit court's importance is that it was
seen as a source of potential Supreme Court nominees. In 1943 Rutledge
was elevated to the Supreme Court, and Vinson joined him there in 1946
as chief justice. All of the other judges—Groner, Stephens, Miller, and
Edgerton—at one time or another were touted as possible Supreme Court
appointments.
Certainly the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was, as it is today, in a singular position in the federal judicial structure.
In addition to exercising the same jurisdiction as the other circuit courts,
it has unique powers deriving from its location at the seat of govern-
ment. Thus the court heard cases of national importance, and it was this
aspect of the court's jurisdiction that explained Roosevelt's personal in-
volvement in selecting the judges sympathetic to the New Deal for that
court. The court also heard appeals stemming from the municipal courts
for the District of Columbia.
The members of the District of Columbia circuit court worried about
how they measured up to other circuit courts. Their level of productivity
was a matter of great concern. In this regard the District of Columbia
court did not compare favorably to other courts. This problem grew pro-
gressively worse during Vinson's tenure on the court, and in November
of 1942, Chief Justice Groner advised his colleagues that in the number
of cases terminated in the period between July 1 and September 30,
1942, their court "was behind every Circuit except the First and the
Fourth, and in each of those Circuits there are but three judges; and in
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cases pending we have a greater number than any other circuit."25 A
year and a half earlier, Groner had admonished his fellow judges to re-
solve the backlog problem. One suggested approach to the problem was
to hand down more decisions either without opinions or with per curiam
opinions. The latter are opinions that speak for the court without being
attributed to any one judge. Vinson's response to this suggestion offers a
good insight into how the circuit court handled its review of cases.
Vinson defined the situation as a "practical problem," which lay in
the nature of their conferences, where they initially discussed cases.
After conference the judges reached a tentative conclusion about a case,
and the judge writing the opinion determined whether it should be per
curiam. Vinson thought the court should determine this only after a thor-
ough consideration of the case, "with the deliberate conclusions of the
Judges expressed in conference both as to the conclusion reached and
the nature of the opinion." All this should occur, Vinson said, before an
opinion is assigned to a judge.
In a memorandum to his colleagues, Vinson explained, "It is appar-
ent that when any of us are thoroughly saturated with a case we are
prone to magnify the importance of the case and we properly desire to
give expression upon many issues which have been decided many, many
times. We restate the principles involved, and in such expressions, may
at times be more confusing than helpful to the Bench and Bar." Vinson's
practical nature is seen in his desire to make both conference delibera-
tions and opinion writing more efficient. His political instincts also were
apparent in his advice to colleagues that "unless we do speed up our
work we will soon have bogged down [to a state] of which Mr. John
Public, the Bar and we complain."26
There is no indication that the court resolved the problem of pro-
ductivity by the time Vinson departed in May of 1943. The court was
still handing down the same number of per curiam opinions in 1943 as it
had in 1938, an average of about seventeen per year, slightly less than 4
percent.
Perhaps it was the tensions produced by concerns such as their lower
productivity that prompted Stephens to complain to Rutledge that their
court was a "lugubrious place."27 Rutledge agreed, adding, "There isn't
enough cheer here. . . . We take ourselves maybe a little too seriously
and I wonder whether sometimes we aren't all too damned conscien-
tious." Rutledge thought it might be a "good thing for all six of us to get
out about once a month and get dead drunk—I mean privately of course.
Maybe halfway drunk would be better." If that form of release should be
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too "nonjudicial," Rutledge recommended "just sitting around now and
then chinning or kidding each other or playing tiddlywinks."28
There were lighter moments in the corridors of the circuit court, as
shown in a concurring opinion that Rutledge wrote to go along with
Vinson's majority opinion in a saga of two dogs.29 It seems that Popo
was the perpetrator of a fatal assault upon Little Bits, a pet Pomerian.
The owner of Little Bits had apprised Popo's owner of the dog's ma-
levolent tendencies but to no avail. Following the fatal attack, Little Bits's
owner sought to recover from the loss of the dog. From a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, Popo's owner appealed. He argued that Little Bits
was not licensed as required by statute and therefore could not be re-
garded as personal property. Vinson carefully reviewed the statutory pro-
visions, along with his common sense, and concluded that Congress did
not intend for an unlicensed dog to lose its status as personal property.
He affirmed the judgment in favor of the owner of Little Bits.
To inject a little humor into their proceedings, Rutledge entered a
concurring opinion that consisted mainly of a poem written by Justice
Miller, the unofficial court poet. He cited the poem as "additional au-
thority."
This saga of Popo, malevolent pooch,
And Erck's Pomeranian pet;
Your etymological-legal approach
To canons of dog etiquette,
Persuade me that canines are property still
Whether licensed, unlicensed or tagged;
Not ferae naturae, or fair game to kill
So long as there's a tail to be wagged. (344)
Exchanges between the circuit court judges were not always light-
hearted banter, as is apparent in an exchange of letters in a case about
the interpretation of a will.3" Miller wrote a dissent highly critical of
Vinson's majority opinion in a case decided in July 1938, just a few
months after Vinson joined the court. Although Vinson seemed overly
defensive about the criticism, it was Chief Justice Groner who first re-
marked on the intemperate nature of the dissent in a letter he wrote to
Vinson. Groner called the language in which Miller had framed the dis-
sent "unfortunate." He said Miller had "attempted to belittle the main
opinion in a way in which I think it ought never to be indulged by mem-
bers of the same court." Groner acknowledged that Miller had the right
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"to express his contrary views as fully as he cares to," but he said it was
"unwise to attempt by ridiculing the main opinion to destroy the confi-
dence of the litigant and the public in the expressed view of the court."
Such disagreement is appropriate in the conference but not in public.31
Vinson's response to Groner was in total accord with the chief's. He
said "the language carried me back to heated arguments in the court
room; heated debates on the House floor, or even ill-considered lan-
guage used in the political campaign If my college days were not so
far behind me, I would be inclined to think that it was a hazing." Per-
haps, Vinson said, "it might be the effect of the weather."32
In a few days' time, Vinson received a gracious letter from Miller.
He said, "You are the last person on the court whom I would desire to
offend and I hasten, therefore to assure you that no reflections of any
kind were intended upon you, and that I had no other intention than
merely to comment as frankly and critically as I could upon your write
up."33 Later, Miller wrote Vinson to say that he had revised his dissent in
the case. The final version of the dissent is toned down considerably
from the earlier circulated draft, which had been a point-by-point, sharp
attack on Vinson's logic.
On another occasion Vinson took exception to Justice Stephens's
attempt to correct sentence structure in one of his opinions. Stephens
had suggested that Vinson eliminate a double negative in a sentence in
order to make a rhetorically stronger sentence. Stephens wrote a lengthy
letter of explanation and apology. "In respect to the double negative:
Please believe me . . . that I did not intend to criticize your sentence
structure. I meant only to suggest the clearing up of what I thought was
one of those inadvertent ambiguities in which I find myself so often
indulging."^
Disagreements over language and sentence structure aside, the mem-
bers of the circuit court displayed fairly strong unity in their judicial
opinions, owing perhaps to Roosevelt's carefully crafted selection pro-
cess. In the five years that Vinson sat on the court, he participated in 439
cases, an average of 88 cases per year. In all of these cases, there were
only 25 dissenting opinions, slightly less than 6 percent of the cases
heard. Vinson himself dissented only five times, about average for his
court. His files contain drafts of several dissenting opinions that he later
withdrew.
As chief justice, Groner was responsible for constituting the three-
judge panels who would sit during a specific week to hear cases. Each
judge sat two different weeks of each month, with the combination of
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judges changing each time. In approximately 68 percent of the cases in
which he participated, Vinson sat with Groner. He sat with Miller in 50
percent of the cases and with Edgerton in 40 percent of the cases. For
whatever reason, the chief justice did not pair Vinson with either Stephens
or Rutledge nearly as often as with the other three judges.
Pedrick, his former law clerk who later became a law professor at
Northwestern University, described Vinson's process for reviewing a
case. The judge would study the record diligently before listening to
arguments of a case. After a tentative decision was reached in confer-
ence, Vinson paid close attention to the circulated opinions, where "the
real decision process took place." Occasionally he would ask a law clerk
for a memorandum on certain aspects of a case.35
During his tenure on the court, Vinson wrote 107 majority opinions,
5 dissenting opinions, and only 3 concurring opinions. He also wrote 2
separate opinions in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.
Petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court were filed in 25 cases in
which Vinson wrote the majority opinion. In all but 4, the petitions were
denied. Of these, the Supreme Court reversed Vinson in 3 and affirmed
in only 1.
Vinson's work habits on the bench did not change substantially from
his days in Congress. He would arrive at work around ten and remain
there until seven or eight in the evening. Much to the chagrin of his law
clerks, he expected them to remain until he left. Pedrick said "it was
often these after-six sessions where work on a particular case gave way
to general conversations" in which they came to really know "the Judge."
Their conversations ranged from Kentucky politics, to baseball, to the
problems of the New Deal, to their families, to Kentucky stories. Pedrick,
recalling these sessions fondly, said they were enjoyed by the judge and
his law clerks.
The cases in which Vinson participated covered a wide range of
issues, from the monumental to the mundane. Cases pertaining to the
national government involved requests for judicial directives to public
officials to carry out their official duties, known as mandamus; injunc-
tions against federal officials; appeals of rulings by administrative agen-
cies in the areas of patents and trademarks, taxation, war risk insurance,
condemnation of lands, bankruptcy, and the Selective Service; and re-
views of orders by the Railroad Retirement Board, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, and the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor. Much of this litigation was the direct result of the
expanded role and responsibilities of the federal government, a conse-
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quence of FDR's social and economic reforms aimed at overcoming the
effects of the depression and restoring confidence in the economy.
Appeals of decisions made by government officials implementing
federal programs were the main source of cases brought before the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Of the 107 cases in
which Vinson wrote the majority opinion, 36 were the result of adminis-
trative action. These included decisions about patents, war risk insur-
ance, workmen's compensation, FCC licenses for radio stations, actions
by various secretaries of Cabinet-level departments, and rulings by the
Railroad Retirement Board and the National Mediation Board. Nearly
85 percent of these opinions favored the government's decisions. In only
6 instances did the opinion go against the government.
The rulings in federal cases had important implications beyond the
immediate litigants in the case. The cases pertaining specifically to the
District of Columbia were narrower in their scope and impact. They
involved more common concerns about wills and trusts, real estate trans-
actions, negligence, insurance, domestic and family relationships, con-
tracts, and banking. Approximately one-third of the cases Vinson heard
were in the area of private law, where the state had no direct interest.
Rarely were the members of the court called upon to determine
whether particular statutes or governmental actions were constitutional,
the kind of issues that Vinson regularly had to confront later on the Su-
preme Court. The more routine nature of many of his opinions on the
circuit court, involving the application of laws rather than their validity,
make it difficult to distinguish a clear and underlying judicial philoso-
phy at this stage of his judicial career. Nonetheless, some tendencies
were already apparent and later became major themes in his Supreme
Court years.
One characteristic was Vinson's propensity to defer to the power of
the legislature. In cases involving statutes of Congress, Vinson was very
meticulous about reviewing the history and wording of the legislation to
determine the lawmakers' intent. Another trait was his strong reliance
on precedent. It is not unusual for judges to rely on precedents as a basis
for a decision, but Vinson was especially inclined to be guided by previ-
ous rulings. In cases where there was no judicial precedent or clear statu-
tory authority, Vinson "reached his decisions by the rational analogical
processes of common law rather than by introduction of personal view."
Judge Stephens said of Vinson, "He is a believer in government accord-
ing to law and regards it the duty of judges to apply the law and not to
make it."36
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Pedrick attributed Vinson's approach to judging to two key experi-
ences of his life: his legal education at Centre College and his long ten-
ure in Congress. "On questions dealing with subject matter that he had
studied at Centre and which his practice had confirmed, such as the law
of evidence . . . he tended to view the law as a relatively closed system."
In these types of cases, Vinson "viewed the judging process as largely a
search for previously established rules."37
Vinson's legislative experience resulted in a different approach on
questions relating to the exercise of federal power. In such cases, Vinson
"viewed the law as a dynamic institution and the courts as a partner in
the affirmative process of government." Vinson did not bow unques-
tioningly to congressional and administrative actions; rather, "when he
thought a problem calling for the exercise of governmental power ex-
isted he was certain that government had the power to act, if it went
about the task in an acceptable way" (58-59). Taken as a whole, these
characteristics indicate that Vinson was inclined toward a philosophy of
judicial restraint, according to which judges give greater leeway to
policymakers in the elected branches of government. Given his strong
defense of FDR's court-packing plan, aimed at justices who consistently
invalidated New Deal legislation, it was unlikely that Vinson would have
assumed a more activist stance as a judge.
In his deference to legislative intent and reliance on precedent, Vinson
was very much like his fellow judges. His opinion writing, however,
was distinctly different. Vinson took a more practical approach to opin-
ion writing than did his intellectual brethren on the circuit court. His
opinions, "plain and unadorned,"38 were usually briefer than those of his
colleagues. His formula was to state the facts, identify the pertinent le-
gal authority, and explain the conclusion demanded by the logical analy-
sis. Vinson's reputation for logical analysis had been established in the
House. Speaker William Bankhead said he had "the best organized and
analytical mind I ever came in contact with."39 Another former House
colleague, congratulating Vinson on one of his opinions, said he was
"pleased to find that attention to detail and comprehensiveness of view
which always characterized you up here."40
Vinson relied very heavily on his law clerks in the drafting of his
written opinions. Usually the clerks prepared an initial draft of the opin-
ion after discussing the case with the judge. Then Vinson reviewed the
draft and pressed the clerks on legal points. In these deliberations Vinson's
"Kentucky-isms" often came out. Arguments or propositions Vinson
thought were valid were "sound as old wheat in a mill." When law clerks
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advanced arguments that Vinson thought were suspect, he would say,
"We had better get out the lead pencil on that one." Pedrick said the
"lead pencil" reflected Vinson's tough-mindedness and skepticism.
Vinson was not impressed with statements clothed in fancy rhetoric.
The statement had to be written, he said, "so that folks can understand
it." Pedrick summarized Vinson's views on written opinions this way:
"[His] emphasis on simplicity and communications was the product of a
long experience in public life and at the same time a testament to his
faith in an informed democracy as the proper mode of government. He
had great faith in the 'folks.'"41 Perhaps this was part of Roosevelt's
scheme—to nominate Vinson, a man with political instincts and a prac-
tical bent, to a court that was filled predominantly with men who had
extensive judicial experience or careers in academia.
The key to Vinson's rulings about administrative decisions lay largely
in how he construed the statute being implemented. He must have felt
some ownership for many of these, for a significant number of the con-
gressional statutes at issue were passed while he was in Congress and
with his support. These included the Railway Employee Retirement Act
of 1934, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Vinson's familiarity with the statutes and their
legislative history is vividly demonstrated in several of his opinions.
Vinson was generally inclined to defer to the expertise of adminis-
trators charged with implementing a statute unless he could be convinced
that administrative discretion was exercised in a manner contrary to leg-
islative intent. A good example of his approach to reviewing administra-
tive discretion is found in his opinion in Railroad Retirement Board v.
Bates.42 The case involved a railroad employee who worked for two
railroads jointly. When one ceased operations, she was granted a pen-
sion, which was later assumed by the government under the Railroad
Act of 1937. While receiving this pension, she continued to work for the
other railroad company. When she ceased her employment with the sec-
ond company, she applied for an annuity, which provided a much larger
monthly payment than her pension. The Railroad Retirement Board in-
terpreted the 1937 Railroad Act to mean that a pensioner could not re-
ceive an annuity because she was already receiving a pension. The
employee petitioned the district court, which directed the Railroad Re-
tirement Board to determine the employee's eligibility for an annuity,
irrespective of the fact that she was currently a pensioner, and if she
was found eligible, the board was to grant an annuity in lieu of pen-
sion benefits.
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Vinson began his opinion by stating that "proper weight" should be
given to the board's interpretation because it "is familiar with problems
in its field and has had experience and understands that Act which cre-
ates it." However, because this was a relatively new area for the board,
Vinson felt more attention should be given to legislative intent. "[The]
question is a question of law, one of statutory interpretation," and that,
he said, "is a field in which courts are regarded as having some expert-
ness" (643). Vinson proceeded to dissect in minute detail the relevant
provisions of the Railroad Retirement Acts of 1935 and 1937. He con-
cluded that the unique position of the employee had never occurred to
Congress, leaving the court with the additional burden of trying to deci-
pher congressional intent "from the history, the outlines, and the pur-
pose of the act, as well as the specific language."43 Applying logical
analysis, Vinson concluded that Congress could not have intended a re-
tiree to receive both a pension and an annuity, nor could it rationally
have intended that one who draws a pension be automatically excluded
from receiving an annuity in lieu of a pension. Following this logic,
Vinson determined that the district court had properly directed the Rail-
road Retirement Board to determine the retiree's eligibility for an annu-
ity. Rutledge praised Vinson's opinion for doing "a good job of supplying
what Congress left out."44 Intended as a compliment, Rutledge's remarks
suggest that Vinson was really engaging in policymaking, rather than
following legislative intent.
Once Vinson was convinced that the intent of Congress in passing a
statute had not been violated, he would generally allow administrators
broad discretion in their rulings. He did this in the case of National
Association of Wool Manufacturers v. Fleming,45 when the woolen in-
dustry questioned how the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor defined what products constituted the woolen
industry for the purposes of determining prescribed wages. The defini-
tion was crucial because of wage differentials for workers producing
cotton and woolen products and the impact of established minimum
wages on competitiveness between industries. The law in question was
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLS A), of which Vinson had been an avid
supporter while in Congress. Although it did not pass until June 25,
1938, after his departure for the circuit court, Vinson understood how
crucial the FLSA was to the legacy of the New Deal. He wrote majority
opinions in three cases that involved the powers of the Wage and Hour
administrator under the FLSA, upholding the administrator's power in
every one.46
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Vinson's opinion in National Association of Wool Manufacturers
contains a highly detailed analysis of the minutiae of the law and its
application to the competitive advantages and disadvantages of the
woolen and textile industries. Vinson determined that the ruling of the
Wage and Hour administrator regarding the definition of a woolen prod-
uct, which hinged on such technical details as what percent of wool a
product must contain to be classified as woolen, was consistent with the
legislative goal of eliminating competitive advantages that result from
low wages, but that elimination, Vinson wrote, "is to be done only as
rapidly as practicable. That is primarily a matter for administrative de-
cision and we are not an administrative tribunal. The scope and extent of
judicial scrutiny over administrative action depends upon the statute,
the adequacy of the process below, and a sound relationship between the
two branches of government."47 Satisfied that all requirements of the
law had been met, Vinson allowed the ruling of the Wage and Hour
administrator to stand.
In one opinion in which Vinson construed a congressional statute
regarding administrative discretion, he was reversed by the Supreme
Court. The dispute was between two labor organizations over represen-
tation for collective bargaining for employees of a railroad carrier, New
York Central Railroad. The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen sought to
be the representative of all the yardmen employed by the company. The
Switchmen's Union of North America sought to represent a smaller group
of employees.48 The National Mediation Board designated all yardmen
for the carrier as participants in the election and, based on the results,
certified the Brotherhood as the sole representative. The Switchmen
brought suit in district court challenging the board's determination about
who could participate in the election and seeking cancellation of the
certification. They claimed that the board should have recognized that
certain portions of the New York Central Railroad represented separate
crafts and classes and were entitled to a separate vote on representation.
The board maintained that its only power extended to determining
whether New York Central was a single carrier and that, having done so,
it had no additional authority to separate yardmen by different crafts
and classes.
Vinson determined that the board had fulfilled legislative intent in
declaring that New York Central was a single carrier for the purpose of
collective bargaining and that the board did not have the authority to
treat the switchmen as a separate class. "It is for Congress to determine
policy," he said. "Our province is to keep the Board within the confines
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of that policy" (796). Rutledge dissented in this case, mainly on the
question of whether the statute required the board to designate that all
yardmen employed by the carrier constituted a single unit.
Nine months after the opinion was handed down and seven months
after Vinson's departure from the circuit court, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision. Rutledge, now a Supreme Court justice, did not
take part in the case. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority
opinion, which did not discuss the merits of the controversy but focused
exclusively on whether the district court, and subsequently the circuit
court, had any grounds to intervene at all once the board had made its
ruling. The majority determined that the board's decision was final be-
cause Congress had not specifically authorized judicial review. In ef-
fect the majority ruling reached the same result as Vinson but on
different grounds. Justice Stanley Reed wrote a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Owen Roberts and Robert Jackson. The dissenters
argued that Congress did not intend to deprive employees of a judicial
remedy in protecting their rights in selecting representatives in collec-
tive bargaining.49
One of the more interesting opinions that Vinson wrote regarding
administrative action involved a petition for a writ of mandamus direct-
ing Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to pay twenty-five thousand
dollars to the estate of the petitioner.50 This was the sum specified in the
congressional appropriations bill in 1937. Morgenthau refused to pay
the money on the grounds that Roosevelt had vetoed the measure and
returned it to Congress within the ten-day limit allowed by the Constitu-
tion. The plaintiff claimed that the bill had not in fact been returned
properly within the specified time. Although the record showed that
Roosevelt's veto message had been delivered in writing to the Senate on
the tenth and last day allowed by the Constitution for presidential ac-
tion, the plaintiff claimed that the message was not properly presented
to the Senate with a formal announcement of the president's objections.
The administration claimed it had followed a thirty-year practice for
sending veto messages to the Senate and that the Senate itself had failed
to properly record the receipt of the veto message and present it to the
members.
The Prevost case presented something of dilemma for Vinson be-
cause it pitted Congress and the president against each other, and Vinson
felt a kinship with both. In the end he concluded that the evidence sup-
ported the president. Vinson argued that to require a presidential mes-
senger to do more than deliver the written veto message with stated
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objections created an artificial formality and erected a barrier to the
exercise of a constitutional power. Some of Vinson's former colleagues
in Congress squawked to him about his ruling. To placate them, Vinson
sent a copy of his opinion to Lewis Deschler, parliamentarian of the
House of Representatives. In reply Deschler admitted that Vinson's rea-
soning in the opinion was "sound and clear" and "amply cleared up any
fogginess that remained."51 Deschler could not help but comment that
House procedures, being much more efficient than those of the Senate,
would never have allowed such a gap in procedures to occur.
Tax cases, not included in the previous discussion of administrative
rulings, constituted about 18 percent of Vinson's majority opinions. Given
his extensive involvement with tax legislation in the House of Repre-
sentatives, Vinson relished dealing with tax matters. The cases repre-
sented a mixture of tax issues and consisted mainly of appeals from the
rulings by the Board of Tax Appeals, for in tax cases Vinson was not as
inclined to support the government's position as he was in other areas of
law. Here he could draw on his own expertise on tax legislation and not
feel obliged to defer to administrative experience. In all of his opinions
in tax cases, Vinson wrote for a unanimous majority, another indicator
of the influence of Vinson's expertise in tax matters. That other mem-
bers of the court respected Vinson's acumen in tax matters is shown in
comments his colleagues sent to him about his opinions. For example,
in one tax case,52 Vinson reversed the government on the question of
timeliness of appeal because he determined that the petitioner, who had
gone to extraordinary lengths to meet a filing date, should not have his
appeal barred, because the failure was not his fault. Chief Justice Groner
said, "Well written—If this is not the law it ought to be the law and I
challenge any court to say the contrary and ordinarily what ought to be
is. Certainly in a case like this."53 Justice Edgerton also praised the opin-
ion as "a beautiful job,"54 and Justice Stephens described it as "good
law, good sense."55
In another tax case, which upheld a decision of the U.S. Board of
Tax Appeals,56 Justice Rutledge described Vinson's opinion as "an ex-
cellent and interesting opinion. You leave the appellant pretty much . . .
in the position of the minister who announced alum-lipped, that 'there
will be no services today.'"57 Justice Miller, who had previously served
on the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, called the same decision "clear, con-
cise and convincing."58
Vinson ruled against the government's position in ten of the nine-
teen tax cases in which he wrote the majority opinion. Three of these ten
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opinions involved appeals of rulings by the Board of Tax Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Seven involved appeals from the U.S. Board of
Tax Appeals.
Five of the seven tax opinions that went against the federal govern-
ment consisted of several insurance cases that were consolidated be-
cause they all involved the same beneficiary. The main opinion for these
insurance cases was John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, Com V
of Revenue.,59 The issue revolved around the question of who was liable
for unpaid taxes on the interest earned on deposits from an insurance
estate; the deposits had been left with the insurance company at the
direction of the beneficiary, who was now deceased. The Board of Tax
Appeals had upheld the ruling of the commissioner of internal revenue
that the insurance companies, with whom the beneficiary had similar
policies, were liable for the tax.
To resolve the question, Vinson meticulously analyzed the provi-
sions of the relevant statute, the Revenue Act of 1926, and concluded
that Congress clearly intended the beneficiary alone to be liable for the
tax in the case of an insurance estate. Not content to let the decision rest
on the most recent statute alone, Vinson proceeded to conduct a com-
parative analysis of provisions of two previous revenue statutes, which
left him with no doubt that the legislature intended the beneficiary to be
liable for the insurance estate tax. For good measure, he included an
exceq?t from a report by the Ways and Means Committee on the subject.
His opinion in the insurance estate tax cases clearly illustrates Vinson's
empirical bent, a trait honed as a legislator. Just as he approached the
development of legislation with an eye toward the facts, Vinson had
great faith that sufficient study of all relevant facts inevitably leads to
the correct answer to a question.60
Although known for his faithful reliance on precedents, Vinson did
not accept them with a blind eye, and in the insurance tax cases he was
skeptical of the one precedent cited by government lawyers. That case,
he said, "is not on all fours," and he offered a detailed explanation of
why it did not square with the issue at hand.61
Among the cases involving an appeal from a ruling by an adminis-
trative agency was the only one of Vinson's majority opinions that dealt
with racial discrimination.62 The case was about a dispute over union
representation between the National Federation of Railroad Workers, a
black association that represented the coach cleaners employed by the
Texas Pacific Railway Company, and the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen
of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The Na-
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tional Mediation Board investigated the dispute and called for an elec-
tion. Based on the results, the board certified the Brotherhood as the
proper representative for the coach cleaners. The Federation sought an
injunction from the district court to void the election.
Several issues were raised by the Federation to prevent the board's
certification from taking effect. One of the issues was the effect of Broth-
erhood representation on its employees. In particular, the Federation
objected to rules established by the Brotherhood that required black
members to participate in separate lodges and stipulated that officers
bargaining with the carriers would not be black. The Federation claimed
that these rules would deprive them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the equal protection clause, which states that "no state shall deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Vinson disagreed with the Federation's claim. The Fourteenth
Amendment, he noted, prohibits discrimination by state governments,
and in this case no state action was involved. The only possible constitu-
tional rights that might be pertinent were those guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment, but, as Vinson noted, it relates only to actions by the fed-
eral government and not private parties. Therefore, the Brotherhood,
being a private association, could limit the rights of minority employees
without offending the guarantees of the Constitution. Vinson explained:
"It may be that certification of the Brotherhood will mean that white,
rather than colored men will represent the coach cleaners in negotia-
tions with the carrier. If so, that condition will obtain because a majority
of the coach cleaners voted for it, and not by reason of any governmen-
tal action. Moreover, it can continue only so long as they desire it. It
cannot be that the Constitution denies colored workmen the right to se-
lect a white representative or vice versa."63
The Federation case was on the cusp of cases about discriminatory
practices that soon flooded the federal courts. Vinson's determination
that private discrimination was not subject to the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment was consistent with Supreme Court precedents go-
ing back to 1883, when the Court invalidated the public accommodations
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. That statute, passed by Congress
to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, sought to prohibit discrimi-
nation in privately owned public accommodations.64 Several years later,
when Vinson was chief justice of the United States, the Supreme Court
found ways to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to private forms of dis-
crimination. A good example is Vinson's 1948 majority opinion in Shelley
v. Kraemer,65 in which he found a way to effectively end racial covenants,
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which allowed private discrimination in the sale of housing. Vinson also
supported the Supreme Court's ruling in 1953 that outlawed the unoffi-
cial primary held in Texas by the Jaybird Democratic Association, an
all-white organization.66
Vinson's tendency to side with the government is readily apparent
in criminal cases. He wrote twelve majority opinions in criminal cases,
and of these only three favored the defendant. Because these cases dealt
with constitutional issues more than with other areas of the law, Vinson's
opinions in this area offer some of the clearest insights about his judicial
philosophy. A good example, and one of his more noted opinions, was
Viereck v. United States}1 George Sylvester Viereck was convicted by a
jury for violating the Propaganda Agency Act of 1938, which required
persons acting as agents for foreign governments to register with the
secretary of state. It provided criminal sanctions for willfully omitting a
material fact on the original registration forms and on subsequent bian-
nual statements. In answer to a question on the registration form asking
for a "comprehensive statement and nature of business," Viereck simply
wrote "author and journalist." He omitted information about extensive
propaganda activities in which he was engaged.
The trial began in 1942, shortly after the United States entered World
War II, and in pretrial publicity Viereck was vilified as a "Master Nazi
Agent" by such notable publications as the Washington Post.6* At his
trial the government proved that Viereck had been engaged in German
propaganda activities, but Viereck argued that he undertook such activi-
ties in his own behalf and that, according to his interpretation of the
statute, he was not required to provide the nature of these activities to
the secretary of state. Vinson disagreed with that argument. He wrote,
"When the concern is with disclosure of propaganda, a measure would
be a half-way one if it did not require one to reveal propaganda he puts
out on his own as well as the propaganda he puts out as an agent."69
Vinson's dislike of the petitioner's numerous activities as a propaganda
agent is palpable as he recounts in vivid detail the varied ways in which
Viereck promoted the pro-German cause.
A second issue raised by Viereck was whether the act had autho-
rized the secretary to ask the petitioner for all of his activities, including
those undertaken in his own behalf. Vinson, who normally sought to
follow legislative intent to the letter, in this case was willing to "read a
little more liberally the Act's authorization to the Secretary to do that
which will make the statute work and a full disclosure of all political
activities of an agent as agent or as his own is a sine qua non for feasibil-
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ity" (951). In Vinson's view the secretary of state had acted completely
within the scope of legislative authority when he promulgated rules re-
quiring a full disclosure of all political activities of a registrant, and
Viereck "knew that he was skirting the line of demarcation in leaving
unrevealed many of the things he did" (958).
A third set of issues raised by Viereck concerned misconduct on the
part of the prosecutor and certain procedural errors by the trial judge.
Vinson acknowledged that the conduct of the prosecuting attorney "was
not exemplary, particularly in view of his office." This he blamed in part
on the defense counsel, and he claimed that both attorneys had made
remarks that were uncalled for. Vinson also agreed that the prosecuting
attorney had made "inflammatory" remarks in his closing statements
but that these did not result in "prejudicial error" (962). As to certain
theatrics in which the prosecutor had engaged, Vinson said, "This ap-
pears to us to be unnecessary stage business on the part of the prosecu-
tor, [but] . . . the ends of justice would not be served by reversing on
instances of improper action like this, considering the many aspects of
this case" (963). The crux of Vinson's opinion is summed up in these
closing comments: "The alleged looseness of the Act, the regulations,
and the forms, is not sufficient to allow a willful evader to succeed in a
technical claim that he has not been legally brought to task. The evi-
dence presented against the defendant is strong and he has no quarrel
with its deficiency" (964). In other words, Vinson was convinced that
the defendant was guilty in this case and that none of the procedural
shortcomings could have changed that fact.
Viereck petitioned the Supreme Court for a review of the circuit
court's ruling, and in March of 1943, shortly before Vinson left the court,
the Court reversed the decision.70 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice
Stone pointedly rejected the reasoning of Vinson's opinion. As to the in-
terpretation of the statute itself, Stone wrote: "The unambiguous words of
a statute which imposes criminal penalties are not to be altered by judicial
construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach, however
deserving the punishment" (244). Taking aim at Vinson's obvious dislike
of Viereck's activities, Stone said, "Men are not subject to criminal pun-
ishment because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions or thwarts a
general purpose sought to be effected by specific commands they have
not disobeyed For the courts are without authority to repress evil save
as the law has proscribed it and then only according to law" (245). The
majority of the Court also thought that the prosecutor's inflammatory
remarks to the jury had in fact deprived the petitioner of a fair trial.
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An unlikely pair of Supreme Court justices dissented from the ma-
jority opinion—Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas. Black wrote
the dissenting opinion, which argued that "the general intent of the Act
was to prevent secrecy of any kind of political propaganda by foreign
agents" and that the act could legitimately be interpreted to grant the
secretary of state the latitude to ask for all propaganda activities in which
a foreign agent had engaged. Black's opinion rested squarely on his
strong commitment to the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
"Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our people,
adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and
the false, the bill is intended to label information of foreign origin so
that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the infor-
mation comes from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements
rather than detracts from the prized freedoms by the First Amendment.
No strained interpretation should frustrate its essential purpose" (251).
The irony of the judicial lineup in this case is rich. Vinson's opinion
was reversed by an opinion written by the chief justice he would eventu-
ally succeed. A pair of justices who frequently disagreed with Vinson,
especially over issues of individual rights, voted to uphold him in this
case, albeit for entirely different reasons. In his zeal to promote First
Amendment freedoms, Black happened to end up on Vinson's side, but
during their time on the Supreme Court, they were often at odds over the
extent of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court's opinion in the
Viereck case did not end the matter. Only four months later, in July
1943, Viereck was retried and reconvicted. Again the circuit court of
appeals affirmed the conviction,71 although Vinson was no longer there.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Vinson did on occasion take the defendant's side, even when he
thought the defendant was guilty. In Nueslein v. District of Columbia,12
Vinson offered an impassioned defense of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure. The defendant in the
case had been convicted in the Police Court of the District of Columbia
of driving while under the influence of liquor. The saga began when a
taxicab struck a parked vehicle. The two police officers summoned to
investigate found a cab close to the damaged car. In the cab they found
the registration card and a character license of the owner, but the driver
had left the scene. The officers went to the owner's home, and when
their knock was not answered, they entered. They called to the occu-
pant, who answered from upstairs. The officers went upstairs and spoke
with the defendant through a bathroom door. He said he would be right
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down. After fifteen minutes, he presented himself and stated that he was
the owner of the vehicle. The officers, accepting this statement to be
true and also believing him to be intoxicated, arrested him.
The conviction hinged mainly on the officers' testimony that the
defendant said he was driving the taxicab at the time of the accident.
Citing other evidence that corroborated the charge of intoxication, Vinson
thought that the defendant was most likely guilty. However, he con-
cluded that the officers' behavior of entering the suspect's home without
his permission and without a search warrant or an arrest warrant was a
blatant disregard for the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. This
left the question of whether the officers' testimony could be admitted as
evidence.
In 1940 the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained by an unlaw-
ful search was far from settled. Vinson noted that under common law
practice evidence would have been admissible no matter how obtained,
and most state courts were following the common law rule. Until 1914
the federal courts followed the same principle. But the landmark case of
Weeks v. United States changed that.73 Under the rule established by
Weeks, illegally obtained evidence became inadmissible. Although there
were exceptions to this rule, Vinson determined that this case was not
one of them. He said, "When two interests conflict, one must prevail. To
us the interest of privacy safeguarded by the Amendment is more impor-
tant than the interest of punishing all those guilty of misdemeanors."74
Adding emphasis to this position is Vinson's conclusion that it is "more
important to effectuate the vital constitutional policy of security in the
home from general investigations directed toward the hope that some
evidence will turn up [than to pursue a] policy that all misdemeanants
be brought to task" (696). This emphasis on the individual's rights is
somewhat surprising, given Vinson's own prosecutorial background as
well as his position on rights of the accused while he was on the Su-
preme Court.
A case concerning the power of a federal district court to punish for
criminal contempt charges presented Vinson with an opportunity to ex-
pand on that most profound legal question, What is the law?75 The issue
was raised because of a change in the Supreme Court's construction of
an 1831 statute governing obstruction-of-justice offenses and punish-
ment for such acts. In 1939 the defendant, Emmett Warring, pleaded
guilty to a charge that he had used money to influence a prospective
juror and to charges that he had investigated the possibility of influenc-
ing another prospective juror. These acts occurred several days prior to
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the trial and some distance from the courthouse. The defendant chal-
lenged his sentence for these acts, claiming that the district court's con-
tempt power did not extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any
person in their own court or so near thereto as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice.
A 1905 Supreme Court construction of this provision of the statute
established that it included all attempts to influence jurors, wherever
they were, and this ruling had been reinforced with subsequent deci-
sions. In April 1941, the Supreme Court overturned its previous rulings
and said that the words "so near thereto" must be given a geographical
and not a causal construction. The question before the circuit court was
whether the 1941 interpretation of the statute took away the district court's
power to punish Warring for his acts in 1939. Vinson said it did not.
Vinson's opinion provides a lengthy analysis of the implications of
both courts and legislatures changing "the law." "This discussion on the
effect of altering the law can be pretty well tied together," he said, "when
it is realized that the law is not a pure science, that law loses its vital
meaning if it is not correlated to the organic society in which it lives,
that law needs some stability of administration, that law is more for the
parties than for the courts, that people will rely upon and adjust their
behavior in accordance with all the law be it legislative, judicial or both."76
He concluded that a change in the meaning of a statute applied only to
actions from that time forward and not to previous actions, acting under
the authority of a court ruling in effect prior to that time. He said, "We
reject the idea that if a court was considered to have the power in 1939
to do a certain thing under existing statutory construction, and in 1941
that construction is changed so that it no longer has the power to do that
thing, it should be concluded that it never had the power in 1939" (647).
To Vinson it boiled down to a matter of maintaining order, which
requires that people conform to the rule of law, and they can only con-
form to the law as it is laid down. He wrote in conclusion: "It has often
been said that the living should not be governed by the dead for that
would be to close our eyes to the changing conditions which time im-
poses. It seems even sounder to say that the living should not be gov-
erned by their posterity, for that, in turn would be downright chaotic."77
The Supreme Court seemingly validated Vinson's opinion a few months
later when it refused a petition of certiorari to review the case.
As a Supreme Court justice, Vinson heard numerous cases involv-
ing civil liberties. While on the circuit court he heard relatively few. The
Cold War, in full force during Vinson's tenure on the Supreme Court,
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had not yet started to heat up. Besides his opinion in the Viereck case,
the only civil liberties case in which Vinson wrote a majority opinion
was United States v. Offutt.n In 1942 Dorsey Offutt, a lawyer, and his
client, Robert Sopourn, were indicted on charges of conspiring to vio-
late the Selective Service and Training Act. They challenged the suffi-
ciency of the indictment.
Before Sopourn had been ordered to report for induction, he had
consulted with Offutt, and subsequently both men had spoken with mem-
bers of the local board and presented them with a letter and two affida-
vits. Offutt had spoken with the appeals agent for the local board on the
date his client was to have been inducted and subsequently advised his
client not to report. Both men were charged with conspiracy to avoid the
draft. They claimed that for a conspiracy to exist there had to be an overt
act and that failure to report was not an overt act. Vinson, however,
determined that failure to report met the test of an overt act. In part he
was influenced by the gravity of the times. The United States had just
entered World War II and was "preparing for what has become our
nation's crisis" (340).
Nonetheless, Vinson was clearly troubled by the possibility that in-
stead of agreeing to take the law into their own hands, the defendants
were merely attempting to bring all facts and consideration to the atten-
tion of the local board, which he said was "a natural function of a lawyer
and a registrant." Vinson recognized that the right to be represented be-
fore a government body was essential to protecting individual rights,
and he tried to weigh this right against the government's need to recruit
soldiers. He said: "In the interests of a free people, preserving the dig-
nity of the individual as much as possible while organizing our nation's
forces to battle in that behalf, we make it our concern to flash a signal
of warning. Perchance this is not adjudication as usual, but if we can
add one title to the preservation of man's worth behind the lines, we
accept the concomitant responsibility."79 Vinson revealed a surprising
sympathy for a draft dodger. Perhaps the case reminded him of his
own reticence at the onset of World War I to leave behind a life of
relative luxury to become engaged in military action. Even when he
did "sign up," he was never on the battlefront but was safely "behind
the lines," at military bases in Kentucky and Arkansas. It was not a
happy experience for Vinson, and in later years he recalled the disrup-
tive effects of the military, which included "the heartache and misery of
separation from home and family."80 The Offutt decision was a tough
call for Vinson, but others saw it as the correct decision. Rutledge sent
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him a brief note describing it as "a very well written opinion—and—
curbstone. I would agree."81
Whenever the circuit court was reviewing appeals from trial courts,
Vinson almost always voted to uphold the lower court's ruling. In
Parmelee v. United States, a case that involved imported materials de-
termined to be obscene, Vinson wrote a blistering dissent, highly critical
of the court majority, which had reversed the lower court's determina-
tion of what is obscene.82 The materials in question were copies of im-
ported books, entitled Nudism in Modern Life, which contained a few
small nude photos. A U.S. customs officer deemed these materials to be
a violation of federal customs laws and confiscated the books. The trial
court determined that the books were obscene and should be destroyed.
The majority opinion wrestled with the meaning of the term ob-
scene and concluded that it "is not susceptible to exact definition" (731).
The majority put heavy emphasis on the literary, scientific, and educa-
tional merit of the materials. Vinson thought that the Tariff Act's ban on
obscene materials called for a broader definition of the term than the stan-
dard established in precedents where obscenity was associated with crimi-
nal statutes. In an opinion that is highly unusual for him because of its
strident tone, he pointedly attacked on the reasoning of the court majority.
Vinson thought the court majority had overstepped its bounds as
appel late court judges in holding that the book was not obscene within
the meaning of the statute. This was not an issue of the First Amend-
ment right of free speech but a question of whether the district court
correctly followed the mandate of Congress. Vinson considered the is-
sue of whether the materials were obscene to be a factual question, and
the verdict of the lower courts on matters of fact is "final and conclu-
sive," he said. For Vinson the issue turned on whether reasonable men
could differ, and if so, "the question is one for the fact trier." In this
logical vein, Vinson reasoned that "whether a book is obscene presents a
question of fact, if reasonable men could differ on that question" (740).
In deference to the trial court, Vinson argued that the appellate court
could not disturb the trial court's determination "unless it is prepared to
say that no reasonable men could have found as did the [court]." Nor-
mally such a determination is done by a jury, but in this case the trial
court judge was the arbiter, and as such, Vinson said, precedent dictated
that the court "may not apply to the facts its own method of analysis or
process of reasoning as a judge, but should try to reflect in its findings
the common experience, observation and judgment of the jury of aver-
age intelligence" (741).
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On this point Vinson is vehemently in opposition to the majority
opinion, because it tends to rely more on the judgment of social scien-
tists, who "do not always reflect, or even intend to reflect, the sentiment
of the community." Furthermore, he argued, "this publication . . . is to
be judged in light of the present day standard, not that of the world of
tomorrow."83
The Parmelee dissent provides clear evidence that Vinson adhered
to a philosophy of judicial restraint in limiting the role of the court in
matters he thought were best left to others. He chose to focus on the
powers of the trial court under the statute rather than to examine the
larger issue of what is obscene. In this and other regards, the Parmelee
opinion also reveals once again Vinson's pragmatic nature. He is clearly
deciding the case based on the climate of the times rather than announc-
ing an abstract standard for the future. Vinson rarely wrote dissenting
opinions. As a person known for being a team player, it went against his
grain. The tone of the Parmelee dissent revealed how much the majority
opinion violated his basic judicial philosophy.
Vinson has been taken to task by some critics for using an overly
narrow standard to determine the meaning of the term obscene, but at
least two of his fellow judges thought that Vinson had made a persuasive
argument. Rutledge wrote, "You made a good case for this point of
view."84 Edgerton was even more complimentary. He described the opin-
ion as "excellent, good-tempered and devastating." Edgerton said that
although he "did agree heartily with Justin [Justice Miller], I am now
inclined to agree with you that the judgment should be affirmed—tho I
do not 'approve' the judgment below."85 Both judges, and Edgerton in
particular, imply that although they might have made a different deter-
mination than the trial court judge made, they thought Vinson was right
in arguing that it was his call and not that of the appellate court. One
senses, however, that Vinson agreed with the trial court judge's determi-
nation that the materials in question were in fact obscene. The materials
offended his own sense of decency.
The Parmelee opinion also shows how important the average per-
son was as a point of reference to Vinson as a politician and a former
legislator. He takes offense that the appellate court would give more
credence to experts than to the views of those in the community at large.
It was this aspect of the opinion that appealed to one of his former col-
leagues in the House. Rep. Frank Crowther of New York, praising
Vinson's opinion, wrote, "We have surely traveled a long road . . . and
modesty in our women folks no longer seems to be an attribute.... I feel
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a measure of obscenity of various types has been hiding behind the mantle
of art for a long time. I am for your dissenting opinion."86
In March 1942 Chief Justice Harlan Stone appointed Vinson to serve
as chief judge of the Emergency Court of Appeals. This court was estab-
lished by the Emergency Price Control Act, passed January 30, 1942, to
hear complaints about price ceilings for commodities and rents set by
the price administrator. Vinson served on this court with two other mem-
bers—Judge Albert B. Maris of the Third Judicial Circuit, and Judge
Calvert Magruder of the First Judicial Circuit. Vinson held this position
simultaneously with his seat on the circuit court, and the members often
met in circuit court offices. The court's powers were limited to setting
aside a regulation or price schedule, dismissal of the complaint, or re-
manding the decision back to the price administrator. Relatively few
complaints were filed with the Emergency Court of Appeals in its first
ten months. In January of 1943, Vinson made a speech before the Bar
Association of the District of Columbia, in which he remarked on the
paucity of complaints, fifteen altogether. He attributed this to one of
three possible factors or a combination of them: "(1) that Congress did
an acceptable job in the enactment of the legislation; or (2) that the Price
Administrator has done an acceptable job in the administration of the
Act . . . ; or (3) that the American people affected by the legislation,
visualizing its purpose, have buckled their belts and are taking it; that
the business men of this country, large or small, are as patriotic as we
would have them be, and though pinched in spots, they yield to their
financial discomfiture for the good of the country."87 After the first year,
complaints came more readily. By January 1944 the number had in-
creased to 113.88
There were other explanations for the limited number of appeals
from the Office of Price Administration (OPA) decisions. The proce-
dures for appealing OPA rulings were so restrictive that they may have
discouraged complaints. For example, the administrator was directed to
consult with industry representatives "as far as practicable," but no right
to a hearing was guaranteed. Further, Congress adopted novel proce-
dures that made it more difficult for parties to challenge the validity of
the OPA regulations. In giving the Court of Emergency Appeals exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review the validity of price orders, Congress sought
to avoid delays that could be caused by litigation in separate district
courts and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the national price regu-
lation program.89
Vinson served on the Emergency Court of Appeals for fourteen
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months. During that time he wrote four majority opinions and issued
one dissent. Petitions for certiorari were filed in two of his majority
opinion cases, and both were denied by the Supreme Court. In the case
in which he dissented, Vinson's opinion went against the ruling of the
price administrator. In one of his longest opinions, he determined that a
warehouse was a public utility and as such was entitled to an exemption
under the Price Control Act. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed
the majority and sustained Vinson's dissent.90
Although it was not apparent at the time, Vinson's tenure on the
Emergency Court of Appeals was a prelude to his appointment as direc-
tor of the Office of Economic Stabilization, to which Roosevelt appointed
him in May 1943. As chief judge of the Emergency Court of Appeals,
Vinson had jurisdiction over price controls for commodities and rents;
but as director of economic stabilization, his responsibilities were much
broader. Both jobs placed him squarely in the administration's scheme
for managing the economy during the war.
Pedrick, his former law clerk, surmised that Vinson, missing the
"rough and tumble of politics," welcomed his first opportunity to serve
the war effort. He thought it likely that Vinson would have left the court
even if the world had remained at peace. According to Pedrick, Vinson
"entered the executive branch of government with real enthusiasm and
with only minor regrets over the seeming end of his judicial career."91
Nonetheless, his five-year tenure on the circuit court of appeals was
an invaluable asset for Vinson. Without that experience it is not likely
that he would have been considered for the chief justiceship in 1946. As
a member of the circuit court, Vinson had established a reputation as a
competent but cautious judge. Judge Stephens wrote that Vinson's work
on the court of appeals was characterized by "integrity of mind, cour-
age, common sense and balance, a natural sense of justice, and dili-
gence."
His judicial philosophy had all of the traits of judicial restraint. His
deference to legislative intent, to administrative expertise, and to the
discretion of trial court judges resulted in a consistent progovemment
stance. In upholding the decisions of administrative agencies, he helped
to sustain the legacy of the New Deal in areas such as labor mediation,
wage and hour policies, and economic policies. His strong penchant for
following the dictates of precedent meant that he would not be a trail-
blazer in setting new precedents. His colleague Stephens said that Vinson
recognized, like Justice Benjamin Cardozo, that "adherence to prece-
dent . . . must be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have
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faith in the even-handed administration of justice of justice in the
courts."92 When it came to the law, Vinson placed a high value on soci-
etal order and believed that stability and continuity in the law were es-
sential to that end.
His opinions were methodical in their presentation of detail and fact
and their emphasis on logical analysis. Except for rare occasions, his
writing did not exhibit much passion or humor. Although Vinson's di-
rect, dry, methodical approach to opinion writing was not highly valued
by judicial scholars, it had appeal for a president like Truman in 1946,
when he was looking for a sturdy hand to guide the Supreme Court
through the troubled waters in which it foundered.
CHAPTER 6
Available Vinson
On New Year's Day 1945, a Monday, Tennessee congressman Estes
Kefauver wrote a short note to Fred M. Vinson, who at the time had been
director of the Office of Economic Stabilization (OES) for a year and a
half. "Today, I am in my office thinking of the past year and of the
things and people we should be thankful for," he began. "My thoughts
turn to you and of the hard work, vision and unselfish service you have
rendered our country. I just wanted to express my confidence in you and
to wish you good health in the new year."1 Also in his office that day was
James M. Proctor, a judge on the appeals court for the District of Co-
lumbia, and he too had been thinking of his friend and former colleague.
"I frequently hear your able and patriotic service commended, often by
those who do not know you personally," Proctor wrote to Vinson. "Yet,
I dare say little of praise comes directly your way. So I hope this kind of
New Year greeting may bring some pleasure and encouragement."2 It
did. In his reply Vinson noted that warm words for the OES "are few and
far between" and that Proctor's kind gesture helped in "lightening the
burden of the many problems confronting us and bringing to us a real-
ization that our efforts are valued by those who understand."3
The burden Vinson bore as head of the OES, a position he held for
nearly two years, was to preside over practically every facet of the home-
front economy, making decisions to control rents, prices, production,
and wages so that inflation would not add to the cost of fighting the war
as it had in World War I. To achieve President Roosevelt's goal to keep
the lid on prices and wages, Vinson more often than not fought multifront
battles against the demands of farmers, businesses, and workers. The
job had been so draining for Vinson's predecessor, James F. Byrnes, the
first economic stabilizer, that he wanted out after just a few months and
lobbied the president for something more grandiose; he wanted to make
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policy instead of setting the price for "potatoes and beans."4 Roosevelt
responded by creating the Office of War Mobilization and installing
Byrnes as its first director. In this position, which acquired the informal
title of "assistant president," Byrnes had responsibility for running all
phases of the war effort except those that were strictly diplomatic or
military. His relief at shedding OES was obvious. "It's a happy job—
happy for me to turn it over to you," Byrnes said at Vinson's swearing-
in ceremony in May 1943. For his part, Vinson, then fifty-three, said,
"I'm smiling today for the last time."5
Although his smiling days might have been over, Vinson neverthe-
less was eager to be serving in a job of such importance and one that
propelled him into the midst of the frenzy swirling in wartime Washing-
ton. Being a federal judge had provided him with security because it
was a lifetime appointment, and Vinson found the work satisfying, but it
was also a cloistered existence and far removed from the epicenter of
political action in which he had thrived and excelled as a congressman.
As the nation's chief inflation fighter, he could again get out his lead
pencil, as he liked to put it when confronted with difficult problems, and
work out a solution, just as he had done so many times in drafting com-
plicated tax and revenue legislation. Explaining his decision to leave the
judiciary, Vinson said, "I had a feeling that I was not making much of a
sacrifice in the war and it was up to me to do something more than sit on
the bench and listen to lawyers' arguments." Furthermore, Vinson said,
he was "constantly reminded of my eldest boy in the air force ready to
sacrifice his life if God willed it, while his father was living a life of
ease." He said when Roosevelt offered him the job of economic stabi-
lizer, "I was glad to do it. After all, we've only one life to live and when
the country needs one's services, I believe that it is one's duty to serve."6
His wife, Roberta, left no doubt that she too was pleased with the move.
Noting that Byrnes also had given up lifetime tenure as a Supreme Court
justice to become OES director, she said, "I remember thinking how
magnificent it was of him to do so. Now that practically the same thing
has happened to us, I realize that it is, indeed, a privilege rather than a
sacrifice to be able to contribute toward winning the war."7
Vinson's stay in the executive branch lasted only three years, but in
this brief period he became a household name, earning a reputation as a
tough-minded, honest, and able administrator who could be relied upon
to handle whatever troubleshooting task came his way. During this time
he became known as "Available Vinson," because whenever Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman needed someone to tackle a difficult assignment,
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Vinson left the federal bench in 1943 to head the Office of Economic Stabilization.
(Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
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whether it was managing the domestic economy during wartime or mak-
ing plans for the postwar period, they reflexively turned to Vinson. He
always answered the call, even if he had to take a pay cut of three thou-
sand dollars, as he did when agreeing to give up the job as economic
stabilizer to become federal loan administrator in 1945. The great re-
pository of goodwill that Vinson had cultivated while in Congress was a
valuable asset once he crossed over into administrative ranks. It assured
him of easy congressional confirmation and made him an effective ad-
vocate for important administration programs. Vinson's success in the
executive branch, as in Congress, also was due to his genuine warmth
and gentility in dealing with people. He might disagree with someone
but still leave that person "convinced that he has given their viewpoint
the most careful consideration." Though not in any sense a backslapper,
"he makes you feel that he has a deep and abiding interest in your hap-
piness, the state of your wife's health, the progress your children are
making in school, the welfare of your family's pet dog."8
The near-universal acclaim Vinson received for his work in the ex-
ecutive branch naturally led to talk of him as a potential presidential
candidate. That never happened, but it was a logical assumption given
the mark Vinson made in performing assignments of ever-increasing
importance and complexity for both the Roosevelt and the Truman ad-
ministrations. After nearly two years as economic stabilizer, Vinson took
charge of government loan policies at the Federal Loan Agency, a job he
held for less than a month; he then succeeded Byrnes again, this time as
director of war mobilization; and finally he was named secretary of the
Treasury.
Shortly before Vinson had assumed command at OES, the presi-
dent, worried that creeping inflation would soon add billions to the cost
of the war, issued his "hold the line" order to freeze wages and prices,
with some exceptions, at their adjusted 1942 levels and to roll back the
cost of some food items. To Vinson's literal way of thinking, his march-
ing orders from Roosevelt were clear and specific: hold the line meant
exactly that. In a nationwide broadcast over CBS on July 8,1943, Vinson
spelled out in dramatic fashion the vexing economic difficulties facing
the country and pledged his resolve to hold the line. "Soaring wages,
skyrocketing prices, frantic migration and turnover of labor, uncertainty
in food production, black markets, shortages, slowdowns, strikes—those
are the body sores of inflation," he said, adding that eliminating "this
dread disease in its initial stage is our primary task." Failure to do so,
Vinson said, "will gravely impair the nation's effective support of our
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heroic forces abroad; will delay the hour of military victory; and will
sow the seeds of bankruptcy, panic, deflation and poverty in the peace-
time which follows." Stabilization, in contrast, he continued, "will
strengthen us in our job of supplying the armed forces; will hasten the
hour of victory; and will lay the solid economic foundation for a pros-
perous and productive peace. On the home front, then, we are fighting
the fires of inflation."9
Extinguishing those fires proved to be far more formidable than
Vinson could have imagined when he moved into OES headquarters in
the Federal Reserve Building in mid-1943. Dancing around the flames
and poised to add fuel to the fire were organized labor, business inter-
ests, farmers, members of Congress, Cabinet secretaries, and even FDR
himself. But Vinson, perhaps as well as anyone else in public life at the
time, was suited for the task of reconciling conflicting interests and fash-
ioning compromise. In Congress and on the court of appeals, he had
earned the reputation as a hard bargainer, "but a bargainer all the same,
a man with convictions but no hard and fast dogma, with a spirit of
compromise and a willingness to move ahead slowly, so long as he does
move ahead."10 One of his many sayings, certainly one apropos to the
heat he faced as economic stabilizer, was "Things go better when you
don't get hot and bothered."
The appellation "judge," which followed Vinson from the judiciary
to OES, was also appropriate to the job, because in a sense he remained
a judge, "settling disputes between warring Washington agencies at the
rate of about one a day and handing down dour decisions against every
interest that sought to sneak or bully its way across the anti-inflation
line."11 In addition he tried to remain judicial-like by staying above the
political fray, rendering judgments independently, objectively, and im-
partially. He took great offense at the suggestion that anything other
than the evidence at hand could be a factor in his decisions, as one indis-
creet lobbyist for southern cotton cloth manufacturers discovered. In a
report to the group on his meetings in Washington with various officials,
including Vinson, concerning a textile wage dispute case, William P.
Jacobs claimed that a decision favorable to the industry might be forth-
coming. He explained that because of "pressure we know has now reached
him [Vinson] it is possible that for political reasons he may be forced to
indefinitely hold the matter, or he may recommend a basis somewhat
lower than the WLB [War Labor Board] would authorize."12 The so-
called confidential report was obtained by the Textile Workers Union,
which in turn made it public through the press. Vinson was furious. In a
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scorching letter to Jacobs, he told the lobbyist he had blatantly distorted
their meeting by stating in his report that "effective pressure from higher
up" might sway the wage decision. "Nothing in my interview with you
could have given a color of truth to these statements," Vinson wrote.
"Naturally, I deeply resent any intimation from whatever source, that I
am subject to political pressure in discharging my duties."13
Willard Pedrick, who had been a law clerk for Vinson on the circuit
court and was on his staff at OES, recalled how carefully Vinson avoided
conflicts of interest. He noted that when orange or mushroom growers
might be given a small price increase, they would send a crate of or-
anges or mushrooms to OES. When Pedrick and others asked Vinson
what to with the bounty, "he would say, get rid of it. He wouldn't touch
it, not one piece," Pedrick said, adding that Vinson "wanted to be in a
position to say that his office, and this was true, never accepted any
showing of gratitude or anything else."14
In reaching decisions on especially tough and complex issues, Vinson
relied upon the decision-making technique he used on the bench and
throughout his career, which he called the saturation method. That meant
soaking himself in information and then letting the facts suggest the
answer.15 For Marvin Jones, in charge of the War Food Administration,
Vinson's slow, deliberate approach sometimes was frustrating. "Fre-
quently when we would go to him with troublesome questions," Jones
recalled, "he would listen and then say, 'I will think over this and let you
know.'" Urging a quick decision, especially if the issue affected perish-
able food, Jones told Vinson he would rather have a wrong decision than
to have it delayed. Vinson "would laugh and say, 'Better be careful, I
might decide against you.'" Jones allowed, however, that Vinson was
"an exceedingly busy man with a terribly difficult job" who rarely "made
a wrong decision."16
Vinson's methodical ways also must have been chafing to his young
and brash legal assistant at OES, fellow Kentuckian Edward F. Prichard
Jr., whose father had been a classmate of Vinson's at Centre College and
his teammate on the baseball team. Prichard, a Washington wunderkind
who had graduated with honors from Princeton University and Harvard
Law School, started at OES shortly after its creation as head attorney
under Byrnes. He had risen rapidly in the Roosevelt administration
through his intelligence, political acumen, and connections. Prichard
was a law clerk and protege of Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter
and a presidential insider who was influential in shaping the New Deal;
he also, interestingly, became Vinson's chief antagonist on the Supreme
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Court. A memo Prichard wrote Vinson in spring 1944, in which he mixes
business and politics, illustrates the range of his interests, his egocen-
tricity, and his impetuous nature. Prichard, who had not yet turned thirty,
listed four things he wanted Vinson to do. In his first point, he said it was
"most urgent" that Vinson meet with Donald Nelson, who headed the
War Production Board, and Chester Bowles, who was in charge of the
Office of Price Administration, on the issue of low-cost clothing.17 "I
suggest you set it up for Monday without fail," Prichard said. Secondly,
he told Vinson, "I think you should sit tight on strawberries. If you make
him sweat it out, it will be interesting to see what Chefs [Bowles] reac-
tion will be." In his third instruction, Prichard wrote, "I think you should
call Justice Byrnes and tell him how important it is for somebody to
defend the Montgomery-Ward seizure on the Hill, particularly in the
Senate." He thought the issue, which involved the government's un-
popular takeover of the mail-order firm in a labor dispute, "will come
back to harm us in the campaign again and again." Finally, Prichard
suggested "you talk to Justice Byrnes and Judge Rosenman [Roosevelt
adviser] about Lyndon Johnson. It would be a most excellent move."17
According to Prichard's biographer, he was "seeking an expanded role
for an up-and-coming Texas congressman."18 Despite the incongruity of
their personalities, Vinson took Prichard with him as a top aide when he
moved to higher and higher positions in the executive branch.
The staff at OES, which numbered fewer than fifty, also included
two other Kentuckians—Paul L. Kelley and Paul A. Porter—who were
valuable assistants to Vinson. Kelley, from Ashland, was Vinson's right-
hand man not only at OES but also earlier while he was in Congress and
on the court of appeals and later when he was chief justice. Porter, who
as a young Kentucky newspaper editor and lawyer was drawn to Wash-
ington by the New Deal, was general counsel and deputy director of
OES. He went on to become chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission and head of the Office of Price Administration.19
Some of the biggest challenges Vinson and his staff at OES faced
came from organized labor, which was especially effective in pressing
its demands for increased wages in the face of higher living costs. Unions,
despite their no-strike pledge at the beginning of the war, used strikes
and threats of strikes to win concessions, weakening the "Little Steel"
formula that was designed to fix all pay increases to 15 percent above a
1941 base for the duration of the war.
In dealing with the upheavals in 1943 staged by unions representing
coal miners and railway workers, Vinson discovered that Roosevelt's
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Vinson with longtime aide Paul Kelley, a native of Ashland. (Courtesy of Special Col-
lections, University of Kentucky Library.)
interpretation of his own hold-the-line dictum contained shades of gray,
which undercut his effectiveness and credibility as the strict stabilizer
he intended to be. For his part, the president bought labor peace at the
risk of adding to inflation; he needed the mines open and the rails run-
ning because of their obvious importance to waging war. He also wanted
to keep labor in his camp in the likely event he would make a fourth run
for the White House in 1944.
John L. Lewis, the monomaniacal leader of the United Mine Work-
ers, led the assault against the Little Steel formula through tactics such
as short-term, selective strikes. Roosevelt responded by seizing the mines,
but Lewis held the upper hand, as was apparent when the final settle-
ment was reached at the end of 1943. An attempt was made to camou-
flage the miners' wage gains by using a different method of calculating
the length of the work day, paying them for the travel time from the
mine entrance to the workplace and back again, for example. But it was
clear that Lewis, by doggedly and defiantly bucking the administration,
had gotten most of what he wanted for the miners, whose annual wages
went from $1,715 in 1942 to $2,535 two years later, an increase of nearly
50 percent. Although his methods proved successful, they also earned
Lewis the overwhelming antipathy of the American public and Con-
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gress. Lawmakers, responding to the anti-Lewis feelings in the country,
enacted the War Labor Disputes Act, also known as Smith-Connally,
which added to the president's power to seize strike-bound plants dur-
ing wartime.
Another setback for the administration on the wage front occurred
when the railroad unions, those representing operating employees such
as conductors, firemen, engineers, and switchmen and those for the non-
operating employees such as maintenance workers, sought pay raises.
In late spring of 1943, a special labor railway panel recommended to
Vinson that the more than 1 million nonoperating railway workers be
given an increase of eight cents an hour. To Vinson, the answer was a
simple no; he ruled that it was not warranted in part because these em-
ployees had already received a raise under Little Steel. That should have
ended the matter as far as Vinson was concerned, but in next few months
his black and white decision faded against the combined forces of con-
gressional involvement, public opinion, union intransigence, and presi-
dential intervention.
After Vinson's decision, the railroads and the unions reached a settle-
ment on the eight-cent-an-hour increase and sought legislative endorse-
ment of their agreement. Vinson returned to the familiar terrain of Capitol
Hill to argue that his original judgment on the pay hike should be up-
held. If he expected his long congressional service to afford him any
special treatment, he was mistaken, at least in the Senate. Ironically,
given the close relationship that they would later forge, Vinson came in
for a scolding from Sen. Harry Truman, sponsor of a measure to grant
the union pay request. He called Vinson's original decision "entirely
silly" and a later settlement proposal "perfectly absurd." The Senate
passed the bill overwhelmingly, with even Vinson's old Kentucky col-
league, Majority Leader Alben Barkley, voting in support. Enactment of
the legislation, Vinson said, would mean "Congress itself will have bro-
ken the Little Steel formula" and "will have told the country that a privi-
leged group is outside the stabilization program and is not to join the
battle against inflation."20 The legislation stalled in Congress because
the House failed to take it up before leaving for the Christmas recess,
most likely as a result of action by Vinson's close friend, Speaker Sam
Rayburn. He refused to delay adjournment so that a vote could be taken
on the bill. By the time Congress returned in January 1944, peace on the
railroads had been achieved, but not before the railway unions called for
a strike, the government prepared to seize the railroads, and the presi-
dent negotiated a settlement. Using the expedients of overtime pay, travel
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expenses, and vacation pay, the agreements preserved the Little Steel
formula in name only. In the end, the nonoperating employees were
given pay raises on a sliding scale of nine to eleven cents an hour, and
operating workers got a raise of nine cents an hour.
Despite these well-publicized breaches in the administration's anti-
inflation efforts, Vinson said in a report marking the first anniversary of
the economic stabilization program that the line had been held fairly
well against inflation. "The workers who have gone out on strike have
been too much in the limelight," he said. "They have obscured the mil-
lions who have worked harder and longer than ever before, and worked
without let-up, even when they felt they had legitimate grievances." Al-
though there had some advance in prices, it "was not as great as it could
have been in view of the inflationary pressures, or in comparison with
the price rise which occurred during the last war." During World War I,
prices shot up by nearly 30 percent, he said, but they had been held
down to 12 percent since the beginning of World War II. Inflationary
pressures remained as serious as ever, however, because there was still
about $36 billion "more in our pockets than there are goods and services
available for us to buy," Vinson said. "The battle against rising prices is
by no means conclusively won," he said, adding, however, that it was
"inconceivable that the American people would let down now after the
progress that they have made in the fight to hold prices down."21
Vinson's power over the everyday lives of Americans at home was
most pronounced in the decisions he made affecting prices for clothing,
food, and gasoline. A particularly vexing problem for him on the price
front involved the scarcity of low-cost clothing, which he called in a
report to Roosevelt "the biggest stumbling block to the entire stabiliza-
tion program." He added, "The textile and clothing industries can howl
louder and make more money than any group with which I have dealt in
my present post."22 At the heart of the problem was the "highest-price
line" order of the Office of Price Administration in early 1943, which
froze clothing prices at their one-year-earlier levels. Manufacturers, faced
with increased labor and material costs, virtually stopped making cheaper
lines of clothing, because they determined that to do so would be un-
profitable; instead they produced higher-priced items and lowered the
quality of popular-priced merchandise. This resulted in the near-disap-
pearance of low-end clothing from retail stores and increased pressures
on the cost of living.
Vinson responded to the crisis in late 1944 by ordering stepped-up
action by the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administra-
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tion. His exhortations got results, according to Business Week, which
reported, "Activity in OPA and WPB textile divisions indicates that. . .
Vinson really meant business last week when he called for tightened
price and production controls on textiles and clothing."23 The Works
Progress Administration (WPA), the agency responsible for overall war-
time production, directed that 75 percent of the total yardage available
for civilian use be used in the manufacture of low- and medium-priced
children's clothing and such essentials as men's shirts and shorts and
women's slips and housedresses. Manufacturers of higher-priced cloth-
ing would be forced to scramble for the little yardage remaining in the
free market. In addition, the OPA, the agency responsible for pricing
policy, ordered clothing prices rolled back about 6 percent, or to their
level in mid-1943. To make sure that retailers passed along the savings
to customers from the rollback in manufacturers' prices, the OPA re-
quired that each individual garment be "preticketed" by the manufac-
turer with the retailers' ceiling price. In addition, volunteers were used
to visit stores to check on compliance.
When it came to controlling food prices, Vinson was able to wield
the weapon of subsidies. Through a program of massive government
funding by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, he was able to en-
sure that food producers and manufacturers could make a profit while
still adhering to price ceilings. In 1943, for example, he ordered the War
Food Administration to purchase from canners and processors their out-
put for the year of peas, snap beans, sweet corn, and tomatoes at prices
that reflected their higher wage costs and then sell the products back to
them at lower costs so that they could sell to consumers at prices set by
the OPA. Without subsidies, Roosevelt believed that inflation would
balloon with workers constantly demanding more money to pay for the
ever-increasing living costs. The program faced strong opposition, how-
ever, from some farm-belt legislators who believed that subsidies were
slow and complex and that higher prices were the simplest solution.
Congressman Jesse P. Wolcott, a Republican from Michigan, who
authored a bill to end all subsidies, also claimed that the program was
intended to socialize agriculture. Similarly, a lobbyist for cattle produc-
ers equated subsidies with bribes and said they grew out of a desire on
the part of the federal government to regiment the nation completely.
Responding to the criticism, Vinson said that to prohibit price supports
would "torpedo our stabilization policy as effectively as any U-boat ever
torpedoed a Liberty ship."24 In early 1944, Roosevelt vetoed legislation
that would have eliminated subsidies, saying that enactment of the bill
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"would increase food costs at least seven percent, increase the whole
cost of living materially, and destroy the price and wage stabilization
program."25 The veto was sustained.
With the president's blessing, Vinson freely used his power to grant
subsidies. For instance, annual subsidies of $100 million went to grain
mills to keep the price of flour and bread from rising; another $100-
million-a-year subsidy program was approved to reduce the prices of
apples, onions, oranges, potatoes, peanut butter, lard, and edible veg-
etable oils; and subsidies were given dairy producers as a means of off-
setting their increased costs while keeping retail prices stable. In other
actions involving food, Vinson set ceiling and floor prices for the cattle
industry, and he restored the grading of beef, veal, lamb, and mutton
after Congress had taken such authority away from the OPA.
One of Vinson's most important decisions at OES was to deny the
oil industry its request for a price increase of thirty-five cents a barrel,
which would have raised the cost of gasoline and heating fuel. He held
firm to his judgment despite pressure from powerful quarters, including
his old House confederate Speaker Rayburn from oil-rich Texas. Secre-
tary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who also functioned as petroleum ad-
ministrator for war, had proposed the increase in crude oil prices as an
incentive for increased production. The proposal was opposed by Bowles
of OPA, and it fell to Vinson to make the final decision. Porter, general
counsel and deputy director of OES, took several weeks to analyze the
issue for Vinson and concluded in his two-hundred-page report that the
increase was not necessary and would not achieve its purposes. After
reading the study, Vinson said, "I'd better take it home with me and
study this more and think about it."26 He boiled the study down to a
twenty-nine-page decision, which reached the same conclusion that
Porter had: the increase could not be justified.
But before announcing his decision to deny the increase, Vinson
called Rayburn, who had said he would make a legislative push for the
increase if OES turned it down. Upon hearing what Vinson had decided,
Rayburn said, "Fred, I'm gonna have to fight you for the first time in my
life on the floor of Congress."27 During subsequent House debate on the
measure, Rayburn descended from the Speaker's box to the well of the
House to make a speech in support of increasing oil prices. The Speaker's
advocacy notwithstanding, legislative efforts failed. Bowles said that he
and Vinson were able to "convince Congress that OPA's subsidy plan to
the oil industry, which cost the government only $50 million, was to be
preferred to Ickes' prices increases, which would cost $525 million."28
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Given the range of his edicts, it is understandable that in the public's
eye Vinson was seen as nearly omnipotent and the one to contact to get
something done. But he was unwilling to intervene, even for friends
from Kentucky, if the matter fell outside his jurisdiction. When the Ken-
tucky Department of Welfare was denied its request to purchase new
milk pasteurization equipment for its mental health facility in Frank-
fort, a department official, who had been a Vinson ally for years, wrote
him asking for help. After having his office investigate why the planned
purchase had been refused by the War Food Administration (WFA),
Vinson reported to the state official that there was "a terrific shortage"
in this type of equipment and that the WFA "is endeavoring to make
distribution of the available equipment... where they are most needed."
He suggested the department try to locate used equipment, adding, "I do
not feel, that in view of their [WFA's] adopted policy, that there would
be much that we could do to have an exemption made in this instance."29
Vinson responded similarly to a friend from Ashland who felt he de-
served an increase in gasoline rations because of necessary trips to his
doctor's office in nearby Huntington, West Virginia. "I regret to inform
you that this is a matter over which I have no control whatsoever," Vinson
wrote. Noting that the distribution of gas for civilian use was in the
hands of the OPA, he then outlined the appeal procedure his friend needed
to follow if he chose to do so.30
Although his twelve-hour workdays at OES left little time for any-
thing else besides an occasional hand or two of bridge with old friends
such as Rayburn and Barkley, Vinson did leave the hurly-burly of Wash-
ington behind for nearly a month to serve as vice chairman of the Ameri-
can delegation at the U.N. Monetary and Financial Conference held in
July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Representatives from more
than forty countries attended the conference, the first one of its kind
since 1815, to work on ways to establish financial and economic coop-
eration and stability in the postwar world. Using the plans and ideas of
U.S. Treasury undersecretary Harry Dexter White and the preeminent
British economist John Maynard Keynes as their foundations, the del-
egates created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, better known as the
World Bank. The IMF was intended to function as an orderly interna-
tional monetary system whose clear and precise rules on the money flow
between member states would facilitate world trade, and the World Bank's
role was to be a source of loans to assist in the reconstruction of war-
torn countries and in the growth of developing nations. A key compo-
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nent in the international monetary scheme was the establishment of a
fixed relationship among currencies, which White wanted based on the
U.S. dollar and its ties to gold. Vinson was given the responsibility of
devising the system of quotas, which determined how much each coun-
try would contribute to the international funds. According to Keynes,
this question was "the thorniest of the conference, and his [Vinson's]
handling of it, which was forceful, but at the same time tactful, helped to
bring matters to a peaceful issue."31 The main obstacle to final agree-
ment at Bretton Woods had to do with quotas. A higher quota meant
more prestige and was a sign of a country's relative economic impor-
tance. America and Great Britain, not surprisingly, ranked one and two.
Just as an agreement was about to be reached, China and France hesi-
tated to sign because both wanted higher rankings.
Vinson, who was an expert at soothing bruised egos, stepped in and
appealed to the recalcitrant delegations not "to make the task of friends
more difficult."32 He told the Chinese that the United States revered "the
historic friendship that has existed throughout the years between China
and our country." To the French, Vinson invoked the name of Lafayette,
saying "we learned it at our mother's knees that France came to us years
ago when we were in need." Vinson's performance was called a classic
Vinson taking a break at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. (Courtesy of Spe-
cial Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
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case of diplomatic apple-polishing, but his ploy worked. The objections
were withdrawn and the way was cleared for the creation of a single
new monetary system.33 After mollifying the Chinese and the French,
the next hurdle for Vinson and other leaders of the U.S. delegation, in-
cluding White and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., was to sell
ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement to Congress.
As the world's leading economic power, the United States had
pledged to contribute the biggest shares of the initial IMF and World
Bank capitalization. According to a quota system that Vinson helped
devise, the United States would fund $2.8 billion of the $8.8 billion
proposed for the monetary fund, which intended to use the money to
make short-term loans to help developing nations pay their debts. To the
World Bank, whose money would be used for long-term loans to sup-
port commercial and infrastructure projects, the United States would
provide $3.2 billion of the $9.1 billion total. Vinson, in an appearance
before the House Banking and Currency Committee in the spring of
1945, said had something like the Bretton Woods institutions been cre-
ated following World War I, World War II might not have occurred.
"When we tried to walk the single path and failed to accept our respon-
sibilities, it became every nation for itself—a race for trade." The best
proof of the merit of the agreement, according to Vinson, was that it did
not become an issue in the 1944 presidential campaign. Thus, he added,
"It must square off pretty well with the interests of the people."34 De-
spite predictions from political prophets that Bretton Woods faced tough
sledding in Congress, both the Senate and the House overwhelmingly
approved the agreement. Final congressional approval came in July 1945,
exactly one year after delegates had convened in New Hampshire.
By the time of ratification, Vinson had become secretary of the Trea-
sury, his fourth and final major position in the executive branch. He was
appointed by the new president, Harry S. Truman, who had assumed the
office when President Roosevelt died in April 1945. Vinson's elevation
to the Cabinet post came only a few months after Roosevelt had, in
rapid succession, made him federal loan administrator and then director
of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
Upon ending his nearly two-year reign at OES in early March 1945,
Vinson reported to Roosevelt that the economic stabilization program
"has not worked perfectly, but it has worked," noting that living costs
had risen only 2 percent since the president's "hold-the-line" order of
April 1943. However, he said the pressures to keep wages and prices
under control would increase rather than decrease in the coming months.
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1
Vinson, fourth from right, at swearing in of Harry Truman as president on April 12,
1945, in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Next to Vinson is his good friend House
Speaker Sam Rayburn. (Copyright Washington Post, reprinted by permission of the D.C.
Public Library.)
"General belief that the war was about to end has, to some extent, jeop-
ardized the saving psychology which has so firmly underpinned our entire
system of control." Controls were also being endangered by creeping
price increases, which made it harder to hold the wage line, according to
Vinson. He thought the culprit was the so-called product standard policy
of the Office of Price Administration, which allowed a particular prod-
uct in an industry to go up in price even though the earnings of that
industry were more than ample. Vinson wanted a return to past practices
when price increases were denied to any industry that made more money
than it had earned during a peacetime base period: "Since almost every
industry is earning far more than this, such ? rule would permit few if
any price increases."
In closing his report to Roosevelt, Vinson said, "I believe we can
fairly say that in no other country, during this or any other war, have
inflationary tendencies been more firmly checked in the face of greater
difficulties, both political and economical." Credit for this accomplish-
ment, he believed, largely belonged to "those in OPA, the War Food
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Administration and the War Labor Board and other agencies . . . and to
you and Justice Byrnes who have given the program such earnest and
understanding support."35 Although Vinson was too modest to credit his
own efforts, others certainly did so. A resident of Mt. Sterling, Ken-
tucky, wrote that although he was anti-New Deal and had been "anti-
Vinson, politically," he was now a big fan. "I must confess a swing to
the Vinson column and in which I am joined . . . by thousands of Ken-
tuckians who have, heretofore, been equally as anti as myself. . . . You
have, sho', done a splendid job and we are extremely proud of you."36
Even more pleasing for Vinson than having a former foe turned into a
friend was the thanks he received from soldiers. "After having returned
to the U.S. to find that the dreaded inflation, which was so feared in
1942 & 1943, has not materialized, I should like very much to offer my
sincere thanks to you," wrote an air force sergeant. He added, "The fact
that a lid was kept on wages & prices, thus protecting the buying power
of those of fixed incomes as my wife and mother, is due, I judge, almost
wholly to your efforts."37 A navy lieutenant who was in Europe awaiting
orders to the Pacific wrote Vinson to let him know "how appreciative so
many of us overseas are of the fine job you have done. . . . Most of us
hope to be civilians again before too much longer, and as you certainly
understand, the hope that inflation will go no further than now is per-
haps our most sincere wish, as many of us will return to the old job at
the pre-war wage scale."38
Vinson's adroit performance as economic stabilizer in balancing the
interests of warring groups made him the logical choice to help steer
Roosevelt through the storm he created when he picked his former vice
president, Henry A. Wallace, to replace the legendary Jesse H. Jones as
secretary of commerce. In addition to heading the Commerce Depart-
ment, Jones, a wealthy Texas businessman, also held the position of
federal loan administrator, which gave him authority over the
government's vast lending activities and war plant operations. The pros-
pect that Wallace, considered by many to be a left-wing loose cannon,
would now control what was in effect the world's largest banking insti-
tution set off alarms on Capitol Hill and in the business community.
When Congress responded to the fear about Wallace by passing legisla-
tion separating the Federal Loan Agency from Commerce, Roosevelt
called upon Vinson to head the newly independent entity. The decision
immediately calmed the troubled waters. Vinson won unanimous and
unusually speedy approval from a normally polarized U.S. Senate. When
he heard of the appointment, Paul Porter, by now chairman of the Fed-
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eral Communications Commission, said he turned "cartwheels in the
office and yelled with great glee," adding that it was "the best thing that
has happened since the election."39
The reaction in the press, though not as exuberant as Porter's, never-
theless was positive irrespective of a publication's political bent. The
liberal New Republic said the appointment "was received with more
general approval than any other choice he [Roosevelt] has made in a
very long while."40 The conservative Business Week, which ran a glow-
ing three-page spread that chronicled Vinson's life and career, said his
record in Congress and at the OES had "demonstrated that he has a
stubborn independence" and that Vinson "will never be anybody's sym-
bol for ideological warfare."41 The Louisville Courier-Journal, which
treated Vinson more favorably as an administrator than as congressman,
used the occasion of his latest appointment to ridicule the common re-
frain of protest "against this or that figure in the New Deal that he 'never
met a pay roll.'" The newspaper said the payroll yardstick had been
made to appear "in the last 12 years as the sine qua non of the public
servant," especially if an official's responsibilities in any way intersected
with business. Calling the catchphrase threadbare, the editorial said it
was "self-evident that public administration is something entirely apart
from the administration of private business; that it requires imagination
instead of the rigidity of the pay roll—meeting routine, a sense of human
value rather than of cost-accounts, an awareness of the involvement of
destiny before dividends." Vinson, the paper said, having fortified him-
self against the shibboleth by his accomplishments, "may have performed
the added service of putting an end to it for all time."42
Going from economic stabilizer, where it was his job to keep wages,
prices, and profits down, to supervising and coordinating the network of
government finance agencies grouped under the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation was akin to being transformed from Scrooge to Santa Claus.
Vinson obviously relished the prospect of being able to give rather than
restrict. "The job of director of the loan agencies is no cinch, but I have
a feeling I'll be able to say 'yes' once in a while," he said.43 In his first
press conference as federal loan administrator, Vinson indicated that he
wanted to use the government's multi-billion-dollar lending might to
rocket postwar America into an economy of full employment, high prices
for agricultural products, high wages for workers, and big profits for
industry. In less than a month, however, Vinson had to leave behind his
ambitious plans as loan administrator to take on a different assignment.
Again, it was a disgruntled James Byrnes who precipitated the latest
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change in Roosevelt's administration; in early April 1945, he quit his
position as director of the renamed Office of War Mobilization and Re-
conversion after twice being disappointed by FDR. The first slight, be-
ing passed over for vice president in 1944, was compounded when the
president chose someone else to be secretary of state when Cordell Hull
resigned because of failing health.
In the last major appointment before his death on April 12, 1945,
Roosevelt again picked Vinson to replace Byrnes. Without delay, the
Senate unanimously confirmed his appointment to the second most pow-
erful job in Washington, one known unofficially as "assistant president,"
and Vinson moved to the east wing of the White House. Although he
held the position for only three months, his tenure came during the criti-
cal period from V-E (Victory over Europe) Day to just before V-J (Vic-
tory over Japan) Day when decisions had to be made on what wartime
controls could be lifted, how best to reallocate production and man-
power resources for a one-front war, and how to begin the process of
converting the country from wartime to peacetime. Despite taking ag-
gressive and decisive actions on these pressing matters as well as others,
"Vinson ended his stay without substantial attacks from any quarter,"
according to a history of the agency by a staff member. "He left OWMR
with his reputation for wisdom, balance, and forthrightness unsullied."44
Shortly afterGermany surrendered in early May 1945, Vinson ended
two so-called "nuisance" restrictions by lifting the midnight curfew on
entertainment places and the ban on horse and dog racing, but he made
it clear that civilian life for the duration of the war against Japan would
continue to be lean and difficult. "All our effort toward war, and toward
production will be needed up to the last minute," Vinson said, noting
that virtually all of the economic controls then in place, including ra-
tioning, high taxes, and wage and price ceilings, had to remain until the
war in the Pacific was won.45 Vinson's decision on racing, incidentally,
cleared the way for the seventy-first consecutive running of the Ken-
tucky Derby, good news for his fellow Kentuckians even though the
event had to be moved to June 9 from its normal time on the first Satur-
day in May. Vinson also dealt with a meat shortage in the country, the
worst since rationing had begun, by ordering more government subsi-
dies to boost production and controls to prevent black-market activity.
The wife of a former House colleague had another crisis she wanted
Vinson to tackle, suggesting facetiously that he divert some of the rub-
ber used for tires to corset manufacturers "before I spread all over these
wide open spaces. This synthetic stuff just won't fence me in."46 Amused
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by the letter, Vinson responded in kind with the assurance "that I am
struggling with the rubber situation. I hardly know which plea is more
forceful and persuasive in regard to the girdle situation—yours or
Roberta's. I have first-hand information on the situation that exists, but
assure you that your evidence will not be overlooked."47
The influence and power Vinson wielded as "assistant president"
had limitations; that was evident in the summer of 1945 when he lob-
bied hard, but unsuccessfully, in the House in behalf of Truman's efforts
to make the Fair Employment Practices Committee, which was created
in 1941 to help minorities get and keep jobs, a permanent governmental
agency. A rebuff from Joe Bates, who held his old seat in Congress,
created a sore that never healed. Vinson tried to persuade him to provide
the one vote needed to report the controversial FEPC proposal out of the
Rules Committee so that it could be debated by the full House. Bates
refused, and "Vinson has had nothing to do with him ever since."48
Amid signs pointing to the imminent defeat of Japan, Vinson in
early July issued a report to President Truman and Congress entitled
"The Road to Tokyo and Beyond," which was his blueprint for the post-
war American economy. The document also set the stage for the big
debate that ensued in postwar America over how large a role govern-
ment should play in the economy. In Vinson's vision, the United States
would enjoy such prosperity in peacetime that Americans would be in
the "pleasant predicament of having to learn to live 50 per cent better
than they have ever lived before."49 That level of economic bliss could
only be achieved, Vinson believed, through the combined and coordi-
nated efforts of government and private business and industry. On the
one hand, his report advocated lower corporate taxes to encourage busi-
ness and industrial development and to keep venture capital moving into
new enterprises or expansion of older ones. On the other hand, Vinson
recognized that government had major roles to play in the economy as a
stimulator and regulator. His litany of governmental involvement in-
cluded public works projects to bridge unemployment gaps during busi-
ness slowdowns, payments to farmers to stimulate production of scarce
commodities, financial assistance and information services to small busi-
nesses, arbitration and other orderly procedures to protect workers' rights
to organize and bargain, more comprehensive unemployment insurance
and old-age pensions and more attention to public health measures, and
a vigorous antimonopoly policy to ensure fair competition.
Vinson's prescription for a healthy postwar economy was a tonic
for some and cod-liver oil for others. Collier's magazine called Vinson's
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report "an excellent instrument with which to orientate your own think-
ing about how to keep a prosperous peacetime economy," adding that it
"may turn out to be a reliable road map to the most widely prosperous
and happiest era that Americans have yet enjoyed."50 The most impor-
tant elements of Vinson's program, said the Chicago Sun, were "the
direct governmental measures he proposes as a balance wheel to keep
the economy operating at high levels." The paper said the broadening of
Social Security, a long-term public works program, and a fiscal policy
to compensate for the fluctuations of private investment and expendi-
tures were measures that "cannot be avoided by a democracy which has
the courage to look ahead."51 The Courier-Journal also praised Vinson
for the idea that government's proper function is to make sure that a
balance in the economy is maintained: "Government is the instrumen-
tality for doing things which need to be done for the welfare of all the
people, and this means . . . positive action for protecting standards of
living and rejecting the idea that these must be left to chance or the
automatic operation of so-called nature forces."52
Other editorials, however, decried the thought of more governmen-
tal involvement in the economy. "The idea of prospering by shoveling
out tax money has bitten deep when a man like Fred M. Vinson accepts
it," said the Arkansas Democrat. Vinson's program, it said, "reaches for
the New Deal Santa Claus suit" and was a "recipe for more taxes, and an
invitation to pressure groups to demand new kinds of government spend-
ing."53 In a similar vein, the Macon Telegraph in Georgia said, "It is
alarming to the last degree to hear a man in high position blandly com-
mitting this government, so far as he can, to a policy of paternalism, in
face of the catastrophic experience we went through during the depres-
sion which preceded the artificial prosperity of the present World War."54
The Standard-Examiner in Ogden, Utah, which was especially critical
of Vinson's proposal for a public works program, concluded, "Uncle
Sam has looked after his nephews so generously in their periods of
trouble, the nephews have assumed the happy-go-lucky attitude of re-
fusing to worry until an emergency arises and then to appeal to Uncle."55
The ink hardly had time to dry on the postwar report before the
president, who was quickly reshaping the Cabinet he had inherited from
Roosevelt, named Vinson secretary of the Treasury on July 6, 1945, af-
ter forcing out Henry Morgenthau Jr., who had held the post for nearly
twelve years. Vinson's appointment, like the previous ones, won unani-
mous approval in the Senate. Under the law at the time and because
there was no vice president, he was now second in line to succeed the
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president behind Secretary of State Byrnes, who had only a few days
before finally gained the position denied to him by FDR. With his well-
founded expertise in tax matters and his genius for numbers, Vinson
was a natural for the Treasury job. In his wartime positions, Vinson had
also demonstrated his skills as an administrator, but his chief asset was
his ability to deal with Congress. Truman could expect that his eco-
nomic plans would get a far better reception from legislators when pre-
sented by Vinson, a shrewd politician who enjoyed wide and friendly
relationships on Capitol Hill, than if they were proposed by Morgenthau,
whose chief difficulty had been his inability to get along with lawmak-
ers. When he went to the Hill, Morgenthau was accompanied by a cote-
rie of experts to whom he would turn when asked questions. Vinson,
however, "strolled into hearings unencumbered by aides or by volumi-
nous documents and testified out of the wealth of tax knowledge filed in
his own mind."56
As if to underscore his congressional ties, Vinson's swearing-in cer-
emony was held in the large Ways and Means Committee room where
he had spent so much of his time when he was a member of the House.
Senators and representatives of both parties praised Vinson, as did his
predecessor, Morgenthau, who said, "If I had had to pick among all the
people for my successor, I would have picked Fred Vinson." Republican
Rep. Bertrand W. Gearhart of California, alluding to speculation that
Vinson might be either a presidential or vice-presidential candidate in
1948, said, "I have been beating the drum for Fred Vinson ever since I
have been in Congress. Maybe I'll be beating a drum for him for an even
higher office."57 Senate Majority Leader Barkley of Kentucky added a
bit of levity to the proceedings when, after noting that Vinson was mov-
ing into his fourth position in six months' time, he quipped, "I hope he
will stay here long enough to identify the rack where he hangs his hat."58
The setting and the tributes obviously meant a lot to Vinson, who re-
counted the day's events in a detailed letter to his old friend and col-
league Robert Doughton, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
who was unable to attend. "The audience filled the room—all seats were
filled, and the back and sides were packed, as a matter of fact I think
they could have very properly hung out the 'Standing Room Only' sign.
The boys were most generous in their remarks—it was truly a field day."
After the oath of office was administered by Chief Justice D. Lawrence
Groner, with whom Vinson had served on the appeals court, "news-reels
and news pictures were taken. Then I shook hands with the folks, and
thence, back to your office for awhile." After lunch on the hill with
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Official portrait of Vinson as secretary of the Treasury. (Courtesy of Special Collections,
University of Kentucky Library.)
House Speaker Raybura "and the boys," Vinson said he then "came back
down to 'run the show' for John Snyder who was taking over as my
successor. These ceremonies took place in the Rose Garden on the White
House grounds. When this was over, I came on over to the Treasury and
started in."59
The domain Vinson now oversaw as the nation's fifty-third secre-
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tary of the Treasury was one of the largest in government, employing
nearly ninety-seven thousand people in far-flung operations that included
making coins and currency, protecting the president and other important
officials, collecting tax money, enforcing drug laws, and supervising
national banks. Though he was chiefly concerned with postwar tax and
fiscal policies during his eleven months as secretary, Vinson counseled
Truman on a variety of other matters as well. "I valued his judgment and
advice very highly, and until he was appointed to the Supreme Court he
was in on nearly every conference on every subject," the president said.60
Less than a month after Vinson took office, the war with Japan was
over and he was confronted with the difficult task of trying to put flesh
onto the broad outline of the recommendations contained in his "Road
to Tokyo and Beyond" manifesto. His biggest fear was massive unem-
ployment among the 12 million men and women in the armed forces, all
but about 1.5 million of whom would be returning to civilian life, and
among the 10 million workers who worked in strictly war-related pro-
duction jobs. To forestall what some were forecasting as another de-
pression, Vinson made full employment the cornerstone of his postwar
economic program. This could be achieved, he believed, through a bal-
anced approach that would unleash the engines of free enterprise through
Vinson talking via a walkie-talkie on October 8, 1945, at a football game between the
Washington Redskins and Detroit Lions. With him is his son Jimmy. (Courtesy of Spe-
cial Collectons, University of Kentucky Library.)
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tax relief for businesses and provide compensatory spending by govern-
ment to take up any slack. The remarkable transition of Vinson, who as
a Congressman was a champion of higher corporate taxes, into what in
contemporary parlance would be a supply-sider, is best explained by his
lifelong devotion to the welfare of veterans. He was chilled by the pros-
pect that the men and women who won the war would suddenly be dis-
carded in peacetime. Vinson often stated that he hoped his work "will
make some contribution toward the kind of country we desire for the
boys when they return after the 'shooting' is over."61
In a Congress dominated by moderate to conservative Democrats, it
was, not surprisingly, much easier for Vinson to win support for the
component of his full-employment plan that called for tax cuts than for
the companion piece seeking government underwriting of jobs when
private endeavors fell short. In fall 1945 Vinson became the first secre-
tary of the Treasury since Republican Andrew Mellon to go before Con-
gress with a program of tax reductions. His proposals called for cuts of
some $5 billion for 1946, including the repeal of the excess profits tax
on corporations, which had been enacted in 1940 as a way to prevent
war profiteering. Even though the tax had raised large amounts of rev-
enue, Vinson considered the tax "too erratic a tax engine to turn loose
for even one full year of the postwar period."62 Others disagreed, most
notably Marriner Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who
opposed repeal on the grounds that it would further damage a federal
budget already heavily unbalanced, it would benefit large corporations
that needed it the least, and it would be inflationary by igniting a wage-
price spiral. In one of the few policy disagreements the two ever had, Ed
Prichard, who had gone with Vinson to Treasury as his assistant, also
opposed repeal. "I strongly urged and felt that the excess profits tax
should be repealed in driblets, should be staged out, because of the ne-
cessity for continued fiscal strength or as an anti-inflationary measure,"
Prichard recalled. Calling Vinson's advocacy of the measure "one of his
few economic mistakes," Prichard said that although repeal probably
aided the rapid reconversion, it may also have been "one of the contrib-
uting factors to the very large postwar inflation that we had."63
Congress, with an eye toward the 1946 elections, wanted to be even
more generous than Vinson in giving tax relief to corporations and indi-
viduals, which put him in the position of trying to hold cuts to his rec-
ommended $5 billion level. At a hearing before the Senate Finance
Committee, that task was made more difficult because he had stepped
on and broken his eyeglasses the morning of his appearance, forcing
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him to try to read his prepared remarks with borrowed glasses. As the
comical scene unfolded, Vinson first borrowed a pair of glasses from
one aide, but those made him squint; another borrowed pair made him
see double. The ever-helpful Alben Barkley pulled off his own glasses,
handing them to Vinson with the comment, "These may be too young
for you, but you can use 'em." He saw triple, went back to a previous
loaner, and "with time out for arguing with Republicans, plowed through
his 11 pages of facts and zeros with hardly a bobble."64 In the end, though,
Congress cut nearly $1 billion more in taxes than Vinson and the admin-
istration wanted.
The second part of Vinson's full-employment program, which called
for the government to spend what was necessary to assure a job for
virtually everyone in the workplace, also emerged from Congress in a
form different from what he had intended. Although the Employment
Act of 1946, which Truman signed on February 20, 1946, created the
Council of Economic Advisers to analyze economic developments, es-
tablished a joint congressional committee on the economy, and required
the president to submit an annual economic report to Congress, the leg-
islation "contained no guarantees, no firm policies or policy mecha-
nisms, no embodiment whatever of the liberal Keynesian ideal."65 A
disappointed Majority Leader Barkley wryly commented that the legis-
lation "promised anyone needing a job the right to go out and look for
one" (366). One commentary observed that even though the
administration's proposal was emasculated by Congress, "it made a start
and it is doubtful whether anyone in the administration other than Vinson
could have accomplished even that."66
During his reign as Treasury secretary, Vinson also used his politi-
cal skills in the arena of foreign economic policy, most notably in mobi-
lizing public and congressional support for a $3.75 billion loan to Great
Britain and nurturing the Bretton Woods agreements into fruition. The
abrupt end of Lend-Lease on the heels of V-J Day caused great alarm in
England, which hurriedly assembled a team of emissaries, including
Lord Halifax, the ambassador to the United States, and Lord Keynes,
economic adviser to the chancellor of the exchequer, to plead for finan-
cial assistance to help the nation deal with a staggering load of foreign
debt and other pressing economic needs in the postwar period. Negotia-
tions opened in the fall of 1945 at the Federal Reserve Building in Wash-
ington with Vinson and William L. Clayton, assistant secretary of state
for economic affairs, leading the U.S. delegation. Truman, Vinson,
Clayton, and other top officials in the administration were more than
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sympathetic, but most Americans and many in Congress had already
turned inward, preferring that the country's economic might be used at
home rather than abroad now that the war was over, even if it meant
ignoring the plight of such a longtime and staunch ally as Britain. Keynes
had envisioned an outright gift or grant of $6 billion, but Vinson and
Clayton, a self-made man who was as practical and pragmatic as Vinson,
knew that for any deal to win approval on Capitol Hill and in the heart-
land, the size had to be smaller, it had to be in the form of an interest-
bearing loan, and there had to be some reciprocity from the British. In
terms of amount, Vinson came in low at $3.5 billion, Clayton high at $4
billion, and Truman split the difference, deciding that the final loan fig-
ure would be $3.75 billion. The loan, hammered out after three months
of hard bargaining, also called for an interest rate of 2 percent, repay-
ment over a fifty-year period, and a reduction in tariff and exchange
restrictions and other trade concessions by Great Britain.
After sealing the deal with the British, Vinson and Clayton went on
the offensive to win over public opinion and Congress, delivering nu-
merous speeches, supplying facts and figures to influential columnists
and broadcast commentators, and testifying on Capitol Hill. In his talks
and testimony, Vinson emphasized the free trade aspects of the agree-
ment, arguing that the loan could usher in a new era of international
cooperation, with peace and prosperity for all. Speaking to a meeting of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia,
Vinson said that the significance of the agreement with Great Britain
"goes far beyond its economic effects, important though they are. This
is a world in which all countries must work together if we are to live in
peace and prosperity. The alternative—God save us—is to perish to-
gether. Mankind certainly has the wit and the will to choose not death
but life."67 Vinson did not discount the amount of money involved, which
he said "is a lot of do-re-mi in anybody's book," but he added that "war,
including its aftermath is costly business. This loan represents about
two weeks of our expenditures for war toward its close. In my judgment,
this is not an expenditure but an investment. It is sound business for
America."68 When asked during a call-in program on the NBC radio
network whether the United States could afford to make the loan, Vinson
replied that the credit was an investment, not an expenditure. "We will
get it back with interest," he said. "And in view of what's at stake—a
healthy Britain and a healthy world trade—I don't think we can afford
not to make the loan."69 Vinson continued to focus on the trade aspects
of the agreement during the several days he spent before the Senate and
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House banking and currency committees, warning during one appear-
ance that failure to approve the loan would "compel the British to weld
the sterling area and British commonwealth into a militant trade group"
with the United States forming one of its own to compete. "Two rival
blocs would mean economic warfare," he said. "Probably we would win,
but it would a Pyrrhic victory."70
While the House was still deliberating the British loan after its pas-
sage in the Senate by a 46-34 margin, Vinson suggested to Truman that
a statement of support from World War II hero Gen. Dwight Eisenhower
might be helpful to the cause. The president, however, did not think it
necessary "to use him for every occasion that comes up," and besides,
he said, "Rayburn assures me that they are going to get it through."
Truman said that he was "just as strong for the British loan as any man
could be, and I have pulled every possible string I can to get it approved,
but I still believe it would be best not to ask Eisenhower to make a
statement."71 The House finally approved the loan on July 13, 1946, by
a vote of 219 to 155, and two days later Truman signed the legislation
into law at a White House ceremony.
Vinson's other major involvement in international economic affairs
came during early March of 1946 when he presided over the organiza-
tional meeting in Savannah, Georgia, of the two Bretton Woods institu-
tions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As chairman
of the board of governors of both groups, Vinson had the power to shape
the major questions to be decided at the conference, and he used it,
much to the annoyance of Lord Keynes, who headed Britain's delega-
tion. The two men, who developed an intense dislike for each other dur-
ing the loan negotiations, clashed in particular over where the offices of
the fund and the bank should be located and over the management struc-
ture of the two organizations. With the British loan still pending in Con-
gress, Vinson, of course, held the upper hand over his English counterpart.
Nevertheless, Keynes fought for his positions as best he could. He thought
New York City made the most sense as a headquarters location because
the United Nations was there and because of the city's position as a
center of international finance. Vinson, however, had decided it was to
be Washington, D.C. This rankled Keynes, who in a memorandum after
the conference complained that Vinson had used his authority to make
his choice of Washington "an absolute instruction to the American Del-
egation from which they were not to be free to depart in any circum-
stances." As a result, he said, it was impossible for U.S. delegates "to
listen to our arguments."72 The American position was that Washington
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Vinson at the Savannah Conference in March 1946. Seated to his right is John Maynard
Keynes, who headed the British delegation. (Courtesy of Special Collections, Univer-
sity of Kentucky Library.)
was the logical selection because having embassies there made it easier
for IMF and bank members to communicate with their countries and
because information on the economies of countries throughout the world
would be readily available. Another compelling reason for Vinson, though
one not articulated at the conference, concerned the growing tensions
with the Soviet Union. He thought it wise to keep a close eye on the
organizations, realizing that decisions made "at the headquarters of the
Fund and Bank might have important political consequences affecting
the national security of the United States."73
On the issue of management, Vinson and Keynes agreed that the
fund should be headed by a managing director and the bank by a presi-
dent, but they were at loggerheads over the U.S. proposal that each insti-
tution have a governing board consisting of twelve full-time directors
and twelve full-time alternates. To Keynes, who argued for part-time
directors, the plan meant gross overstaffing that would hinder the effi-
cient operation of the organizations. The American position, with just a
minor change, prevailed, and Keynes suffered another disappointment.
It would not be the last one.
Keynes had assumed that Harry Dexter White, his coarchitect of the
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Bretton Woods institutions, would become the first managing director
of the IMF. He found out at Savannah that it was not to be. The explana-
tion from Vinson was that Truman had decided that an American should
be head of the World Bank to assure the confidence of the financial
community in New York and that it would not be appropriate for Ameri-
cans to be in charge of both organizations, making White ineligible for
the position. The tnith of the matter was that White had become a poten-
tial time bomb for the administration. What to do with White became a
top priority for the White House in the late winter of 1946 after he had
been accused in an FBI report of passing government information to
Soviet agents. The timing of the report made the decision even more
complicated because it came after Truman had nominated and the Sen-
ate had confirmed White to serve on the governing board of the IMF as
an executive director. The president, Vinson, Secretary of State James
Byrnes, Attorney General Tom Clark, and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover
discussed several possibilities, including firing White and making no
public statement, asking him to resign, and allowing him to take the
IMF job but keeping him under surveillance. The last option was de-
cided upon, and White was allowed to join the fund when it began op-
erations later in 1946, playing "a highly influential role during the IMF's
first year."74 He resigned the next year because of failing health and died
of heart failure in 1948, three days after forcefully testifying before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities that he had never been "a
Communist, nor even close to becoming one" and that the principles he
believed in and lived by "make it impossible for me ever to do a disloyal
act or anything against the interests of our country."75
Shortly after the Savannah conference and the White affair, Vinson
got a much-needed breathing spell when he returned to Kentucky in the
spring of 1946 for pleasure and politics. The relaxation came at the Ken-
tucky Derby, where he and his wife Roberta played host to the president's
daughter, Margaret. Not only did Truman entrust the care of his daugh-
ter to Vinson, he gave his Treasury secretary five dollars to bet on the
Derby. In a playful confession of his inability to "pick 'em," Vinson
wrote to Truman, "Your Trustee came, saw and was conquered." He still
possessed the tickets that represented "your misplaced confidence in
order to produce them in court to meet any action, criminal or civil, that
you might bring against me," Vinson added. In closing, he said, "And
now having made this worthless investment for you, and thereby losing
your confidence and friendship, may I call you what I truly think you
are, 'A damn sucker' !"76 The political event of his spring sojourn in
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Kentucky was a speech to four hundred of the party's faithful at a Jack-
son Day dinner in Louisville to raise money for the Democratic Na-
tional Committee. Vinson's appearance came amid reports that he was
being lobbied hard by party officials in the state to run for the U.S.
Senate in 1946. As he introduced Vinson, Louisville mayor E. Leland
Taylor said Kentuckians were hoping that Vinson would cap his emi-
nent career by filling "the shoes Henry Clay wore as U.S. Senator."77
Vinson made no reference to his intentions, discussing instead the pend-
ing loan to Great Britain and the administration's domestic and interna-
tional economic policies.
The next and final step in the public life of "Available Vinson,"
however, would not be to fill the shoes of Henry Clay, but rather those of
Harlan Fiske Stone, the chief justice of the United States, who died un-
expectedly in April 1946.
CHAPTER 7
The Chief Justice
and His Court
On June 24, 1946, as thousands watched, Fred M. Vinson was sworn in
as the nation's thirteenth chief justice. President Truman, who said he
had "labored long and faithfully" in his duty of selecting a chief justice,
declared that the only regret he had was "losing Vinson from the cabi-
net." The president voiced confidence that respect for the Supreme Court
would be "enhanced" by Vinson's appointment. Despite the fact that
Vinson was the thirteenth chief justice, Truman said his appointment
was "lucky for the U.S. and lucky for Mr. Vinson."1 The next seven
years, however, did not live up to the hope and optimism of the colorful
swearing-in ceremony.
Although it came as a surprise to many, there was much to justify
Vinson's appointment in 1946. Two overlapping considerations were
preeminent. One was the diminished respect for the Supreme Court re-
sulting from the highly visible personal infighting, especially that be-
tween Justices Hugo L. Black and Robert H. Jackson. The other was
Vinson's reputation as a mediator and respected politician who had proved
his mettle in Congress and a succession of key positions in the Roosevelt
and Truman administrations. Truman thought that Vinson, known for
his amiability and collegiality, could play the role of peacemaker and
bring some order to the splintered Court.
That Vinson was not as successful in achieving this goal as Truman
hoped is the result of many factors and can best be understood by exam-
ining the controversy leading up to Vinson's appointment, the personal
and philosophical rivalries on the Court, Vinson's own personality and
his relationship with the other justices, and his continued close ties to
Truman that by today's standards may have bordered on the unethical.
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To many observers, Vinson's appointment smacked of cronyism, and
some thought that he did not display enough independence from his
friend and political benefactor.
When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22,1946, most
people in and outside of Washington expected Justice Jackson to suc-
ceed him. This widely shared expectation dated to FDR's elevation of
Stone in 1941 to be the twelfth chief justice. Before making that ap-
pointment, Roosevelt consulted retiring chief justice Charles Evans
Hughes about his successor. Specifically, the two discussed Stone and
Jackson, who was attorney general at the time. Although Hughes en-
dorsed Stone, who had served on the Court for sixteen years, he also
recommended that Jackson be appointed to succeed Stone.2
Stone's death set in motion a series of political activities that could
only occur in a place like Washington, D.C., in the postwar environment
of intense ideological disputes about the future social and economic
direction of the country. The Court could not escape being embroiled in
these disputes, and the composition of the Court was vitally important
to people of every political stripe. Truman moved cautiously to select a
new chief justice. One week after Stone's death, he invited retired chief
justice Hughes to the White House to discuss appointments. Exactly
what took place in that meeting became a matter of dispute, which can
be partially untangled through the public record.
One of the first public signs of the struggle over the appointment
appeared in the Washington Post on May 2, 1946, in a column by Mar-
quis Childs. Referring to Truman's meeting with Hughes, he wrote, "The
weight of the advice" that Hughes gave Truman "was that the Chief
Justice should be selected from outside the ranks of the court."3 Merlo J.
Pusey, who was writing an authorized biography of Hughes at that time,
claims that the former chief justice wondered where Childs got his in-
formation, which he said was not an accurate account of his meeting
with Truman. The Childs column was followed by several media reports
about a bitter fight between Justices Black and Jackson, which had seri-
ous ramifications for the appointment of the new chief justice. The most
extensive account appeared on May 16 in a story by Washington Star
columnist Doris Fleeson. She recounted in detail the origins of the Black-
Jackson "blood feud," which stemmed from the Jewell Ridge case in
1945.4 Black had refused to disqualify himself from a case involving the
Jewell Ridge Coal Company and the United Mine Workers. Black's
former law partner, Crompton Harris, was counsel for the United Mine
Workers, and a five-to-four majority, which included Black, sided with
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the mine workers. The coal company petitioned for a rehearing and asked
specifically that Black be removed from the case. Jackson was so in-
censed with Black's failure to disqualify himself that he attached an
unprecedented statement deploring Black's actions to the Court's denial
of a rehearing in the controversial case. The angry Black considered
Jackson's attack to be a "gratuitous insult" to his personal and judicial
integrity. Fleeson reported that the information about this "clash of wills"
had been provided to Truman. "The harassed President, a southerner
himself," Fleeson said, "was quick to perceive the affront which Mr.
Black feels he suffered." She reported that Truman had confided to a
senator that "Black says he will resign if I make Jackson Chief Justice
and tell the reasons why. Jackson says the same about Black."5 Fleeson's
article was slanted in favor of Black, and Jackson was convinced that
some member of the Court had breached the confidence of the confer-
ence table.6
A week after the Fleeson article appeared, Fred Rodell, a Yale law
professor who wrote widely on legal subjects for law journals as well as
for the popular press, reported in the Progressive that when the
progressives got wind of the possibility of Jackson's being elevated to
the chief justiceship, they "poured protests into the White House—by
phone, by emissary, by personal appearance—to block Jackson." Rodell
said, "They succeeded, and they probably succeeded permanently."7
Another blow against Jackson was struck by retired Supreme Court jus-
tice Owen J. Roberts, whom Truman invited to the White House on May
2 to discuss the appointment. Truman claims that Roberts also advised
him that Vinson was the best choice.8 Several years later, Roberts re-
fused to comment on the advice that he gave to Truman, but Jackson
told his biographer, Eugene Gerhart, in 1951, "I have no doubt that Rob-
erts advised that the appointee come from off the bench." The following
year, Jackson told Gerhart that "it was probably Roberts" who recom-
mended Vinson to President Truman.9
It was Black whom Jackson held responsible for his not being cho-
sen. On June 8, two days after Truman announced Vinson's nomination,
Jackson, who was in Nuremberg as the lead U.S. counsel prosecuting
the Nazis for war crimes, sent the president a fiery telegram blasting
Black. After perfunctory congratulations to Truman for "having named
as Chief Justice an honest, forthright and trustworthy man," under whom
he said he would be happy to serve, Jackson spewed forth his venom
over the events that had transpired. He said that he had read reports that
Black had threatened to resign if Truman promoted Jackson to chief
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Vinson is sworn in as the nation's thirteenth Chief Justice on June 24, 1946, by Chief
Justice D. Lawrence Groner of the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. (AP/Wide World Photos.)
justice and that "thereupon you agreed to do so. These events were at
once given wide publicity either by the White House or Mr. Justice
Black." Jackson said: "I would be loathe to believe that you would con-
cede to any man a veto over court appointments. Every justice, every
aspirant, every judge on lower courts, and every litigant before the court,
is now given the impression that a judge may be denied promotion if he
incurs the displeasure of Mr. Justice Black on grounds however trivial."
Jackson was grieved that Truman had not bothered to contact him in
Nuremberg, "on a mission undertaken at your request," to inquire about
the "truth of the insinuations." Jackson then wrote approximately six
pages describing his version of the events surrounding the Jewell Ridge
case, which resembled in some ways tales of two high school boys bul-
lying each other over perceived threats to their reputations. Finally, he
told the president that the "protection of my own name lies in disclosing
the facts heretofore suppressed. I must meet the situation forthrightly
and over my own signature." He concluded with a request. "Unless you
can suggest some better method of making my position clear to the pub-
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lie and to the bar of the country or unless you think it preferable that I
release this cable myself from here, I am compelled to ask you to re-
lease it."10
Truman's reply to Jackson was swift and forceful. "You have been
grossly misinformed," he said, and he assured Jackson that he had "not
discussed the question of the appointment of a new Chief Justice with
any member of the Court. I received no information from anyone that
even insinuated that you were unfit for promotion. There may have been
some newspaper comment regarding differences existing within the
Court, but I took no notice of them nor did they enter into my decision in
any way. I did not see the article in the Star you refer to nor had I ever
heard of it before. Justice Black has given me no information either
orally or in writing on this subject." In no uncertain terms, Truman said,
"The reputation and the position of the Court are of paramount interest
to me and no purpose can be served by making this controversy public."
He ended the telegram cordially, telling Jackson that he was "doing a
splendid job and performing an outstanding service," and he appreci-
ated "the difficulties with which you are faced."11
Despite Truman's urging him not to make public the details of his
feud with Black, Jackson did so anyway. On June 11 he sent another
telegram to the president. In it he said, "I regret that I could not accept
your conclusion that this matter should not be made public. I think no
good can come from further suppression of the facts that are favorable
to me since part of the facts have been peddled." Jackson informed
Truman that he had forwarded to the chairman of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees "a statement confined strictly to answering the
one case which had already been given out as the inside cause of the
feud. I have tried to handle it so as to cause no embarrassment to you or
to Vinson. It is far better that this matter be cleaned up now than left to
break in some form after Vinson takes over, or to embarrass him by
smoldering in the secrecy of the conference room."12 On the same date
that Truman received Jackson's cable, the story broke in the New York
Times.
So why did Truman pick Vinson? He stuck by his claim that Hughes
advised him to nominate Vinson. Pusey, Hughes's biographer, and
Gerhart, Jackson's biographer, both question the reliability of that ver-
sion of Truman's meeting with Hughes. In a series of letters exchanged
between Gerhart and Joseph Short, secretary to the president, and be-
tween Pusey and Short in 1951 and 1952, the three protagonists laid out
their claims.
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Truman's last statement on the matter was sent to Pusey on April
29, 1952, by Short. He asserted again Truman's recollection "that Chief
Justice Hughes' final recommendation was Mr. Vinson. The President
recalls that he and Mr. Hughes discussed every member of the Supreme
Court, a number of Federal Circuit Court Judges, and several members
of the State Supreme Courts. Mr. Hughes, the President recalls, spoke
highly of Justice Jackson but ended the conversation with the recom-
mendation of Mr. Vinson as the late Chief Justice Stone's successor."
Signifying that the president would not engage in any more debate about
the issue, Short's letter stated, "If this conflicts with the understanding
of other people like yourself, it still stands as the President's version of
a two-man conversation on which apparently no notes were made by
either one." Truman indicated his approval on a copy of the letter with a
handwritten comment, "This is as correct as can be, H.S.T."13
It is virtually impossible to verify what did transpire in the conver-
sation between Truman and Hughes. Gerhart offered one possible sce-
nario that lets both men stick to their version, in a letter he wrote to
Truman in November 1951. Gerhart suggested that Hughes "may have
considered Mr. Justice Jackson as 'the better man' so far as his legal and
judicial qualifications are concerned . . . [but] that he regarded Chief
Justice Vinson as 'the better man' from the point of view of his ability to
harmonize the conflict on the Court."14 Gerhart leaves no doubt in the
Jackson biography that he believes Hughes's version of the meeting with
Truman and accepts the view of Rodell that the publicity about Black's
threatened resignation was inspired by Black's friends who did not want
Jackson to be elevated over him. The stories, Rodell said, were leaked to
the press to impress upon Truman the serious nature of the Black-Jack-
son feud. Although he denied it vehemently, there is some evidence to
suggest that it was Justice William O. Douglas who leaked stories about
the Jewell Ridge case to the media.15
Tom C. Clark, who served as attorney general under Truman and
was later appointed by him to the Supreme Court, supported Truman's
recollection of the events. Clark said that in discussing the nomination
with Truman, "we had to figure out just who would be the best peace-
maker." The president asked Clark to talk with Chief Justice Hughes.
Clark called the former chief justice and asked if he could come and see
him. Hughes replied that he would come to see Clark. "We decided we'd
go to the White House and he told the President that in his view Vinson
would be an ideal person for it."16
Independently of the Hughes advice, Truman's decision to select
162 / Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky
someone off the bench seems perfectly justifiable. Whether Vinson was
the best person for the job may be questioned, but in light of Jackson's
ill-tempered cable to the chairmen of the judiciary committees in Con-
gress, which he made available to the press, there is ample reason to
guess that choosing Jackson would have only intensified the internecine
warfare that had been laid bare. To close observers of the Court, the
whole episode further diminished the Court's already tarnished reputa-
tion. When the story of the Black-Jackson feud broke in the press on
June 11, Vinson's former colleague on the circuit court, Chief Justice
Groner, wrote to another colleague, Justice Stephens. "What a nasty
mess," he said. "Its destructive influence on public opinion will be wide-
spread and the man in the street will consider it a joke to be told that
trust and confidence in the courts and of the administration of justice is
at the basis of free government."17 Stephens agreed wholeheartedly with
this assessment and blamed the whole thing on Roosevelt. He said, "It
all stems from the character of 'the Great White Father's' appointments
to the courts."18
Without doubt, the infighting on the Supreme Court among
Roosevelt's appointees convinced Truman that Stone's successor must
be someone off the Court and that it should be someone who had the
ability to bring harmony to the court. Clark Clifford, one of Truman's
most intimate advisers, said, "Once the President had heard about the
problems in the Court, I rather doubt he seriously considered anyone
else."19 Vinson had a reputation as a person who could get along with
almost anyone. Richard Kirkendall, who wrote Vinson's profile for Leon
Friedman and Fred L. Israel's anthology on the lives of Supreme Court
justices, identified Vinson's personality as the most influential factor in
Truman's decision to appoint him chief justice. The qualities Truman
admired were Vinson's "sociability and friendliness, his calm patient
and relaxed manner, his sense of humor, his respect for the views of
others, his popularity with the representatives of many factions, and his
ability to conciliate conflicting views and clashing personalities, and to
work out compromises."20 Kirkendall did not mention loyalty, but that
too was of utmost importance to Truman. In his memoirs, Truman wrote
that Vinson had "a sense of personal and political loyalty seldom found
among the top men in Washington."21
In his study of presidential appointments to the Supreme Court,
Henry Abraham noted the similarities among all four of Truman's ap-
pointees to the Court: "They had all held public office; they were his
political, professional, and personal friends; he understood them; he liked
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them; they liked him; he liked their politics."22 Vinson matched these
criteria perfectly. He and Truman had developed a close personal friend-
ship between 1945 and 1946 and interacted on both a personal and pro-
fessional basis. Vinson had become a trusted adviser during Truman's
first year in office and was a frequent visitor to the White House for
social occasions, including late-night poker games. As former members
of Congress, both men felt strongly that Congress and not the Court
should shape national policy and write laws.
Matthew Connelly, who was serving as appointments secretary to
President Truman in 1946, said that Truman valued Vinson's legislative
experience: "As a legislator he had achieved a great reputation. Mr.
Truman, naturally having been in Congress for many years, liked those
things about Vinson."23 In 1945 Truman described Vinson in his per-
sonal diary as a "straight shooter, knows Congress and how they think, a
man to trust."24 Truman was the last president to appoint a member of
Congress to the Supreme Court. Relatively few of the Court appointees
since Truman's time have had previous legislative experience. Thomas
Corcoran, adviser to President Roosevelt and lifelong companion to
Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote to Vinson shortly
after his nomination about the importance of his legislative experience.
Corcoran said that Holmes had once told him that Edward Douglass
White was the greatest chief justice, "greater than either Taft or Hughes,
because White had been a legislator and had been compelled to know
the men and to feel the tug of the deep currents of his times . . . and to
understand to his marrow the reasons and the processes which bring law
into being."25
Although the turmoil on the Court and Vinson's personal traits and
close personal relationship with Truman were the most obvious reasons
for Vinson's nomination to the Court, a pragmatic political consider-
ation may have also played a role. Elevating Vinson to chief justice gave
Truman the opportunity to name his lifelong friend and fellow Missou-
rian John Synder as secretary of the Treasury. Truman announced both
appointments on the same day. Snyder, a Missouri banker from St. Louis,
had held many positions in the Truman administration. At the time of
his appointment, he was the director of the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion, a post Vinson had once held. It is an ironic twist that
Vinson's elevation to the Court opened the door for Snyder to succeed
him. Vinson, along with Robert E. Hannegan, postmaster general, chair-
man of the National Democratic Party, and Truman's chief political lieu-
tenant, had fought vigorously to deny Snyder the treasury position. Snyder
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had become anathema to party liberals and organized labor, and he and
Vinson had never had a high regard for each other. Snyder had wanted to
be appointed to the presidency of the International Bank and Recon-
struction, and both Vinson and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had
successfully thwarted that move. Vinson's nomination had been held up
while the battle over Snyder raged. Once Vinson got the president to
appoint his candidate, Eugene Meyer, publisher of the Washington Post,
to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Vinson
felt he gained as much as he could from the president and gave up his
opposition to Snyder for the treasury post.26
There were only a few glitches when Vinson's nomination was sent
to the Senate. One member of the seventeen-member Judiciary Com-
mittee, E.H. Moore of Oklahoma, a Republican, voted against his con-
firmation. The floor vote on his nomination was delayed a week because
of protests filed by two citizens.27 These were determined to be inconse-
quential, and he was confirmed unanimously by the Senate on June 20,
1946. Senator Moore was not present.
The eyes of the media were riveted on the Court's opening session
on October 8, 1946, when all nine justices would be sitting for the first
time since April 1945, when Jackson had accepted assignment as chief
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. The New York Times de-
scribed the atmosphere as "the tensest surrounding the opening of a term
in all of the 157 years of the tribunal's life."28 Of immediate interest was
the first public meeting between Justices Black and Jackson since the
latter's public attack on the former four months earlier. As the justices
took their places on the high bench, there was no evidence of public
animosity. Seated far apart because of differences in seniority, the two
justices did not look at each other.29 Two days later, as the justices con-
vened for their initial conference of the term, Associate Justice Harold
H. Burton recorded in his diary the first exchange between the feuding
justices. Burton said Jackson was seated beside him when Black entered
the conference room: "Justice Black shook hands with him immediately
and Justice Jackson said, 'Good Morning, Hugo.'" During the confer-
ence Burton reported that Jackson and Black "joined in a brief discus-
sion—all in the best of quiet manners." Following the conference, all of
the justices ate lunch together.30
Although the personal animosities between Black and Jackson were
kept in check as Vinson stepped to the helm, the Court's voyage under
his guidance was not smooth sailing. The deep philosophical and per-
sonal rivalries from the Stone court kept the waters churning. A few
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Vinson and his messenger, Robert H. Marshall, on the opening day of the Supreme
Court on October 7, 1946. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky
Library.)
months before his death, Chief Justice Stone used a simile to describe
the bickering among the justices. He said he felt "a good deal like the
man who sticks his head through a sheet at a country fair and lets the
boys throw baseballs at him."31 Justice Felix Frankfurter described the
Court's problems in more philosophical terms. He wrote his assessment
of the Stone Court's shortcomings to his colleague Justice Frank Murphy
on June 10, 1946, the day Vinson's appointment was announced.
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If I were translated into a classroom and had to tell my students
what I thought about the period just closed, I would say the
following.. . .
1. Never before in the history of the Court were so many of its
members influenced in decisions by considerations extraneous to
the legal issues that supposedly controlled decisions.
2. Never before have members of the Court so often acted
contrary to their convictions on the governing legal issues in
decisions.
3. Never before has so large a proportion of the opinions
fallen short of requisite professional standards.32
This is the environment into which Vinson stepped in October 1946.
The president and the nation, having grown weary of the Court's divi-
siveness, held high hopes that Vinson would be able to bring harmony
and order to the nation's highest tribunal. It was not to be. As court
scholar Melvin Urofsky observed, "Given another lineup at a different
time, Vinson might well have been considered a good chief, but he proved
unable to control or guide his colleagues."33
Urofsky described the Stone and Vinson courts as "transitional courts,
located between the conservative, property-oriented courts of the Taft
and early Hughes era and the individualistic activism of the Warren years"
(1). In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the Court was
preoccupied with protecting the property rights of business owners from
government regulations. These policies were largely the product of the
Progressive movement, which sought to counteract the social disloca-
tions caused by rapid industrialization. To that end, the Progressives
succeeded in passing a wide range of laws, under the police powers of
the state, to protect employees in the workplace and to regulate relations
between management and labor. These included workmen's compensa-
tion laws for injured workers, safety and health standards for working
conditions, maximum working hours, and minimum wages.
These regulatory laws were challenged by business owners as viola-
tions of their freedom of contract and their right to control their prop-
erty. They found a sympathetic ear among a majority of the Supreme
Court justices, who interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
prohibitions against depriving a person of "life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law" to mean that business should operate largely
unfettered by interference by the states or the federal government. In
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A political cartoon that illustrates the divided Supreme Court that Vinson inherited in
1946.
doing so, the Court relied on the doctrines of economic due process and
liberty of contract.34
The economic hardships caused by the depression in 1929 prompted
further economic regulations, and the federal government took a much
more active part following Roosevelt's election in 1932. Heavily Demo-
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cratic Congresses passed broad, sweeping regulations with breathtaking
speed. Fifteen measures were passed in 1933 alone, including the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which directed industry groups
to draw up codes of fair competition that governed production, prices,
and labor relations, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which
subsidized farmers in order to control crop production. In 1935 Con-
gress followed with the National Labor Relations Act, establishing the
right of workers to organize and bargain collectively; the Bituminous
Coal Act, which applied wage and price controls and collective bargain-
ing rights to the coal industry; and the Social Security Act, which cre-
ated old-age pensions and unemployment insurance. In rapid succession
the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA, the AAA, and the coal act. As
a member of Congress, Vinson felt the sting of the Court's rulings, for
he had been intimately involved with many of these acts. He had helped
to write the tobacco processing taxes under the AAA and was instru-
mental in the passage of the Guffey-Vinson coal bill that Congress passed
after the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Act. The hostility of
the Court's majority to these measures precipitated the constitutional
crisis of 1937 and prompted FDR to propose his famous court-pack-
ing plan.35
As a counterbalance to the Court's laissez-faire majority, Roosevelt
proposed adding one court seat for each justice over the age of seventy,
which most of the property rights justices were. Although Congress and
the public in general disapproved of Roosevelt's court-tampering ef-
forts, the plan succeeded in nudging the Court to take a different stance.
The historic case of West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,^6 which up-
held a Washington state minimum wage law for women, signaled the
Court's turning point. Decided by a slim five-to-four majority, West Coast
Hotel marked the beginning of the end of the Court's hostility to eco-
nomic regulation. Two weeks later the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act by the same five-to-four
majority.37 This abrupt switch in the Court's direction in 1937 signified
that a constitutional revolution was under way. The new direction of the
Court was sealed when Justice Willis Van Devanter resigned at the end
of the Court term in June, presenting Roosevelt with his first opportu-
nity to appoint a Supreme Court justice.
Between 1937 and 1945, FDR appointed eight men to the Court and
elevated a ninth to be Chief Justice. The Court that Vinson joined in
1946 comprised seven Roosevelt appointees and one Truman appointee,
Harold Burton, a Republican, who was appointed in 1945.38 All of
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Roosevelt's appointees had been staunch New Dealers and approved the
Court's about-face on economic regulation in 1937, but beyond that they
did not share a common judicial philosophy. Once the constitutionality
of the New Deal had been firmly established, the philosophical unanim-
ity of the Roosevelt Court disappeared. As new issues, particularly those
relating to civil liberties and civil rights, began to dominate the Court's
agenda, two opposing blocs emerged on the Court. One bloc coalesced
around Hugo Black and consisted of Justices William O. Douglas, Wiley
B. Rutledge, and Frank Murphy. The other group coalesced around Felix
Frankfurter and consisted of Justices Jackson, Stanley Reed, and Bur-
ton. The nation waited to see with which bloc Vinson would align.
The doctrinal fault lines separating these two groups revolved around
two fundamental questions regarding the exercise of judicial powers.
The broader question concerned the proper role of the court in relation
to the other branches of government, especially when determining
whether the decisions of those branches were constitutional. One view,
the judicial restraint position, holds that the court, whose members are
appointed, should show deference to the elected branches. According to
this view, when weighing constitutional questions, the court should strive
to uphold legislative or executive decisions unless there is some clear
constitutional prohibition against such action or an equally compelling
reason why the action should be invalidated. Frankfurter was the Court's
leading advocate of judicial restraint. He firmly believed that the elected
representatives of the people should be given adequate opportunity for
experimentation. If the people's representatives made a bad or unwise
decision, the proper remedy in a democratic society was the ballot box.
When issues came before the Court involving governmental infringe-
ment of an individual freedom, such as speech, Frankfurter's approach
required the judge to balance the rights of the individual against the
government's interest in maintaining order and security.
This view is rooted in the "clear and present danger" test estab-
lished in 1919 by Oliver Wendell Holmes.39 The test serves as a guide
for judges in weighing the individual's freedom of speech against
government's concern with order. Speech that poses a serious and im-
minent threat to public order and safety can be prohibited. It is through
this balancing of interests that the judge is able to defer to other institu-
tions. Ironically, although this perspective enhances the role of the judge,
it is more consistent with a limited role for the court, one imposed by
the judge himself. For Frankfurter, judicial discretion was the route to
self-restraint.
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Given Vinson's long career in elected office, he was naturally in-
clined toward this view. He was particularly sensitive to the issues of
national security that were of preeminent concern during the Cold War
era, and his views on the subject are most clearly articulated in one of
his most famous opinions, Dennis v. United States.40 In addition, Vinson
surely understood and shared Truman's expectations that his judicial
appointees would "find the law," not "make the law."41 A former law
clerk said that Vinson's "whole conception of the democratic process
counseled caution when, as a judge, he was invited to set aside the equi-
librium of social interests represented by a legislative pronouncement."42
Black, who has been described as a "result-oriented" justice, was
less concerned about the virtue of judicial deference to the other branches
if that stood in the way of the desired result, as it often did. Black also
advocated judicial restraint, but he approached that concept differently.
His position is best illustrated by his stand on the absolute and literal
meaning of the First Amendment. According to Black, the language of
the First Amendment, that "Congress shall pass no law respecting" free-
dom of speech meant just that, no laws restricting speech or expression.
To Black there was "no place in the First Amendment for the clear and
present danger test."43 He would not tolerate any exceptions to free
speech, even in the face of threats to public order or national security.
The idea that a judge should, as Frankfurter advocated, have the discre-
tion to "balance" the interests of the individual against the interests of
government was simply wrong. A consequence of limiting judicial dis-
cretion to a fixed meaning of the Constitution, which is how Black con-
ceived of judicial restraint, meant that laws passed by legislative bodies
might be invalidated. "I believe," he once wrote, "it is the duty of the
Court to show 'deference' to the Constitution only."44
Even in the intense heat of the Cold War, Black uniformly voted
against the government and for the individual. This put him on the op-
posite side from Vinson, whose instincts and experience made him sym-
pathetic to government's need to address public fears about order, safety,
and national security. Most of Vinson's service in the executive branch
had been done under emergency conditions, and "he tended to think of
the problem of freedom largely in terms of the affirmative use of politi-
cal power to create and preserve such conditions as are favorable to
freedom."45 Vinson never voted against the government where national
security matters were at issue.
The other source of philosophical differences between the Frank-
furter and Black camps stemmed from sharp disagreements over the
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interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and what restrictions it imposed on the states. Black took the position
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
all of the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, thus imposing the
same restrictions on states as it did on the national government. Conse-
quently, the states, like the federal government, were prohibited from
infringing on individual freedoms such as speech, press, religion, and
free association, and they were also required to guarantee the same pro-
cedural rights as the federal government, such as the protection against
self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures.
In contrast to Black's absolutist view of total incorporation, Frank-
furter espoused "selective incorporation," which again required a "bal-
ancing view." Rather than accepting a fixed meaning for any individual
right, Frankfurter chose to weigh the individual right against "the neces-
sity for allowing play at the joints of the crude machinery of govern-
ment."46 He also argued that "due process of law" was an extremely
vague concept, which required judicial discretion and a flexible inter-
pretation. Again, Vinson was inclined to Frankfurter's point of view. His
natural bent toward pragmatism and his experience in seeking compro-
mise to achieve desired goals made him wary of any absolutist stance or
interpretation. One of his law clerks said his judicial approach had a
predominantly "pragmatic cast" and that "as a judge he ordinarily re-
acted suspiciously to the grand generalization."47
These sharp philosophical differences among the members of the
Vinson Court were often exacerbated by intense personal rivalries and
conflicts. On occasion these personal animosities were even reflected in
the wording of opinions. Theories of leadership on the Supreme Court
developed by such scholars as David J. Danelski and Robert J. Steamer
help to explain why Vinson proved no more capable than Stone at unify-
ing the Court.48 Leadership on the Supreme Court requires the perfor-
mance of two kinds of functions: task leadership and social leadership.
Social leadership concerns how the chief justice conducts himself with
his colleagues and his efforts to make the Court a more harmonious
body. Vinson's ability to provide social leadership was aided by his per-
sonal affability, and he worked hard to foster good relations with his
colleagues. He went out of his way to accommodate the personal needs
of the justices. This was especially noticeable in his consideration of
illnesses that affected various Court members. On two occasions Dou-
glas was away from the Court for health reasons. Vinson diligently kept
him informed about the Court's business and was very solicitous in en-
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Vinson in his judicial robes at the Supreme Court. (Harris & Ewing, courtesy of Special
Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
couraging him to recover his health before returning to the bench. He
showed the same consideration for Justice Murphy's prolonged health
problems. He willingly rescheduled any Court business when another
justice had a personal conflict. Vinson's files are replete with notes of
appreciation from his colleagues for his kindness to them. One thing
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that stands out about Vinson's relationship with his colleagues is that
there is no record of his ever having said anything to another member of
the Court or to one of his law clerks that demeaned any of his colleagues.
The same cannot be said for some of his brethren. Success in social
leadership, though, does not equate with task leadership.
Task leadership has managerial and intellectual components. Mana-
gerial leadership relates to keeping the docket up to date and using po-
litical skills in guiding the conference, in assigning opinions, and in
choosing when to write opinions for the Court. Intellectual leadership is
displayed at the conference debates and in writing the opinions.49 A criti-
cal measure of the chief justice's leadership is how he manages the con-
ference, where the justices meet to discuss cases. As the presiding officer,
the chief justice speaks first and votes last. He can exercise task leader-
ship through his presentation of cases, by facilitating compromise, and
by ending debate when necessary. In the process of decision making,
disagreements can become high-spirited, leading to antagonisms and
tensions. Dealing with these negative consequences of conference de-
bate requires skills in social leadership. This task is necessary to keep
the Court socially cohesive. Rarely will a chief justice excel at both
types of leadership. Others on the Court may fulfill one of these func-
tions. If both functions are performed well, the consequences for the
Court as an institution are highly positive. Conflict is reduced, and so-
cial cohesion and satisfaction with the conference increase. Also, pro-
duction, in terms of the number of decisions per time spent, increases.
Three characteristics determine a chief justice's actual influence over
the Court: esteem, ability, and personality.50 Of these three characteris-
tics, Vinson's strongest asset was his congenial personality, but it was
not enough to overcome his weakness in the other two areas, esteem and
ability. From the beginning some of his colleagues harbored doubts about
Vinson's judicial credentials. On October 15, 1946, following a visit
with President Truman at the White House by all the justices, Frank-
furter asked Reed, also from Kentucky, his candid opinion of Vinson.
Reed, who was not known as one of the Court's intellectual leaders,
replied, "He is just like me, except that he is less well-educated and has
not had as many opportunities." Although Reed had held some expecta-
tions that he might be selected as chief justice, he told Frankfurter that
had he been president he would not have appointed either Vinson or
himself. "I know a good deal about the history of Chief Justices of this
Court and the great ones have been men like Marshall, Taney and Hughes,
men of recognized pre-eminence before they [came to the court]."51
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Another justice who expressed reservations was Douglas. He liked
the chief justice personally. He described him as a person with "a gentle
voice and gentle manners." But he did not consider Vinson to be a great
jurist. Douglas said that like Truman's other appointees, he was "medio-
cre." He theorized that Truman harbored some feelings of inferiority,
noting that the president once said to him, "You know Bill, you are the
one person I see who does not try to make me feel inferior." From this
exchange and others with the president, Douglas speculated that "the
reason he named people like Fred Vinson to the Court was in order to be
surrounded by men whose stature did not exceed his own.""
The justice who harbored the greatest doubts about Vinson's abili-
ties and who became his chief antagonist was Frankfurter. He expressed
reservations about Vinson following the first conference at which ar-
gued cases were taken up. Frankfurter recorded in his diary on October
19 that the way Vinson dealt with the cases "gives further evidence that
he is likely to deal with complicated matters on a surface basis." He
described the chief justice as "confident and easy-going and sure and
shallow."53 In fairness, Frankfurter said that "one must give him ample
time to show his qualities, but he seems to me to have the confident air
of a man who does not see the complexities of problems and blithely
hits the obvious points." Yet, said Frankfurter, "he does it all in good
temper and dispatch." A few weeks later, Frankfurter again observed
that "Vinson conducts the Conference with ease and good humor, dis-
posing of each case rather briefly by choosing, as it were, to float merely
on the surface of the problems raised by the cases" (283).
Edward F. Prichard, a Kentuckian who at one time had been a Vinson
protege when he worked for him in the executive branch and who had
served as a Frankfurter law clerk prior to Vinson's appointment, de-
scribed the "personal rancor" that developed between the two men.
"Frankfurter," he said, "did not have high regard for Vinson's judicial
capabilities and. . . was not very adept at concealing his views on things
of that sort." The antagonisms between the two men stemmed from dif-
ferences in background and personality. Prichard described Vinson as
"a practical day-to-day kind of person, he didn't spin out and articulate
philosophical positions—just the opposite of Frankfurter." Although
Vinson was an affable man by nature, "he could take offense if he were
affronted and Frankfurter was a good affronter."54
Early on, Frankfurter tried to lure Vinson into his camp, which was
his standard approach to newly appointed justices. Flattery and instruc-
tion were the key elements of his strategy. Soon after his appointment,
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Vinson replied to a congratulatory letter from Frankfurter. "I want to tell
you," he wrote, "how happy your letter made me, and how much I wel-
comed your generous prophecy in regard to my conduct of the office of
Chief Justice."55
During his first year on the Court, Vinson sought out Frankfurter's
advice. On one occasion a baffled Vinson asked Frankfurter about a
pending case. "What is happening around here? I haven't heard any-
thing for several days." Frankfurter, sensing an opportunity to instruct
the Chief Justice, discussed with him how they might "smoke out" the
majority. Vinson replied, "I am ready to move in whenever I have to, but
I want to take my time about it and not do it too soon. If I have any
special ability, it is that of getting on with folk and I want to do it here
without making people feel that I am unduly moving in and that this is
why I rather thought it would be unwise for me to move in on [this]
case." Frankfurter surmised that Vinson was reticent in "taking the ini-
tiative on questions before the Court and asserting such intrinsic author-
ity as the position of the Chief Justice gives."56 To show signs of weakness
such as this was an open invitation to Frankfurter, who had a reputation
for trying to dominate those whom he considered to be intellectually
inferior.
In his psychological biography of Frankfurter, H.N. Hirsch explains
Frankfurter's behavior toward Vinson and other members of the Court
as the result of his neurotic personality. He had a strong need to manipu-
late people and an even stronger desire to win. When he failed to win, he
became bitter and vindictive.57 Such was the situation with Vinson. Be-
ginning in early 1950, his attitude toward Vinson turned vengeful, and
he began to criticize him at every opportunity. This change in his behav-
ior coincided with two major changes in the Court's personnel. Over the
summer of 1949, two of Roosevelt's appointees—Frank Murphy and
Wiley Rutledge—died suddenly. Truman appointed Attorney General
Tom C. Clark to fill the Murphy vacancy and Sherman Minton, whom
the president had known since their days in the Senate together, to fill
the Rutledge vacancy. Clark is on record as saying that he thinks Vinson
lobbied Truman for his own appointment.58 Clark and Minton were very
much in the Vinson mold, and their appointments produced what many
court scholars labeled the Truman Court. With the four Truman appoin-
tees, all of whom supported a passive judiciary and a progovernment
stance on most civil liberties issues, Vinson had an almost automatic
majority. He could usually count on Reed, Frankfurter, or Jackson to
join their bloc. Perhaps it was the realization that his own stature had
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been diminished with the appointments of Clark and Minton that caused
Frankfurter problems.
Newton Minow, who served as a clerk for Vinson in 1951-1952,
maintained that the real intellectual leaders on the Court while he was
there were not Frankfurter and Black but Vinson and Black. Minow ar-
gues that scholars "tended to underestimate Vinson as a power in the
Court because they didn't regard him as a scholar." In calling Vinson
one of the Court's intellectual powers, he was defining intellectual in
terms of "strongly held, strongly articulated views." Minow's thoughts
on the matter were shaped by the prominence of the steel-seizure case
during his clerkship, but in that context his observations ring true. When
a big case like steel seizure came along, "Vinson had a view and Black
had a view and others would fluctuate around them. Frankfurter and
Jackson were more colorful in their legal language and they could write
more artful opinions with better quotes. But in the real tough cases there
was Vinson and Black on opposite sides."59
Howard Trienens, who served as a Vinson clerk along with Minow,
recalled that Frankfurter became very unhappy whenever he learned that
Vinson did not always vote the way Frankfurter wanted him to. Accord-
- 5 r
Vinson at a dinner given in his honor by his law clerks on June 5,1951. Front row, from
left, David Feller, Willard Pedrick, Vinson, Karl Price, Francis Allen, and Lawrence
Ebb; second row, Ike Groner, Art Seder, Newton Minow, Murray Schwartz, Wilbur Lester
and Howard Trienens. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Li-
brary.)
The Chief Justice and His Court / 177
ing to Trienens, there was a period when Frankfurter would not sign a
Vinson opinion no matter what it said. Although he eventually got over
it, Trienens said their relationship remained strained in a "professional
sense."60 Frankfurter, even though he agreed with every word, would
write a separate concurrence, a practice that greatly irritated Vinson.
Another thing that irritated Vinson was Frankfurter's habit of stand-
ing up in conference while addressing the other justices. His demeanor
was that of a college professor; sometimes he would go and pull a book
down from the shelves. On one particular day, recalled Tom Clark, Frank-
furter was standing and talking about a case "and he said something that
irritated the Chief."61 Vinson thought the remarks reflected on his integ-
rity, and "the Chief pushed his chair back . . . and was sort of making
toward Felix." Douglas recalled that the chief justice said, "No son of a
bitch can ever say that to Fred Vinson."62 Minton and Clark intervened
and held Vinson until he could cool off. Later that day he apologized to
Frankfurter.
Although Clark said that this was the only incident in which Vinson
lost his temper, there were many other situations in which the chief jus-
tice and Frankfurter locked horns. One issue that was perennially a mat-
ter of concern to all the members of the Court was petitions for certiorari,
the procedures by which a litigant could ask the Court to review a case
from a lower court. Four justices must vote to grant review before a case
can be brought to the Court. During Vinson's tenure as chief justice,
there was an increasing number of petitions for certiorari. Frankfurter
felt that the Court granted too many petitions. Vinson was sympathetic
to this view but no doubt resented the officious way in which Frank-
furter instructed the Court on the mater of a "serious evil" in the Court's
work. In a memo sent to all members of the Court, Frankfurter wrote,
"The evil is the filing week-after-week of utterly baseless petitions."63
In a comment that reflected on Vinson's leadership, Frankfurter said
that the situation "offends every consideration relevant to the efficient
and economic conduct of our business." He then identified several cases
that should not have been accepted for review and laid out his own for-
mula for stemming the number of petitions for certiorari.
It is not known how Vinson replied to Frankfurter's complaint about
the matter of granting too many petitions for certiorari, but he did re-
spond at length to another Frankfurter memorandum sent to all mem-
bers of the Court. This complaint was about extending the amount of
time within which to file a petition for certiorari. Frankfurter's main
concern was about the need to notify the opposing party in a case that an
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extension had been granted. The issue had been raised in a case on which
Frankfurter was working. To his memo he attached a proposed new rule,
drawn up by the clerk of the court.64 In less than a week, Vinson sent a
memo to all the justices saying, "It doesn't strike me that [the proposed
new rule] does the job," and he proceeded for two pages to explain how
his view of the problem differed from Frankfurter's view, to elaborate
on the concerns he had about Frankfurter's proposal, and to suggest a
solution of his own.65 This prompted another lengthy memo by Frank-
furter. Vinson's proposal, he said, "arouses sympathy in me," but upon
reflection he was persuaded that "practical considerations preclude the
desirability of such a change." Two days later Frankfurter followed with
yet another memorandum, which he said was not circulated "for the
pleasure of arguing but to aid if possible in dealing with questions to
which my original memorandum had given rise."66 Later that same day,
Vinson responded with a five-page memo restating his own views and
explaining why Frankfurter's proposal was not desirable. This exchange
of memos, stemming from Frankfurter's need to tell Vinson how the
Court ought to be run, was not an everyday occurrence, but it happened
frequently enough to frustrate Vinson. It is striking that these justices
wrangled before the members of the Court via memoranda when a simple
face-to-face discussion might have resolved their differences. It is a clas-
sic situation of Frankfurter the professor instructing the chief justice
and the latter taking exception to it.
Indicative of Frankfurter's constant needling of Vinson are the nu-
merous occasions on which he wrote notes of apology to Vinson. In one
handwritten note, he said, "Don't let me irritate you. I don't mean to.
Sometimes I over tease."67 On another occasion he wrote, "If I spoke
unduly on what was an unemotional and technical matter, I'm sorry and
apologize."68 One other time he apologized for his "slipshod English" in
saying to Vinson '"You don't know what will happen' when I meant
'nobody knows.'"59
Sometimes Frankfurter quibbled with Vinson over the conduct of
the Saturday conferences in which the justices discussed pending cases.
At the beginning of the October 1950 term, Frankfurter sent one of his
familiar "Dear Brethren" memos to the Court members asking for their
"indulgent consideration" of suggestions for improving the disposition
of already argued cases. He contended that the Court did not take enough
time before reaching a decision or before writing and circulating opin-
ions. In typical fashion he stated that his suggestions did "not imply
criticism of the present Court or of its doings,"70 which it obviously did.
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At the end of the term, he sent another memorandum to his colleagues
reiterating his concerns. "It would greatly surprise me if all of us did not
feel cases this Term had not been adequately informed." Specifically, he
said, "there was no adequate opportunity to study a case" before the
justices voted. "I do not recall," he said, "any instance—there may have
been such—in which we postponed a vote on an argued case."71 Frank-
furter requested that the justices meet in conference at the beginning of
the next term to discuss the problem. Vinson obliged by calling the con-
ference that Frankfurter requested, but he also took issue with his facts.
"My recollection is very definite that we have postponed many such
cases. I will make a check in regard to this feature to see whose memory
is correct on this point." Vinson said that his policy had always been to
pass any argued case upon the request of a single justice. Vinson, the
master of doing his homework, was so eager to prove Frankfurter wrong
that he already had the data in hand before the ink had dried on his
memorandum. Attached to it was a four-page list of all the cases from
the 1946 term through the 1950 term in which votes were not cast at the
first conference following argument.72 The scheduled conference kept
being postponed because individual justices were unable to attend. In
the end, "the uniform lack of enthusiasm by his brethren finally made
Frankfurter realize there was no point in insisting on a special confer-
ence."73
One of the most important powers of the chief justice is to assign
the writing of opinions to individual justices. If the chief justice is in the
majority, he may assign an opinion to himself or to another member of
the majority. If he is in the minority, then he assigns the justice to write
the dissent. The senior justice in the majority assigns the opinion for the
majority opinion. The more often the chief justice is in the majority, the
greater his control over opinion assignment. Vinson maintained a tight
control over the assignment of opinions by bending himself to the ma-
jority. He was in the majority in over 86 percent of the cases. He aver-
aged only nine dissents per term, far less than Stone's annual average of
eighteen.74
How the chief justice assigns opinions has several ramifications for
the Court. It can affect the value of the decision as a precedent, make the
decision more acceptable to the public, help to hold the chief justice's
majority together in a close vote, and influence dissenters to join the
Court's opinion.75 Law clerks Minow and Trienens offered some insight
about the chief justice's approach to assigning opinions. They noted that
he "went into that kind of calculation of analysis of how he could assign
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cases in a way to keep a majority if he was on the majority." By the time
Trienens and Minow became clerks in 1951, Vinson was almost always
in the majority, because the four Truman appointees usually voted to-
gether. This meant that his task was to assign opinions in a way to get
the fifth justice, and he would discuss his strategies with his clerks. "For
example he would say now if I assign Bill [Douglas] to this, then he'll
write such and such an opinion and you might lose Jackson or Burton.
So I think what I'll do is assign [it] to [Jackson] and Burton may be able
to go along."76
Often a chief justice assigns important cases to himself. When he
speaks for the Court, he lends the prestige of his office to the decision.
Vinson had a reputation for assigning the "plum" cases to others. In
fact, one of the more favorable assessments of Vinson's role as chief
justice was that he was fair in assigning opinions. A frequent Vinson
critic, Yale law professor John P. Frank, observed that Vinson did not
play favorites when assigning opinions. There was "no hazing period of
dull statutory and tax cases for the younger justices."77 Vinson's law
clerks agreed that "in the vast bulk of cases the Chief's sole motivation
was the equitable sharing of the work load." In order to distribute opin-
ion writing fairly, Vinson kept a large chart with nine columns, indicat-
ing which opinions had been assigned to each justice and when each
opinion was handed down. Vinson had difficulty in maintaining an equi-
table distribution of cases because of the varying speed with which the
respective justices completed opinions, and as a result the assignment of
opinions on the Vinson Court favored those justices who wrote more
expeditiously.78 Delay in completing opinions increased in importance
as the term drew to a close, because the Court could be forced to sit for
extra weeks waiting for some justices to get caught up.
The problem of timeliness in completing opinions is illustrated by
an incident that occurred at the end of Vinson's first term in the well-
known Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation
case.79 The case had originally been assigned to Burton after oral argu-
ments were heard in December 1946. By June, Burton had not produced
a draft of the opinion, and with only a few weeks left in the term, Vinson
reassigned the case to Murphy. Frankfurter, who wrote a dissenting opin-
ion, commented in the first draft that he circulated to his colleagues
about the lack of time available to him to write the dissent because of
the delay in receiving the majority opinion. Rutledge counseled Frank-
furter against making the issue of late opinions so public because it would
disclose the "confidential routines of the Court." It would also have the
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effect, he said, or making it appear that Murphy, "who took over [the
case] not by request but by the Chief's assignment" was the cause of the
delay, and it would not "be quite fair to Harold."80 For once, Frankfurter
accepted the advice of a colleague. At the end of the Chenery opinion,
handed down June 23, 1947, is a notation that Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson dissent, "but there is not now opportunity for a response ad-
equate to the issues raised by the Court's opinion." The two justices
indicated that the detailed grounds for dissent would be filed in due
course.81 The actual dissent, written by Jackson and joined by Frank-
furter, was filed October 6,1947, and printed with the majority opinion.
Critics laid the blame for the Court's inability to get its work done
on time squarely on the shoulders of the chief justice. Fred Rodell, like
Frank a Yale law professor and no fan of Vinson's, wrote that "either he
does not know or does not care how to make most of his colleagues get
at their work and get it done. . . . He lets a backlog of opinions-to-be-
written pile up for months, so that the Court's two or three most efficient
work-horses get assigned far more than their share."82 Rodell may have
been trying to burnish the image of the Court's most efficient "work-
horses," Black and Douglas, with whom he had an intimate relation-
ship. Through their personal interactions with Rodell and in a steady
stream of correspondence, the two justices shared with him their thoughts
about the Court and its justices and about each other. Rodell's admira-
tion for both justices was no secret.
The issue of getting opinions written in a timely fashion was a prob-
lem that plagued the circuit court when Vinson was a member. Chief
Justice Groner, who presided over the D.C. circuit court, went to great
lengths to prod his colleagues to be more productive. There is nothing in
Vinson's extensive files on the Supreme Court, or those of the other
justices, to suggest what specific measures if any he took to speed up
opinion writing. However, a thorough analysis of the amount of time
taken by Vinson Court justices to process opinion concluded that with
the 1949 October term, when Vinson had the benefit of a solid major-
ity, "he succeeded in his efforts to get opinions written more expedi-
tiously." Cases were completed approximately one month faster during
that time.83
One result of Vinson's efforts to share the responsibility for writing
the plum opinions was that "sometimes a whole year might go by with-
out his having reserved anything of real significance for himself." The
drawback of this strategy for him was that "the number of Vinson's
majority opinions of any profound consequences can be counted on one
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hand."84 In fact, Vinson was frequently criticized in scholarly publica-
tions for his limited productivity in opinion writing. Rodell wrote that
Vinson "sets his brethren the worst example of any chief justice in
memory by making no effort to carry his fair share of the Court's real
workload—that is, the writing of opinions."85 In his seven years on the
Court, Vinson averaged twelve majority opinions per year, which was
actually very close to the Court's average of thirteen. In his first three
terms, Vinson wrote thirty-eight majority opinions.86 Only two justices
wrote fewer opinions, Rutledge, who wrote thirty, and Burton, who wrote
a paltry twenty-two. In contrast, Douglas wrote seventy-one and Black
wrote sixty-nine. In his last four terms, when he was more often in the
majority, Vinson wrote forty-one majority opinions; the range for the
other justices was a low of thirty-seven for Burton and a high of fifty-
seven for Black. Black and Douglas were less often in the majority dur-
ing Vinson's last four terms.
Opinion writing was clearly not Vinson's favorite part of being a
justice. Some have suggested that Vinson did all of his writing "with his
hands in his pockets, outlining the general approach to his clerk[s] and
then suggesting but few revisions in the draft."87 Minow and Trienens
confirm that his law clerks were given a great deal of responsibility in
drafting opinions. "The fact that he wasn't going to sit down with a
blank yellow pad and start from scratch was characteristic of an admin-
istrator," but Vinson would go over the opinions with his clerks, ex-
pressing his ideas before and after the drafting of the opinion. The final
product clearly reflected Vinson's views.88
The most prolific opinion writers were the Court's most liberal mem-
bers—Black and Douglas. Even though their views were significantly
different from Vinson's, he often favored them in assigning cases be-
cause they were the most productive. This suggests that Vinson, unlike
some chief justices, did not rely on ideology alone as the basis for as-
signing opinions. He was not, however, indifferent to the basis on which
a case would be decided. Frankfurter recalled an incident in Vinson's
first term when the chief justice was disturbed over an "outrageous"
majority opinion in a labor case written by Reed, which "in effect took
labor unions out of the Sherman law." When Frankfurter asked Vinson
what he thought ought to be done about the opinion, he said, "By gad,
something has to be written and I wondered whether you wouldn't want
to write the dissent." Frankfurter agreed, and then Vinson asked him to
write the majority opinion in another labor case. Vinson said it was a
complicated case, and "since Stanley [Reed] had some doubts about it, I
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probably was more likely to persuade him in what I wrote than anybody
else."89
There were some tensions in the relationship between the two Ken-
tuckians Reed and Vinson. These surfaced early in Vinson's tenure as
chief justice on the occasion of his first opinion, United States v. Alcea
BandofTillamooks^Vmson was overly sensitive about the rather strong
dissent written by Reed, and he asked Frankfurter "why Stanley would
write a dissent in such strong terms." Frankfurter asked Reed about the
reaction of the chief justice, and Reed replied: "He is very sensitive. You
must remember he comes from the mountain region of Kentucky. It makes
a difference whether you come from a community where you assume
everyone is ready to help everyone else, or from the mountains where
you are brought up to be suspicious and distrustful. And as I said some
time ago, Fred Vinson has all those qualities."91 Reed recalled that Vinson
had once pressed him about why he opposed one of his opinions. Vinson
asked, "Are you opposing me because I was appointed Chief Justice
instead of you when you wanted to be Chief Justice?" Reed replied, "Of
President Truman participates in a four-way handshake with Vice President Alben Barkley,
left, Vinson, and Stanley Reed on inauguration night, January 21,1949, at a Kentucky
society ball for Barkley. (AP/Wide World Photos.)
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course I would have liked to have been appointed Chief Justice. All I
looked at as to your choice over me was that I felt that my experience on
the Court had been wider than yours."92
Vinson was very much concerned about the reputation of the court
as an institution, and he tried in vain to bring more unity to the Court's
decision making. Under his predecessor Stone, a large number of deci-
sions were not unanimous, and many of those were decided by a slim
majority of five to four. Things got progressively worse under Vinson.
In his first term, 36 percent of the Court's opinions were unanimous; in
his third term it was 26 percent. In his final term, there was a record low
of only 19 percent agreement on cases,93 bringing the Court the distinc-
tion of being "the most fragmented in history" up to that time.94 Vinson
felt that the reputation of the Court suffered as a result of the fragmented
decisions, and because of this he wrote very few dissenting opinions. In
seven years he voted in approximately 760 cases and dissented only 26
times. Of his 91 authored opinions on the Court, only 12 were dissents.
Vinson hoped to use his powers of persuasion to reduce the number of
dissents. He was not up to the task.
Not only was the Court plagued by closely decided opinions, but
often those in the majority disagreed on the basis for the decision. An
indication of Vinson's inability to reduce the divisiveness on the Court
is the large number of concurring opinions filed by justices. Vinson's
nemesis Frankfurter was notorious for writing separate opinions. Frank-
furter resisted Vinson's efforts to reduce the number of multiple opin-
ions. One of the first encounters Vinson had with Frankfurter over the
matter was the case of Willie Francis, a black man who had been sen-
tenced to death in Louisiana for murder.95 The state's first attempt to
electrocute Francis failed when the chair malfunctioned, and the state
set a second date for his execution. Francis sought judicial relief, argu-
ing that to put him through that experience again amounted to a denial
of due process by subjecting him to double jeopardy and cruel and un-
usual punishment. Reed was assigned to write the majority opinion, which
took the position that sending Francis to the electric chair a second time
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. On the majority side,
in addition to Reed, were Vinson, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Black. On
the dissenting side were Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas, and Burton, who
had been assigned to write the dissent. Several justices planned to write
concurring opinions. After Vinson pleaded with his colleagues to elimi-
nate multiple opinions, Jackson joined in Reed's majority opinion and
Murphy and Rutledge withdrew their dissents and joined Burton. Frank-
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furter, however, insisted on filing his separate opinion, leaving the court
without a majority opinion.96
Vinson and Frankfurter had divergent views about the value of mul-
tiple opinions. Vinson was mainly concerned with the resolution of a
dispute, and he favored unanimous decisions "because they provided a
better guide for judges and lawyers interpreting the law."97 Frankfurter,
in contrast, stressed the educational function of the Court, which he felt
was well served by multiple opinions. One case in particular provoked a
sharp exchange between the two justices. In Kovacs v. Cooper,98 Vinson
persuaded Reed to drop language in his majority opinion to which Frank-
furter objected, and then he asked Frankfurter to drop his concurring
opinion and join in the majority. He refused because he thought the case
was "disposed of on the basis of what I deem a misleading formula. I
see no intrinsic harm, and often much good, in multiple opinions." Frank-
furter concluded that although there may be things that hurt the Court,
the "writing of conscientious opinions courteously expressed, whether
for the Court in concurrence, or in dissent, is not one of them. We are
here largely for that purpose."99
In response, Vinson replied that of course there was a place for "con-
scientious opinions courteously expressed. . . . But that the Bench, the
Bar, and the public generally have a right to be critical of the many
opinions that sometimes appear in the disposition of cases. I know that
the Bench and Bar have great difficulty, at times, in knowing what to do
when we get through with some cases."100 The next day, Frankfurter
sent Vinson a long memo describing in detail the history of dissenting
opinions under various chief justices as far back as Taney. He then aimed
another dart at his chief justice. "If there is one thing that the history of
this court proves, it is that very little attention should be paid to the
ephemeral griping of an uninformed laity and too often of an unlearned
or narrowly preoccupied bar."101 Vinson's reply the next day was swift
and caustic. He thanked Frankfurter for his "charming recitation" of the
history of multiple opinions but said that Frankfurter "missed the boat"
in terms of his attitude about multiple opinions. Obviously irritated by
Frankfurter's dismissive attitude toward the bench and bar, Vinson vig-
orously asserted that "any judge worth his salt" should be influenced
only by "a conscientious resolution" of the issues before him. "I do
believe," he said, "that our function is to decide the issues which are
presented in such a way that judges and the Bar may know how to con-
duct themselves in the future." Then, his anger clearly showing, Vinson
concluded, "Thanks for the lecture, even though you misjudged my po-
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sition and set up a straw man to attack. I would have preferred to have it
face-to-face. It started in that manner—it will only be continued in that
way."102 Determined to have the last shot, Frankfurter wrote, "I'm sorry
to miss a boat—particularly if it is a good one. I hope there's another
one—-even if I catch it tardily. Nobody is more ready... for face-to-face
talks than I."103 There is no record of the two justices having a face-to-
face talk over this issue, but two things are clear. Frankfurter not only
ignored Vinson's pleas to drop his separate concurrence in the Kovacs
case; he also continued until Vinson's death to file numerous concurring
and dissenting opinions.
Although the reputation of the Court may have been further dam-
aged by the declining number of unanimous decisions and the large num-
ber of multiple opinions, the aspect of the Court's business that generated
the greatest criticism among judicial scholars was its low productivity.
Indeed, the number of cases decided by the Court declined significantly
under Vinson. In his first term the Court accepted 142 cases for review.
In the prewar years the Court had accepted more than 200 cases for
review.104 The most significant change in the caseload began in 1949
when Truman's last two appointees, Minton and Clark, joined the Court.
In that year the number of cases dropped to 94. In the two subsequent
years, it went even lower—88 in 1950 and 89 in the 1951 term. In Vinson's
last year on the Court, when many cases of pressing national impor-
tance were presented to the Court, the number of cases increased to
104.105
The Court controls the number of cases it hears each year through
its power to grant or deny petitions for certiorari, the procedure by which
litigants can petition the Court for a review in cases where the Court is
not mandated by statute to hear a case. By the time Vinson became chief
justice, most of the cases reached the Court through the route of certio-
rari rather than a right to appeal. This was largely the result of a law
passed in Congress in 1925, which limited the number of mandatory
cases the Court must accept on appeal, thus allowing the Court greater
discretion over the cases it would hear each term. Those justices who
were apostles of judicial restraint were less inclined to grant review of
cases. With the arrival of Minton and Clark, there was a solid block of
seven justices, the four Truman appointees plus Frankfurter, Reed, and
Jackson, who generally wanted a limited role for the Court and thus
were more likely to deny certiorari petitions. As long as they stuck to-
gether, the number of cases heard would be limited. This perturbed lib-
eral judicial scholars, such as Frank, who favored a more active Court.
The Chief Justice and His Court / 187
By their estimates, the Court should have been accepting approximately
60 more cases per year for consideration,106 and they often listed cases
that they thought should have been heard. Vinson's success in limiting
the Court's caseload can be counted as a measure of his success at task
leadership, but those who wanted a more activist Court were not willing
to give him that much credit.
Vinson firmly believed that the Court's caseload should be more
limited. He thought the Supreme Court should not function as a "mere
revisory body to correct errors of lower courts, but as a tribunal whose
judgments should be reserved for cases of high national importance or
clear conflict below."107 Vinson had both personal and policy reasons for
his view. His personal considerations stemmed from his belief that the
pressure of the Court's work was responsible for Justice Rutledge's un-
timely death. In terms of policy, he would sometimes vote to deny cer-
tiorari on grounds of practical policy, "believing that conflicting opinions
then in prospect would unsettle more law than they could settle." One of
his law clerks put it best: "In general, the Chief's philosophy regarding
applications for review was that he couldn't run the world from his
chair—a philosophy that made him much less anxious than some other
justices to grant review of cases involving such matters as the adminis-
tration by the states of their criminal processes" (29).
Less charitable critics attributed the Court's decreased productivity
to "laziness," but others offered different explanations. One was that
there was a decline in the number of cases worthy of consideration.108
Another was that the increasing number of dissenting opinions "set some
limit to the number of cases which can be handled by the Court in its
present temper; it is the most industrious members who are at the same
time the most constant dissenters. In the 1950 term, when the Court had
only 98 majority opinions, it also handed down 23 concurring opinions
and a whopping 60 dissenting opinions.109 A chief justice is frequently
described as "the first among equals." He is equal to his colleagues in
that each has only one vote in a given case. Yet he is also the person who
is assigned the responsibility for providing leadership to the Court. When
Truman chose Fred Vinson to be chief justice, he was counting on his
leadership qualities, demonstrated successfully in a series of positions,
to provide much-needed unity to a Court torn by personal bickering and
sharp philosophical disagreements. Although the personal animosities
did not disappear, they were hidden behind the "purple curtain" that
shields the Court from public scrutiny. Vinson tried his best to reduce
the excessive dissents and concurrences, but he was unable to get his
188 / Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky
colleagues to accept the responsibility for acting as an institution rather
than a group of individuals. In his view, the Court was better served by
unanimous decisions that would enhance the certainty of the law and
the ability of judges and lawyers to understand and implement them.
Writing shortly after Vinson's death, one of his sharpest critics, John
Frank, observed that Vinson's main shortcoming was not in his failure
to stifle dissent, for "the will of one man, Chief Justice or not, is not
enough to have any great effect as to dissents." To Frank, the more tell-
ing indication of Vinson's weakness as a leader was that "the bulk of his
own outstanding opinions were for a less than unanimous Court, and in
a surprisingly large number, he did not unequivocally speak for five
Justices."110 Frank, of course, did not write from an unbiased view. He
had previously served as a law clerk to Black and had written a highly
favorable biography of the justice. They remained close friends until
Black's death.
Although there may be merit in the arguments of Frank and other
critics, they were remiss in failing to recognize the impossible odds
Vinson faced. As chief justice, his only real power was persuasion, and
the people he had to persuade, especially Frankfurter, had already served
on the court eight to ten years prior to his appointment and already had
established national reputations. To men like Frankfurter, Vinson was a
"Johnny-come-lately and an upstart."'1' Frankfurter's insistence on writ-
ing numerous dissenting and concurring opinions made it difficult if not
impossible for Vinson to unify the Court. There is the possibility that no
one could have succeeded any better than Vinson. Further, any assess-
ment of Vinson must account for the social and political tensions of the
time during which he served on the Court as well as his brief tenure.
With more time, Vinson might have developed into a stronger leader of
the Court. As Steamer noted, none of the chief justices deemed to be
among the best ever served such a brief term.
Vinson's main difficulties stemmed from the fact that his colleagues
recognized him as the "first among equals" in name only. Many of them,
especially the Roosevelt appointees, did not consider him to be equal in
intellect and ability. The real blame may lie with Truman. As one ob-
server noted, "If the justices do not have the desirable sense of acting as
an institution . . . it is not necessarily the fault of any one or more jus-
tices. . . . It is perhaps because to the appointing power it has been irrel-
evant that the incumbent justices may not respect the capacity of the
new appointee."112 Truman was interested in appointees who thought
like he did, whose political instincts and abilities he trusted. These are
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the traits of a politician, and although a chief justice must possess politi-
cal skills, these alone are not sufficient for effective leadership of the
Court. In Truman's view, Vinson lived up to his expectations of what a
chief justice should be. Some scholars of the Court, however, rated him
a failure. Perhaps Vinson's chief shortcoming was his inability to move
far enough out of Truman's orbit to act independently of the president,
to define for himself what a chief justice should be.
CHAPTER 8
The Chief Justice,
the President, and the Politics
of Economic Stabilization
Fred Vinson, puffing on his pipe, leaned forward and spoke in confiden-
tial tones to Harry Truman. "What would the people of the United States
of America think if they knew that the President and the Chief Justice
were playing poker with five aces?" The two men were playing poker at
Key West at the time, when they discovered that two decks of cards had
inadvertently been mixed together. The American people might have
been less concerned about the makeup of the card deck than the fact that
the president and the chief justice maintained such intimate contact.
Vinson's occasional visits to Key West with the president were not kept
secret, but the full extent of his involvement with Truman during his
seven years as chief justice was not widely known, much less publi-
cized.1
The closeness of these two leaders raised questions about how Vinson
voted on some important cases before the Court. Two in particular, United
Mine Workers v. United States (1947) and Youngstown Sheet and Tube v.
Sawyer (1952), demonstrated that Vinson may have been acting more as
a friend of the president than as an impartial jurist. Both of these cases
pertained to strikes that threatened the president's postwar economic
stabilization program and the government's subsequent seizure of the
industry assets in order to avert the strikes.2 In fact, on virtually every
issue of importance that came before the Supreme Court, Vinson did not
fail to serve Truman's interests.
Truman and Vinson had a genuine affection for each other, and their
friendship, which began in earnest shortly after Truman assumed the
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presidency, strengthened over time. Before appointing Vinson to be chief
justice, Truman included Vinson in almost every conference because he
"valued his judgment and advice highly."3 Truman was particularly im-
pressed with Vinson's ability as a peacemaker, and Clark Clifford,
Truman's legal counsel, who also served as a confidant of the president,
said, "Once the President heard about the problems in the Court, I rather
doubt he seriously considered anyone else."4 No one may have been
more surprised about the choice than Vinson himself. In early May he
told Tom Corcoran, a former Roosevelt adviser, that no one had spoken
to him about going on the Court, and furthermore he was not "too inter-
ested."5 However, on June 5, the day before Truman announced that
Vinson was his choice for chief justice, he was at the White House for a
lengthy visit with the president, prompting speculation that he was be-
ing considered for the Court appointment. Pressed by reporters as he
left the White House, Vinson "chuckled" when asked if the Court ap-
pointment was the subject of the conference, but he would not deny that
it had been discussed. Truman did not officially tell Vinson he wanted
him to serve as chief justice until the following day at a White House
reception. There was little time for him to decline; the president sent his
nomination to the Senate in less than an hour.
After Vinson joined the Court, he and Truman continued to see each
other socially, and Vinson also continued to advise Truman about vari-
ous matters of politics and state. By the standards of today, such a rela-
tionship between a president and the chief justice would be highly suspect,
but in fact there was ample precedent of Supreme Court justices serving
the interests and needs of presidents. Bruce A. Murphy, who wrote about
the secret political activities of Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Vinson's
antagonist Felix Frankfurter, says, "The whole notion of a judiciary to-
tally secluded from politics appears to be more myth than history."6 He
found that two-thirds of the Court's justices had engaged in some form
of extrajudicial political behavior, either on an informal basis or in re-
sponse to official government requests. These activities included "ad-
vising presidents, suggesting legislation to Congress, proposing executive
and judicial appointments, participating in informal diplomatic missions,
writing articles, delivering speeches, and sitting on governmental tribu-
nals." Murphy documented numerous ways in which Frankfurter, who
was publicly outspoken about the impropriety of such extrajudicial in-
volvement, was actively involved in political activities while on the bench.
Part of the attraction between Truman and Vinson was the similarity
in personality and background. They were both "border-state, middle-
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of-the roaders, and practical New Dealers."7 They could also be quite
earthy in their language, a trait that was in evidence at regular poker
games. Sometime these were held at Blair House, the Trumans' tempo-
rary residence while the White House was under repair, but often the
poker games took place on the Williamsburg, the presidential yacht. Jus-
tice Tom Clark, who was also a regular at these events, said he and
Vinson would leave the Court after the Saturday conference and then fly
down to Norfolk to catch the launch, which took them to the boat. They
would stay until late Sunday evening. According to Rear Adm. Donald
MacDonald, commander of the Williamsburg, there were two groups of
people who played poker with Truman. One group played a game in
which no one could lose more than a certain amount of money, but oth-
ers played for unlimited stakes. Vinson, he said, was in the "expensive
group."8
Clifford told of one particularly tense game of poker on the occa-
sion of Vinson's birthday in January. The birthday party was an annual
event arranged by Clifford at the request of the president and usually
held at Clifford's home in Chevy Chase, Maryland. In a game of high-
low, with most of the cards showing on the table, the pot had grown to
about three thousand dollars. Vinson had a good hand and stood to win
at least half of the pot if he got any card from a jack down. He turned to
Truman, who was dealing, and said, "OK, Mr. President, hit me." The
president flipped over a queen of spades. Vinson looked straight at the
president and without blinking said, "You son of a bitch." There was a
moment of stunned silence, because even in the informal setting of the
poker table, everyone still called Truman Mr. President. Vinson stam-
mered an apology, "Oh, Mr. President, Mr. President." Clifford recalled,
"Never did President Truman, or the rest of us laugh harder than we did
at that moment."9
Fred and Roberta Vinson occasionally socialized with Harry and
Bess Truman. In some respects they were practically "family." Mrs.
Truman and their daughter Margaret called the chief justice "Poppa
Vin."10 Truman even named a version of stud poker that he particularly
liked "Papa Vinson,"11 although within the family he referred to Vinson
as "the Big Judge."12 Reportedly, Roberta Vinson was one of the few
women—if not the only woman—besides Mrs. Truman and Margaret
who ever visited the president at Key West.13 On occasion, the Vinsons
hosted the Trumans at a dinner, either at a restaurant like the F Street
Club or at their Wardman Park Hotel apartment.
Vinson's relationship with Truman went well beyond socializing.
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He was one of Truman's closest confidants, and the president constantly
sought his advice and counsel on many matters. They reportedly con-
versed late at night, "after the last caller has left the White House and
after the President himself is presumably tucked away for the night."14
Vinson was also a participant in some key meetings regarding partisan
political decisions. In 1948 Vinson participated in discussions about
whom Truman should select for his vice-presidential running mate. As
an indication of how different things were then, Clifford said that at the
time he "saw nothing improper in Vinson's presence; the meeting had
no bearing on any matters pending before the High Court, and Vinson
was a close friend whose views President Truman respected." Clifford
also noted that there were precedents for such close relationships be-
tween presidents and members of the Supreme Court, including Herbert
Hoover and Harlan Fiske Stone, and Franklin Roosevelt and Felix Frank-
furter.15 Clifford later changed his mind on the appropriateness of Su-
preme Court justices serving as presidential confidants. "There is simply
too much at stake to permit the risks and temptations that can arise in
such circumstances. Discussions with the President inevitably involve
the Justice, at least subconsciously, in the President's political fate—
and this could affect his opinions on a variety of issues before the Court"
(216).
In 1948 Vinson became entangled in one of Truman's campaign
initiatives—the incident that has become known as the Moscow Mis-
sion or the Vinson Mission. Vinson had reluctantly agreed to the
president's request that he meet with Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, os-
tensibly to promote a peaceful understanding between the two nations.
The original purpose of the proposed mission, however, was to boost
public support for the president, who lagged far behind his Republican
opponent for the presidency in public opinion polls. To accept the
president's request to undertake the mission meant he would have to
resign his position as chief justice, for Vinson was on record as strongly
opposing extrajudicial assignments for Court justices. He reminded the
president of that when Truman proposed the plan. He said, "Justices
should confine themselves to their Court duties and stay out of all side
activities."16 Fortunately for the president, the chief justice, and the coun-
try, Secretary of State George C. Marshall reacted so strongly against
the plan that Truman canceled the proposed trip, but he never forgot
the sacrifice that Vinson was willing to make for him. In 1950, in a
letter to Bess, Truman recalled Vinson's loyalty during the 1948 cam-
paign. "He didn't want to go," Truman reminded her, "but he said,
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'I'm your man to do what you want me to do for the welfare of the
country.' How many Congressman, Senators, even cabinet secretaries
would have said that?"17
Marshall was so upset about not being consulted about the Vinson
mission that he threatened to resign. Questions about his intention to
resign were heightened when he returned to the United States in No-
vember 1948 for the removal of a diseased kidney. This prompted specu-
lation about who his successor might be. Vinson's name surfaced as a
possible candidate. Marshall did resign in 1949, the day after Truman's
inauguration, and was replaced by Dean Acheson. Within a year, Acheson
was under heavy fire from Republicans in Congress for a number of
reasons. One was his strong defense of Alger Hiss, a former midlevel
State Department employee who had been accused of spying by Whittaker
Chambers, a former editor at Time and an admitted Communist. Hiss
could not be tried for espionage because the ten-year statute of limita-
tions had run out. However, he was tried twice for perjury. His first trial
ended in a hung jury, but on January 22, 1950, he was convicted on
evidence produced by Chambers. Following his conviction, Acheson
declared, "I will not turn my back on Hiss." The Hiss affair was coupled
with charges from Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy that the State
Department was heavily infiltrated by Communists. Adding oil to these
troubled waters for Acheson was the fall of mainland China to the Com-
munists, an event hung squarely on Acheson's shoulders.
Amid this turmoil, Truman was reported to be considering appoint-
ing Vinson as secretary of state and nominating Acheson as chief jus-
tice. Speculation about Vinson's appointment increased on March 19,
1950, when Vinson visited Truman, who was vacationing at Key West.
The next day the president scotched the rumors with a public denial
issued by his press secretary, who said the president believed Acheson
was doing his work "admirably." The rumored swap between Vinson
and Acheson was described as "completely erroneous" and the chief
justice's visit was labeled "purely social."18
Despite the president's denials, speculation continued about Vinson's
being named secretary of state. Fueling the fires this time were strong
demands from Republicans in Congress. On December 12, 1950, Re-
publican senators had scheduled a vote on whether to issue a formal
demand to Truman that Acheson be relieved as secretary of state. The
most prominent candidate to replace Acheson was Vinson. He was seen
as a person "with whom Congress will cooperate to the limit permitted
by normal partisanship and divisions over foreign policy in both par-
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ties."19 The idea of Vinson's being named to head the State Department
invoked some criticism by those who thought that members of the Court
should not be transferred to the arena of politics. Nonetheless, it was
agreed that "his appointment would be highly popular at the Capitol,
and that the present ill-feeling would vanish at the sight of his name on
the Presidential commission." In response to the press coverage, on
December 13, Vinson assured his colleagues on the Court that he had
"never been asked about becoming Secretary of State and that he did not
want to do so." He did, however, tell his colleagues that he could not
predict what might happen in "actual circumstances." Burton reminded
him that Chief Justice Hughes resigned to run for the presidency. Vinson
said he "thought resigning to become Secretary of State might be better
understood and accepted than doing it to run for the presidency."20
The presidency was exactly what Truman had in mind for Vinson.
Truman said in his memoirs that he had decided on his inauguration day
in 1949 that he would not run for the presidency again. He felt burdened
by the "grave problems that confronted the nation."21 Margaret Truman
said that her father began the search for his successor as early as 1949,
when he approached Vinson with the possibility of his seeking the presi-
dency. She reported that her father first raised the question with Vinson
in a March 1949 visit to Key West and that he was noncommittal.
According to Truman, he first approached Vinson with the idea in
the summer of 1950 but was turned down. Truman persisted. He ap-
proached Vinson again on October 11,1951, at a meeting at Blair House,
and again in November 1951, when Truman invited the Vinsons to join
him and his family at Key West for Thanksgiving. In private conversa-
tions the president vigorously urged Vinson to run. Vinson told the presi-
dent he wanted to speak to his wife about it. After discussing the matter
with Roberta, and after further consideration, Vinson told Truman "he
felt honestly and in his heart that he did not think he should use the
Court as a steppingstone to the presidency." Truman reminded him that
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes had done so, and in his own opin-
ion there was nothing wrong with his becoming a candidate (490).
Truman made one last try, only this time he tried to persuade Mrs.
Vinson that her husband should run. Vinson did not give Truman a defi-
nite answer before he left Key West. Charles Murphy, who was special
counsel to the president at the time, grew impatient with Vinson's delay
in answering the president and took it on himself to visit him at the
Wardman Park to ask when he was going to answer and what he was
going to do. Vinson asked, "Charlie, did the President send you to ask
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Vinson and his wife Roberta at Key West, Florida. (Photo archives FDR Library.)
me this question?" Murphy said he had not. Vinson replied, "Well, I'm
not going to tell you. I'll tell him."22
When Vinson did tell him, sometime in December or January, the
answer was no. The reason he gave this time was his "physical condi-
tion."23 Vinson was not the healthiest of men. He was overweight, a
chain smoker, with dark circles under his eyes and a pasty complexion.
Although at one time he had been a good athlete, he apparently did very
little exercise. It is not clear that Vinson was aware of any serious health
problems in late 1951, when he gave Truman his final answer. As it
turned out, he had less than two years to live. Aside from health consid-
erations, there may have been something more significant that caused
him to turn down a request from his close friend—his concern about the
potential damage to the Court's reputation. He had expressed reserva-
tions in 1950 about a chief justice moving into a political position such
as secretary of state, and he believed that the public would be even less
accepting for a chief justice to use the Court as a springboard to the
presidency.
Although Vinson was unwilling to pursue the presidency, he was
not reluctant to participate in party politics behind closed doors. On
February 18, 1952, Truman invited six of his closest advisers, including
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Vinson and Truman relax on the lawn of the Winter White House in Key West on March
23,1950. (AP/Wide World Photos.)
Vinson and Clifford, to a highly secret dinner meeting to discuss the
presidential campaign. The main topic was who should be the party nomi-
nee for president. According to notes kept by the president, Vinson turned
the tables on Truman, saying he did not see how Truman could refuse
another term. Others agreed, but other names, including Adlai Stevenson
and others, were discussed. No agreement was reached.24 Vinson attended
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another "off-the-record" meeting on February 25, 1952, with members
of Truman's senior staff. They reached a nearly unanimous decision that
the President should not run. Following that meeting, Vinson exclaimed,
"That was the frankest meeting I ever heard in my life."25 He was amazed
that so many people close to Truman advised him against running.
The depth of Truman's and Vinson's affection for each other was
cemented by a deep sense of duty and obligation to each other. Truman
was profoundly grateful for Vinson's strong sense of loyalty. He wrote
in his memoirs that Vinson had a "sense of personal and political loyalty
seldom found among the top men in Washington [where] too often loy-
alties are breached for political advantage."26 This loyalty was tremen-
dously important to Truman when he was buffeted by the storms of the
presidency. In 1950, when Truman was under heavy fire from the media
and members of Congress over the loss of China and charges of Com-
munist infiltration of the State Department and other government agen-
cies, he wrote his wife a letter from Key West, where he had gone at her
urging to regain his equilibrium. He despaired because "everybody shoots
at me . . . and the general trend of the pieces is that I am a very small
man in a very large place." In this letter he mentioned a visit from Vinson
and added, "The Chief Justice is one man in high place who still be-
lieves in me, trusts me and supports me."27
One of his first opportunities to support the president came in a case
in which the pot was already boiling when Truman nominated Vinson to
be chief justice and which reached a full head of steam shortly after
Vinson took the center chair on the Court. As the Supreme Court was
making a transition under a new chief justice, the nation was also mak-
ing a transition from a wartime to a domestic economy. Vinson had helped
to facilitate that transition in his post at the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion and after that as secretary of the Treasury, his last two
positions before becoming chief justice. In this shifting, highly volatile
economy, industrial labor disputes began to take center stage. Pent-up
labor demands, most of which had patriotically been suppressed during
the war, began to be unleashed. Perhaps the most prolonged and devas-
tating dispute was between coal miners, led by the fiery John L. Lewis,
and the soft coal mine operators. The ensuing battle brought the feisty
Truman toe-to-toe with the pugnacious Lewis. It ultimately landed on
the doorstep of the Supreme Court, with a brand-new chief justice, Harry
Truman's close friend and adviser, Fred Vinson. The timing proved to
be Truman's good luck and Lewis's misfortune.
Although increased wages were part of the demands made by the
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coal miners, their primary concerns were the establishment of a health
and welfare fund, supported by royalties from the coal companies, and
more rigorous mine safety enforcement. Talks between the miners and
the operators, which had begun in early March 1946, failed to bring any
agreement. Lewis threatened a strike on April 1 if the miners' demands
were not met. In order to avert a strike, which he believed would have
devastating effects on his reconversion and stabilization programs,
Truman became personally involved in trying to resolve the differences
between the operators and the miners. These efforts failed to bring agree-
ment on the terms of a contract, and the miners struck on April 1, 1946.
As the strike dragged on, the nation reeled under its effects. Indus-
tries were shut down, energy consumption was drastically curtailed, and
financial losses resulted. Truman continued to intervene in the dispute.
He met with Lewis and spokesmen for the coal operators six times in
the White House between March and May,28 but he could not produce an
acceptable solution. After a month, the strike was being called a "na-
tional disaster." Truman released a report from the War Mobilization
and Reconversion office that manufacturing plants all over the nation
were shutting down.29 As the strike proceeded, Truman assumed an even
more visible role in trying to resolve the dispute. On May 10 Truman
denounced the strike as "nearing the status of a strike against the gov-
ernment" and predicted government seizure of the mines if necessary.30
A day later, the miners and the operators agreed "in principle" to a plan
endorsed by Truman that included a provision for the controversial wel-
fare fund, and Lewis announced a two-week truce in the strike.
Agreement on the proposed plan broke down as quickly as it had
materialized, and on May 17 both the operators and the miners rejected
Truman's request that they submit their differences to arbitration. Fear-
ing that the strike would resume at the end of the two-week truce, on
May 21, Truman, acting under the authority of the War Labor Disputes
Act, also known as the Smith-Connally Act, ordered his secretary of the
interior, Julius A. Krug, to seize the nation's soft coal mines and operate
them under government control. The War Labor Disputes Act autho-
rized seizure and operation of facilities necessary for the war effort.
Even though the war was over, the act remained in effect for six months
following the end of hostilities, and the U.S. government had not offi-
cially declared an end to hostilities. Subsequent to seizure, Krug worked
with the miners and the operators to achieve agreement on the terms and
conditions of employment during the period of government control.
Truman also kept his hand in the negotiations, including face-to-face
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meetings with Lewis, and on May 29 what became known as the Krug-
Lewis agreement was reached.31
A period of relative calm prevailed over the summer while Krug,
Lewis, and the operators negotiated the terms for a contract with the
unions, which would return the mines to the owners. On September 13
the negotiations broke down, and on October 21 Lewis fired the next
salvo in the battle. He charged that the government had breached the
contract by failing to carry out some of its terms. Lewis demanded a
conference with Krug and administration officials on November 1 to
discuss reopening the contract with the government but was turned down.
He then sent a telegram to Krug stating that failure to honor the meeting
would void the Krug-Lewis agreement and obliquely threatened a strike
of four hundred thousand soft coal miners on November 1, four days
before the congressional elections. Although Truman remained silent
on the developments, the controversy, coming just before the congres-
sional elections, was seen as an embarrassment to the president. Truman
later said that Lewis contributed to the Democrats' losing control of
Congress that year.32
Lewis claimed that under the Krug-Lewis agreement, either party
could give a ten-day notice of a desire to renegotiate the terms of the
agreement and the other party was obligated to attend. Although the
government disputed Lewis's interpretation of the agreement, it did even-
tually enter into negotiations before the November 1 strike deadline.
Despite Truman's active involvement, the talks went nowhere. On No-
vember 15 Lewis announced that the union would terminate the agree-
ment on November 20 and that a strike would ensue. The government's
response was that the miners had no power to unilaterally terminate the
agreement and that under the War Labor Disputes Act it would seek an
injunction to prevent the miners from striking. Failure to comply with
such an action would carry fines of five thousand dollars per day and a
possible prison sentence of one year.
Truman lost patience with the defiant Lewis, and he ordered Attor-
ney General Clark to "fight John L. Lewis on all fronts."33 The next day,
November 18, Clark, citing the "great loss and irreparable damage to
the country" that would result from a work stoppage, sought a declara-
tory judgment from the federal district court, stipulating that the miners
had no power to unilaterally terminate their agreement with the govern-
ment. The government also requested a temporary restraining order
against the union. U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Columbia
T. Alan Goldsborough issued a temporary order restraining the union
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from carrying out the strike. Close associates of Truman confirmed to
the media that Truman "had decided the time had come for a final show-
down with the mine union chief who several times had forced the gov-
ernment into its [stand.]"34
Lewis and the miners defied the district court order and began a
strike on November 21. Truman, who had given an order "to fight Lewis
to a finish," instructed the Justice Department to press for a contempt
citation against the union. In short order Judge Goldsborough ordered
Lewis to appear in court for contempt hearings. He refused on the grounds
that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the order because the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932 prohibited courts from issuing injunctions in
labor disputes. Judge Goldsborough rejected the argument that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act applied to the miners' dispute with the government and
held both Lewis and the union in civil and criminal contempt. Lewis
was fined ten thousand dollars and the union was fined $3.5 million.
The judge also made the temporary restraining order against the strikers
permanent.
On December 5 the United Mine Workers (UMW) filed an appeal
of the contempt convictions and the $3.5 million fines with the District
of Columbia circuit court, Vinson's old court. The following day, the
government filed a petition of certiorari in both cases directly with the
Supreme Court. Now, for the first time, Vinson entered the picture. On
December 7 the lawyers for the coal miners met with Vinson on the
government's petition for certiorari, and immediately after the meeting,
Lewis unexpectedly called for an immediate end to the strike and or-
dered workers to continue working until April 1, 1947. The headlines of
the New York Times boldly declared, "Lewis Ends Strike, Mines Open
Tomorrow; Surrenders after Lawyers See Vinson."35
Drew Pearson, syndicated Washington columnist and a close friend
of Vinson, reported in his weekly broadcast on December 8 that one of
the factors that caused Lewis to back down occurred on Saturday, De-
cember 7, when "Chief Justice Vinson held a very significant meeting
with President Truman in which he expressed his private opinion that
the Supreme Court would uphold the lower court injunction against the
United Mine Workers . . . and afterward word of the Chief Justice's view
was quietly transmitted to the United Mine Workers."36 In his broadcast
the following week, Pearson corrected the impression "that Chief Jus-
tice Vinson took any sides in the coal strike case or conferred with any-
one in such a way as to indicate he might decide against the miners." He
said that the chief justice, "for whom I have the highest regard, took
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absolutely no sides, except to express himself very forcefully that the
Supreme Court owed it to the nation to try this injunction case in a
hurry."37
The following day, in his weekly column, "The Washington Merry-
Go-Round," Pearson reported what happened in the Supreme Court's
chambers on December 7, when the lawyers for the miners and the gov-
ernment met with Vinson for the purpose of determining whether the
Supreme Court would take immediate jurisdiction in the dispute and to
set a time for argument. The miners asked for a twenty-five-day delay to
prepare their case. Attorney General Clark asked that the date for argu-
ments be set on December 16. "Would you like to know what I think?"
asked Vinson. "I had in mind setting argument for next Thursday [De-
cember 12]." His words, said Pearson, "fell like a bombshell" on the
lawyers for the miners. This left them with only five days to prepare
their case. Two hours later, John L. Lewis called off the strike.38 Al-
though there is no independent source to verify what Pearson reported,
his closeness to both Truman and Vinson lends credibility to his version
of what happened.
Vinson's declaration that the case would be argued on December 12
was just a bluff. Shortly after the strike had ended, Vinson asked to meet
again with the attorneys for the mine workers and the government. The
chief justice asked both sides their views as to when the case should be
reargued. The mine workers argued for a date in February or March.
Attorney General Clark wanted it set in January. On December 9, the
Court announced that it would take the coal case on direct appeal, but it
set oral arguments for January 14, 1947, a month later than the date
Vinson had originally proposed.39
Frank Murphy's conference notes reveal that the Supreme Court
began discussing whether to grant the petitions for certiorari on Decem-
ber 6, the day before Lewis announced the end of the strike. On that day,
which was a day before Vinson met with Clark and the lawyers for the
miners, the Court agreed to grant the petitions; however, after learning
that the strike had been halted, the justices decided to reconsider. Only
Vinson, Reed, and Burton still favored granting petitions. Black, Dou-
glas, and Frankfurter voted to deny certiorari. Murphy, Jackson, and
Rutledge thought further discussion was needed before making a deci-
sion. Yet, two days later, on December 9, seven justices voted to hear the
case. Only Black and Douglas opposed.40
The following week, the UMW won an important concession from
the Supreme Court when it agreed to broaden the appeal to allow the
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Court to consider the question of whether the Norris-LaGuardia anti-
injunction act applied to the situation with the miners under their agree-
ment with the government. The New York Times predicted, "The legal
battle before the Supreme Court may well be the 'battle of the century'
in so far as some aspects of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and, perhaps, the
Constitution are concerned."41
Oral arguments in the case were held on January 14, 1947, before a
packed courtroom, and the questions by the justices were so exhaustive
that the hearing lasted almost four hours. The most active questioners
were Frankfurter, Jackson, Black, and Douglas. Vinson, who was still
fairly green in his role as chief justice, asked very few questions. Vinson
directed a question at Joseph A. Padaway, counsel for the UMW, about
whether the union had challenged the government's seizure of the mines
the previous May. Padaway said that it was not necessary to do so.42
The justices met in conference on January 20 to discuss the Lewis
case. Douglas's copious notes on the conference revealed the sharp dif-
ferences among the justices on the central issues before the Court.43 The
case boiled down to four questions: whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was applicable to the government; whether the United Mine Workers
could be held in contempt even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited
the issuance of a restraining order; whether the trial judge had improp-
erly commingled civil and criminal intent; and whether the fines im-
posed by the district court were excessive. Vinson was able to muster a
decisive majority only on the question of whether the miners were obli-
gated to obey the court order even if they thought it was illegal and thus
should be subject to fines. On the crucial question of whether the Norris-
LaGuardia Act pertained to the government, the Court was split five to
four.
Vinson was never in doubt about any of the issues. He supported the
government in every one of them. His colleagues recalled him railing
against Lewis, saying he was "getting too big for his britches."44 Vinson
at one time had an amicable relationship with Lewis, owing especially
to the "great fight" he made in behalf of the enactment of the Guffey-
Vinson Coal Stabilization Act in 1936. Lewis called Vinson "one of the
loyal champions" of the mining industry.45
What had set Vinson against the miners in the decade since he had
received Lewis's laudatory remarks? Two things stand out. One was
Lewis's bitter attack on Truman. In October, at the annual meeting of
the UMW, Lewis had denounced Truman as "a man totally unfitted for
his position. His principles are elastic, and he is careless with the truth.
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. . . He is a malignant scheming sort of an individual who is dangerous
not only to the United Mine Workers, but dangerous to the United States
of America."46 These were hard words to swallow for a person as close
to Truman as Vinson was. A second factor was Vinson's strong suspi-
cion of individuals or groups that posed threats to the nation's well-
being. The pugnacious Lewis had earned his threatening reputation when
he called a strike of the miners during World War II, and he sharpened
that image with this devastating strike. To Vinson, the rule of law was at
stake, and the only way to preserve it was to support the government. He
worked to achieve support among his fellow justices for that purpose.
He had his work cut out for him.
As things stood coming out of conference, there was no solid ma-
jority on any single point, an indication that the internal divisions within
the Court had not subsided much in Vinson's brief tenure as chief jus-
tice. In the ensuing weeks, various justices worked to sway others to
their point of view. On the day following the conference, Frankfurter,
hoping to shore up Robert Jackson's tentative view in conference that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to the government, wrote his col-
league a lengthy discourse on the history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Persuaded by Frankfurter's argument, Jackson sided against the govern-
ment on that issue. Black, who had been somewhat tentative in confer-
ence, finally supported Vinson. None of the other justices changed their
positions on the issue of applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, leav-
ing a bare five-to-four majority in favor of the government's position.
The remaining negotiations among the justices were over the con-
tempt charges and the appropriateness of the fines. First was the issue of
whether the defendants were required to obey an injunction that they
thought was invalid. Fowler V. Harper, Rutledge's biographer, main-
tained that the Court could have avoided the question but that Vinson
was motivated by other considerations. Justices Black and Douglas
thought it was unnecessary to decide on this question once the validity
of the injunction had been established. Douglas expressed concern to
Vinson about the danger of making the obligation to obey so broad that
it might undermine the effectiveness of Norris-LaGuardia.47 The chief
justice, however, because of the importance and the highly controversial
nature of the case, "wanted to bolster the decision with as many affirma-
tive votes as possible." Had the Court not taken up the question of obli-
gation to obey the court order, the Supreme Court's opinion would have
hung on a narrow majority of five to four.48 This, of course, was the most
famous point established by the decision.
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Frankfurter and Jackson had already indicated their agreement that
the defendants were bound to obey the court's order whether it was valid
or not. This gave Vinson a seven-to-two majority on the necessity of
compliance and added a more positive note to the Court's ruling. This
aspect of the case was given more emphasis in media reports the day
after the opinion of the Court was delivered. Vinson must have gotten
great satisfaction out of the headlines in the New York Times: "Lewis
Conviction Upheld by Highest Court, 7-2."49
The most extensive negotiations among the justices were over is-
sues about the fines and whether they were excessive. There was the
question of whether Goldsborough erred in commingling the convic-
tions and fines for civil contempt, which was for the refusal to comply
with the initial order, with the convictions and fines for criminal con-
tempt, which were levied for punishment. Assessing fines for civil con-
tempt required different procedures and considerations than assessing
fines for criminal contempt. Although Vinson himself thought that both
fines were appropriate, he was willing to modify his position in order to
get more majority support. The ill will toward Lewis was such that even-
tually seven justices were willing to uphold the contempt citation and
the ten-thousand-dollar fine against him, which meant that Truman's
nemesis would not be let off the hook. Now Vinson's challenge was to
gain as much consensus as possible about the fines for the union. The
initial draft of the opinion that Vinson circulated to the Court revealed
how far he was willing to go to get agreement. It contained a statement
that a majority of the Court "concluded that the fine against the union
was unwarranted and proposed remanding the case to the district court."50
The response to this draft revealed how difficult creating a majority opin-
ion would be.
Frankfurter was adamantly opposed to the idea of remanding the
Lewis case to the district court for a reassessment of the fines. Such an
action would be "deplorable" and could have "seriously undesirable
consequences," such as the perception that the result would be a victory
for Lewis.51 Douglas favored overturning the judgments not only for the
union but also for Lewis and remanding the case to the district court
with instructions to segregate the civil and criminal fines. He wrote Vinson
that he was not convinced that any damage was shown. He argued, "The
evidence of damage seems to be very speculative and in the realm of
possibility, perhaps probability, but not certainty." Douglas added that
he thought it would be "desirable to give the District Court some stan-
dards by which a remedial fine can be imposed."52
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Other than Rutledge and Murphy, both of whom opposed any fines,
the person who was most concerned about the fines was Stanley Reed.
He wrote his colleagues a memo stating that the fines were "excessive
in both the discretionary and constitutional sense." However, he said he
could "acquiesce in fixing fines at $10,000 for Mr. Lewis and $500,000
for the Mine Workers," a sum that Reed still thought was excessive. He
wanted to make a proviso that the district court judge be given the power
to reduce the fines even further in light of further developments.53
Frankfurter's reaction to a conditional fine was conveyed to Vinson in a
handwritten note penned on a draft of Reed's proposal. "This is skillful
eyewash and makes it all the more important that we conclude this busi-
ness without any ifs, ands and buts." He added that he had "talked fiercely
to Stanley and told him his proposal is ignominious and stultifying."54
Vinson strongly preferred that the fines imposed be unconditional,
but Black and Douglas thought that all fines should be conditional. This
left Reed as the key to obtaining a majority, and Vinson was prepared to
negotiate a sum for the fine against the UMW that could secure Reed's
agreement. Reed showed great sympathy for the miners because he
thought they "acted in accordance with their concept of their legal
rights."55 Frankfurter tried to win Reed over to the idea of unconditional
fines by proposing wording in his own concurrence that referred to the
strong ties of solidarity among the mine workers and between members
of the United Mine Workers and their president. "Fellowship in labor
vital to the Nation and loyalty to a leader in promoting their legitimate
interests are sturdy virtues. But all of the gains that the miners have
made in the past are ultimately due to the fact that they enjoy the rights
of free men under our system of government."56 Frankfurter's objective
was not only to win over Reed but also to appeal to Burton. It did not
work. Burton said it sounded too much like "soft soap." Referring to
wording that Vinson was working on, Burton said, "I believe it should
not hand out bouquets and compliments to anyone—but confine itself to
the thought there may have been good faith which failed to appreciate
the seriousness of the step taken."57 Frankfurter sent Burton's reply on
to Reed with the comment, "See what the Christian Burton thinks of my
emollient."58
Burton's diaries revealed the extensiveness of the efforts to negoti-
ate an agreement that would satisfy the four justices, besides himself,
who were the most supportive of fines—Vinson, Frankfurter, Jackson,
and Reed. The meetings among these justices moved from a weekly
basis in early February to an almost daily basis in late February.59 Reed
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eventually agreed to an unconditional fine for the miners of $700,000,
with a conditional sum of $280 million if they failed to abide by the
orders of the district court. Vinson's victory, with Frankfurter's help,
kept the decision from being remanded to the district court by a narrow
five-to-four majority. The outcome of his efforts to craft a solid majority
for the government in the UMW case was a mixed bag for Vinson. He
won important concessions but failed to unify the Court to the extent he
had hoped.
While the members of Supreme Court worked feverishly behind the
scene to settle the issues, media speculation began to build as to when
the Court would announce its opinion. It came in a surprise move on
Thursday, March 6. Nearly fifteen years had passed since a decision had
been handed down on any day but Monday.60 There was no advance
notice to anyone outside of the Court, not even the Court's public rela-
tions officer or the attorneys in the case.61 One explanation for the sur-
prise timing of the opinion is provided in a memo that Reed sent to
Vinson. He said, "It might be wise for the Clerk to advise our public
relations man that printing requirements were a factor, as on Monday
other opinions come down, and there were requests for an unusual num-
ber of the opinions."62 Time magazine suggested that the real reason for
the unusual timing was that the opinions were written and "Vinson knew
they were too hot to keep from a watchful press."63 At noon, Vinson
began to read his majority opinion. Within half an hour the attorneys for
both parties arrived. It took two hours and twenty-six minutes for the
opinions to be read, and even then all documents were not read in full.
Although the timing of the opinion day may have been unexpected,
Vinson's majority opinion upholding the government's position on ev-
ery issue should not have come as a surprise. For a person who had
played a key role in the government's efforts at economic stabilization
during and following the war, he could not help but be alarmed at the
threat that labor demands for increased wages constituted for the country's
efforts to keep inflation under control. Vinson devoted the bulk of his
opinion to defending the district court's authority to issue the injunc-
tion. This required a declaration that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
prohibited courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes, did not ap-
ply to the government as employer. His argument rested on his reading
of legislative intent. Here he had some firsthand knowledge, because he
had voted for the Norris-LaGuardia Act when he was in Congress. First
he noted that nothing in the language of the act indicated that it was
intended to apply to government. He wrote, "We cannot construe the
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general term 'employer' to include the United States where there is no
express reference to the United States and no evident affirmative grounds
for believing that Congress intended to withhold an otherwise available
remedy from the Government."64 He referred to "an old and well-known
rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or
privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to
that effect" (272). Furthermore, Vinson argued that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act withdrew the power of injunction from federal courts only in cer-
tain cases, those "involving or growing out of any labor dispute" that is
a dispute involving "persons." Vinson noted that the act itself did not
define "persons" and that "in common usage that term does not include
the sovereign, and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed
to do so. . . . The absence of any comparable provision extending the
term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did not desire the
term to extend to them" (275).
Next, Vinson sought to determine legislative intent by reviewing the
floor debate on passage of the bill. He noted that Representative Blanton
of Texas had proposed an amendment to the Norris-LaGuardia Act that
would have specifically made an exception to the provision limiting
injunctive power "where the United States Government is the petitioner."
Although this amendment was rejected by the House, Vinson relied
heavily on the views of Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia, the House sponsor of
the bill. LaGuardia had opposed the amendment, but only because such
"express exception was not necessary." After reading the definition of a
"person participating in a labor dispute," LaGuardia said, "I do not see
how in any possible way the United States can be brought in under the
provisions of the bill" (277). Two days after the Court's opinion was
announced, LaGuardia, coauthor of the act, told the labor committee of
the Senate that the Court was correct in its interpretation of congres-
sional intent.65
Vinson rejected the defendants' arguments that when the mines were
seized under the War Labor Disputes Act, they did not become employ-
ees of the government because the mines were still under private man-
agement. The Krug-Lewis agreement, Vinson wrote, "was one solely
between the Government and the union. The private mine operators were
not parties to the contract nor were they made parties to any of its subse-
quent modifications." As further evidence he offered that private opera-
tors had vigorously opposed many of the provisions incorporated into
the agreement.66 Even though the government utilized the services of
the private managers, the government retained ultimate control.
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Vinson then turned his attention to the question of the district court's
power to issue the temporary restraining order. In addition to the hold-
ing that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prevent the court from issuing
injunctive relief, Vinson argued that alternative grounds supported such
power. The district court had "unquestionable power to issue a restrain-
ing order for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a
decision upon its own jurisdiction" (290). Vinson noted that the in-
junction was issued two and one-half days before the strike was to
begin but that the defendants did not file a motion to vacate the order.
Instead, he said, "they ignored it and allowed a nationwide coal strike
to become an accomplished fact." To support his argument, Vinson
relied on a 1906 opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in United
States v. Shipp.61 In that case the Court ruled that a court order had to
be obeyed even though its legality was in doubt. Citing the Shipp prece-
dent, Vinson concluded that "the District Court had the power to pre-
serve the existing conditions while it was determining its own authority
to grant injunctive relief."68
The third question that Vinson addressed concerned the commin-
gling of citations and fines for civil and criminal intent. Judge
Goldsborough had tried the civil and criminal contempt charges together
and levied fines without segregating the fines for each type of contempt.
The defendants claimed that they did not know they had been charged
with criminal contempt, but Vinson summarily dismissed this claim.
Even though the defendants were not advised that they were subject to
criminal contempt, he said they "were quite aware that a criminal con-
tempt was charged" and had mentioned it in one of their motions to the
Court (297). "Common sense would recognize that conduct can amount
to both civil and criminal contempt.... Disposing of both aspects of the
contempt in a single proceeding would seem at least a convenient prac-
tice" (299).
Vinson staunchly defended the district court's convictions for crimi-
nal contempt. On this point his pique at Lewis's defiant antics was evi-
dent. "One who defies the public authority and willfully refuses his
obedience, does so at his peril. In imposing a fine for criminal contempt,
the trial judge may properly take into consideration the extent of the
willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of
the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effec-
tively terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the public
interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in the future." Vinson
described Lewis's policy of defiance as "the germ center of an economic
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paralysis which was rapidly extending itself from the bituminous coal
mines to practically every other major industry of the United States. It
was an attempt to repudiate and override the instrument of lawful gov-
ernment in the very situation in which governmental action was indis-
pensable" (303).
Vinson concluded that the fine of ten thousand dollars against de-
fendant Lewis for criminal contempt was warranted. A majority of the
Court, however, felt that the fines against the miners were excessive.
They reduced the fine to $700,000 but stipulated that the union would
pay the additional $280 million unless the union complied fully with the
court orders within five days. Acknowledging the seriousness of the fines,
Vinson said, "The majority feels that the course taken by the union car-
ried with it such a serious threat to orderly constitutional government,
and to the economic and social welfare of the nation, that a fine of
substantial size is required to emphasize the gravity of the offense." In
wording aimed at smoothing over differences among the justices in
the majority, Vinson added, "Loyalty in responding to the orders of
their leader may, in some minds, minimize the gravity of the miners'
conduct; but we cannot ignore the effect of their action upon the rights
of other citizens or the effect of their action upon our system of gov-
ernment." In words that reflected his own long-held view about loy-
alty, Vinson said, "In our complex society, there is a great variety of
limited loyalties, but the overriding loyalty of all is to our country and
to the institutions under which a particular interest may be pursued"
(306).
Frankfurter's concurring opinion strongly defended the majority
argument that the district court had the power to issue an injunction and
to punish Lewis and the miners for failure to obey it. To hold otherwise,
he said, would be to "deny the place of judiciary in our scheme of gov-
ernment. . . .  There can be no free society without law administered
through an independent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to deter-
mine for himself what is law, every man can. Legal process is an essen-
tial part of the democratic process" (312).
Frankfurter devoted most of his opinion to his disagreement with
the Court majority about the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
He criticized Vinson's "artificial canon of construction" and argued that
this case was clearly a labor dispute as defined by the act. Further, he
said, the provisions of the act that denied the courts injunctive powers in
labor disputes under the act were not based on the "character of parties."
He said Congress intended to withdraw from courts the power to inter-
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vene in labor disputes, regardless of whether the parties were private or
public (313).
Black and Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which they said
that they agreed with the Court's opinion that neither the Norris-
LaGuardia Act nor the War Labor Disputes Act barred the government
from obtaining an injunction. They agreed that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act pertained to labor disputes between private employers and their
employees, that the court had the power to issue an injunction pending
adjudication of the controversy, and that the court had the power to co-
erce obedience to those orders and to impose conditional sanctions nec-
essary to compel obedience. "Courts could not administer justice if
persons were left free pending adjudication to engage in conduct which
would either immediately interrupt the judicial proceedings or so change
the status quo .. . that no effective judgment could be rendered" (330-
31). What the two justices could not agree to was the unconditional
fines levied as criminal punishment. In contempt proceedings, courts
must rely on the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed,"
they said, and the fines levied against Lewis and the miners were far
more than that. They thought that conditional civil sanctions would have
produced the obedience desired. To Black and Douglas, the $700,000
fine set by the majority was excessive. They argued that the fine on
Lewis and the union should be conditional, "subject to their full and
unconditional obedience to the injunction" (335).
Murphy's blistering dissent followed. He argued forcefully against
every position in the Court's opinion. He acknowledged that the govern-
ment was confronted with the "necessity of preserving the economic
health of the nation and it was imperative that some effective action be
taken to break the stalemate." However, Murphy argued, "those factors
do not permit the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon for
misapplying statutes according to the grave exigencies of the moment.
That can have grave consequences even more serious and lasting than a
temporary dislocation of the nation's economy resulting from a strike of
the miners" (336). The court did not have the power to issue the injunc-
tion, and the miners were not obligated to obey it. "We lack any power
to ignore the plain mandates of Congress and to impose vindictive fines
upon defendants. They are entitled to be judged by this Court according
to the sober principles of law" (342).
Rutledge's vigorous dissent is nearly as long as the Court's opinion.
He began with an admonition to his colleagues about the public furor
over Lewis and the coal strike. He said, "This case became a cause cele-
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bre the moment it began. No good purpose can be served by ignoring
that fact. But it cannot affect our judgment save only to steel us to the
essential and accustomed behavior of judges" (342). Rutledge reminded
the justices that their job was to decide the case according to their con-
science and what the law commands, and he was of the firm conviction
that the law in question prohibited the district court from issuing an
injunction. Congress, he said, clearly intended to limit the jurisdiction
of the courts in labor disputes, which was its prerogative under the Con-
stitution. There is no precedent, he said, that holds "that a refusal to
obey orders or judgments contravening Congress' mandate is criminal
or affords cause for punishment" (351). Thus, like Murphy, he thought
neither Lewis nor the miners could he held in contempt.
The reactions to the UMW decision were predictable. Legal schol-
ars widely condemned the majority view. The strongest criticisms of
Vinson's opinion were aimed at his dismissal of the language of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the intent of Congress that the legislation
applied to "any labor dispute." It was variously called "one of the
poorer—if not the poorest—opinions written by Vinson,"69 "legal gym-
nastics,"70 and a "blundering treatment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."71
The sharpest criticism was an article in the University of Chicago Law
Review. The author took the Court to task for what he labeled "judicial
policy making." He said, "The Supreme Court may have believed, as
thoughtful men with the interests of the nation at heart, that the country
would be bound for hell in a hay-rick if Lewis and his union were not
stopped in their tracks. But that is none of their business. Their business
is to apply the law as written and to let Congress do the worrying about
matters of economic convenience."72
Although Vinson had a long history of deferring to the legislative
will, he was on the horns of a dilemma in this case. A careful reading of
legislative intent might have spelled victory for Lewis and the miners and
an embarrassing loss for the Truman administration. Vinson was not pre-
pared to do that. In the opinion of one scholar, James J. Bolner, who wrote
a doctoral dissertation on the chief justice's opinion, Vinson "was intent
upon supporting the executive in its fight with Lewis."73 He was, in fact,
less than discreet with his colleagues about his concerns. In trying to per-
suade Murphy to support the government's position, Vinson is reported to
have said, "Frank, the blue chips are down. . . . We've got to help the
administration out of this mess."74 The chief justice's attempts to per-
suade Murphy did not succeed. Instead, a law clerk reported, Murphy
was "infuriated" by Vinson's plea to rescue the government.
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Even without his sense of loyalty to the president, it is doubtful that
Vinson would have ruled any differently. His opinion is completely con-
sistent with his long-standing view that government has the power to
promote public order and provide for the nation's defense. The idea that
government should be helpless in the face of threats to the nation's well-
being was anathema to him. As director of economic stabilization dur-
ing the war, he had been prepared to seize the railroads and the mines.
One of the most highly publicized cases was the government's seizure
in 1944 of Montgomery Ward, the nation's second-largest mail-order
house handling civilian goods. The government acted in the heat of a
labor dispute that threatened to shut down Montgomery Ward, which it
thought would impede the effective prosecution of the war. Wilbur Lester,
a former Vinson law clerk on the court of appeals, was working with
Vinson at the time. Lester said that Vinson never had any doubts that the
"President in times of emergency had to assume leadership and to take
such action as was necessary to preserve the country and the govern-
ment."75 A federal circuit court of appeals upheld the government, and
before the Supreme Court could rule on Montgomery Ward's appeal,
the federal government withdrew control. So there was no legal valida-
tion of the government's action.
Vinson's experiences as director of war mobilization and treasury
secretary, which followed his term as head of economic stabilization,
gave him firsthand knowledge about how precarious the nation's economy
was after the war. The soft coal miners were not the only workers whose
demands threatened economic stabilization. While Truman was con-
fronted with the miners' strike, he was dealing with almost exactly the
same situation with the railroad industry. Other labor disputes were on
the horizon.
The Court's opinion received more favorable treatment from the
popular press, reflecting public opinion, which was more concerned about
the threats to the nation's economy and the potential ramifications of a
decision that supported Lewis and the miners. The Washington Post de-
clared, "The Court has struck a blow for law and order." It called the
decision "a clear and forceful application of law to an area of lawless-
ness [and showed] that the United States is not a helpless victim in the
face of such an assault. It can act to protect the public interest."76
The New York Times said, "Our highest court has grappled boldly
with one of the greatest problems of our times," and called the ruling "a
moral injunction toward a greater sense of public obligation." Fearing
that this would not be the end of labor strife, the Times called upon
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Congress to pass "better legislation" authorizing the president to take
over any vital industry when its operations are halted by an employee-
employer dispute.77 The Times editorial reflected the same concerns as
those expressed by members of Congress, and the most significant af-
termath of the Court's opinion may have been its stimulus to new legis-
lation that imposed stricter regulations on the right to strike.
Members of Congress uniformly praised the Court's ruling, and sev-
eral of them called for tougher antilabor laws. Antilabor sentiments had
already emerged in Congress as early as 1945 when the first postwar
strikes began. Among the main targets was the National Labor Rela-
tions Act or Wagner Act, passed in 1935, which protected workers' right
to collective bargaining. Several antilabor measures aimed at curtailing
the power of labor to carry out disruptive strikes were introduced and
failed. In May 1946 Truman himself proposed the Temporary Disputes
Settlement Act, which included some rather strict measures to deter "la-
bor disputes interrupting or threatening to interrupt the operation of in-
dustry essential to the maintenance of the national economic structure
and to the effective transition from war to peace."78 In 1946 Truman
vetoed an even stricter law proposed by South Dakota representative
Francis Case that included provisions for a sixty-day cooling-off period
before any strike could occur.
After the Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress in
1946, a victory fueled in part by diametric forces—the public's disgust
with labor and labor's frustration with Truman—even more antiunion
bills were introduced. The most significant of these measures to suc-
ceed was the Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, which amended the
Wagner Act. The national emergency strike provisions were among the
most important aspects of Taft-Hartley. These empowered the president
to obtain an eighty-day temporary injunction if he thought that a threat-
ened strike would present a national emergency. The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service would then assist the two sides to reach a settle-
ment. Subsequent procedures spelled out in the law effectively estab-
lished an "eighty-day cooling off period" in labor disputes. Taft-Hartley
was passed over Truman's veto. A prime consideration behind his veto
was the need to woo labor support, which had been badly frayed by
Truman's actions against the coal and railroad strikes. He made his veto
of Taft-Hartley a major issue in 1948, and Truman was convinced that
labor support was responsible for his reelection.79 On the morning after
the election, Truman exclaimed, "Labor did it."80
Truman's failure to use the national emergency provisions of the
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Taft-Hartley Act in another labor crisis in 1952—a threatened strike by
the steelworkers during the Korean War—became the basis for one of
his major defeats at the hands of the Supreme Court. The story of the
steel strike and subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court has striking
parallels to the coal miners' strike in 1946. Both strikes involved gov-
ernment seizure of affected industries, and both issues landed on the
doorstep of the Supreme Court while Vinson was chief justice. As in
1946, Truman was concerned about his program for economic stabiliza-
tion, and just as in 1946, the looming elections were a consideration.
Only this time it was a presidential election, and though he was not
expected to run again, he was concerned about his party's chances of
holding the White House. In 1946 the nation was operating under war-
time economic policies, such as the War Labor Disputes Act. In 1952
the United States was in actual combat in an undeclared war in Korea.
Truman recognized the necessity of intervention when the first indi-
cations of conflict between the United Steelworkers of America and the
steel companies surfaced in December 1951. Steelworkers were press-
ing their demands for a hefty wage increase, which the steel companies
would have been willing to grant if they could raise prices. However,
with the existence of price controls, the steel companies had to petition
the government for a price adjustment. In the meantime, the Steelwork-
ers contract was due to expire on December 31, 1951, and with no
progress in contract negotiations, Truman referred the dispute to the
Wage Stabilization Board (WSB). He stressed the importance of pre-
venting an interruption in the production of steel. At the same time,
Truman urged the steel unions and operators to continue working and to
cooperate with the WSB. "The national interest demands it," he said.81
On March 20, 1952, the WSB, which was comprised of representa-
tives from government, unions, and industry, issued a report that was
very favorable to the unions. The industry representatives on the board
issued a minority report, criticizing the WSB ruling as being decidedly
prolabor. The Truman administration's immediate reaction to the report
of the WSB was that it was too generous to the workers; Truman feared
that it would undermine the stabilization program. Within a few days,
however, the WSB changed its mind.
In the next two weeks, various officials in the Truman administra-
tion worked directly with the unions and the steel owners to settle their
disagreement. On April 3 a tentative agreement was reached, but it hinged
on government approval of a price hike. Truman was reluctant to yield
to the industry's demand for a price increase because he believed that it
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would threaten his entire stabilization plan. Yet the absence of an agree-
ment increased the likelihood of a strike. That too was intolerable. His
various war advisers had painted dire scenarios of what a stoppage in
the production of steel might mean.
Truman began to explore options available to him in the event that
bargaining failed and a strike was imminent. He no longer had the op-
tion provided to him in the War Labor Disputes Act, under which he had
seized the coal mines to keep them operating in 1946. In the interim
Congress had passed the Taft-Hartley Act and, with it, provisions for an
eighty-day cooling-off period when strikes threatened industries vital to
the national interest. Truman and his advisers did not give much consid-
eration to using the Taft-Hartley Act. First, there was the obvious politi-
cal drawback—labor's staunch opposition to it. Truman and his advisers
agreed that an injunction issued under Taft-Hartley would impose a hard-
ship on workers by forcing them to work for wages they thought were
inadequate. They felt that the burden to settle should be placed on the
companies, because they were the ones that refused to settle. In addi-
tion, the Taft-Hartley Act would not achieve the objective of maintain-
ing steel production, except for the eighty-day period of the temporary
injunction.82 Other options considered were seizing the steel mills under
section 18 of the Selective Service Act or under the Defense Production
Act or requesting seizure legislation from Congress. These were rejected
as being either too complex, too time-consuming, or of questionable
applicability.
After a lengthy and spirited debate about the advantages and disad-
vantages of each alternative, Truman and his advisers concluded that
relying on the president's "inherent powers" under Article 2 of the Con-
stitution was the most desirable approach. Article 2 contains three pow-
ers from which a president might infer a power to act. It vests executive
power in the president, designates him to be commander in chief of the
army and navy of the United States, and requires that he faithfully ex-
ecute all laws. Relying on seizure under inherent powers allowed the
president to pursue his goals of "continued steel production and reason-
able price control" while at the same time permitting him to intensify
his efforts to effect a settlement (80).
Advice from Vinson may have played a role in Truman's decision to
seize the steel mills under his inherent powers. Robert J. Donovan claims
in his book Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-
1953 that "Vinson, in a most questionable act for a chief justice who
might later have to weigh a case in court, privately advised the president
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to go ahead with the seizure, basing the recommendation on legal
grounds." Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder argued strongly against
seizure, but according to Donovan, "Truman was not persuaded and re-
plied that the chief justice himself had assured him that the way was
clear for the president legally to seize the steel industry and that such an
act would be constitutional."83 Although Donovan's book clearly impli-
cates Snyder as the source of this claim, the author refused to verify that
when questioned by reporters. Robert Ferrell's book Harry S. Truman:
A Life, published four years later, reports that following Snyder's death,
Donovan acknowledged Snyder as the source. Margaret Truman, in a
book about her mother published in 1986, also claims that her father
conferred with Vinson prior to seizing the steel mills and was assured
that the move was legal and that the Supreme Court would uphold him.84
There is no direct evidence to corroborate these second-hand claims
and some reason to doubt their accuracy. Ferrell noted, for example, that
Truman, who studied law for two years in Kansas City, "knew that he
could not properly receive information on the steel case from the chief
justice." Another basis for questioning the accuracy of Snyder's claim is
his dislike of Vinson, a feeling that was mutual. Even though they were
both close and trusted advisers of Truman, no love was lost between
them. Vinson had worked diligently to keep Snyder from positions in
the Truman administration, and much to Vinson's regret, Snyder had
taken his place as secretary of the Treasury when Vinson became chief
justice. On more than one occasion, Snyder expressed negative views
about Vinson. Snyder saw him as a person who was very ambitious,
"always trying to step forward politically."85 He credited him with being
a good negotiator but a weak administrator as secretary of the Treasury.
Furthermore, Truman, in his detailed account of the steel case, never
mentions Snyder as a person who was consulted about plant seizures.
Yet two people who were close to Vinson during the time of the
Court's deliberation of the steel case, law clerks Newton Minow and
Howard Trienens, suspect that Vinson may have told Truman that sei-
zure would be legal. They said the only time they ever saw Vinson, nor-
mally a mild-mannered person, get upset was over the Court's opinion
in the steel case.86 If Vinson did assure Truman that seizure of the steel
mills would be upheld by the Supreme Court, it would not be the first
instance of such a breach. There is extensive historical precedent for
such advice, as noted in Bruce Murphy's work on extrajudicial behav-
ior. Commenting on Vinson's reported advice to Truman, Murphy said,
"You can argue that it's inappropriate or unwise, but you cannot argue
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that its unethical because there's no ethical standard governing that sort
of behavior."87
Another factor that is said to have motivated Truman to seize the
steel mills under his inherent powers was an opinion that Attorney Gen-
eral Tom Clark had sent to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare in 1947, regarding the possible repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Clark's opinion stated that "the inherent power of the President to deal
with emergencies that affect the health, safety and welfare of the entire
Nation is exceedingly great."88 He offered as support for his opinion the
precedent established in the United Mine Workers case in 1946. With
Clark now on the Supreme Court, along with the chief justice and
Truman's two other appointees, Harold Burton and Sherman Minton,
Truman had good reason to believe that his seizure of the steel mills
would be upheld if the issue ever reached the Court. The president may
have overlooked one important fact about the opinion that Clark sent to
Congress in 1947. It rested on the Court's interpretation of the War La-
bor Disputes Act, which was not a consideration in the steel case.
Armed with this conviction, on April 8, 1952, Truman announced in
a nationwide radio and television address that he had ordered his secre-
tary of commerce, Charles Sawyer, to seize the nation's steel mills, and
he also announced that he was asking representatives of the union and
the steel companies to resume collective bargaining to try to reach a
settlement. Then, unable to resist a jab at the steel companies, he blamed
them for the current state of affairs. "The companies have said . . . that
unless they can have what they want, the steel industry will shut down.
That is the plain unvarnished fact."89 He criticized the steel companies
for insisting on their price demands in the face of record profits. Com-
menting on the negative editorials in the nation's newspapers, Truman
said: "Tell them to read the Constitution The President has the power
to keep the country from going to hell."90
In less than thirty minutes following the president's speech, lawyers
for the steel companies submitted a motion with the federal district court
for the District of Columbia for a temporary restraining order against
the president's seizure. On April 24 Judge David A. Pine, a Roosevelt
appointee, presided over a hearing on whether to grant a preliminary in-
junction against the administration. Such a hearing would typically focus
on the possible injury to each party and to the public that would result
from issuing or not issuing injunctive relief, but because of a tactical error
made by the government's lawyers, the proceedings before Judge Pine
explored the merits of the case, that is, whether the president had the
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power to seize the steel mills. The government's lawyer boldly asserted
at one point that the president had unlimited power in an emergency.
The audacity of the government's positions was too much for the
"strict constructionist" Pine. He determined that "there is no express
grant of power in the Constitution authorizing the President to direct
this seizure. There is no grant of power from which it reasonably can be
implied." Pine made specific reference to the Taft-Hartley Act as the
remedy "provided by Congress to meet such an emergency."91 On the
question of damages, Pine rejected all of the government's arguments
and concluded that the steel companies would suffer irreparable harm.
Accordingly, he issued the preliminary injunction, and the steelworkers
called for an immediate strike.
Faced with the reality of a stoppage in steel production and still
determined not to use the Taft-Hartley Act, the Truman administration
immediately filed for a stay of Pine's injunction with the court of ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. There the government's claim got a
more favorable review from a bench that included two of Vinson's former
colleagues, Chief Justice Harold M. Stephens and Associate Justice Henry
Edgerton. On April 30 the court of appeals, in a five-to-four majority
opinion announced by Judge Edgerton, stayed Judge Pine's injunction
for two days. In sharp disagreement with the district court judge, they
declared that "there is at least a serious question as to the correctness"
of Judge Pine's ruling that the president's seizure of the steel industry
was illegal.92 The judges stipulated that if petitions for writs of certiorari
were filed in the Supreme Court within two days, the stay would con-
tinue until the Supreme Court acted on the petitions. Or if the request
for certiorari were denied, the stay would remain in effect until further
order of the court of appeals. Again the Truman administration lost no
time in filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Simulta-
neously, the president requested that the steelworkers terminate their
strike, and they complied.
One day after receiving the petitions for certiorari, the Supreme
Court, by a vote of seven to two, voted to grant certiorari. Only Frank-
furter and Burton voted against accepting the case. The Court unani-
mously voted to stay the preliminary injunction until the final disposition
of the case and set oral arguments for May 12. Burton recorded in his
diary that the chief justice received word during the discussion that the
president had said that unless the strike was settled by Monday, he would
order wage increases, but Vinson did not report this information until
after the decision to grant certiorari had been made.93
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About a week before the oral arguments, Burton had lunch with
Vinson, Black, Reed, Clark, and Minton, his regular lunch group. Bur-
ton left that meeting with the feeling that he was "largely alone in hold-
ing the President was without power to seize the steel plants in the face
of Taft-Hartley."94 His perceptions were wrong. On the day of oral argu-
ments, it was abundantly clear that most of the other justices had serious
doubts about the president's actions.
The significance of the case was apparent on May 12, 1952, when
more than three hundred people packed the courtroom to hear the oral
arguments in the case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer. The
Court relaxed its rule against standing during the session, which allowed
an additional two hundred people to view the proceedings. Hundreds
more stood outside the chamber. When John W. Davis presented the
case for the steel companies, he was asked relatively few questions; but
when Solicitor General Philip Perlman presented the government's case,
he was subjected to a barrage of questions. Black, Douglas, Frankfurter,
Jackson, and Burton were relentless in pressing Perlman. It was clear
from their questions that they had reservations about an inherent presi-
dential power to seize the plants and whether there was any statute that
conferred such a power. Perlman was repeatedly asked to explain the
president's failure to use the Taft-Hartley injunction to prevent the strike.
Perlman kept returning to the idea that a steel strike at this critical time
would create an emergency of such proportions that the president had to
act, which he was empowered to do under the Constitution.
Vinson asked relatively few questions, none of which directly ad-
dressed the constitutional issues. At one point he asked, "What do I
understand your position with regard to action by the Congress, vetoing
or expressly disapproving of the action of the President?" Perlman re-
sponded that this was not an issue "because the President said he would
abide by whatever Congress did . . . he made that crystal clear."95 This
allowed Perlman to demonstrate that Truman respected the authority of
Congress to act. He noted that Congress had failed to take any action
and therefore had in effect "acquiesced" to the seizure. At another point
in the proceedings, Perlman asserted that if the steel companies were
harmed by the seizure, they had an adequate remedy under the law—a
suit for damages against the government in the court of claims. The
resources of the government "are back of any damages they may suf-
fer," he said. "How can you say that?" Vinson asked. "How are we to
determine damage?"96 Perlman was under relentless pressure from the
justices, and at one point he had to request time to finish his answer to a
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question posed by Douglas before the justice pestered him with another
question. Perlman's performance caused some consternation with Vinson,
who complained that he "bounced around with this arguments and never
finished a subject." Later, the chief justice felt compassion for Perlman
and said, "I want you to do what you want to do."97
This allowed Perlman to turn to the question of seizure precedents
established by previous presidents. He specifically mentioned Roosevelt's
seizure of the North American Aviation plant in 1940 in order to use the
airplanes for the war effort, which occurred while Justice Jackson was
attorney general. The justice responded that the 1940 seizure was differ-
ent because North American was under direct government contract, which
made it a strike against the government. Minton was so disturbed about
Jackson's seeming about-face that he confronted him with it later. Jack-
son replied, "But I was Attorney General then, and I'm a justice now."98
During the oral arguments, Minton asked only friendly questions of
Perlman. Clark's questions also reflected some sympathy for the
government's position. He questioned the court's ability to pass on the
merits of an emergency, "especially when there were many facts that
could not be revealed for reasons of national security."99
The oral arguments were carried over to May 13, when the two par-
ties made their closing arguments. Perlman was allowed extra time in
order to answer the questions posed to him. If there was any doubt as to
where the Court was headed, that was quickly erased on May 16, when
the justices met in conference to discuss the case. Before they met that
day, Vinson sent a memorandum to all members of the Court urging
them "to take extra precaution to prevent any leak in respect of our de-
liberations."100 Vinson began the conference with a strong defense of the
president's actions. "History shows there is power," he said, and seizure
does not have to be authorized by Congress. He argued that situations
such as Korea or those involving NATO required the United States to
furnish arms, materials, and men. These commitments, Vinson said,
"placed serious responsibility on the President." He was not acting in
defiance of Congress; instead, in his report to Congress, "he said if he
was not right, let Congress choose the methods. . . . Congress has done
nothing."101
Black followed Vinson and declared that "most of what the Chief
Justice said is irrelevant." To him the question was whether the presi-
dent had the power to seize without a statute, and Black concluded that
he did not. He declared that to be a lawmaking power and said,"That
power under the Constitution is in the Congress." Although Black thought
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the Court "must" address the constitutional issue, Reed was reluctant to
do so. He said they "should keep the President in control of the plants to
see what Congress may do." Although he preferred not to decide the
constitutional issue, he felt that the president did have the power as com-
mander in chief.
Frankfurter, ever insensitive to the need for unanimity on the Court,
began with the comment, "Everyone should write in this case." He agreed
with Black on the issues of separation of powers, and although he too
would have liked for the Court to avoid the constitutional questions, he
concluded that it could not. Jackson did not want the Court to pass on
the question of whether there was an emergency. He accepted that there
was an emergency and said the question was what the president could
do in an emergency. Jackson claimed that the president "is in an unten-
able position. [He] can throw the Constitution overboard, but we can't."
Burton spoke mainly about the Taft-Hartley Act. The president, he
said, had no power to seize apart from statute. He said that the legisla-
tive history of Taft-Hartley indicated that Congress would provide for
seizure after the remedy in the act had been exhausted. Clark followed
Burton, and he was the one justice whose position at the oral arguments
was ambiguous. Now, Clark spoke against the president's actions. He
began with the statement that the Court's decision "should be limited to
this case," and in this case the president had no power. Clark said he
could have avoided the situation "by two methods not involving sei-
zure." In war situations, Clark clearly thought the president would have
the power to seize plants, but, he said, "this is not war in Korea." Not
surprisingly, Clark made no reference to his memo to Congress in 1947,
supporting the existence of the president's inherent powers. Vinson must
have been deeply disappointed at Clark's about-face. Sometime prior to
the conference, he had told Vinson, "If you have four, I'll be the fifth."102
After the conference, Clark said Vinson never spoke to him about his
change of heart. "He was not that type. He wouldn't try to twist your
arm."103
The last to speak at the conference was Sherman Minton, and he
was adamant in his defense of the president's seizure to prevent the
strike. Douglas noted that Minton was "very excited and pounded the
table." He said, "There is no vacant spot in power when the security of
the nation is at stake . . . the power is the power of defense and it rests in
the President." Unlike Clark, he had no doubt that the country was at
war and that "Truman seized the plants because the defense of the coun-
try required it." The conference lasted nearly four hours. In the end, six
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justices voted to affirm Pine's injunction. Justice Jackson was almost
gleeful following the conference when he called his law clerks, includ-
ing William O. Rehnquist, who later became chief justice, into his cham-
bers. He said, "Well, boys, the President got licked."104 One could almost
interpret Jackson's words as a long-awaited payback for not being named
chief justice.
Black, being the senior justice in the majority, assigned the case to
himself. He tried to fashion an opinion that would accommodate all of
the justices in the majority, but that proved impossible. In reality, their
positions were not that compatible, save for the belief that the president
lacked the power in this situation to seize the steel mills to prevent a
strike. As a result, every justice in the majority wrote a separate opinion.
This meant that the ruling lacked the force of a majority opinion. Vinson
wrote the opinion for the minority. Neither Minton nor Reed, who joined
him, was inclined to write separate opinions, but both contributed sug-
gestions that were incorporated into Vinson's opinion. Reed's main con-
tribution was to get Vinson to emphasize the temporary nature of the
seizure near the beginning and end of his dissent.105
The nation had to wait only two weeks to learn the outcome of the
case. On June 2 the opinions were announced. Black, who wrote the
Court's opinion, went first and took only fifteen minutes to read his
seven-page opinion. He said the president's authority to issue the sei-
zure order could only come from one of two sources: a statute or the
Constitution. Black said such authority was not found in any statute. He
noted that when Congress contemplated the Taft-Hartley Act, it rejected
an amendment that would have authorized government seizures in emer-
gency situations. Nor, said Black, could the power be derived from the
aggregate of his presidential powers under Article 2 in the Constitution.
The president's action constituted lawmaking, and the Constitution vested
"all legislative power" power with Congress. He argued that the
president's role in lawmaking was limited to recommending and veto-
ing legislation and executing laws once they were passed. Black did not
even leave open the possibility that under some catastrophic event, such
as total war, the president could take property to settle labor disputes
without statutory authority. Black declared that the president's seizure
order could not stand and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Douglas wrote only a five-page opinion. He was the only other jus-
tice who agreed with Black's absolute position denying inherent pow-
ers. His main thrust, however, was that the government's action amounted
to taking private property, and when the government seized private prop-
erty, it was bound by the Fifth Amendment to provide just compensation
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to its owners. According to Douglas, the president was without author-
ity to raise revenues, and Douglas said Congress was the only branch
that "has the power to pay compensation for a seizure [and therefore] is
the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the
President has effected."106 Thus, Douglas saw the president's action as
violating the principle of checks and balances by getting into the realm
of congressional power. The four remaining justices in the majority were
not as unequivocal as Black and Douglas on the question of presidential
powers to seize property when it served the national interest.
Although Frankfurter thought that courts should ordinarily avoid
constitutional issues where possible, he said the issue could not be avoided
in this case. Unlike Black's absolutist position, which rejected outright
the notion of inherent powers, Frankfurter chose not to define the
president's powers comprehensively, recognizing that the judiciary would
be required to intervene at times to determine where the lines of author-
ity should be drawn. He discussed the history of congressional statutes
that had authorized executive seizure of the units of production and noted
in each instance that Congress had carefully circumscribed the use of
such power. His opinion contained fourteen pages of tables analyzing
every statute that authorized presidential seizure. Frankfurter noted in
particular that the authors of the Taft-Hartley Act had unequivocally
denied granting the president the power of seizure as a remedy in labor
disputes to insure production. Nor could any other statute passed subse-
quent to Taft-Hartley be construed as giving the president this power.
Jackson's opinion was also based on the separation-of-powers doc-
trine, but his approach was to establish categories of circumstances un-
der which presidents might act, ranging from those that would be the
least vulnerable to challenge to those that would be the most vulnerable.
Under this scheme, Jackson argued that the president's authority to act
would be at a maximum when he acted pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization from Congress. His power would be at its "lowest
ebb" when the president took actions "incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress."107 Jackson thought Truman's actions in
this case fell into this latter category. The only justification for acting
contrary to legislative intent would be if there were some residual pow-
ers in the presidency that were beyond the reach of Congress. Jackson
concluded that the president's powers as commander in chief did not
extend to seizing industries he thought necessary to supply the army.
Rather, this was a congressional power derived from Congress's power
to raise and support armies and navies. Jackson seemed to think that the
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president had enough power. The nation would not suffer, he said, "if
the Court refuses to further aggrandize the Presidential office, already
so potent and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense
of Congress" (879).
Burton also addressed the separation-of-powers issue and devoted a
significant portion of his five-page opinion to the language and legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley Act. "The most significant feature of that
Act," he said, "is its omission of authority to seize an affected plant"
(657). Truman circumvented the procedures outlined in this act and chose
a remedy that Congress had reserved to itself. Burton then rejected the
notion that a president had inherent constitutional power to seize private
property in this case, but he left open the question of whether such power
might exist in "catastrophic situations" such as imminent invasion or
threatened attack. The "controlling fact" for Burton was that Congress
had acted within its constitutionally delegated powers when it passed
Taft-Hartley, and Truman's order had "invaded the jurisdiction of Con-
gress" (660).
Clark, in view of his pronouncements on the issue as attorney gen-
eral, was the most reluctant to reject outright the inherent powers con-
cept. He noted that "the limits of presidential power are obscure . . .
[and] the Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in
times of grave and imperative national emergency" (661-62). If, how-
ever, Congress has laid down specific procedures for meeting a type of
crisis confronting the president, he was bound to follow them, but "in
the absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent
power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the
nation." In the steel situation, Clark noted that Congress had provided
three procedures—the Defense Production Act, the Taft-Hartley Act,
and the Selective Service Act. Truman invoked only the Defense Pro-
duction Act and had exhausted the available remedies there. He did not
invoke the other two. Clark concluded that in view of these various pro-
cedures prescribed by Congress, the seizure could not be sustained.
Vinson's dissent was a vigorous defense of the president's actions
and criticism of those who opposed him. "Those who suggest that this is
a case of extraordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraor-
dinary times," he said. He devoted several pages of his dissent to dis-
cussing the measures taken by the United States since the end of World
War II to assume its responsibility to promote peace and security in the
world. Congress authorized these commitments with legislation and with
funding, and it was the president's duty to execute these legislative pro-
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grams. "Their successful execution," Vinson said, "depends upon con-
tinued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel" (672).
To accept the view that only Congress could authorize the seizure of
the steel mills for public use, Vinson said, would leave the president
"powerless at the very moment when the need for action may be most
pressing, and when no one, other than he, is immediately capable of
action" (680-81). In a seventeen-page analysis, Vinson reviewed previ-
ous presidential actions without specific authorization from Congress.
Included in this discussion were references to opinions supporting presi-
dential seizure by Jackson and Clark when they were attorney general.
When reading his opinion from the bench, Vinson stopped and said ex-
temporaneously, in what was considered to be friendly sarcasm, "Chang-
ing one's minds is evidence of strength."108 At that point, Black turned
and caught Jackson's eye and grinned at him; Jackson reciprocated.
Vinson made a pointed reference to Roosevelt's seizure of the North
American Aviation company, which produced military aircraft, some
six months before Pearl Harbor, and he cited at length Jackson's opinion
in which he claimed that the president had a "moral duty to keep this
Nation's defense effort a 'going concern.'"109 Again, Vinson noted how
Jackson stated his position then as vigorously and forcefully "as he or-
dinarily does now." Those in the courtroom caught the inflection in
Vinson's voice on this last point, and there was a spontaneous outburst
of laughter in which Jackson himself joined.110
Vinson continued. The president has not assumed he has unlimited
power in this case, he said, and he pointed to the message Truman sent
to Congress "stating his purpose to abide by any action of Congress,
whether approving or disapproving of his seizure action."111 Truman
was not trying to defy the legislative will. The president was not man-
dated to follow the emergency procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act. In-
stead, he chose to follow the procedures of the Defense Production Act,
which called for mediation under the Wage Stabilization Board. When
these efforts failed, he was not then required to use the Taft-Hartley Act.
Vinson said these were parallel, not consecutive, remedies. Vinson in-
cluded a swipe at the justices in the majority for their "lack of reference
to authoritative precedent, the repeated reliance upon prior dissenting
opinions, the complete disregard of uncontroverted facts showing the
gravity of the emergency, and the temporary nature of the taking." These
serve to "demonstrate how far afield one must go to affirm the order of
the District Court" (708).
Vinson rejected what he called the "messenger-boy concept" of the
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presidency implied in the majority opinion, a term that caught the atten-
tion of the news media the following day. In a comment directed at
Judge Pine, he said, "The District Judge stated this is not time for 'timo-
rous' judicial action. But neither is this a time for timorous executive
action." The president had to act to prevent the "disastrous effect" that
would result from interruption of steel production and thereby preserve
the defense programs that Congress had enacted (709). Only the three
dissenters were willing to grant the president that kind of unlimited power.
Reactions to the Court's opinion were varied and predictable. The
person most affected was Truman, who was both surprised and disap-
pointed about the decision. His anger was still palpable four years later
when he wrote his memoirs. "I would never, of course, conceal the fact
that the Supreme Court was a deep disappointment to me. I think Chief
Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion hit the nail right on the head, and I
am sure that someday his view will come to be recognized as the correct
one."112 Truman found it incomprehensible that the Court could ignore
that gravity of the situation confronting the nation. Despite his disap-
pointment, within two hours of receiving word of the decision, Truman
ordered Commerce Secretary Sawyer to comply with the decision and
return the plants to the steel industry. The strike continued until June 24,
fifty-three days after it started, when Truman agreed to an increase in
the price of steel so that an agreement could be reached.
Generally, the nation's media were favorable to the opinion. The
New York Times editorial argued that the case was much more about the
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches than
about the immediate controversy between the union and the steel com-
panies. The Times proclaimed that "the Supreme Court majority struck
a blow for that balance."113 Legal scholars of the day generally approved
the Court's reaffirmation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, but there
were criticisms as well.114
A major criticism of the Court's opinion in the steel case was about
its applicability, particularly in view of the multiple opinions written by
those in the majority. John Frank wrote in the Chicago Law Review that
"all that was absolutely clear was that this particular seizure was in-
valid."115 He noted that Jackson prefaced his own opinion from the bench
with the remark that "Justice Black's opinion is the least common de-
nominator on which five of us can agree." Only two justices took the
absolute position that the president could never seize property without
legislative authority, regardless of circumstances. The other four left
open the possibility that executive seizure might be sustained under con-
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ditions of war, or even under Cold War conditions. A Harvard Law Re-
view article agreed that precedent would have limited application. It said
the opinion contained "extremely broad language and manifests a mood
as well as a decision on particular facts; but there is no indication that it
is intended to curtail the President's power in foreign affairs, and the use
of formal power by the President in domestic matters is rare."
These criticisms aside, scholarly judgment in general was that the
main thrust of the opinion was "a strong reaffirmation of the constitu-
tional checks and balances, and the heartiest setback for executive power
in more than a decade.""6 Frank described it as "a marked step toward
restoring the balance of power between the Congress and the President,
a balance which was tipping ever more toward the latter." He applauded
the majority for "wisely putting general principle ahead of the immedi-
ate situation," even if it did leave the country without a sound basis for
preventing production disruption in emergencies.117 According to the
Harvard Law Review, the "lasting importance of the decision would seem
to rest with the political effect, the practical limitation on the activities
of the President, rather than any legal effect.""8
Contemporary scholars agree with the assessment of the long-term
implications of the decision. In her landmark work on the steel case,
Maeva Marcus said the case had "lasting constitutional significance" in
that it helped to redress the balance of power among the three branches
of government. It was equally significant in other ways, for it "served as
a prelude to a more activist period for the Supreme Court." The Court
could easily have resolved the issue on nonconstitutional grounds, but it
chose not to do so. Its newfound assertiveness in the Youngstown case
signaled the Court's willingness to tackle constitutional issues head-on.
No one knew at the time, but a new era for the Court under a new chief
justice was not that far away."9
As for Vinson, his dissenting opinion drew both praise and criti-
cism. Frank, normally critical of Vinson, called it his "strongest single
opinion."120 He said it was "an opinion of necessity . . . but it offers a
real, large-scale expression of the emergency powers of the President."
He thought Vinson claimed far more power for the president than was
necessary for the case, which was contrary to his tendency to decide
cases on narrower grounds. In this regard it was like Vinson's United
Mine Workers opinion. In both of these, Frank said, the fact that Vinson
departed so far from his own accepted practices "is some indication of
the emotional intensity with which he must have regarded them" (218).
Some Vinson critics think his emotional intensity was driven by his
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close relationship to Truman or a debt of loyalty for his appointment.
The closeness of that relationship and the frequency of their personal
interactions are not in doubt. However, some who were closest to Vinson
at that time disagree that his relationship with Truman was the motivat-
ing reason behind his vociferous defense of presidential power. Trienens,
who was his law clerk during the steel case, said that Vinson's feelings
on the legal merits of the case were strongly held not because of Truman
but from his own wartime experience as director of economic stabiliza-
tion where "he had been the seizor." He thought it was in the national
interest to seize firms when labor and management were doing some-
thing that was injurious to the economy. Trienens said Vinson "felt so
strongly about that that it wouldn't have mattered who was President or
if he ever knew him, it would come out the same way."121
Although the United Mine Workers case and the steel seizure case
presented very different legal issues, they nonetheless provide an excel-
lent prism for viewing Vinson's approach to issues involving the power
of government, and especially the powers of the president, in emergency
situations. As someone who normally followed as closely as possible
the will of the legislature, in these cases Vinson seemed to find ways
around their stated positions. The reason for this lay in his sympathy for
the role of the executive as the person best able to respond quickly and
decisively to crises. It also reflected his sympathy for Truman.
As far as Vinson's role as chief justice was concerned, these two
cases resulted in very different outcomes. In 1946 Vinson managed to
gain the Court's support in behalf of the government, but by 1952 the
tide was running out for both Vinson and Truman. Vinson found himself
writing for the minority, against a six-person majority in which every
justice wrote a separate opinion explaining why the president lacked the
authority to seize the steel mills. The steel case, coming on the cusp of
what was to be Vinson's last year as chief justice, stands as stark testi-
mony to Vinson's inability to unify the Court, much less to persuade a
majority of his colleagues to accept his point of view.
The decision in the steel case had much larger significance for the
Court as well as the nation. Marcus contends that the case not only helped
to redress the balance of power among the three branches of govern-
ment, but it also signaled the beginning of a more activist period for the
Supreme Court. The Court abandoned its mindset against resolving cases
on constitutional grounds if they could be decided on other grounds.
The Court's newfound willingness to tackle constitutional issues head-
on in the steel case was directly linked to the assertiveness the Court
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would soon display in resolving disputes involving school desegrega-
tion, reapportionment, and the Pentagon Papers.122 Vinson's opinion in
Youngstown showed that he was increasingly out of sync with a major-
ity of his colleagues. His death in the year after the decision in the steel
case not only marked the end of the Vinson Court but also ushered in a
new era of judicial activism.
CHAPTER 9
Individual Rights in the
Cold War Climate
When Fred Vinson became chief justice in 1946, the Red Scare era in
American politics had already begun to boil. Responding to the spread-
ing fear in the land that Communists were hell-bent on world domina-
tion, Congress the previous year had made the previously temporary
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) into a standing com-
mittee. Armed with the power of subpoena and the enthusiastic coop-
eration of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, HUAC became a major power
base for investigating and exposing subversive activities. Congressional
Republicans blasted the Truman administration as being "soft on com-
munism" and made this one of the major issues in the 1946 off-year
elections. When the Republicans succeeded in winning both houses of
Congress, Truman fought back. In response to charges that he harbored
subversives in government jobs, he established a Commission on Em-
ployee Loyalty to assist in the creation of standards and procedures for
investigating federal employees. The ultimate goal was removing dis-
loyal and subversive workers. Then in 1947 Truman issued Executive
Order 9835, which established the country's first loyalty program for
federal employees.
A second strategy by the administration to fight the claim that Truman
was soft on Communism was the vigorous prosecution of the leaders of
the Communist Party of the United States. Truman's attorney general,
Tom Clark, initiated aggressive prosecution of party members in 1948
following a combative session with the Republican-controlled House
Un-American Activities Committee, in which he was grilled about his
failure to use the Smith Act against subversive forces. Within a year the
Justice Department had secured the indictments and convictions of the
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eleven top leaders of the Communist Party for violations of the 1940
Smith Act, which made it illegal to conspire to overthrow the govern-
ment or to advocate the overthrow of the government.
Although the threat of Communism appeared very real to vast num-
bers of Americans, including some justices, others thought such fears
were overblown. There was little doubt, however, where Vinson stood.
As he dealt with these issues, he adhered strongly to one of his most
cherished beliefs—that order must be secured for freedom to exist. When
he had to balance society's need for order and stability against an
individual's freedom of speech, Vinson usually came down on the side
of order. As he said in a speech before the American Bar Association in
September 1947, one year after becoming chief justice, "the only alter-
native to the supremacy of law is anarchistic chaos or the reign of a
personal dictator."1 Generally, Vinson's views were shared on the Court
by Stanley Reed, Robert Jackson, Sherman Minton, and Tom Clark;
Harold Burton occasionally sided with these five, but not always. Felix
Frankfurter was in the middle. He was an avowed defender of free speech,
but he was just as firm in his adherence to judicial restraint, causing him
frequently to uphold legislative actions that restricted speech. The Court's
staunchest libertarians, Hugo Black and William Douglas, believed that
positions like Vinson's were an overreaction to a movement that posed
little harm and were used to justify unconstitutional restrictions on indi-
vidual freedom. Each camp was so fixed in its position that neither could
accept the possibility of merit in the opposite view.
Scholarly research in the 1990s brought the question of Communist
activities in the United States under new scrutiny and provided credible
evidence that in fact party leaders in the Soviet Union did control the
activities of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). In
1992 the opening of the Soviet archives dealing with Communist activ-
ity in America yielded a wealth of data. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes,
and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, who examined these files in depth, con-
cluded that "concerns about the subversive threat of the CPUSA and
worries that Communists employed in sensitive government jobs con-
stituted a security risk" were well founded.2 A second work by Klehr,
Haynes and Kyrill M. Anderson has also provided strong evidence
that the American Communist Party was controlled, financed, and run
by Communist Party leadership in the Soviet Union.3 Various other
scholars have drawn upon the data from the Soviet archives to docu-
ment the significant number of individuals in government service who
were engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union.4 This evidence sug-
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gests that the worst fears of people like Vinson were not based on pure
paranoia.
Vinson had more than an inkling about Soviet espionage in the U.S.
government. In February 1946, when Vinson was serving as secretary of
the Treasury, Truman forwarded to him a memorandum from FBI direc-
tor J. Edgar Hoover containing "serious charges" that Harry Dexter White,
then assistant secretary of the Treasury, was passing "materials which
came into his possession as a result of his official capacity" to two Trea-
sury Department employees who were part of a network of suspected
Soviet agents who had been under intensive investigation by the FBI
since November 1945.5 Materials now available through the opening of
this country's Venona files and from decrypted telegraphic cables be-
tween Soviet spies in the United States and their superiors in Moscow
offer solid evidence that White was assisting a Soviet spy network in the
United States.6
Even though the recently discovered data now make the views of
the anticommunists in the decades of the 1940s and 1950s seem less
irrational, they do not justify the assumption that every member of the
Communist Party was part of the scheme to undermine the government.
Many idealistic people joined the Communist Party for a variety of rea-
sons, and the government's effort to rout out the true subversives was so
broad and stringent that it swept many innocent victims into its net. The
Court's libertarians were more inclined to think of the Communist Party
in terms of these people, people who merely advocated certain beliefs
but were not engaged in espionage, and thus they had little sympathy
with their colleagues who were driven by theories of a Communist con-
spiracy. The underlying assumptions of the two camps on the Court were
intertwined with the existing doctrinal and personal differences among
the justices, and addressing these issues proved a daunting task for the
Court.
American Communications Association v. Douds represented one
of Vinson's strongest opinions in defense of government measures to
thwart Communist influence.7 Douds involved a suit by the American
Communications Association, a union affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, over section 9 (h) of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act,
which denied protection under the National Labor Relations Act of 1937
to any union whose officers failed to swear that they were not Commu-
nists. Union leaders were required to take an oath that they were not
members of the Communist Party nor affiliated with such party, nor did
they believe in or support "any organization that believes in or teaches
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the overthrow of the United States government by any illegal or uncon-
stitutional methods."
Vinson, joined by Burton and Reed, focused on the purpose of Con-
gress in passing the National Labor Relations Act in 1937 and the subse-
quent noncommunist affidavit provision in 1947. These, he said, were
aimed at eliminating impediments to interstate commerce. One such
obstruction was the so-called political strike. Congress had amassed "sub-
stantial amounts of evidence" that Communist leaders had used and
would continue to use strikes "in support of policies of a foreign gov-
ernment" and that Communists had infiltrated union organizations to
use them as a means by which "commerce and industry might be dis-
rupted when the dictates of political policy required."8
The union claimed that the statute violated fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment, including the right of union officers to
hold political views of their choice and to freely associate with political
groups they desire and the right of unions to choose officers without
interference from government. The National Labor Relations Board ar-
gued that there was no First Amendment problem, because it was only
denying a "privilege"—the use of its service—to noncomplying unions.
Vinson, however, recognized that neither position was entirely accurate.
The Court could not treat section 9 (h) as if it was merely withdrawing a
privilege "gratuitously granted by Congress," nor could the Court con-
sider the provision as a licensing statute prohibiting those persons who
do not sign the affidavit from holding union office. The question that
emerged was much more difficult. Did Congress violate the First Amend-
ment when it denied leadership positions to union members because of
their particular beliefs and political affiliations? Vinson found that Con-
gress did have such power. He likened the restrictions on labor unions to
restrictions imposed on other enterprises, such as bank directors in the
underwriting business and other rational schemes imposing restriction
on specific occupations.
The heart of Vinson's opinion rested on his interpretation of the
"clear and present danger test" as articulated by Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis. Although the Holmes-Brandeis doc-
trine was originally intended to deal with speech or actions that posed a
threat to national security, Vinson argued that the question presented in
Douds was different. Instead, the government's interest in this situation
was "in protecting the free flow of commerce from what Congress con-
siders to be substantial evils of conduct that are not the products of speech
at all." It is not the consequences of speech that Congress feared, but
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rather "the harmful conduct which Congress has determined is carried
on by persons who may be identified by their political affiliations and
beliefs" (396).
Vinson went to great lengths to clarify that the Court could not up-
hold restrictions on speech unless the evil it might produce is "substan-
tial" and "relatively serious," but he rejected the idea that previous courts
had intended to "lay down an absolutist test" to determine what consti-
tuted danger to the nation. Instead, Vinson said the Court must deter-
mine which of the conflicting interests demanded the greater protection
"under the circumstances" (399). In weighing the circumstances, Vinson
said the Court must give due deference to the "legislative determination
of the need for restriction upon particular forms of conduct." Further,
Vinson determined that Congress had not restrained "the activities of
the Communist Party as a political organization," nor had it stifled be-
liefs. He noted that section 9 (h) affected "only a relative handful of
persons, leaving the great majority of persons of the identified affilia-
tions and beliefs completely free from restraint." Those who were af-
fected, he said, were still "free to maintain their affiliations and beliefs"
and were subject only to possible loss of positions that Congress had
concluded were being abused "to the injury of the public by members of
the described group" (404).
Another issue raised by the plaintiffs was that section 9 (h) was so
broad that it could apply not only to members of the Communist Party
and affiliated organizations but also to any person who believed in the
overthrow of government by force. Vinson acknowledged that the breadth
of the provisions, if read literally, could include "all persons who might
under any conceivable circumstances, subscribe to that belief," but fol-
lowing his ingrained inclination toward judicial restraint, Vinson deter-
mined that there was no reason to construe the statute that broadly. He
thought the Court had the duty to interpret a statute in a way that avoided
the danger of unconstitutionality, as long as such construction of the
statute was consistent with the legislative purpose. Vinson thought the
legislative intent behind section 9 (h) was served by construing it "to
apply to persons and organizations who believe in violent overthrow of
the Government as it presently exists under the Constitution as an ob-
jective, not merely a philosophy" (407).
Vinson's avoidance of the First Amendment issue on this last point
led Frankfurter and Jackson, who concurred with most of the Court's
opinion, to dissent in part. Frankfurter was in total agreement that the
Court had a duty to allow Congress some latitude in how it should regu-
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late in order to protect the industrial peace of the country. However, he
thought that Congress "had cast its net too indiscriminately" when it
required someone to take an oath that they did not favor illegal or un-
constitutional methods of changing the government" (420-21).
Jackson's lengthy concurrence actually went further than Vinson's
opinion in limiting the Court's power to review the provisions of Con-
gress except to determine if there was a "rational basis" for the pro-
scribed remedies. He provided a lengthy analysis of the differences
between the Communist Party and other parties in the United States to
explain why Congress was justified in singling it out for differential
treatment. Like Frankfurter, however, Jackson thought the belief provi-
sion of Section 9 (h) was unconstitutional. He did not think Congress
had the power to "proscribe any opinion or belief which has not mani-
fested itself in any overt act" (442).
Black took the "absolutist" position that section 9 (h) was an uncon-
stitutional infringement of the First Amendment. "Individual freedom
and governmental thought-probing cannot live together," he said. Con-
gress could not use the commerce power to proscribe "beliefs and po-
litical affiliations." He noted that the First Amendment was added
after the Constitution was adopted in order to prohibit Congress from
using previously granted powers, such as the power to regulate com-
merce, to restrict freedom of belief or expression. "Freedom to think,"
he said, "is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by imposi-
tion of civil liberties" (446).
Several points are noteworthy about the various opinions in Douds.
One is that the case demonstrated how far Vinson was willing to go to
support the government when it restricted individual freedom for the
public's interest in security. On every issue raised in Douds, Vinson gave
the benefit of the doubt to the government. The point for which he was
most criticized was the way in which he applied the clear and present
danger test, particularly with regard to the standards to be applied in
deciding whether a clear and present danger existed. John P. Frank said
Vinson set the standards so low "that almost any act of Congress would
appear to meet them."9 Vinson was also criticized for going much fur-
ther than necessary to uphold the statute. Like Frankfurter and Jackson,
he could have achieved the same result while still recognizing some
limits imposed by the First Amendment.
The outcome of the Douds case signified that on most civil liberties
issues, Frankfurter's and Jackson's professed self-restraint would result
in their aligning with the Truman appointees, increasing the likelihood
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that the Court would tolerate more restrictions of individual rights than
did the Stone Court. Had Rutledge and Murphy still been on the Court,
the majority opinion could well have gone the other way on key points.
The outcome also revealed that Black lacked support among his breth-
ren for his absolutist position on the First Amendment freedoms. Dou-
glas shared Black's view, but he did not participate in the Douds case.
Starting with the 1949 term, Black and Douglas were increasingly in the
minority, as more and more civil liberties cases reached the Court. In
the first three terms with Vinson as chief justice, Black dissented on the
average in 23 percent of the cases. In 1949 his dissent rate went up to 33
percent, and in the 1950 term it reached 38 percent. Douglas's rate of
dissent increased over that same period from an average of 28 percent to
an average of 38 percent. In contrast, Vinson's dissent rate decreased
from 13 percent in his first three terms to a mere 4 percent in the 1949
and 1950 terms.10
As troubling as the Douds opinion was to civil libertarians, it was
far overshadowed by another opinion, Dennis v. United States (1951)."
This was the Court's response to the appeal of the Communist Party
leaders who were convicted of violating the Smith Act in October 1949.
The trial had lasted nine months, the longest criminal trial in American
history at that time. Throughout the trial there were constant confronta-
tions between the defendants and their lawyers and the presiding judge,
Harold Medina. He exhibited little sympathy for the defendants and even
less tolerance for their disruptive and dilatory tactics. The defendants
appealed the verdicts to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
upheld the convictions.
The highly respected chief judge of the second circuit, Learned Hand,
wrote the circuit court opinion. He reviewed several Supreme Court pre-
cedents in his opinion, beginning with the Schenck case, in which Holmes
first enunciated the clear and present danger test, and ending with Douds,
which he said "was in some ways the most important of all" because it
had reaffirmed the court's role in weighing an infringement of free speech
against the public interest in suppressing danger. In each case, Hand
said, the courts "must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger."12
Hand justified the holding of a clear and present danger by review-
ing the history of the Cold War. In particular, he assessed the situation in
the summer of 1948 when the defendants were first indicted. Hand said
that Dennis and his followers were acting in close concert with Commu-
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nist factions in western Europe and that relations between the Soviet
Union and the West were growing increasingly hostile. He noted that
Communists had singled out the United States as the "chief enemy,"
and as a result "any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any difference
in the construction of the modus vivendi—such as the Berlin Blockade
. . . might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war." He asked
"how one could ask for a more probable danger, unless we must wait
until the actual eve of hostilities" (201,213). Under these circumstances,
Hand concluded, the United States was justified in prosecuting those
who appeared to seek the overthrow of the government by force.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in October 1950, it lim-
ited its review to the questions of whether the Smith Act, either inher-
ently or as construed and applied to the Communist Party officers,
violated the First Amendment and whether the act violated the First and
Fifth Amendments because of vagueness. Attorneys for the party offi-
cials sought to delay the oral arguments set for December 4,1950, until
January 22, 1951, purportedly to allow a British barrister to participate.
The Court denied this request, and shortly thereafter Frankfurter circu-
lated a memorandum to the members of the Court warning them that
they were dealing with "extremely sophisticated tacticians" who were
concerned not merely with legal issues but were "engaged in propa-
ganda for extraneous ends." Frankfurter said he had "no appetite for
debate with these men, and the Court should avoid giving them any
opportunity for it."13 Frankfurter's memorandum was in reference to the
tactics being carried out by the Communist Party to generate public sym-
pathy by "educating the masses" about the potential threat to constitu-
tional freedom posed by the government's prosecutions.
Oral arguments were held on December 4, and the Court met in
conference on December 9 to discuss the case. Douglas's conference
notes provide a window on the Court's deliberations. His first entry was
"CJ. affirms—practically no discussion." Vinson was followed by Black,
who said the "clear and present danger test was not satisfied" and voted
to reverse. Only Frankfurter and Jackson are reported as having dis-
cussed specific points at some length. Six justices at the outset voted to
affirm the convictions. Clark did not participate. Only Black and Dou-
glas voted to reverse. At the conclusion of his notes, Douglas added,
"The amazing thing about the conference . . . was the brief nature of the
discussion. Those wanting to affirm had [their] minds closed to argu-
ment and persuasion." There is nothing to indicate that Douglas was any
more amenable persuasion than those he attacked. Clearly frustrated
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over his failure to sway more of the brethren to his point of view, he said
the conference discussion was "largely pro forma," and he despaired
that it signaled a "drastic return of the 'clear and present danger test'
which [affirmation of convictions] required."14
For the next six months, the justices circulated copies of their opin-
ions to each other. Even though a majority of six justices voted to affirm
the convictions, those in the majority could not agree on a single opin-
ion. Vinson assigned the majority opinion to himself, and Minton, Reed,
and Burton joined him. Frankfurter and Jackson concurred with the
majority, but each wrote separate concurring opinions. Black and Dou-
glas each wrote separate dissenting opinions. Clark again did not par-
ticipate in the case. While the justices debated in secret, some of those
on the outside were hoping to influence their decisions through indirect
means. In a statement carried over national airwaves, the Communist
Party predicted protests and demonstrations in various cities if the con-
victions were not overturned. At the other end of the ideological spec-
trum, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates approved
a resolution condemning the conduct of the defense attorneys at the trial
of the Communist Party leaders and called for their disbarment. Frank-
furter was so disturbed by these thinly veiled efforts to influence the
Court that he thought the actions of both the ABA and the Communist
Party deserved a judicial citation for contempt.15
In drafting the opinion for the majority, Vinson relied heavily on the
circuit court opinion written by Hand. This proved to be a great benefit
to Vinson, because Hand's opinion had provided legitimacy to views
that Vinson held. The first issue that Vinson dealt with was the question
of intent, because the structure and purpose of the Smith Act required
proof of intent. "Congress was concerned with those who advocate and
organize for the overthrow of the government," he said, and those "who
recruit and combine for the purpose of advocating overthrow intend to
bring that about."16
The crux of the problem was whether a criminal conviction could
be sustained constitutionally merely by proving an intent to advocate
the overthrow of the government by force and violence without proof
that they actually intended to do so. Vinson thought that intent to advo-
cate was enough. He equated advocacy with intent to follow through
and declared that "the power of Congress to protect the Government of
the United States from armed rebellion is a proposition that requires
little discussion." He rejected the "right to rebellion" where the existing
government structure provides for peaceful and orderly change. He said,
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"We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclu-
sion, must lead to anarchy" (501).
Vinson defended the statute against the defendants' claims that it
prohibited even academic discussion of the merits of Marxism-Leninism
in violation of the Constitution's protection of free speech and free press.
He said the very language of the Smith Act negated such a claim. The
act, he declared, was "directed at advocacy not discussion.... Congress
did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories to
destroy the traditional rights of Americans to discuss and evaluate ideas
without fear of governmental sanction" (502). Rather, he argued that
Congress was concerned with the kind of activity in which the party had
engaged.
Vinson had to acknowledge, however, that advocacy of the over-
throw of the government by force, even when coupled with intent to
accomplish that overthrow, still contained an element of speech, and
this forced Vinson to deal with the issue of what the boundaries of free
speech were under the First Amendment. This led him to a discussion of
the Court precedents relating to the clear and present danger test. He
quoted a passage from Holmes's majority opinion in the 1918 Schenck
case that enunciated the test in these words: "The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive ills that Congress has a right to prevent."17
In Gitlow the Court majority had upheld the validity of the New
York Criminal Anarchy Law and the conviction of a member of a left-
wing section of the Socialist Party for violation of the law.18 It also had
ruled that any statute punishing advocacy of the overthrow of the gov-
ernment was constitutionally valid. Thus the precedent set by Gitlow
limited the power of the Court to review such statutes. Vinson, however,
disagreed with that aspect of the opinion. He did not believe that such
convictions should automatically be sustained. Instead, he leaned in the
direction of the dissent by Holmes and Brandeis, requiring proof of clear
and present danger in each case. Holmes and Brandeis argued that when
speech alone, separated from any action, was the evidence for the viola-
tion of a statute, then it was necessary to show that the speech itself
created a clear and present danger. The two justices thought that Gitlow's
speech did not pose such a threat. But Vinson did not go as far as Holmes
and Brandeis did in their Gitlow dissent. It is unlikely that the Holmes-
Brandeis version of clear and present danger, as enunciated in Gitlow
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and the subsequent case of Whitney v. California, would have sustained
the convictions in the Dennis case.19 What Vinson glossed over in his
Dennis opinion was the belief of Holmes and Brandeis that the utter-
ance or publication of a theory, separated from action, could be pun-
ished.
Vinson found a means to link the Holmes-Brandeis argument to the
Court's opinion in Douds, where the Court pointed out that the Commu-
nist oath affidavits were not intended to punish belief but to regulate
conduct of union affairs. He went on to argue again, as he had in Douds,
that the clear and present danger test enunciated by Holmes and Brandeis
was never intended to be "crystallized into a rigid rule to be applied
inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of the case " "Speech,"
he declared, "is not an absolute," and the legislature can deem that "cer-
tain kinds of speech are so undesirable as to warrant criminal sanction."
Wading into a thicket about relativism, Vinson wrote, "Nothing is
more certain in modern society than the principle that there are no abso-
lutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only when associ-
ated with the considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature. To
those who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending
threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that all
concepts are relative."20 What Vinson intended by that statement was
that the clear and present danger test produced no absolute standard for
every case to determine the immediacy of threat. He went on to explain
what the phrase meant in the context of the Communist beliefs.
Government, he said, had a "substantial enough interest" in protect-
ing itself against violent overthrow. He declared this to be the "ultimate
value" of any society, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure
from armed attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be pro-
tected." That is a succinct statement of Vinson's core belief. Order must
come first if there is to be any other value, such as freedom. Thus, gov-
ernment is required to act. It need not "wait until the putsch is about to
be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited" (509).
An attempted overthrow, even if it is doomed to fail, "is a sufficient evil
for Congress to prevent." Vinson then appropriated Hand's words: courts
must "weigh whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its probabil-
ity, justifies the invasion of free speech." Adopting this as the Court's
rule, Vinson said, "It is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might
devise. . . . More we cannot expect from words" (510).
Even though no attempt to overthrow the government had actually
occurred, Vinson said, the danger posed was real, for this was "a highly
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organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call
when the leader felt that the time had come for action." Leaving no
doubt as to the majority's position, Vinson rejected the argument of the
minority that there is a distinction between a conspiracy to advocate and
the advocacy itself, for "it is the existence of the conspiracy which cre-
ates the danger" (511).
Finally, Vinson dismissed the petitioners' claim that the language of
the Smith Act violated the First and Fifth Amendments because the lim-
its on speech were not sufficiently clear. He admitted that the standard
set by the act was "not a neat mathematical formula," but he thought
that the Court's attempts to clarify the scope of factors included in the
standard adequately indicated "to those who would advocate constitu-
tionally prohibited conduct that there is a line beyond which they may
not go" (516). The fact that there might be "borderline cases" in the
future involving the applicability of the standard did not warrant revers-
ing the convictions because the petitioners were unaware that their ac-
tivities were constitutionally proscribed by statute.
Frankfurter's concurring opinion, almost as long as the other four
opinions combined, criticized the majority approach for its heavy reli-
ance on the clear and present danger test and the preferred position doc-
trine with which Black and Douglas had enshrined freedom of speech.
This, he said, had led to giving constitutional support to "uncritical lib-
ertarian generalities" (527). Instead, Frankfruter promoted his idea of a
balancing test, which called for an "informed weighing of competing
interests" (525). This responsibility, he said, falls primarily to the legis-
lature, "and the balance they strike is a judgment not to be displaced by
[the courts] unless outside the pale of fair judgment" (540). Frankfurter
provided a lengthy discourse on precedents in which the Court had sought
to resolve conflicts between speech and competing interests.
Jackson's concurring opinion offered a simpler and perhaps more
logical way to uphold the convictions than the tortured reasoning that
Vinson went through to apply the clear and present danger test or
Frankfurter's weighty repudiation of it with the balancing test that se-
verely restricted the Court's role. Jackson argued that the clear and present
danger test was not the appropriate measure for dealing with the kind of
activities in which the Communists engaged. Jackson maintained that
the clear and present danger test should be applied "in the kind of cases
for which it was devised, such as the threat posed by "hot-headed speech
on the street corner, or a circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or
parading of some zealots behind a red flag" (568).
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Jackson thought the Court was on sounder legal ground to focus on
the act of conspiracy, because there was no constitutional right to en-
gage in conspiracy. He said, "Conspiracy may be an evil in itself, inde-
pendently of other evil it seeks to accomplish, and no overt act is or need
be required" (573-74). Jackson said the law of conspiracy was the "chief
means" available to the government to deal with organizations like the
Communist Party, albeit "an inept and awkward remedy," and govern-
ment should not be deprived of it. He declared, "There is no constitu-
tional right to 'gang up' on the government" (577).
Black's dissent is relatively brief, for he had agreed to allow Doug-
las to carry the burden of dissent.21 Although both agreed that the Vinson
opinion had not properly adhered to the Holmes-Brandeis formula for
clear and present danger, each dissenter took a different thrust. Black
began by clarifying that the defendants had not been charged with an
attempt to overthrow the government nor any overt acts designed to over-
throw the government. The charge was that they had "agreed to assemble
and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date." Black said that
regardless of how the indictment was worded, it represented a "virulent
form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First
Amendment forbids."22 Black essentially advocated an absolutist posi-
tion on the First Amendment. He could not agree "that the First Amend-
ment permits [the Court] to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech
and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere reason-
ableness." He said, "Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment
so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress" (580).
He concluded his opinion with the "hope that in calmer times, when
present pressures passions and fears subside, this or some later Court
will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place
where they belong in a free society" (581).
Black's dissent revealed the sharp philosophical differences between
himself and the Court's majority. These differences were captured even
more vividly in some rather uncharitable comments that Black wrote on
a February draft of the chief justice's opinion. When Vinson wrote that
government did not have to wait "until the putsch is about to be ex-
ecuted," Black noted in the margin, "good semantic emotionalism and
ghost conjuring." To Vinson's description of the imminent threat of the
Communist conspiracy, Black added, "Emerging crisis, always the plea
of those who would give dictatorial power to rulers." To other such ref-
erences he said, "The goblins'll get you!" When Vinson referred to the
"kind of activity" in which Dennis and his followers were engaged, Black
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asked, "What activity?" On another point he said, "These people were
not convicted for their acts."23 The mocking tone of Black's remarks
reveals his lack of esteem for the chief justice, as well as a measure of
intolerance of anyone who might take the Communist threat seriously.
Douglas, unlike Black, did not accept that freedom of speech is ab-
solute. He conceded that "teaching methods of terror and other sedi-
tious conduct" would be beyond protection. However, the Communists
were not charged with a "conspiracy to overthrow" but with forming a
party to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government. He noted
the paradox that books used by the Communists could legally remain on
library shelves and be used in a class. That, he said, makes the crime
"depend not on what is taught but on who the teacher is. That is to make
freedom of speech turn not on what is said but on the intent with which
it is said. Once we start down that road we enter territory dangerous to
the liberties of every citizen."24 Douglas did not think that the Commu-
nist Party in the United States posed such a threat. It is a "bogeyman,"
he declared, noting that it had been so thoroughly exposed in the United
States that "it had been crippled as a political force." They are merely
"miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold"
(588-89).
The Dennis opinion came at the end of Vinson's fifth term as chief
justice, and it stands as testimony to his inability to unite the Court. He
was able to muster only a plurality to his position. The other two mem-
bers of the majority supported the judgment of the Court to uphold the
convictions of the Communist Party leaders, but they were as critical of
his reasoning as the dissenters were. The muddled status of the clear and
present danger test going into the case had contributed to the problems
of crafting a majority opinion. Ambiguous precedents pointed in differ-
ent directions. The multiple opinions in Dennis, rather than clarifying
the matter, only muddied the waters. Four justices, Vinson, Reed, Bur-
ton, and Minton, sanctioned the validity of the clear and present danger
test, albeit in a significantly modified version compared to the Court's
direction prior to Dennis. Frankfurter repudiated it and substituted a
balancing test. Jackson limited its applicability to a very narrow range
of cases. Black essentially discounted clear and present danger or any
test as an acceptable limit on free speech. Douglas thought "clear and
present danger" could limit speech but not mere advocacy separated
from action. In his historical analysis of free speech in the United States,
David Rabban said that Dennis "marked both the apex and the turning
point of the Court's reliance on the clear and present danger test [be-
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cause] the phrase could no longer bear the pressure of the inconsistent
interpretations placed upon it by different justices." Rabban noted that
although subsequent decisions occasionally cited the test, it never re-
captured the prominence it had before Dennis.25
Critics of the Dennis opinion, such as Melvin Urofsky, thought it
had one redeeming aspect—that "the clear and present danger test never
recovered from the beating it received from the hands of the majority."26
Free speech scholar Harry Kalven blamed the problem on efforts by the
Court's majority to adjust the test "to meet the political exigencies of
the case . . . giving it the kiss of death."27 The political exigencies to
which Kalven was referring were the highly visible nature of the trial in
Medina's court and the accompanying charges that the United States
was indulging in political trials. Kalven said, given the importance of
the occasion, the Court felt compelled to "reconcile the Government's
anti-Communist strategy with the traditions of free speech and political
tolerance." This is why Kalven said the Court had to "work so hard to
confirm the convictions" in what otherwise should have been an open
and shut case for reversal (195).
Michael R. Belknap, who has written extensively on political trials
in the United States, blamed the Court for overreacting to anticommu-
nist fever and participating in the political prosecution of the Commu-
nist Party leaders.28 Belknap said such political prosecutions constituted
"official abuse of dissenting minorities" and that in the United States
they had most commonly occurred when the nation was under consider-
able stress.29 In the Dennis case and other prosecutions of Communist
Party leaders, the source of the stress was the Cold War. In Belknap's
judgment, trials like Dennis represent an unjustified use of all the ma-
chinery of government, including the courts, to repress those whose views
challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. In the case of the Communist Party
leaders, Belknap said the methods used to debilitate "a small radical
organization" were a high price for the country to pay because they "se-
riously endangered rights lying at the heart of the American constitu-
tional system" (7). Views of legal commentators sounding similar themes
appeared in such distinguished publications as the Harvard Law Re-
view, the Virginia Law Review, the Chicago Law Review, the Vanderbilt
Law Review, and the American Political Science Review.™ These au-
thors thought the actions of the Communist Party leaders did not consti-
tute a sufficient threat and that therefore the infringement of their free
speech was not justified.
There were, however, a number of scholars who defended Dennis as
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a reasonable response to a potential threat and not just a response to
public opinion. They took more seriously the dangers of the Commu-
nists' "clandestine speech" and their "conspiratorial nature." Sidney
Hook, professor of philosophy at New York University, in a book en-
titled Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No! echoed Vinson's concerns that the
survival of the United States was threatened by a conspiratorial move-
ment with ties to Moscow, making the Communist Party in the United
States in effect "a para-military fifth column."31 Belknap identified a
flaw in this reasoning. The Communists were dangerous not because of
the ideas that they taught but because of the nature of their organization
with its ties to Moscow. There in a nutshell was the great divide. Could
the Communist Party's ideas and doctrine be separated from its organi-
zational roots and connections? Those who thought so believed that their
speech was protected by the First Amendment, but people like Vinson,
who did not think so, believed that the CPUSA presented a clear and
present danger. Political scientist James Bolner, defending Vinson's rea-
soning in Dennis and Douds, said it was "far from being the irrational
ravings of contemporary caricatures" but rather reflected "his honest
and sincere reading of our constitutional history."32
Press reaction to the Dennis opinion was mixed. The New York Times
lauded the Court for establishing an important principle: "that liberty
shall not be abused to its own destruction." The Times said there was
little reason to fear a Communist uprising, but there was reason to fear
the "harmful activities of Communist spies and traitors. The First Amend-
ment was designed to preserve our freedom and not to serve the pur-
poses of a furtive conspiracy allied with foreign Governments to
overthrow all freedom."33 The Washington Post called the decision "the
most important reconciliation of security and liberty in our time." The
Post argued that the opinion would not diminish free speech and pre-
dicted that "the cool reasoning of the majority opinion will strongly
appeal to the good judgment of the present and future generation."34
Not surprisingly, criticism came from the more liberal publications.
The New Republic said the Court "paid tyranny the tribute of imitation"
and that "the great damage lies in the deterioration of the American
spirit of freedom."35 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch labeled the opinion
"narrow, timid and confused," whereas the New York Post accused the
Supreme Court justices of exhibiting the "timidity of scared politicians."36
Although no one in the press mentioned the fact, it is of interest to note
that three of the four justices in the Dennis plurality—Vinson, Burton,
and Minton—had all served in Congress. In fact, as a senator, Minton
Individual Rights in the Cold War Climate / 247
had voted for the Smith Act. Perhaps this made them more attuned to
the pressures faced by politicians from a fearful public. Black, the only
other member of the Court with a legislative background, was so com-
mitted to the sanctity of freedom of speech that his previous congres-
sional experience was not a factor.
One aspect of Vinson's opinion that created an unexpected uproar
was his statement, "Nothing is more certain in modern society than the
principle that there are no absolutes." Vinson had used this in conjunc-
tion with his view that a phrase like "clear and present danger" could not
be construed the same in all situations. Barron 's, which praised Vinson's
opinion in general, chided the chief justice for including the "logically
fallacious" statement. The author of the article wrote, "If there are no
absolutes then there is no such thing as truth and consequently there are
no principles, which are themselves applications of fundamental truths."37
Religious publications such as the Christian Century took Vinson to
task for his statement, but the more temperate Catholic Standard of-
fered a more thoughtful response.
The public spotlight generated an avalanche of letters from the pub-
lic. Vinson's standard reply to the letter-writers was to urge them to
reserve judgment until they had read the full opinion. Sometimes he
added other comments that revealed that he was stung by the vehement
response to this statement. In one reply he wrote, "I do not believe that
you can find anything in my Dennis opinion or any other statement made
by me, written or spoken, that would even squint at the interpretation
given in the statement to which you referred in your letter. . . . It was a
real shock to me to know that anyone could draw such an inference from
the actual words used."38 In another letter he said, "After you have read
[my opinion], I would be glad to have your views on the injustice done
to me."39
In the end, the Dennis opinion, for all the passions it stirred up,
proved to be less significant than either its critics or its admirers pre-
dicted. In the short term it resulted in the stepped-up prosecution of
Communist Party members, but at nowhere near the level that civil lib-
ertarians feared. By 1955 a total of 129 party members had been pros-
ecuted, a far cry from the 12,000 to 25,000 that were originally
projected.40 The long-term effect of Dennis was limited as well. In 1957,
in the case of Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed convic-
tions under the Smith Act of several leaders of the California branch of
the Communist Party.41 The opinion, written by John Marshall Harlan,
modified Vinson's Dennis opinion by making a distinction between the
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advocacy of the teaching of an abstract doctrine and adding a require-
ment for concreteness. His opinion makes no reference at all to the clear
and present danger formula.
Much had changed in the six years since Dennis was decided. Stalin
died in 1953, and an armistice was declared in Korea. In 1954 the Sen-
ate censured Sen. Joseph McCarthy, and the public fixation over Com-
munism had given way to more temperate views, giving the Court more
breathing room. Also, the composition of the Court underwent drastic
changes. Three justices in the Dennis plurality, Vinson, Reed, and Minton,
along with Jackson, were no longer on the Court. The changed compo-
sition of the Court "in calmer times" produced a different response from
the Court, and Dennis was history. Harlan's interpretation of Dennis
made it virtually impossible to apply Smith Act conspiracy provisions
to the Communist Party, and there were no further prosecutions.
Of all the cases that the Court heard regarding members of the Com-
munist Party, none riveted the attention of the nation as much as that of
accused spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Coming at the end of Vinson's
final year on the Court, the Rosenberg case speaks volumes about the
continuing conflicts among the justices. It may have been the single
most contentious issue that the Court dealt with. Conference debates
degenerated into screaming matches, and justices leveled behind-the-
scenes accusations that other justices were acting out of ulterior mo-
tives. The fight was bitter, and the Court was bloodied by the turmoil.
On April 5, 1951, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of
espionage by a federal jury for sharing atomic secrets with the Soviet
Union in 1944 and 1945. Seven times between October 13, 1952, and
June 18, 1953, the Supreme Court denied petitions of certiorari to re-
view the case. Each request for review turned on a different issue, but
each was denied. Vinson, Reed, Clark, and Minton voted against every
petition. Frankfurter and Black consistently voted to grant the requests,
albeit for entirely different reasons. Black thought all along that the case
presented serious constitutional questions, whereas Frankfurter was more
concerned about the Court's responsibility to hear the case and to dispel
public perceptions that the Rosenbergs were being treated unfairly. Bur-
ton, Jackson, and Douglas vacillated in their positions. Douglas's be-
havior seemed the most peculiar and brought the Court's long-simmering
personal rivalries to the boiling point once again.
For the first three appeals filed by the Rosenbergs' lawyers, Dou-
glas sided with the majority to deny the petitions for certiorari. The last
of these was on April 11, 1953. The Court's denial of the third request
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was held up for more than a month while Frankfurter debated writing a
dissent. On May 20 Frankfurter sent a memorandum to the conference
specifying that he and Black would simply state that they adhered to
their previous position on granting review. Then on May 22 Douglas
sent his colleagues a surprise memorandum announcing his change of
position. He explained that he had studied the record further and "reluc-
tantly concluded that certiorari should be granted." He said the conduct
of the U.S. district attorney, which had been a key issue for those sym-
pathetic to the Rosenbergs, "probably prejudiced the defendants seri-
ously."42 After receiving Douglas's memorandum, Vinson decided to
reopen the case at the Court's regular conference on May 23. It turned
into a stormy session.
Douglas's memorandum infuriated both Frankfurter and Jackson,
who believed that Douglas had written the dissent to protect his libertar-
ian reputation, knowing that there was no chance of the Court's granting
review, because only two other justices—Black and Frankfurter—sup-
ported it. Frankfurter used Douglas's changed position as an opportu-
nity to lobby Burton and Jackson to drop their opposition to reviewing
the case. He succeeded in convincing Jackson, who thought that Douglas's
memorandum was an embarrassment to the Court. At the May 23 con-
ference, Jackson strongly rebuked Douglas and announced that he would
vote to grant certiorari. He made the fourth justice to do so, thus deny-
ing Douglas the opportunity to publish his dissent. Douglas then with-
drew his memorandum, saying it was "badly drawn" and that he had not
realized that it might embarrass anyone. With the offensive memoran-
dum withdrawn, Jackson announced he would vote to deny certiorari
after all. As he left the conference room, he said to Frankfurter, "That
S.O.B's bluff was called."43
The Court's denial of certiorari was announced on May 25, 1953,
but it was not the final chapter in the Rosenberg saga. In his detailed
account of the case, Michael Parrish said the May 25 decision was "only
a prelude to the tangled legal and political conflicts of the following
month [in which] passion often triumphed over reason."44 On two more
occasions the Court was presented with petitions in behalf of the
Rosenbergs, and on both occasions the Court turned them down. Dou-
glas voted against both petitions. Then on June 16, one day after the
Court had finished its regular term, Douglas was presented with a re-
quest for a stay of execution for the Rosenbergs by Fyke Farmer, a Nash-
ville, Tennessee, lawyer, and Daniel Marshall of Los Angeles. Neither
had any connection to the case or to the defendants but purported to act
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for Irwin Edelman, who described himself as "next friend" to the
Rosenbergs but who also had no connection to them. The petition raised
a new issue, namely that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which re-
quired a jury recommendation for the death penalty in espionage cases,
had superseded the Espionage Act, under which the Rosenbergs had
been convicted and sentenced.
Douglas agonized over how to respond to the new petition, which
he thought raised significant new issues. Although accounts differ slightly
as to the sequence of events, Douglas apparently consulted both Vinson
and Frankfurter about his dilemma. Vinson told Douglas that the issue
of the Atomic Energy Act had already been disposed of in the Court's
opinion in November 1952 and that Farmer did not have standing to
litigate the issue. Frankfurter said he urged Douglas to do what his con-
science told him to and not what the chief justice told him. At one o'clock
on the morning of June 17, Douglas drove to Vinson's apartment and
told him that he had almost decided to issue the stay. According to Dou-
glas, they discussed the case for an hour, while Vinson tried to dissuade
him. He left telling the chief justice he would sleep on it.45 On June 17
Douglas issued an order staying the execution of the Rosenbergs and
promptly left town for the summer, thinking that the issue would not be
considered again until the Court reconvened in October.
He was mistaken. At some point in the process—the exact date is in
dispute—Attorney General Herbert Brownell and Acting Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States Robert L. Stern met with Vinson to discuss the
stay of execution. FBI memoranda suggest that the meeting was arranged
at the request of Jackson and took place before Douglas issued his stay
and that Jackson was present at the meeting. Stern, who has written his
own account of the meeting, said he was not sure whether the meeting
occurred before or after the stay order was issued but that, contrary to
what many scholarly sources have reported, Jackson was definitely not
present when they met with the chief justice.46 Regardless of the timing
of that meeting, the day immediately following Douglas's stay, Brownell
filed a request asking the chief justice to reconvene the Court to vacate
the stay. That same day, Vinson called a special session of the Court for
June 18, as previously agreed with Brownell. Most of the justices had
left town for the summer and had to return to Washington.
Douglas heard the report of the special session on the radio while
driving in Pennsylvania. He returned immediately to Washington. Vinson
maintained that he had enlisted Pennsylvania state troopers to locate
Douglas but was unsuccessful. Douglas later learned about Vinson's
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meeting with Brownell and his agreement to call a special session if
necessary. According to FBI files, the meeting occurred the day before
Douglas issued his stay. If this was the case, Vinson would have had
time to advise Douglas of this plan. Douglas remained convinced that
Vinson had set him up. He maintained that the chief justice had obtained
agreement of five justices to overturn the stay regardless of the merits of
the arguments presented in the special session.47
The Court held three hours of oral arguments on the morning of
June 18, followed by a lengthy conference that afternoon and the fol-
lowing morning. Those conferences proved to be the most heated of all
the conferences in which the Rosenbergs' case was discussed. Vinson's
law clerk, William Oliver, recalled that it was one of the few times he
could hear voices raised in conference. He said, "We heard Frankfurter
screaming in a loud voice—we couldn't articulate exactly what it was,
but it was Frankfurter's voice."48 The Court deliberations included sev-
eral highly charged points. Black denounced the special session and the
hastiness of the Court's proceedings. Frankfurter questioned whether
the Court had the authority to vacate Douglas's order, which he claimed
had never been done before. Burton also thought that the Court should
take more time to consider whether there was a substantial question.
Vinson, Jackson, and Minton were convinced that the Atomic Energy
Act did not apply to the case.
The Court then voted on three separate issues. The first one was a
motion to uphold Douglas's stay pending full review by the lower courts.
It lost five to three, with Black, Douglas, and Burton dissenting. Curi-
ously, according to conference notes by both Burton and Douglas, Frank-
furter abstained on that vote. The second vote, on a motion to shorten
the stay and schedule further arguments within three weeks, lost by five
to four. This time Frankfurter joined the minority. Finally, the Court
voted six to three to vacate the stay. On the final vote, Burton joined the
majority. After the Supreme Court announced it would vacate the stay,
President Eisenhower rejected the Rosenbergs' final plea for clemency,
and they were executed on June 19, 1953.
The Court's opinions, published after the Rosenbergs' deaths, re-
veal how fractured the Court was over the case. Vinson, writing what
proved to be his final opinion for the Court, provided a lengthy history
of the case from beginning to end. In his discourse he noted that the
Court had deliberated in conference for several hours before deciding
how to dispose of the questions raised by Douglas's stay. On the proofs
of his opinion that Vinson circulated to the Court, Frankfurter scribbled
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a bitter but lengthy notation about the Court's deliberations. He said,
"The fact is that all minds were made up as soon as we left the Bench—
indeed, I have no doubt. . . before we met on it." He also claimed that
most of the deliberations were about whether the results should be an-
nounced that same day or delayed until the following day.49
Vinson defended the Court's decision to vacate the stay. He acknowl-
edged that the full Court had no practice of vacating stays by single
justices, but he argued that this did not "prove the nonexistence of the
power; it only demonstrates that the circumstances must be unusual be-
fore the Court, in its discretion, will exercise the power." He argued that
the power was derived from the Court's role as the "final forum to ren-
der the answer to the question" that had been urged in the defendant's
behalf. In so doing, Vinson said that the Court had carried out the lim-
ited purpose for which Douglas issued the stay.50 Vinson also sought to
answer critics who thought the Court should have delayed consideration
of the stay, saying that the Court had the responsibility to supervise the
administration of the criminal justice system by the federal judiciary
and that this included seeing that "punishments prescribed by law are
enforced with a reasonable degree of promptness and certainty." Had
the stay been allowed to stand, it would have entailed "many more months
of litigation in a case which had otherwise run its full course" (287). As
to the merits of the case, Vinson simply noted that the Court had deter-
mined that the Atomic Energy Act did not displace the Espionage Act.
Vinson's opinion was followed by concurring opinions from Clark and
Jackson, who explained the Court's rationale as to why the Atomic En-
ergy Act did not apply to the Rosenbergs.
Not surprisingly, vehement dissents were registered by Frankfurter,
Black, and Douglas. All three were convinced that the Atomic Energy
Act, passed in 1946, could be applied to the Rosenbergs. Even though
their main crimes occurred in 1944 and 1945, prior to passage of the act,
others continued up until 1950, thus bringing them under the latter act.
Douglas was adamant that he was right in his reading of the law—that
after 1946 Congress intended that before anyone could be sentenced to
death for disclosure of atomic sentences, a jury recommendation for
such punishment was necessary.
Although public opinion overwhelmingly supported the Court's
decision, the majority was taken to task by several observers for its haste
in making a decision without fully considering the issues raised and for
vacating Douglas's stay without any precedent for doing so. The major-
ity was portrayed as being hell-bent on assuring that the sentence of the
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Rosenbergs be carried out, even at the expense of the defendants' rights.51
Michael Parrish, who relied heavily on Frankfurter's version of the case,
is especially hard on Douglas, calling his inconsistency in voting "inex-
plicable." William Cohen, one of Douglas's law clerks, wrote a strong
defense of Douglas, arguing that his votes were not inconsistent but
rather were based on the issues raised in each case.52 Douglas faced
public censure as well in the form of an impeachment resolution by Sen.
William M. Wheeler of Georgia. Perhaps more than anything else, the
Rosenberg case revealed that during the seven years with Vinson at the
helm, the doctrinal fissures of the Court were as deep and wide as ever,
and the personal relations seemed to have grown more bitter.
In 1951, the same year that the Court decided the Dennis case, it
was confronted with other issues arising from the anticommunist strate-
gies. Prominent among these were appeals from government employees
caught in the web of federal and state loyalty programs. Truman's Ex-
ecutive Order 9835, which established a loyalty program for the federal
government in 1947, authorized the attorney general to create a list of
suspect organizations that was to be used in screening government em-
ployees and applicants. The list consisted of various categories of orga-
nizations, including totalitarian, fascist, Communist, and subversive.
Organizations on the list were not subject to legal sanctions, but em-
ployees and potential employees who belonged to listed organizations
could be subject to investigations by the FBI and subsequent hearings
before regional loyalty boards. A Loyalty Review Board was set up to
hear appeals from employees and applicants. Procedures used by the
attorney general to complete his list were very informal and made no
provisions for the targeted organization to offer evidence in its behalf
before being listed. The government employee or applicant who belonged
to such a group was given no opportunity in a hearing to challenge the
listing of the organization.
The Vinson Court had a mixed record in deciding challenges to the
government's loyalty programs, but Vinson himself denied relief to the
plaintiffs in every case. He wrote none of the loyalty program opinions.
The first major challenge to the federal loyalty program came in Bailey
v. RichardsonP The petitioner, Dorothy Bailey, a government employee,
claimed that the loyalty program violated her constitutional guarantees
of due process and First Amendment rights. The district court and the
court of appeals had denied Bailey's claims. In its unsigned opinion, the
Supreme Court split four to four, thus affirming the lower court's ruling
denying Bailey's claim. Douglas's conference notes shed light on the
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contentious nature of the conference debate about Bailey that resulted
in the four-to-four split. Vinson took an extremely hard-line position.
He was adamant that no government employee "had a vested right" to a
job. He argued forcefully that "the Court cannot run the executive branch
of government," which was what it would be doing if it interfered in the
case. Also voting to affirm the lower court decision were Reed, Minton,
and Burton. Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson were on the other
side. Again, Clark did not participate.
Along with Bailey, the Court announced its ruling in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,™ which also concerned the fed-
eral loyalty program. The Joint Anti-Fascists and two other organizations
challenged their inclusion as Communist organizations on the attorney
general's list, and they sought legal remedies to have their names re-
moved from the list. They claimed that they were not Communists and
had been included on the list arbitrarily. The groups lost their cases in
both the district court and the court of appeals; but in a surprise ruling,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings. Five justices—Bur-
ton, Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson—voted to grant the relief
sought by the Joint Anti-Fascists, but there was no majority opinion for
the Court. Every one of the five justices filed a separate opinion, thereby
undermining any coherent rationale behind the Court's actions. Kalven
called Joint Anti-Fascists "a singularly frustrating and unhelpful prece-
dent."55
The change in the Court's opinion from Bailey to Joint Anti-Fas-
cists turned on Burton, who wrote the opinion for the Court. Burton's
majority opinion, joined by Douglas, said it was not necessary to satisfy
the rule on the constitutional issues, and it ruled against the government
on procedural grounds. He thought that the attorney general had acted
arbitrarily in failing to satisfy the requirement of the executive order for
an "appropriate determination" before designating an organization as
subversive. He must, Burton said, at least provide some indication as to
why an organization was put on the list.
All of the other justices in the majority, including Douglas, wrote
concurring opinions, and all raised constitutional questions about the
loyalty program. Black said it violated the First Amendment and due
process requirements and created a bill of attainder, punishing the plain-
tiffs without benefit of a trial. Frankfurter and Jackson thought due pro-
cess had been denied, and Douglas thought the system of administrative
loyalty trials as a whole was unconstitutional. Reed wrote the dissenting
opinion, in which Vinson and Minton joined. Reed argued that the orga-
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nizations had not been harmed by the government program because of
their designation on the attorney general's list. The organizations had
not been prohibited from conducting any business, nor had they been
punished or deprived of any freedoms. In language reminiscent of Douds
and Dennis, Reed said that under the Constitution the government was
endowed with "the right and duty to protect it against any force that
seeks its overthrow [by force]. Surely the government must not await an
employee's conviction of a crime of disloyalty before separating him
from public service."56 As to the claim that the attorney general had
infringed on the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, Reed noted, "This
Court has never hesitated to deny the individual's right to use privileges
for the overturn of law and order." There is not even a hint that the three
dissenters thought constitutional rights were threatened.
In 1951 the Court gave its blessing to loyalty programs in several
states. These typically took the form of loyalty oaths that public em-
ployees and applicants were required to take. In Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors of Elections,51 the Court unanimously upheld a loyalty oath
requirement established by Maryland for candidates seeking public of-
fice. The same day it announced the Dennis opinion, the Court issued
Garner v. Board of Public Works,58 which sanctioned a loyalty oath re-
quired of all municipal employees in Los Angeles, regardless of the
sensitivity of their jobs. In 1952, in Adler v. Board of Education,59 the
Court endorsed a loyalty program in New York barring persons belong-
ing to subversive organizations from working in the state's school sys-
tem. Adler upheld the constitutionality of the Feinberg law, which made
membership in any organization listed as subversive by the State Board
of Regents prima facie evidence of unsuitability for any job within the
school system. It was the first case that dealt with screening the loyalty
of schoolteachers. Vinson joined the majority opinion written by Minton,
who argued that there was no right to work for a public school system
on one's own terms.
Douds, Gerende, Garner, and Adler left no doubt where the Court's
majority stood on the permissibility of loyalty oaths as a means of bar-
ring subversives from public employment, but even so there were signs
that such tests were becoming increasingly suspect to a growing plural-
ity of the Court. Four justices—Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Bur-
ton—dissented in Garner. The same group, with the exception of Burton,
dissented in Adler.
The doubts of the dissenters finally bore fruit in 1953, shortly be-
fore Vinson's death. In Wieman v. Updegrqffthe Court unanimously in-
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validated an Oklahoma loyalty oath for state employees.60 Wieman proved
that there were limits of acceptability of loyalty programs even among
the justices who had previously supported them. The Oklahoma loyalty
oath was much broader than any of the ones previously reviewed by the
Court. It excluded from state employment anyone who had been a mem-
ber of any organization on the U.S. attorney general's list, regardless of
their knowledge concerning the organizations to which they belonged.
The case was brought by a group of faculty and staff members of an
Oklahoma state college. Clark, who wrote for the Court, said, "Indis-
criminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as
an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process" (191).
Clark's opinion did not go so far as to overturn Gerende, Garner, and
Adler. What distinguished the Oklahoma oath was the fact that it made
no provision for those who might have innocently joined an organiza-
tion designated as subversive.
Even though Wieman was a unanimous opinion, there were the usual
multiple opinions filed by the justices. All agreed with the reasoning of
the majority opinion, but some wanted to go further. Black wrote a sepa-
rate concurrence, which Douglas joined, declaring that the Oklahoma
statute was unconstitutional because it violated constitutional guaran-
tees of thought, speech, and press. Frankfurter wrote a separate concur-
rence "to add a word by way of emphasis to the Court's opinion." In the
field of education, from which the plaintiffs came, Frankfurter said the
Oklahoma oath represented "an unwarranted inhibition upon the free
spirit of teachers." Burton was listed separately as concurring, but he
wrote no opinion. Jackson did not participate in the opinion. Wieman,
coming in Vinson's last term on the Court, offers a glimmer of light as to
the future legality of loyalty programs. The justices were not all singing
from the same page, but on this one issue they were in the same choir.
The road to Wieman was long and winding, as evidenced by the
Court's shifting position on other procedural rights of those accused of
subversion. Issues about the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination for Communist Party members were good examples. In
Blau v. United States (1950),61 Black spoke for a unanimous Court in
ruling that Patricia Blau, a witness before a federal grand jury, could
refuse to answer questions about her affiliation with the Communist
Party of Colorado. Black said she could invoke her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination because to admit her party activities
could result in prosecution under the Smith Act. The Court reached a
similar conclusion in a case involving Blau's husband in a decision an-
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nounced on January 15,1951,62 The Court, speaking again through Black,
unanimously upheld the husband's right not to divulge information about
the activities and records of the Communist Party.63 Originally, Minton
had written a dissent, which Jackson had planned to join, but for the
sake of unity, they abandoned the dissent.64
The two Blau opinions were only a temporary reprieve for broaden-
ing the protection against self-incrimination. Within six weeks of the
second Blau opinion, the Court announced a third case that greatly im-
paired the protection, Rogers v. United States.65 That case involved Jane
Rogers, a cohort of Blau, who admitted to a Colorado grand jury that
she had been the treasurer of the Colorado Communist Party and that in
that capacity she had possessed membership lists and dues records. By
the time of the inquiry, however, she was no longer treasurer and re-
fused to tell the grand jury the name of her successor because she said
she did not want to subject another person to what she was going through.
Two days later, she was brought to court on contempt charges, and there,
having heard a defendant in another case refuse to answer on the grounds
of self-incrimination, she did the same. The trial court denied her claim
and sentenced her to four months for contempt. Originally the Court
majority was in favor of upholding Rogers's claim, and Vinson and
Minton had both prepared dissents. However, Vinson's dissent was per-
suasive enough to convince Jackson to change his mind, and the chief
justice's opinion became the opinion for the Court.66
Instead of using the Rogers case to expand upon the privilege of
self-incrimination, Vinson, speaking for the Court, significantly narrowed
the protection. His opinion upheld the trial court's contempt sentence
on three grounds. First, Rogers had not specifically invoked her privi-
lege against self-incrimination in her initial appearance before the grand
jury. Instead, she had refused on the grounds of not subjecting her suc-
cessor to what she had experienced. Vinson said, "The petitioner's claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination was pure afterthought." Sec-
ond, he argued that even if she had claimed the privilege initially, it
would not justify her refusal to supply the name of the person to whom
she had given the Party records. There was "no privilege with respect to
the books of the Party." Finally, Vinson said that Rogers had waived her
privilege of silence when she had freely admitted her own Communist
Party membership and that she would not have further incriminated her-
self by answering other questions put by the grand jury.67
Black wrote a vigorous dissent, which was joined by Frankfurter
and Douglas. He implied that the majority saw the privilege against self-
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incrimination "as more or less a constitutional nuisance which the Court
should abate whenever or however possible" (376). He argued that the
waiver of the privilege of self-incrimination is not to be inferred lightly
and that in Rogers's case she had sought to avoid answering the ques-
tions on any grounds available until she became aware that she could
assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Other groups besides Communists were also affected by govern-
ment policies aimed at subversive activities. Numerous cases pertained
to the constitutionality of the procedures and methods of the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC). Members of certain groups,
called to testify before HUAC, were convicted for failure to cooperate
with the committee. From 1947 to 1949, the Supreme Court was asked
five times to review the convictions of people who had failed to comply
with HUAC investigations. The Court denied review in all but one of the
cases. In the fifth case the Court was prevented from ruling on the mer-
its of the case because the appellant had fled the country.
Starting with the October 1949 term, the Supreme Court finally be-
gan accepting appeals from HUAC-related cases. Two of the cases were
appeals by leaders of the Joint Anti-Fascist Committee, an organization
that claimed to be a charity providing aid to victims of the Spanish Civil
War but which HUAC and the attorney general's office considered to be
a subversive organization. In United States v. Bryan,6* the executive sec-
retary of the organization, who had custody of the group's records, had
been subpoenaed by HUAC to produce specified records of the associa-
tion to the committee. She refused to do so on the grounds that the com-
mittee lacked constitutional authority to demand them. She was then
indicted, tried, and convicted for contempt of Congress. The court of
appeals reversed her conviction on the grounds claimed by the defen-
dant that the committee lacked a quorum at the time of her testimony
and was not duly constituted, which justified not turning over the re-
quired documents.
Vinson's majority opinion dealt with two major issues. The first
was whether the lack of a quorum of the committee nullified the
defendant's obligation to testify. Vinson concluded that it did not. He
noted that the defect in the composition of the committee was one that
could have been easily remedied but that the defendant did not raise the
issue of the committee composition until two years later at her trial.
Further, Vinson noted that the defendant did not deny that she would not
have complied with the subpoenas regardless of the composition of the
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committee. Vinson thought she was merely using the lack of a quorum
as a vehicle of escape.
When the Court refused to accept Bryan's argument about the lack
of a quorum, it reversed a precedent set the previous term in an almost
identical case. In Christoffel v. United States,69 the Court had invali-
dated a conviction for perjury before a House committee because of a
failure to show that a quorum of the committee was actually in the room
at the time that the perjured testimony was given, even though there had
been a quorum when the session began. The Court's abrupt turnaround
can be explained in part by the change in the Court's composition.
Christoffel was decided by a five-to-four majority that included Murphy,
Rutledge, and Douglas. Two members of the Christoffel majority—
Rutledge and Murphy—were no longer on the Court. Douglas, who was
recuperating in Arizona from major injuries suffered when he fell from
a horse, and Clark, who had been attorney general when many Commu-
nist cases were prosecuted, did not vote in the Bryan case. Black and
Frankfurter, who had apparently been in the majority in Christoffel, joined
their colleagues on the quorum question to make the Bryan decision
unanimous.
The second question in the Bryan case was whether excerpts from
the defendant's testimony could be read to the jury that convicted her of
contempt in view of an immunity statute that stipulated that "no testi-
mony given by a witness before any committee of either House shall be
used as evidence in any criminal proceeding . . . except in a prosecution
for perjury." Bryan was tried for contempt, not perjury. Vinson con-
ceded that her "testimony comes within the literal language of the stat-
ute," but he said that to interpret the statute in that manner led to "absurd
conclusions" and ignored the legislative purpose, which was to obtain
information through the granting of immunity. He argued that it would
be unreasonable to assume that Congress also intended to grant immu-
nity for failure to provide information. Congress, he said, intended the
immunity only for "past criminal acts," and not for refusal to comply.
There is no doctrine of "anticipatory contempt," he said.70 Vinson's opin-
ion in Bryan is somewhat inconsistent with his usual inclination to fol-
low precedent and the language of the statute. In fact, both Black and
Frankfurter dissented from the Court's interpretation of the statute. Black
called the majority's refusal to read the statute literally "judicial law-
making [that] is particularly questionable when used to restrict safe-
guards accorded defendants in criminal cases" (346).
A companion to the Bryan case handed down the same dav was
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United States v. Fleischman,1 x which involved a member of the board of
the Joint Anti-Fascist Committee who refused to produce requested
records and was subsequently convicted for contempt, even though the
records were not in her possession or under her control. Virtually the
same issues were presented in the Fleischman case, with the important
distinction that Fleischman, unlike Bryan, did not have the documents
in her possession. Vinson, again writing for the majority, dismissed this
line of defense. Although Fleischman was only one member of the board,
Vinson noted that she took no action to get the board to direct Bryan to
produce the records, to transfer custody of the documents to someone
else, or to remove Bryan from office. As a member of the board, Vinson
said, Fleischman assumed an individual responsibility to act within the
limits of her power to bring about compliance with the order. Instead,
she had assumed no personal duty to do anything. To absolve her of
such a responsibility would effectively remove the organization "be-
yond the realm of legislative or judicial commands," he said.
Further, Vinson said that the burden of proof was on Fleischman to
show why she had failed to comply with the subpoena, instead of its
being the responsibility of the government to show why she had taken
so long to comply with the committee subpoena. This, Vinson said, was
equivalent to proving a "negative proposition." Vinson recognized in his
opinion that many people inside and outside of Congress were "vigor-
ously demanding" reforms in the practices and procedures of certain
committees and said that the Court's opinion should not be interpreted
as "expressing either approval or disapproval of those practices." The
remedy for reform, he said, "is certainly not to destroy the effective
operation of all committees" (365). As in the Bryan case, Douglas and
Clark did not participate, and Black and Frankfurter dissented. Black's
opinion was highly critical of the majority view. He said that the refusal
to comply could be punished only if the witness had the power to pro-
duce, and in this case the defendant did not have the power to produce
the records.
Those who were dismayed by the Court's treatment of domestic
subversives were even more distressed by the Court's decisions affect-
ing aliens and naturalized citizens. Vinson, like the majority of the Court,
was not inclined to support claims by aliens or naturalized citizens against
the government. Yet he wrote one of his most libertarian opinions sup-
porting the claim of a Japanese alien against the California Alien Land
Law, which forbade aliens ineligible for American citizenship to ac-
quire land.72 That act provided that any property bought by "ineligible
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aliens" in violation of the statute would revert to the state. The law also
contained a provision that property would revert to the state if transfers
of property were made with the intent to prevent or avoid forfeiture. In
1934 Kajira Oyama, an ineligible alien, bought several acres of agricul-
tural land in the name of his son Fred, a six-year-old American citizen.
In 1944 the state sought to gain control of the land on the grounds that
Oyama had conveyed the land to his son in violation of the statute.
In 1948 the Court, speaking through Vinson, upheld Oyama's claim.
This required some creativity on Vinson's part, because there were Su-
preme Court precedents upholding the California act and similar acts in
other states. To overcome the problem presented by precedents, Vinson
accepted the argument presented by Oyama's attorney, Dean Acheson,
later to become secretary of state, that the act was a discrimination against
Oyama's citizen son. Vinson said, "The State has discriminated against
Fred Oyama; the discrimination is based solely on his parents' country
of origin; and there is absent the compelling justification which would
be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature" (640). Typically,
Vinson chose not to examine the validity of the California statute, but he
said that assuming for the sake of argument that the law was constitu-
tional, "it [did] not follow that there [was] no constitutional limit to the
means which may be used to enforce it." He saw a conflict between two
rights. One was the right of the state to formulate landholding rights
within its jurisdiction and the right of American citizens to own prop-
erty anywhere in the United States. "When these two rights clash," Vinson
said, "the rights of a citizen may not be subordinated merely because of
his father's country of origin" (646-47).
Even though Oyama commanded a majority of six, the Court's four
most liberal justices wrote or joined in concurring opinions that went
further than Vinson's. Black, in an opinion joined by Douglas, and
Murphy, in an opinion joined by Rutledge, thought that the entire Cali-
fornia statute was unconstitutional. Reed, writing for himself and Bur-
ton, dissented. Jackson wrote a separate dissent, challenging the logic
of Vinson's opinion in setting aside the state's actions without invalidat-
ing the statute. He said, "If [the state's action] seems harsh as to the
Oyamas, it is only because it faithfully carries out a legislative policy,
the validity of which this Court does not question" (684).
Civil libertarians would have preferred that Vinson's majority opin-
ion had gone one more step and invalidated the California statute, but
even so they applauded the result. In upholding Oyama, Vinson had in-
validated the only effective means of enforcement available to the state.
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As a result of the ruling, the California attorney general immediately
gave up trying to enforce the act and canceled all actions already initi-
ated in pursuit of the act.73
In cases pertaining to aliens, Vinson's Oyama opinion was an aber-
ration. Although he did not write any other opinions regarding aliens
while he was on the Court, he joined the Court's majority to deny alien
rights in each case. Most of the other cases involved decisions about
entry or deportation, and in these matters aliens lacked the same consti-
tutional rights as natural-born citizens. The rights to which they were
entitled were a function of how far the Court was willing to go in inter-
preting constitutional protections and statutory law affecting their sta-
tus. In 1949 the Court made a highly controversial decision in United
States ex rel Knauff \. Shaughnessy.14 The Immigration Service had de-
nied Ellen Knauff, a German war bride, entry to the United States on the
ground that it would be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States."
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Minton, upheld the au-
thority of the Immigration Service to deny her entry without giving her
a hearing. The Immigration Service said it was following an administra-
tive regulation established by the attorney general that allowed aliens to
be excluded without a hearing. The authority for this regulation was a
congressional statute that permitted the president to issue "reasonable
rules, regulations and orders" governing the entrance of aliens during
periods of national emergency. Minton, in upholding the Immigration
Service, said that "whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." He added,
"We are dealing here with a matter of privilege. Petitioner has no vested
right of entry" (544). Minton was joined in his opinion by Vinson, Reed,
and Burton. They were convinced that the attorney general and immi-
gration officials were following the intent of Congress and that they
should not intervene even if the results were harsh. Jackson wrote a
strong dissent that Black and Frankfurter joined. Jackson said, "Con-
gress will have to use more explicit language than any yet cited before I
will agree that it has authorized an administrative official to break up
the family of an American citizen or force him to keep his wife by be-
coming an exile" (551-52). Frankfurter wrote a separate dissent in which
he charged that the majority had misconstrued congressional intent by
interpreting the War Brides Act too narrowly.
The year after the Knauff decision, the Court continued its narrow
construction of alien rights. In Carlson v. Landon,15 the Court ruled that
an alien could be committed to jail without bail while awaiting deporta-
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tion hearings simply because the attorney general alleged that he was a
Communist who, left at large, would pose a threat to national security.
Denying Carlson and his fellow defendants bail meant that they could
be incarcerated indefinitely, possibly for years, because deportation hear-
ings were notoriously lengthy proceedings. Critics of the Carlson opin-
ion were quick to point out the inconsistency between it and Stack v.
Boyle,16 an opinion announced only four months earlier. In Stack, Vinson,
speaking for a rare unanimous Court, had ruled that bail set at fifty thou-
sand dollars each for second-tier leaders of the Communist Party was a
violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive bail.
Vinson's opinion was short and succinct. He began by noting that the
only evidence offered by the government to justify such high bail was
the forfeiture of bail by four other Communists, unrelated to these de-
fendants, who had been convicted under the Smith Act. He also noted
that federal law "unequivocally" provided that in cases of a noncapital
offense a person "shall be admitted to bail." In a statement that for him
was unusually critical of the government, Vinson said, "The Govern-
ment asks the courts to depart from the norm by assuming, without prior
introduction of evidence, that each petitioner is a pawn in a conspiracy
and will, in obedience to a superior, flee the jurisdiction." He declared
this to be "an arbitrary act," stating that "such conduct would inject into
our own system of government the very principles of totalitarianism
which Congress was seeking to guard against in passing the statute un-
der which petitioners have been indicted" (5-6). In order to protect the
constitutional rights of each petitioner, Vinson said, evidence must be
presented to justify bail in excess of the amount usually set for serious
charges of crime.
Despite his views in Stack, Vinson voted with the Court's majority
in Carlson to deny bail in a noncriminal case to aliens subject to depor-
tation hearings. The main difference was that the Carlson defendants
were aliens. Reed, who wrote for the five-man Carlson majority, said
that aliens were "denizens of the country" and were not entitled to re-
lease on bail, that detention without bail was not an abuse of the attor-
ney general's discretion under the statute, and that the statute conferring
such discretionary power was not an invalid delegation of legislative
power. Reed made no effort to reconcile the Carlson opinion with Stack,
which he simply ignored. He concluded that the Eighth Amendment
against excessive bail was not applicable because "deportation is not a
criminal proceeding and has never been held to be a punishment."77 Black,
Douglas, Frankfurter, and even Burton each wrote vigorous dissents
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deploring the government's actions as violations of the Constitution or
statutory authority.
As harsh as the judgment of the Court was in Carlson, it was eclipsed
the following year by the Mezei case.78 Decided on March 16, 1953, it
was the last alien case in which Vinson participated.79 It epitomized the
Court's view of aliens during his term as chief justice. It upheld the
exclusion of Ignatz Mezei, an alien who had lived in the United States
for twenty-eight years and who left the country to visit his dying mother
in Romania, his homeland. Upon returning to the United States, he was
excluded as an alien entering the country for the first time "on the basis
of information of a confidential nature." Mezei was detained on Ellis
Island pending efforts by the Immigration Service to return him to some
suitable country, but no other country would accept him. After another
twenty-one months of detention on Ellis Island, he brought a habeas
corpus proceeding to obtain his release on bail. Clark wrote the opinion
of the Court denying Mezei the right to a hearing because his exclusion
was grounded on national security concerns. In effect the Court's ruling
condemned Mezei to a life on Ellis Island because he literally had no-
where else to go.
The majority opinion generated vehement dissents by Black, with
Douglas concurring, and Jackson, with Frankfurter concurring. Jackson
could hardly contain his indignation. His angry dissent chided the Court
for the harshness of its decision. To the government's claim that Mezei
was free to leave the United States for any country of his choice, Jack-
son said, "that might mean freedom if only he were an amphibian." He
concluded: "It is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice
and fair dealing would menace the security of this country. No one can
make me believe we are that far gone" (220, 228).
The judgment in Mezei seems especially harsh when compared to a
decision announced only one month before in a case with strikingly
similar circumstances. In Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding,m the Court af-
forded due process protection to another alien subjected to deportation
after he left the country by categorizing him as a "resident alien." Chew,
Chinese by birth, after living in the United States as a permanent resi-
dent, joined the Merchant Marine and left the country on an American
vessel. When his ship returned to the United States, he was denied entry
without a hearing. Unlike the unfortunate Mezei, Chew's petition to the
Court received a more favorable response. Burton, who proved to be the
most lenient of Truman's appointees toward the rights of aliens, wrote
the majority opinion. The only dissent was cast by Minton. The major-
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ity opinion held that as a "resident alien" Chew was entitled to Fifth
Amendment protections of due process. Granted, he could be deported
for security reasons, but not without a hearing. Mezei, classified as a
"returning alien," was not even entitled to a modicum of due process.
Mezei's sin appears to be that he spent his absence from the United
States "behind the Iron Curtain." The distinction between Mezei and
Kwong Hai Chew can only be understood in terms of Cold War hysteria.
As Kalven observed about Mezei, it belongs aside other cases "where
homely and trivial facts are seen by the justices, in their endless dia-
logue about freedom under the law, to embody large principles."81
Although the decisions about subversives took center stage while
Vinson was chief justice, the Court was confronted with other cases in
which it had to wrestle with sharply contrasting views about the limits
of free speech. Whereas national laws and practices were the objects of
constitutional challenges in cases dealing with subversives, most of the
other free speech cases dealt with challenges to local government regu-
lations to maintain public order and prevent unwarranted disruptions to
the community tranquility. Vinson's record in these cases was less clear-
cut than in those dealing with subversives. More often than not, he was
inclined to uphold the local government, but on occasion he supported
individual speech.
One means that local communities used to maintain order was ordi-
nances against the use of sound trucks to deliver a message. The first
such case to reach the Court after Vinson became chief justice was Saia
v. New York,*2 decided in 1948. It involved a Lockport, New York, ordi-
nance that prohibited the use of sound-amplification devices except with
the permission of the chief of police. Saia, a Jehovah's Witness minister,
gave sermons in a public park on designated Sundays using sound equip-
ment mounted on top of his car. He had obtained a permit, but the police
chief refused to renew it because there had been complaints about the
noise. Saia used his equipment without a permit, and for this he was
tried and convicted. In a five-to-four decision, which Vinson joined, the
Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as a prior restraint on free
speech because it prescribed no standards to be followed by the police
chief. Douglas spoke for the Court, and his opinion relied on a prece-
dent set in 1940 in Cantwell v. Connecticut.*3 In Cantwell the Court had
invalidated a Connecticut statute that prohibited door-to-door canvass-
ing for religious or philanthropic purposes without prior approval of a
county welfare official. Cantwell set the rule that although a state could
regulate such things as the time, places, and manner of soliciting contri-
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butions or holding meetings on its streets, it could not forbid them alto-
gether. Cantwell affirmed the "preferred position" for free speech and
established the principle that ordinances constituting prior restraint were
constitutionally impermissible.
From 1948 to 1953, the Court began to modify Cantwell, moving
away from the preferred position given to freedom of speech and giving
more leeway to public officials concerned about public order. Vinson's
own position about the validity of prior restraint laws fluctuated, de-
pending on how reasonable he thought the restrictions were. In the year
following Saia case, he voted with the majority to validate another local
ordinance regulating sound trucks. In Kovacs v. Cooper*4 the Court up-
held a Trenton, New Jersey, statute prohibiting all sound trucks or simi-
lar amplifying devices that emitted "loud and raucous" noises on public
streets. Even though eight of the justices agreed that sound amplifica-
tion in public places could be subject to reasonable regulation and that
prohibiting "loud and raucous" noises fell within reasonable bounds,
the multiplicity of opinions created some confusion.
Vinson's switch in position from Saia created a majority of five
justices who agreed to affirm the convictions in Kovacs, but there were
three separate opinions among the majority justices. Vinson and Burton
joined Reed, who spoke for the Court. He pronounced the Trenton ordi-
nance constitutional by giving it a narrow interpretation—that it prohib-
ited only "loud and raucous" sound trucks. He said "absolute prohibition"
of all sound amplification devices would probably be unconstitutional.
Both Frankfurter and Jackson indicated in separate opinions that sound
trucks could be absolutely prohibited. Douglas and Rutledge joined the
dissent by Black, arguing that the conviction should be overturned be-
cause no proof had been offered that the sound truck operated by Kovacs
was emitting "loud and raucous noises." Rutledge found the ordinance
to be an unconstitutional breach of the First Amendment, because he
thought an accurate interpretation was that it would have prohibited all
sound trucks. Murphy dissented but wrote no separate opinion.
An important difference between Saia and Kovacs that may explain
Vinson's change of heart is that Saia involved people who were espous-
ing religious views. The following term, Vinson wrote the majority opin-
ion in two cases that invalidated licensing schemes for religious groups.
Both opinions were decided on January 15, 1951, a time when the Court
was embroiled in the Dennis case and a host of other cases affecting the
rights of people labeled as subversive. Niemotko v. Maryland was a unani-
mous decision that reversed the convictions of two Jehovah's Witnesses
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who had been found guilty of disorderly conduct after attempting to
hold a peaceful religious meeting in a public park without obtaining a
permit.85 There was no ordinance regulating the use of the park, but by
"local custom" organizations wanting to hold a meeting there obtained
a permit from the park commissioner. The Jehovah's Witnesses were
denied a permit and appealed to the city council. The council rejected
their appeal after asking them questions about their refusal to salute the
flag and their views on the Bible. Vinson's opinion was short and suc-
cinct. The city's practices were a blatant denial of the rights of the plain-
tiffs. He noted that there was no ordinance or statute, just an "amorphous"
practice that vested authority in the parks commissioner and the city
council without any standards or limitations as to their decisions. This
made the local practice an unconstitutional "prior restraint" of free
speech. Vinson said it was inescapable that the plaintiffs were denied
use of the park because the city council did not like their views. He
declared, "The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of
those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or per-
sonal opinions of a local governing body" (272). Even though Frankfurter
concurred in the judgment, he indulged the Court with an unnecessarily
lengthy review of the Court's precedents regarding prior restraint, lead-
ing him to conclude the obvious—that free speech had to be balanced
against other interests. He also used his concurrence to distinguish
Niemotko from the other licensing case announced the same day, Kunz
v. New York.*6
Niemotko and Kunz were similar in that both dealt with licensing
permits for groups that wished to use public streets or parks to spread
their views. In Kunz. a Baptist minister had run afoul of a New York City
law that required a permit to hold religious meetings on city streets.
Kunz had received such a permit, only to have it revoked by the police
commissioner because he had ridiculed and denounced other religious
views in violation of a criminal provision of the ordinance under which
the permit was issued. Subsequent efforts to obtain a permit were de-
nied by the police commissioner, but Kunz continued to preach his gos-
pel on the city streets. For this he was arrested and fined ten dollars.
Vinson wrote the majority opinion, which was barely five pages. He
wasted no words in declaring the New York ordinance invalid as a prior
restraint on First Amendment freedoms. He said the ordinance lacked
"appropriate standards" to guide the police commissioner's discretion,
but he was careful to note that the Court's ruling was directed only at
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attempts to suppress speech and not the power to punish, leaving open
the question of what consequences the city could impose if the speech
actually provoked disorder.
Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that a carefully
drafted licensing system proscribing speech that would "outrage the re-
ligious sensibilities of others" might be valid, but only if the criteria for
denying a permit based on predictive violence were clearly delineated.
Even this, Frankfurter admitted, might convey too much discretion. Jack-
son filed the only dissent, a lengthy discourse on why communities should
be allowed to deny permits to those who used speech to malign other
religious believers. Unlike Vinson, Jackson included examples of Kunz's
epithets, such as: "The Catholic Church makes merchandise out of souls,"
"Catholicism is a religion of the devil," and the Pope is "the anti-Christ."
He also attacked Jews as "Christ-killers" and said, "All garbage that
didn't believe in Christ should have been burnt in incinerators" (296).
Jackson noted that these utterances had in fact provoked some vio-
lence, and therefore were "fighting words," which the Court had placed
beyond the protection of the First Amendment.87 The presence of many
Catholics and Jews on the streets of New York created a potential for
violence that the city had a right to try to avoid. Jackson also took a
swipe at the majority opinion for failing to mention the "clear and present
danger" test, which figured so prominently in the Douds case and, he
might have added, the Dennis case that the Court would soon announce.
Vinson's willingness to bar local communities from protecting their
streets from likely disorder does seem to be inconsistent with his will-
ingness to let the national government take extreme measures to protect
against subversive activities. The difference may be explained by his
experience in the administrative branch, where he had to be vigilant
about employees who might be subversives, as well as a sympathy for
Truman, who in 1951 was fending off charges of Wisconsin senator
Joseph McCarthy and other right-wingers of the Republican Party that
he was soft on Communism. Perhaps the turmoil caused by the Harry
Dexter White affair was still fresh in his memory.
Vinson reaffirmed his opposition to licensing schemes in his dissent
in Breard v. City of Alexandria,™ a case decided the same year as
Niemotko and Kunz. The Breard case is interesting because of the way
in which the justices aligned. A majority of six voted to uphold a city
ordinance in Alexandria, Louisiana, that prohibited door-to-door solici-
tation without prior consent of the householder. Breard, who solicited
subscriptions for a major magazine publisher, was convicted for violat-
Individual Rights in the Cold War Climate / 269
ing the act. Reed wrote the majority opinion holding that the ordinance
represented a reasonable balance between "the householder's desire for
privacy and the publisher's right to distribute publications [in the way
they] thought brought the best results." Reed argued that the city had
acted reasonably in promoting a public interest—the right of privacy of
those being solicited. He also rejected the argument that such ordinances
were prohibited by the First Amendment, which he said applied only to
the press or to "oral advocates," not to "solicitors for gadgets and brushes"
(644).
In dissent, Vinson found himself in rare company on free speech
issues. Both Vinson and Black wrote dissents, and each was joined by
Douglas. However, even though they were in agreement on invalidating
the law, Black and the chief justice were far apart in their reasoning.
Consistent with his philosophy of restraint, Vinson chose to avoid the
First Amendment issues and argued that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it constituted "an undue and discriminatory burden on
interstate commerce." He said only Congress had the power to regulate
interstate commerce, citing numerous precedents in which the Court
had invalidated state and local laws infringing on interstate commerce.
Black's dissent stood in sharp contrast to Vinson's. He used the opportu-
nity once again to advance his "preferred position" view about First
Amendment freedoms. He argued that the "constitutional sanctuary for
the press must necessarily include liberty to publish and circulate [and]
it must include freedom to solicit paying subscribers" (648).
As the Court contemplated the validity of local ordinances in cases
like Saia, Kovacs, Niemotko, Kunz, and Breard, it was dealing primarily
with issues of prior restraint. In these cases the Court had to work within
the context of precedents under which prior restraint was deemed sus-
pect because it constituted a form of censorship. A different set of issues
was raised by speech that was deemed to be a threat to public order after
that speech was uttered. In these cases, the questions were how and when
law enforcement officials could intervene to protect the public in cases
of a public disturbance and under what circumstances those whose speech
threatened public order could be punished. As in the cases of prior re-
straint, bitter conflicts resulted from the Court's doctrinal differences.
These differences were vividly reflected in Terminiello v. Chicago
(1949),89 especially in the sharp dissents by Vinson, Frankfurter, and
Reed.
Terminiello, a defrocked priest, delivered an anti-Semitic and ra-
cially inflammatory message to his adherents in a Chicago auditorium.
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His speech aroused his enemies outside the auditorium to violence. They
hurled stones through windows and tried to force open the doors. These
actions incited the people inside the auditorium, although they took no
physical action against those outside, whom Terminiello called "slimy
scum." Police were called and they were barely able to usher the speaker
and his party safely out of the building. Terminiello was tried and con-
victed for causing a breach of the peace. At the trial the judge had in-
structed the jury that a breach of the peace consists of any behavior that
"violates the public peace and decorum" and that such behavior consti-
tutes a breach of the peace if it "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance" (3). The
counsel for the defendant did not specifically object to the judge's in-
structions to the jury at the time, even though they altered the language
of the ordinance under which Terminiello was convicted.
In another five-to-four decision, the Court overturned Terminiello's
conviction. Douglas spoke for the majority, which included Black, Reed,
Murphy, and Rutledge. In an ironic twist, Douglas followed a restraint
position by avoiding the larger constitutional issue of whether
Terminiello's words were in fact protected by the First Amendment. He
declared the conviction void because the judge had improperly construed
the ordinance in his charge to the jury in such a way that the ordinance
as applied was too broadly restrictive of speech. The majority opinion
turned on the judge's instruction to the jury, even though the defense
attorney had never raised that issue at the trial nor in two subsequent
appeals in Illinois state courts. Neither had it been specifically raised in
the certiorari petition to the Supreme Court.
Vinson objected strongly to the majority opinion, because it
"discovered] in the record one sentence in the trial court's instructions
which permitted the jury to convict on an unconstitutional basis." He
pointed out that this "offending sentence" had gone completely unno-
ticed. In fact, he said, it was not part of the case "until this Court's inde-
pendent research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat confused
record." His pique with the majority clearly showing, Vinson said: "I
think it too plain an argument that a reversal on such a basis does not
accord with any principle governing review of state court decisions here-
tofore announced by this Court" (7). Vinson said that had the petitioner's
attorney raised the issue of jury instructions at the trial, he too would
have supported the majority's opinion. Like Douglas, Vinson failed to
address the question of whether a conviction by a properly instructed
jury could have been upheld, but his communications with the justices
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during deliberations suggest he probably would have voted to reverse
the conviction.
The Terminlello case caused Vinson a great deal of anguish, and he
remained ambivalent about his position until the end. At the conference
on February 5, 1949, he had indicated that he would have been inclined
to reverse if the issue of the judge's charge to the jury had been raised
earlier, but since it was not, he thought the case should be dismissed as
"improvidently granted."90 His reasons for thinking that the case should
not have been accepted were clarified in a memorandum Vinson intended
to be published with the opinion. It revealed how indecisive he was about
the case. He said he found himself in agreement with aspects of both the
majority opinion and the dissents. Specifically, Vinson said he agreed
that the judge's instructions to the jury regarding what constituted breach
of the peace had to be treated as if those words were actually written
into the ordinance. He believed that such language made the ordinance
as applied unconstitutional. The problem, however, was that the ques-
tion put before the Court was one it could not reach. Did Terminiello's
speech, based on the evidence in the record, constitute "fighting words"?
Vinson said that if the jury had found that the speech belonged in that
category, then the Court could properly review the jury's findings, but
he noted, "The jury made no such finding because no such question was
put to it." Given the record, Vinson said, the Court was left with only
one question to decide, which was whether the definition of breach of
the peace given to the jury was constitutionally valid. The majority opin-
ion rested on that basis.
As sympathetic as Vinson was to that position, he understood the
argument of the dissent, which was that the Court could not reverse the
conviction on the "constitutional infirmity" of the instructions to the
jury because that objection had not been raised in any of the lower courts
and because it was "specifically and unequivocally waived" before the
Supreme Court. This led Vinson to conclude that there was no question
that the Court could properly answer and that therefore the case should
be dismissed.91 In another memorandum Vinson clarified even further
what he found troubling about the majority's opinion in Terminiello.
Given his practical bent, he was concerned about the impact that the
decision would have on the state courts. He said that in order to avoid
being overruled, state appellate courts would have to examine for all
errors of application of criminal law in any case involving a constitu-
tional attack of any sort. He concluded, "Since I do not believe that this
is, or should be the law, I do not think that we may properly consider the
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infirmity of the instructions in this case."92 In the end his concern about
the burden placed on state courts led Vinson to write one of his few
dissenting opinions. Oddly, it is less eloquent and forceful than the ear-
lier memorandum he had written about the case.
Frankfurter's dissent, joined by Burton and Jackson, also forcefully
decried the Court's overturning of the conviction on a procedural flaw
that had never been raised by the defense or considered by any of the
state appellate courts. The most noteworthy opinion was the twenty-
five-page dissent written by Jackson. He took nine pages to recreate the
unruly nature of the mob outside the auditorium and to quote verbatim
the inflammatory remarks made by Terminiello. With the same passion
he showed in his dissent in the Kunz case, Jackson equated the behavior
of Terminiello and his enemies with a "world-wide and standing con-
flict between two organized groups of revolutionary fanatics" that had
imported to the United States "the strong-arm technique" developed in
the struggle that had devastated Europe. He conjured up images of Hitler's
Germany, fresh in his memory from the Nuremberg trials.93 Jackson
classified Terminiello's remarks as "fighting words," and he said the
majority opinion could endanger freedom of speech by destroying the
order necessary to maintain it. In one of his more memorable statements,
he wrote, "The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between
liberty with order and anarchy without either" (37). Jackson later penned
a bit of doggerel that summed up his view of the Court's opinions in
Terminiello:
If a special size street riot puts you flat on your back,
Be philosophical with Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, Reed, and Black;
As you lie there bashed and bleeding, with your muscles badly hurt'n
Say a little prayer for Vinson, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton.94
Douglas's majority opinion in Terminiello presented problems as
far as precedent was concerned. He was criticized for avoiding the con-
stitutional question of whether the speech of the defrocked priest
was constitutionally protected. Indeed, the Court was forced to revisit
the issue a year and a half later in Feiner v. New York.95 The facts in
Feiner were strikingly similar to Terminiello in that both involved pro-
vocative speech in a setting fraught with the potential for violence. Feiner
was a university student who used a loudspeaker on a Syracuse street
corner to publicize a meeting of the Young Progressives of America. He
called Truman and the mayors of Syracuse and New York City "bums"
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and said the "American Legion is a Nazi Gestapo." He also said that
"Negroes don't have equal rights; they should rise up in arms and fight
for their rights." About seventy-five people, both black and white, blocked
the sidewalk. Some jeered the speaker while others applauded. Police
officers trying to relieve traffic tied up by the crowd heard members of
the audience muttering angrily and saw "shoving" and "restlessness."
One member of the audience told the police officers, "If you don't get
that son of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself." At
that point the police told Feiner to stop speaking. He continued, and
after three attempts to get him to stop they arrested him.
In a six-to-three decision, the Court affirmed Feiner's conviction.
Vinson wrote the majority opinion. The libertarian tendency Vinson had
shown in Kunz and Niemotko did not carry over to Feiner. Whereas Vinson
may have had doubts about Terminiello's case, he had none about Feiner.
In conference he said that the police "need not wait until an explosion
took place," which is the same idea he incorporated into his Dennis
opinion later that term when he said that "government need not wait for
the putsch to occur." Vinson told his colleagues that it was a "simple
breach of the peace case." He said, "the speaker had a right to be pro-
tected but he overstepped."96
Kalven suggested that Feiner "can best be understood as a reaction
against Terminiello,"91 which left doubt about when communities were
justified in silencing speech to protect citizens against public disorder.
It can also be explained by the change in the court membership.
Terminiello was decided when Rutledge and Murphy were still on the
Court, but when Feiner was decided, the two libertarian justices had
been replaced by Clark and Minton. Clark voted with the chief justice,
giving him a majority of six. Minton, in a move highly unusual for him,
deserted his chief and joined Black and Douglas in dissent.
Vinson's opinion in Feiner rested on two main points. One was his
complete acceptance of the trial judge's conclusion that the police offic-
ers were justified in taking action to prevent a breach of the peace. The
other was that the police officers were motivated "solely by a proper
concern for preservation of order and protection of the general welfare"
and that there was no evidence to suggest that their actions were "a
cover for suppression of petitioner's views and opinions."98 Vinson ac-
knowledged that "ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile au-
dience" were not a justification for limiting speech and that there was
danger in giving "overzealous police" too much discretion to disband
lawful public meetings. However, he could not accept that police were
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powerless to prevent a breach of the peace when a speaker "passes the
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot"
(315).
Black and Douglas each wrote separate dissents. In an opinion brim-
ming with indignation, Black took exception to Vinson's reliance on the
trial judges' determination that the unruliness of the crowd justified the
police action in arresting Feiner. He asserted that the Court had the right
to examine the evidence "to determine whether federally protected rights
had been denied." To abandon that rule, Black said, would mark "a dark
day for civil liberties." He declared that the convictions made a "mock-
ery of the free speech guarantees" of the Constitution and that the Court's
opinion was a "long step toward a totalitarian authority" (323). Unlike
Vinson, who thought the police had an obligation to protect the public,
Black thought the police had a responsibility to protect the speaker in
the exercise of his constitutional rights. In an ironic twist, Black cited
the opinions in Kunz and Niemotko, both written by Vinson and handed
down the same day, where he said the Court "in obedience to past deci-
sions" provided a "theoretical safeguard for free speech" (329). What-
ever those cases had guaranteed, Black said, was taken away by Feiner.
Vinson's opinion in Feiner was criticized by the libertarian Court
scholars. The primary criticism was that the Court opinion permitted
the punishment of a public speaker simply because some members of
the audience were annoyed by the message and threatened violence.
Kalven said the Court had endorsed the "heckler's veto" by transferring
the power of censorship to the crowd. He called Feiner "one of the Court's
least satisfactory efforts—a decision which endorses conduct deeply
offensive to free speech values. The man who has his way and emerges
unscathed is the one who calls the defendant a 'son of a bitch' and threat-
ens to hit him."99 As Kalven noted, Feiner, in legitimating broad censor-
ship of street-corner speech, established precedents with which the Court
today still reckons. It clearly snuffed out the libertarian trend on the
Court that had been entertained in Terminiello, which was not mentioned
in the majority opinion or, surprisingly, in the dissent by Douglas, who
wrote that opinion.
Feiner, Niemotko, and Kunz provide an excellent prism to view the
Court's decision-making processes over the thorny issue of free speech
versus community order. Frankfurter voiced his concerns about the
Court's handling of the cases in several memorandums to Vinson. Al-
though he was in agreement with Vinson in all three opinions that the
chief justice authored, he once again felt compelled to justify his deci-
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sion to write separate opinions, a practice that was a constant bone of
contention between the two men. "You and I differ," he wrote, "in the
importance we attach generally to a Court opinion for an agreed result."
Frankfurter said that opinions not only resolved cases but also served as
"progenitors" of future cases. He added that the Court would not be in
the "mess" regarding "clear and present danger" if justices who had not
subscribed to the majority view had not acquiesced to the pressure for
unanimous decisions.100 He cited examples of previous cases where he
wished he had concurred instead of acquiescing. One is left to wonder
how having multiple opinions in free speech cases could have made the
"clear and present danger mess" any better. They do not seem to have
contributed much clarity to the rule of law in the various free speech
cases handed down in 1951, including Douds and Dennis.
One explanation for the "clear and present danger mess" is revealed
in the shifting positions among the justices on each case. From Novem-
ber 25, 1950, through January 13, 1951, Vinson recorded different sets
of votes for each case. At the outset of each case, there was a surprising
number of justices whose votes were "unreported." This indecision was
followed by some justices' shifting their positions, usually either to or
from concurrence. The behavior of the justices in these cases resembled
a story with which Vinson liked to delight Truman and his friends about
the Court. The story originated with a comment made by Desha
Breckinridge, Vinson's friend and newspaper publisher in Lexington,
Kentucky. A reporter who worked for Breckinridge went to him while a
local campaign was in process to get guidance in how to handle his
stories. Asked what position the publisher planned to take in the cam-
paign, Breckinridge replied that he had yet not made up his mind, but
when he did he was going to be "damned bitter." Vinson said that when
he became chief justice he told that story to members of the Court, and
he used it on several occasions when they were deliberating a decision.
Some justices, who were wavering about how to vote in a case, would
use the expression that they had not decided, but when they did they
would be "damned bitter."101
The numerous cases involving First Amendment freedoms that the
Court heard between 1946 and 1953 presented frequent opportunities
for the justices to become "damned bitter" with each other. Black and
Douglas, whose views on freedom of speech had been in the ascen-
dancy when Vinson became chief justice, were now in a minority, hav-
ing been overwhelmed by the four Truman justices plus Reed and
sometimes Frankfurter and Jackson. The latter often agreed with Vinson's
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disposition of a case but frequently felt the need to write separate opin-
ions. In cases where members of the Communist Party challenged dep-
rivation of their rights, Vinson always sided with the government. For
all the divisiveness that these cases caused on the Court, their influence
was short-lived. In the cases where individuals challenged state and lo-
cal laws, Vinson did not always side with the government, particularly if
the issue involved a licensing scheme administered with too much dis-
cretion for officials. Nonetheless, when street-corner speakers were get-
ting other citizens riled up with inflammatory messages, Vinson was
inclined to go with the judgment of the local officials that the threat of
violence was real. These opinions have had more lasting influence as
courts continue to wrestle with deciding where to draw the line between
the right of individuals to express views that are highly offensive to
others and the right of local governments to keep the peace in their com-
munities. The Court under Vinson found that arriving at agreement on
these issues was no easy matter. More than any other group of cases, the
Court's ruling in this area underscores Vinson's inability to forge con-
sistent and coherent Supreme Court majorities. Perhaps Frankfurter put
it best when he wrote to Vinson in 1947 strongly objecting the chief
justice's vote in a case. In the end, he said, "each man must tread the
wine-press of doubt alone."102
CHAPTER 10
The Dilemma of Due Process
and the Promise of Equality
Two of Fred Vinson's most notable traits as a justice, his commitment to
judicial restraint and his adherence to precedent, exerted a strong influ-
ence on how he responded to the thorny constitutional issues about the
requirements of due process and equal protection of the law. Although
both issues had important ramifications for state governments, each one
presented a different set of considerations. Vinson's role on the Court,
and in particular his leadership of the Court, varied in the two areas. In
Court debates about due process questions, Vinson was not the pivotal
player. The main battle was between the Court's most visible and vocal
protagonists, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter. Their strong views on
these issues cast a long shadow over the Court's decisions. Although
Vinson was almost always in the majority when the Court decided the
rights of the accused, he wrote only a few majority opinions in this area
and authored two notable dissents.
The extent of Vinson's role in the equal protection debate has gener-
ated a lengthy scholarly debate. Although he authored three of the Court's
most important decisions overturning discriminatory practices by state
governments, Court scholars are divided over whether he was a reluc-
tant soldier in the drive for equal rights or a cautious leader who took
significant steps that paved the way for the Court's landmark case on
equal rights, Brown v. Board of Education, which was finally decided
after his death.
There were a variety of issues about what exactly were the rights of
the accused under the Constitution. One of the most contentious due
process issues during Vinson's tenure as chief justice was how far to
extend Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
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and seizures. An equally divisive issue was the fundamental question of
which procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights were incorporated in
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and thus served to re-
strict the power of state governments as well as the power of the federal
government. Both of these vexing questions represented to Vinson the
necessity of balancing society's concern for order with the rights of the
individual. As in civil liberties cases, he usually sided with government
and opted for order. During Vinson's tenure as chief justice, the Court
began to deal with these issues in earnest in 1947.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring that before a search can be conducted,
law enforcement officials must usually secure a warrant, issued by a
judge, if there is sufficient evidence that the items sought are likely to be
found on the premises to be searched. Simple as the words sound, there
was no ready agreement among the justices about their application. Their
debates were shaped by two important developments that occurred prior
to Vinson's arrival on the Court. The earliest of these developments hap-
pened in 1914 in the case of Weeks v. United States,' when the Supreme
Court determined that evidence obtained without a search warrant was
not admissible in federal criminal trials. Weeks marked the birth of the
"exclusionary rule" for federal prosecutions. The second development
was the trend begun under Vinson's predecessor, Chief Justice Harlan
Stone, toward liberalizing the rules about search and seizure by impos-
ing strict standards on law enforcement practices. This process had ex-
posed some sharp doctrinal differences among the justices about the
application the Fourth Amendment. Thus, most justices already had es-
tablished views about these issues when Vinson arrived in 1946.
Frankfurter, in particular, considered himself to be the Court's lead-
ing scholar on Fourth Amendment issues. In questions involving federal
law enforcement practices, Frankfurter was adamant about strictly en-
forcing the exclusionary rule in federal cases. In 1947 his position clashed
sharply with Vinson's in the case of Harris v. United States,2 when the
Court overturned the established precedent that a search without a war-
rant incidental to arrest could extend only to objects in plain view of
the arresting officers. In Harris, FBI agents, in the course of carrying
out an arrest warrant for mail fraud, had conducted a five-hour search
of the defendant's four-room apartment. They expected to find evi-
dence of check-forging operations but instead found some classifica-
tion cards and registration cards for the Selective Service that were
unlawfully in Harris's possession. He was tried and convicted on the
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basis of this evidence. By a five-to-four majority, the Court upheld the
conviction.
Vinson wrote the majority opinion, which was supported by an un-
usual alignment of justices that included Black, Douglas, Reed, and
Burton. Drawing upon his interpretation of precedents and the meaning
of "reasonableness," Vinson gave wide latitude to law enforcement offi-
cials who conduct a search incident to an arrest but without a search
warrant. At the outset he noted that the Constitution prohibited "only
unreasonable searches and seizures" and that "the test of reasonable-
ness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms." Vinson derived this
position from his interpretation of the precedent set in Go-Bart Import-
ing Company v. United States (1931), which held that "each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances."3 In that case, however, the
evidence seized was in plain view of the arresting officers.
Vinson offered several other precedents to support his contention
that the law enforcement officers had acted "reasonably" in seizing the
evidence. First, he said that search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
was a long-established practice of both the United States and the states.
Moreover, he noted, earlier rulings had held that "under appropriate cir-
cumstances" searches incident to arrest could extend beyond the person
of the one arrested and could include the premises under his immediate
control. Vinson argued that the law enforcement officers had authority
to enter the dwelling to effect the arrest, and this entitled them to search
the premises for the canceled checks. The fact that these items could be
easily hidden in some secluded spot justified the lengthy and intensive
search. Although such a search was "reasonable" in these circumstances,
Vinson said it would not be reasonable in a search for a "stolen automo-
bile or an illegal still." He thought the law enforcement agents' search
had been conducted in "good faith" that they would find the evidence
they sought. When they found the stolen draft cards instead, they acted
within the law to seize them because their mere possession provided
evidence that a crime was thus being committed in their presence. Vinson
declared that no previous Court decisions would "support the sugges-
tion that under the circumstances the law-enforcement officials must
impotently stand aside and refrain from seizing such contraband mate-
rial." The premise that government officials should not be helpless to
respond to threats against order was a frequent theme in Vinson's opin-
ions and was featured prominently in the Dennis case and the steel sei-
zure case.
Although Vinson acknowledged that excesses of law-enforcement
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officials could endanger the fundamental personal rights, he argued that
the Court would always be "alert to protect against such abuses." He
concluded, however, that the Court should not permit the "knowledge
that abuses sometimes occur to give sinister coloration to procedures
which are basically reasonable."4
Frankfurter, Murphy, and Jackson all wrote vociferous dissents. An
early draft of Frankfurter's opinions alluded to the sharpness of the de-
bate that occurred in conference. "If during our discussion of this case I
spoke with too much vehemence and intensity," he said, "I apologize."5
In an opinion twice as long as Vinson's, Frankfurter roundly condemned
the tactics of the law enforcement agents and the majority opinion, which
he said posed "serious threats to basic liberties." In his pedantic style,
Frankfurter launched into a lengthy historical discourse on the Fourth
Amendment, beginning with the debate among the framers of the Con-
stitution and including a recitation of the Court's precedents. Frankfurter's
chief argument was that "searches are 'unreasonable' unless authorized
by a warrant, and a warrant hedged about by adequate safeguards."6
The dissents by Murphy and Jackson were equally forceful, although
Jackson thought the Court's previous opinions might have created enough
ambiguity that it was understandable that the law enforcement agents
felt justified in conducting their search. However, in the end Jackson
said that a search "with no practical limits on premises and for things
which no one describes in advance" would be "unreasonable" and the
kind of search the Constitution intended to prohibit.7
Among legal scholars the minority opinions in the Harris case were
viewed much more favorably than Vinson's majority opinion. Even his
strong supporters could provide only a qualified approval. Francis A.
Allen, a former Vinson law clerk who later became a professor of law at
Harvard, said it would be "difficult to resist the conclusion that the Har-
ris case makes serious inroads into the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment." Allowing an exception for a search without a warrant as
incident to arrest, Allen said, "virtually swallows the rule." He explained
that Vinson was averse to situations like Harris where "an obviously
guilty criminal" sought to overturn a conviction on "otherwise compe-
tent evidence" because it was illegally seized. He noted that Vinson re-
jected all such claims based on the Fourth Amendment. This included
eleven cases involving federal law enforcement agents and three cases
involving state prosecutions.8 Ironically, on the circuit court of appeals,
Vinson had written one of his strongest defenses of individual rights in
a case involving unreasonable searches and seizures. In that case Vinson
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said "the public interest did not call for the rough and speedy conduct of
officers tracking down a felon."9
James J. Bolner, whose doctoral dissertation analyzed Vinson's opin-
ions in depth, called Harris "perhaps the most bizarre opinion ever handed
down in a search and seizure case."10 In his comprehensive analysis of
the Vinson Court, Herman Pritchett identified the extent of the protec-
tions afforded by the Fourth Amendment as the primary problem facing
the Court in the area of criminal prosecutions. Before Vinson's arrival
on the Court, the law regarding searches and seizures was fairly clear.
Harris changed all of that. "It got the Court into the most trouble in this
field," Pritchett said.11
The very next year, the Court changed course again. So tenuous was
the majority in the Harris case that at the first opportunity to do so,
Douglas deserted to the other side. His shift in position in a trilogy of
cases created a new, but short-lived, majority that reasserted some re-
strictions on searches and seizures incidental to arrest. In Di Re v. United
States,12 the Court ruled that a search of a companion of a suspect val-
idly arrested for a federal offense was "unauthorized and exploratory"
and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In that case only
Black and Vinson dissented, but neither wrote an opinion. In a five-to-
four decision a month later, the Court ruled that if law enforcement agents
had adequate opportunity prior to an arrest to obtain a search warrant
and failed to do so, the arrest, search, and seizure would be unreason-
able. The slim majority in that case, Johnson v. United States,u con-
sisted of Jackson, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. This
same majority prevailed in the third case, Trupiano v. United States,14
leaving Vinson in the position of having to write his first dissenting opin-
ion as chief justice.
In Trupiano, police officers had known for at least three weeks that
a building on a farm was being used for illicit distilling. They made a
nighttime raid on the distillery without a warrant for arrest or a search
warrant. An agent, seeing one of the petitioners in the case engaged in
illicit distilling through an open door, entered the premises, arrested the
petitioner, and seized the equipment. Justice Murphy, one of the Court's
two most ardent libertarians, wrote the majority opinion. Even though
the Court determined that the arrest itself was lawful, it held that the
search was not justified because the agents had had "more than adequate
opportunity" (703) to obtain search warrants before the raid occurred.
Furthermore, Murphy maintained that the proximity of the contraband
property to the person of the petitioner at the moment of his arrest was a
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"fortuitous circumstance which was inadequate to legalize the seizure"
(707). He explained that if the defendant had been outside the building
and arrested in the farmyard, the government's argument supporting
seizure would collapse.
The majority opinion carefully avoided overruling Harris. That case,
Murphy argued, dealt with evidence the law enforcement officials did
not know in advance they would find. Even with this qualification, the
majority's argument was too extreme for Vinson. Unlike the two other
search and seizure cases in which he dissented, Vinson felt compelled to
write a dissenting opinion in Trupiano. His frustration with the majority
rested on his strong conviction that Court precedents clearly supported a
search incident to a lawful arrest. He argued that there was no doubt that
the petitioners "were in flagrant violation of the laws" and that the pos-
session of the materials seized constituted a crime and thus "were the
type subject to a lawful procedure." Clearly, Vinson's sympathies were
on the side of order. He said that insisting on a search warrant where the
issuance of such would contribute nothing to the preservation of rights
under the Fourth Amendment would only serve "to open an avenue of
escape for those guilty of crime and to menace the effective operation of
government which is an essential precondition to the existence of all
civil liberties" (715).
Vinson objected strongly to the majority's position that the
petitioner's presence in the building where the contraband materials were
located was a "fortuitous circumstance" and not adequate to legalize the
seizure. To this, Vinson quipped: "Criminals do not normally choose to
engage in felonious enterprises before an audience of police officials."
Perhaps influenced by his own experiences as a prosecutor, Vinson was
concerned about the practical implications of the ruling. He said the
Court in effect had conditioned the right of seizure incident to a valid
arrest "upon an ex post facto judicial judgment of whether the arresting
officers might have obtained a search warrant." He predicted that the
rule enunciated by the Court could be "expected to confound confusion
in a field already replete with complexities" (715-16).
Vinson's prediction was prophetic. Two years later, in 1950, the Court
added to the confusion. In United States v. Rabinowitz,15 the Court re-
turned to the Harris principle of allowing warrantless searches incident
to arrest and specifically overturned Trupiano by upholding the search
even though law enforcement agents had time to secure a warrant in
advance. Vinson was again in the majority, but the change in the Court's
position resulted not from his own leadership but from the untimely
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Vinson at the funeral of Justice Frank Murphy on July 22,1949, at Harbor Beach, Michi-
gan. On Vinson's left are justices Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Wiley B. Rutledge.
(Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
deaths of Justices Rutledge and Murphy in 1949 and their replacement
with Tom Clark and Sherman Minton. The Rabinowitz majority con-
sisted of the four Truman appointees plus Stanley Reed. Vinson assigned
the majority opinion to Minton, who was in his first term on the Court
and who became Vinson's most loyal ally there. Even Black, who had
strongly objected to the Trupiano ruling, wrote a dissenting opinion in
the Rabinowitz case, but he did so mainly on the grounds that it would
add "new confusions 'in a field already replete with complexities'" (68),
ironically citing words from Vinson's Trupiano dissent.
Rabinowitz signaled a new hard-line approach to search and seizure
issues as well as other criminal procedure issues that prevailed through-
out Vinson's term as chief justice. As Pritchett observed, the net effect
of the search and seizure rulings under Vinson's tenure was "unques-
tionably to give federal law enforcement lawyers greater leeway in mak-
ing searches without warrants and to leave reviewing courts with rather
vague notions as to the grounds on which searches might be declared
unreasonable."16 The uncertainty of the law in the field of searches and
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seizures, which could not have pleased the practical-minded Vinson,
was a product of the divided Court that he inherited as well as his own
inability to provide leadership to a Court where many of the members
considered him to be their intellectual inferior.
The Court's erratic efforts to determine the extent of protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in federal cases were matched in
full measure when it came to cases pertaining to state prosecutions. The
Weeks ruling had established that the exclusionary rule applied only to
federal trials. The issue of what was required in criminal prosecutions in
state courts was part of a contentious debate on the Court extending
back to the case of Palko v. Connecticut (1937).17 That case centered on
the fundamental question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause incorporated procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights
that protected individual rights in criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions. In the decade before the Palko case, the Supreme Court had deter-
mined that key provisions of the First Amendment, such as freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, were absorbed into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 As a result of such rulings, states
were not allowed to interfere with these fundamental freedoms.
Palko raised a different question—whether a state was barred by the
Fifth Amendment prohibition from subjecting a defendant to double jeop-
ardy. Although in 1897 the Supreme Court had held that the just com-
pensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the
states, none of the criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights
had been deemed to have similar status. In the Palko case the Supreme
Court refused to incorporate other procedural rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this landmark ruling, written by Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, the Supreme Court held that only those rights considered es-
sential to "a scheme of ordered liberty" were absorbed into the Four-
teenth Amendment.19 Procedural protections like double jeopardy were
not deemed essential and thus did not restrict the states in the same way
that they limited federal power.
Justice Black had just joined the Court when Palko was decided,
and although he voted with the majority, he had lingering doubts about
the soundness of making such distinctions among the rights guaranteed
in the first eight amendments. Black's concerns slowly led him to de-
velop his doctrine of "total incorporation," which emerged full-blown
in the case of A damson v. California (1948).20 That case raised the ques-
tion of whether defendants in state court proceedings were entitled to
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The debate
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in the Adamson case, decided in Vinson's first year as chief justice, ex-
posed the sharp fissures on the Court about the nationalization of the
Bill of Rights for criminal defendants. This was one of the most impor-
tant constitutional issues the Court would debate during Vinson's ten-
ure, but the chief justice himself was not in the forefront of the battle.
The intensity of the debate no doubt served as a clear signal to Vinson of
the monumental hurdles he would have to leap if he was to bring some
harmony to the bench. At the same time, the nature of the debate be-
tween Black and Frankfurter must have made him aware that his leader-
ship on the Court would have to rest on something other than intellectual
prowess and that the issue of incorporation was not an area where he
was likely to have much impact.
In the Adamson case, Black argued passionately that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended for all of the first eight amend-
ments to be incorporated into the due process clause. He convinced three
other justices of his point of view—Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy.
Although Reed wrote for the majority, which included Vinson, it was
Frankfurter's concurring opinion that provided the strongest counter-
point to Black's view. He rejected the rigidity of Black's position and
argued that although judges were bound to ascertain "whether the criminal
proceedings which resulted in conviction deprived the accused of due
process of law, they were not required to define due process according
to any specific provision of the first eight amendments." Judges, Frank-
furter said, should judge criminal proceedings by whether they offended
the accepted "canons of decency and fairness." To curb the "idiosyncra-
sies of personal judgment," Frankfurter argued that judges must show
deference to the state court under review (67).
Even though they were at odds over many other matters, Vinson
was in strong consensus with Frankfurter's philosophy regarding proce-
dural rights, which remained the dominant view throughout Vinson's
tenure on the Court. Not only was that position in keeping with prece-
dent, but he also found common agreement in Frankfurter's fair-trial
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like Frankfurter, Vinson
was uncomfortable with rigid positions such as Black's total incorpora-
tion theory. It was this aversion to doctrinaire views that got him into
trouble in the Dennis case when he declared that "there were no abso-
lutes." Under fair-trial j urisprudence, j udges sought to determine whether
a defendant had been accorded fundamental fairness based on the record
of the trial. As David Bodenhamer observed, "the fair-trial test meant
that the Court would decide case by case which rights of the accused
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enjoyed constitutional protection."21 A ruling would be based not on
one specific aspect of the proceedings but on the whole record of the
case. The notion that each case was unique and would be decided on its
own merits was consistent with Vinson's more pragmatic and
nonideological approach to decision making.
"It soon became clear," Melvin Urofsky noted, "that Adamson had
not resolved the issue but was merely the opening scene of what would
be an ongoing debate within the Court."22 A notable example was the
case of Wolfv. Colorado (1949).,23 In that case the Court visited the issue
of whether the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures was incorporated under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court majority concluded that the Fourth
Amendment was not specifically incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, but by applying the fair-trial test, it ruled unanimously
that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free
society" (28). Thus the core principle of the Fourth Amendment, forbid-
ding warrantless searches, was made applicable to the states. However,
on the question of whether this meant that evidence seized without a
warrant must be excluded from the state court trial, the Court ruled six
to three that it did not. Oddly, the opinion protected a right but denied a
remedy, which is tantamount to not having the right at all. Frankfurter,
writing for the majority of six, including Vinson, argued that the Fourth
Amendment did not require the exclusion of evidence in state trials. He
reached this conclusion based on the fact that at the time thirty states did
not apply the Weeks rule, and consequently the failure to apply it was
not sufficiently arbitrary or unfair to require states to comply. Other
remedies besides exclusion could be used to overturn evidence obtained
in a warrantless search. The Wb//precedent of not extending the exclu-
sionary rule to states stood until 1961, when it was overturned in the
case of Mapp v. Ohio.21'
The application of the fair-trial concept did not always result in a
ruling favorable to the state. A case in point was the unanimous ruling in
Rochin v. California (1952).25 The defendant in the case had been con-
victed on the basis of two capsules of morphine that doctors had forc-
ibly pumped from his stomach against his will at the direction of law
enforcement agents. The Court overturned Rochin's conviction on the
grounds that the stomach-pumping method violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In conference almost all the jus-
tices expressed dismay at the manner in which the evidence had been
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obtained. Vinson called it a "shocking case," although he said that the
rule of confessions was not applicable because the capsules were seen
and known. Others were more colorful in their language. Both Reed and
Frankfurter said that the case made them "puke."26
Vinson acquiesced to Frankfurter's eagerness to write the opinion
so that he could show how the due process clause could be used to rein
in abusive practices by the state without having to acknowledge that the
clause was a "handbag for the eight original amendments."27 Frankfurter
wrote that the use of stomach pumping without the consent of the ac-
cused "shocks the conscience" and constituted "methods too close to
the rack and screw to permit constitutional differentiation."28 He was
careful not to abandon the Court's stand on incorporation. Black and
Douglas wrote concurring opinions in which they argued that the basis
for overturning the decision should have been the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination. Their view that the Fifth Amendment
was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevail until
1964, more than a decade after Vinson's death. Until that time the Court
muddled along with fair-trial jurisprudence, leaving wide latitude to the
states in their law enforcement practices and trial proceedings.
Consistent with his philosophy of restraint, Vinson's record on is-
sues pertaining to rights of the accused was decidedly progovernment,
whether it was a matter of federal or state procedures. When Vinson
became chief justice, defendants in federal cases were guaranteed the
right to have an attorney through the Sixth Amendment even if they
could not afford one. At the state level, however, the Court had extended
that guarantee only to capital offenses.29 Beyond that, whether a defen-
dant who could not afford an attorney was guaranteed the right to coun-
sel depended on the circumstances. In 1942 the Court had ruled in Betts
v. Brady that the right to counsel was not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment absent any proof that some special injustice had been done.30
Betts meant that the Court would have to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether denial of counsel resulted in an unfair trial.
The Court ruled in twelve right-to-counsel cases while Vinson was
chief justice. In six of those cases, the Court determined that absence of
counsel had not denied the defendant a fair trial.31 Vinson voted with the
majority in each of these. The first five of those cases were decided
before the deaths of Rutledge and Murphy, who along with Black and
Douglas vehemently objected to the majority rulings. For example, in
Bute v. Illinois (1948), the Court upheld the denial of counsel in a trial in
which the defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with
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children. Given the strong emotions such a crime was likely to produce,
the four usual dissenters thought that a skilled lawyer was essential to a
fair trial. The majority did not see it that way. By 1950, when the Court
ruled in Quicksall v. Michigan that counsel was not constitutionally re-
quired where there was no fundamental unfairness, Black and Douglas
were the only dissenters in cases where lack of counsel was condoned.
When the Court reversed convictions on the grounds that the defen-
dant had been denied right to counsel, Vinson was usually in agreement
with the dissenters. An example is Townsend v. Burke (1948),32 where
the Court overturned a conviction because the defendant had been sen-
tenced on the basis of false assumptions conveyed to the jury by the
judge. In Townsend, Vinson joined in dissent. He also dissented in a
Pennsylvania case, Palmer v. Ashe (1951),33 when the Court overturned
the conviction of a defendant with diminished mental capacity. The Court
held that the absence of counsel had prevented the defendant's plea of
guilty from being an "understanding" one. Vinson joined the unanimous
Court in Gibbs v. Burke (1949) in overturning a conviction where inad-
missible hearsay and otherwise incompetent evidence had been presented
at the trial without objection from the defendant, who was acting as his
own counsel.34 Although the Court was unanimous in overturning that
case, Black and Douglas wanted the Court to go further and overturn
Belts. It was not until Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963 that the Black-
Douglas view that indigent defendants in state courts were entitled to
counsel in all felony cases prevailed.35
Vinson's position on the right to counsel was mirrored in his record
on issues of coerced confessions. He usually voted with the minority
when confessions were invalidated on the basis that the methods used to
obtain them violated standards of due process. For example, he dissented
in Haley v. Ohio (1948) when the Court overturned the murder convic-
tion of a fifteen-year-old African American who had been questioned by
police for five hours without an attorney or any other adult present.36 For
three days he was held incommunicado, and a lawyer was denied access
to him. The majority opinion, written by Black, determined that the
defendant's treatment constituted "a disregard of the standards of de-
cency." Vinson, along with Reed and Jackson, joined the dissent written
by Burton. The same four justices dissented in Upshaw v. United States
when a majority of the Court ruled that a confession obtained after the
accused had been detained for thirty hours solely because the police
lacked sufficient evidence to charge him was inadmissible.37 The quar-
tet of Vinson, Reed, Burton, and Jackson dissented again in three cases
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in 1949 when the Court ruled that confessions obtained through intense
psychological pressure violated due process.38
To classify Vinson as a strict law-and-order judge based on his posi-
tions on right to counsel and coerced confessions is justified. However,
in some respects his record actually affords a more complex view. His
position on cases involving habeas corpus proceedings from state courts
indicates that he was not indifferent when claims of denial of due pro-
cess reached the court. Petitions for habeas corpus are requests from
convicted defendants who believe that they were deprived of rights in
the course of their trial and that therefore they are being unlawfully
detained. Such petitions are usually filed by indigent defendants through
in forma pauperis applications. The Supreme Court had a long-standing
rule that all appropriate state remedies must be exhausted before prison-
ers could appeal their convictions with a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court or a petition of habeas corpus to a federal district court.
Such petitions were becoming particularly burdensome to the Supreme
Court when Vinson became chief justice. How and when to dispose of
these petitions presented thorny issues for the Court, and especially for
Vinson, who as chief justice had the responsibility for overseeing the
fair and uniform disposition of appeals.
The state of Illinois was by far the chief offender in failing to pro-
vide adequate postconviction appeals, as evidenced by the fact that in
the 1946 term nearly half of the petitions for postconviction review origi-
nated from that state. So troublesome was this flood of petitions from
Illinois that Rutledge, in a 1947 case,39 complained that the state's pro-
cedures were so complex that they worked against the defendants, who
frequently were told that they had pursued the wrong remedy and thus
denied a hearing of their claims.
A 1949 case, Young v. Ragen,40 gave Vinson the opportunity to ad-
dress this recurring problem with Illinois courts. The petitioner in the
case, who had been convicted and sentenced to prison in an Illinois cir-
cuit court, petitioned that same court for habeas corpus, claiming denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. His petition was de-
nied by the circuit court without a hearing on the ground that it was
"insufficient in law and substance." In the Supreme Court review of the
case, the attorney general representing Illinois acknowledged that al-
though the petition raised substantial federal questions, habeas corpus
was not a proper remedy under state law at the time that the petition was
denied. He also acknowledged that subsequent rulings of the Illinois
Supreme Court indicated that habeas corpus would now be an appropri-
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ate procedure in the case under review, but he maintained that the deci-
sions regarding procedures were solely a question of Illinois law and
did not warrant intervention by the Supreme Court.
Vinson, speaking for a unanimous court, said, "It is not simply a
question of state procedure when a state court of last resort closes the
door to any consideration of a claim of denial of a federal right. . . .
Unless habeas corpus is available we are led to believe that Illinois of-
fers no post-trial remedy in cases of this kind" (238). Vinson acknowl-
edged the difficulties that the Illinois Supreme Court faced in adapting
state procedures to requirements for adequate postconviction review when
prisoners raised claims of denial of federal rights, but he forcefully as-
serted, "That requirement must be met." He warned that if the state lacked
such a posttrial procedure, "we wish to be advised of that fact upon
remand of the case" (239).
The problems of adequate postconviction procedures troubled
Vinson, and he spoke of this concern in an address before the American
Bar Association in September of 1949. He emphasized that "the right of
a prisoner who claims the denial of a federally protected right to petition
is an extremely important one." At the same time, Vinson said he was
concerned about the large volume of these petitions, averaging more
than six hundred a year. Vinson said that ninety-six out of every one
hundred had little or no legal merit and that something should be done
"to stem the flow."
Despite his obvious frustration with the number of these cases, Vinson
said, "I firmly believe, despite the burden, that the right to petition the
Supreme Court should remain and should not be made more difficult."41
Instead, Vinson said, the solution lay in the post-conviction remedies
adopted by the states. If states would provide a well-defined method by
which prisoners could challenge their convictions in open hearings, most
of the cases could be disposed of at the state level. Vinson noted that the
problem of appropriate postconviction remedies had been most acute in
Illinois, but he expressed optimism that a newly adopted state statute
providing a definite, comprehensive posttrial remedy would result in a
marked decline in the number of petitions from that state.
His optimism proved to be unfounded. Within the next two years,
twenty-five cases under the new act had come to the Supreme Court. In
1951 Vinson again addressed the problem in the case of Jennings v.
Illinois,42 one of a trio of cases pertaining to posttrial petitions from the
state of Illinois. The petitioner in the case had filed a  petition in the
court in which he had been convicted alleging a violation of his rights
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under the U.S. Constitution through the admission of a coerced confes-
sion. The circuit court dismissed the petition without a hearing or any
other means of determining the factual issues presented. The state su-
preme court, without argument and without opinion, dismissed the case
through a form order, stating merely that it had examined the record and
found no violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Vinson's opinion reflected his impatience with the Illinois system,
which in effect deprived indigent defendants of any appropriate remedy
for determining their claims that their federal rights had been infringed.
"Petitioners are entitled to their day in court for resolution," he said.
One matter of concern to Vinson in the Jennings case was that the
petitioner's right of appeal under Illinois law was contingent on paying
for transcripts, which, as an indigent, he was unable to do. Vinson con-
cluded that this amounted to no appeal at all. Vinson's sensitivity to the
plight of indigent defendants was not a passing one. He was the honor-
ary president of the National Association of Legal Aid Organizations,
and he told that group in 1947 that it was "the only organization with
which I am similarly connected other than as required by law by reasons
of my office as Chief Justice."43 Vinson had also emphasized the impor-
tance of in forma pauperis applications in 1949 in his address to the
American Bar Association when he noted that "most of the cases in
which the Court has spelled out the requirements of a fair trial under the
due process clause of the Constitution have come as in forma pauperis
petitions."44
The Jennings case was remanded to the Illinois Supreme Court so
that it could be "permitted to provide definite answers to the questions
raised by these cases." If the state court could resolve it through an in-
quiry into the truth of the allegations or a finding that the defendant had
waived his rights, then there would be no further intervention by the
federal bench. However, if Illinois failed to provide an appropriate rem-
edy for determining these questions, Vinson said the petitioners could
file petitions of habeas corpus with the U.S. district court.
In the Young case in 1949, Vinson had been able to gain unanimous
support for his opinion, but in Jennings he could not do so. Both Frank-
furter and Minton, the two justices who were most deferential to state
courts, dissented. Frankfurter used the opportunity to find fault with the
Court's majority for failing to make clear exactly what issues it expected
the Illinois court to address. He thought the Supreme Court had failed to
clarify what was the substantial federal question before it, because that
issue, he said, had never been properly presented to the Court in the
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petition. Vinson's failure to gain the support of Minton, his most faithful
ally on the Court, suggests that the chief justice, although he highly
valued unanimity on the Court, was not inclined to use his powers of
persuasion as chief justice, even among his friends, to achieve unity. As
a result the matter of posttrial procedures continued to be a source of
confusion for the Court, although it should be noted that the state of
Illinois did develop a much more effective set of procedures for
postconviction review.
On occasion Vinson could be very passionate about protecting the
rights of defendants. He demonstrated this in a forceful dissent in the
case of Brock v. North Carolina (1953) during his final year on the Court.45
In this case the defendant claimed that he had been denied his protection
against double jeopardy when the trial judge declared a mistrial at the
request of the prosecution. In the first trial, two accomplices, who had
been separately convicted, refused to testify on the grounds that they
might incriminate themselves with respect to their pending appeals. The
trial judge, on a motion of the state, withdrew a juror from the panel and
declared a mistrial. After the accomplices' convictions were affirmed,
their testimony was admitted in the second trial, at which the defendant
was convicted.
The issue before the court was whether the second trial for the same
offense violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In conference, only Vinson and Black voted to reverse, and only Vinson
is recorded as having spoken about the issue. He said it was shocking
"to say you can try a man, put on all this evidence, and then for the sole
reason that there may be a chance of getting better evidence get a mis-
trial and try him again."46 Minton, ever sensitive to the prerogatives of
the states, wrote the majority opinion affirming the conviction. He re-
lied on previous decisions favoring the discretion of the trial judge to
declare a mistrial and to require a new panel to try the defendant "if the
ends of justice" would be served. Minton was a strong adherent of the
fair-trial concept and argued that no hard and fast rule could be laid
down to determine what constituted due process. Instead, he said, "the
pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and circumstances of
each case."47
The chief shortcoming of the fair-trial concept is that the subjectiv-
ity of the individual justices can result in uncertainty about the law.
Vinson's lengthy dissent in Brock illustrates how individual justices can
reach opposite conclusions. In Vinson's view, allowing the second trial
was contrary to due process. He wrote that "orderly justice could not be
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secured if the rules allowed the defendant to ask for a mistrial at the
conclusion of testimony because the state had done well and the defense
had done poorly. The same limitation applies to the prosecution if the
scales of justice are to be kept in equal balance" (432). In the remainder
of the dissent, Vinson provided one of his most well-written and well-
reasoned opinions. A thorough review of existing practices in other states
revealed that North Carolina was the only state that did not allow a plea
of double jeopardy and that even in that state earlier court rulings had
held it to be an essential right. He rejected the idea put forth by North
Carolina that the state's practice fell within the Palko guidelines. In that
case, Vinson said, the state had asked for a second trial to obtain a trial
free from error by the court prejudicial to the state. Here, the state asked
for its second trial in order to "suit the convenience of the Solicitor" to
strengthen the state's case, when the defendant had done nothing to bring
about trial errors (438).
Having distinguished the Brock case from Palko, Vinson went on to
argue that some of the language in the Palko opinion actually supported
his position. He quoted from Cardozo's opinion that the Court was not
asked in Palko to consider the question of whether the state would be
permitted to appeal a trial that was free from error. Vinson could not
resist an opportunity to tweak Frankfurter, who had written a concur-
ring opinion siding with the majority. He noted that in his concurring
opinion, Frankfurter had acknowledged that a state would fail to pro-
vide due process if it prevented a trial from proceeding to a termination
that would favor the accused merely to allow a prosecutor who has been
incompetent or ineffective to see if he could do better a second time.
In Vinson's final year on the Court, the justices heard three cases
pertaining to racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. Up to that
point the Court had a fairly consistent record of overturning convictions
if systematic discrimination in the jury selection could be proven. Most
of these decisions were unanimous. In the 1952 term, however, the Court's
consensus broke down. In two cases from North Carolina, the Court
upheld the convictions by a six-to-three majority despite evidence of
discrimination injury selection. In one case the Court upheld the valid-
ity of selecting a jury panel from a list of payers of county property and
poll taxes.48 In a companion case the Court upheld the validity of draw-
ing jurors from a list of taxpayers who had the "most property."49 In
both cases the jury selection process had resulted in a disproportionate
number of whites on the jury. The Court dismissed the fact that in the
second case the cards with the names of blacks were marked with a dot
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because a child of five had drawn the names, and all persons on the list,
including blacks, had been called.
Vinson voted with the six-man majority to uphold the state proce-
dures in both of the above cases, but in a third case involving racially
biased jury selection he voted to overturn the conviction, and a unani-
mous majority of the Court agreed. In the case of Avery v. Georgia,50 a
defendant, who had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death,
objected to the jury selection for two reasons. One was that the jury
panel contained no blacks, and the other was that the cards from which
the names were drawn were different colors for each race. The judge
in the case had drawn the names of potential jurors from both races
and had turned the cards over to the court clerk to "arrange" the tickets
and type up the list for jury selection. The state supreme court had
found a prima facie case of discrimination because the panel of jurors
contained no blacks, but it affirmed the conviction after concluding
that the defendant had not presented evidence of any particular act of
discrimination by any particular state official. The state court's position
was that the burden fell on the defendant to prove a specific act of dis-
crimination.
Vinson did not agree. It was up to the state to provide sufficient
evidence "to dispel the prima facie case of discrimination." Vinson said
the practice of using different-colored tickets for members of each race
in the jury pool made it easier for "those who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate" to do so. Vinson found support in a 1942 precedent that those
responsible for jury selection had a constitutional duty to follow proce-
dures that did not discriminate in the selection of jurors. He said: "If
they fail in that duty, then this conviction must be reversed—no matter
how strong the evidence of the petitioner's guilt. That is the law estab-
lished by decisions of this Court spanning more than seventy years of
interpretation of the meaning of 'equal protection'" (561).
The cases that raised questions about the constitutionality of dis-
crimination injury selection were distinct from the other issues of fair
trials because they were brought to the Court under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the due process clause.
The Court's efforts to wrestle with the meaning of equal protection were
most prominent in Vinson's final year on the Court. He clearly made a
more significant contribution to that debate than to the deliberations
about due process. Although he authored three of the Court's main civil
rights decisions, scholars of the Court remain divided about how much
credit the chief justice deserves for moving the court in the direction of
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overturning the separate-but-equal doctrine established in Plessy v.
Ferguson in 1896.51
A careful reading of multiple commentaries about the extensive court
deliberations of segregation cases leading up to the Brown v. Board of
Education decision in 1954 indicates that Vinson deserves more credit
for laying the groundwork to overturn the separate-but-equal doctrine
than his most ardent critics give him. However, there is no doubt that he
moved cautiously and, for some, too slowly in his considerations about
whether and how the Court should proceed to overturn a practice strongly
embedded in the fabric of society and sanctioned by the Court for fifty
years. Although his sense of fairness led him to believe segregation was
wrong, his pragmatism led him to consider the consequences for the
Court and the country of moving too quickly.
Just as in other issues deliberated by the Court, actions by President
Truman cast a shadow over the discussion of desegregation cases, and
his policies formed a backdrop as the Court began its long journey to-
ward ending segregation in public facilities, public transportation, and,
most important, public education. Truman's contribution stemmed from
a commission that he established in December 1946 called the President's
Committee on Civil Rights. This body submitted a report on October
29, 1947, entitled To Secure These Rights, which claimed that a "perva-
sive gap" existed between American ideals and practices. This gap, the
committee wrote, created "a kind of moral dry rot" that was eating away
"at the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs."52 The
President's Committee declared that it was time to create a permanent,
nationwide system of guardianship for civil rights, and it recommended
thirty-five measures to protect the rights of minorities. Among these
was the creation of a permanent federal commission on civil rights, a
standing committee of Congress on civil rights, and a reorganization
and enlargement of the civil rights section of the Department of Justice.
The committee recommended ending segregation in American life in
the areas of employment, education, housing, health services, and pub-
lic services.
Truman promised to study the report with great care, and he was
true to his word. In February 1948 he urged Congress to pass a fair
employment practices act and legislation to outlaw the poll tax, lynch-
ing, and segregation in interstate commerce. Unsuccessful in getting
Congress to act, he acted on his own. He ordered an end to racial segre-
gation in the armed services and reorganized the Department of Justice
civil rights section and directed it to assist private litigants in civil rights
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cases. While Truman was pushing stringent measures to end segregated
practices in all facets of American life, his friend Fred Vinson was in a
position to further the president's objectives through the judicial branch.
The first cases that the Court dealt with were about discrimination
in transportation, and these practices were challenged via the interstate
commerce clause. Precedents established by the Stone Court were im-
portant in how the Vinson Court responded to these cases. In 1946, just
before Vinson took his seat as chief justice, the Court had ruled in the
case of Morgan v. Virginia that a woman traveling on a Greyhound bus
from Baltimore to Virginia could not be ordered to the back of the bus
because of a state law requiring segregation of the races.53 The basis of
the Court's ruling was that the state law posed an undue burden on the
necessity of uniformity in interstate travel. Justice Burton, the lone dis-
senter in the case, warned the Court about the problems of overturning
state laws on the grounds that they created a burden on interstate com-
merce without actually assessing the extent of that burden.
Two years later, when Vinson was chief justice, the Court was forced
to contemplate the consequences of the Morgan decision. In Bob Lo
Excursions v. Michigan,5* the Court was confronted with a situation in
which the commerce clause was invoked as a way to thwart the protec-
tion of equal rights rather than enforcing them. A Michigan civil rights
law forbidding discrimination was invoked against an amusement park
company that conducted steamboat excursions to an island on the Cana-
dian side of the Detroit River. The company had refused to allow a young
black girl, who was with forty white girls, to ride on the steamboat. The
firm claimed that it operated in foreign commerce, which was not sub-
ject to state laws. The Court's majority, led by Justice Rutledge, got
around this dilemma by declaring that the commerce in question was
more local in nature than foreign. Even though the destination was po-
litically under the jurisdiction of another country, it was "economically
and socially" an adjunct of the city of Detroit. This logic was too much
for Vinson and Jackson, who thought that the Court had expanded state
police powers over foreign commerce on the ground that it was "not
very foreign" (44). Vinson's opposition to the Bob Lo majority was no
indication of his lack of support for civil rights. Rather, it was consistent
with his view of how the Constitution had allocated state and national
powers. In Vinson's view, Congress had exclusive power over foreign
commerce, and this could not be transgressed even in the name of indi-
vidual rights.
As Herman Pritchett noted, the Bob Lo case illustrated the difficulty
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of "attempting to achieve egalitarian goals through the cold-blooded
and clumsy constitutional concept of commerce."55 Despite these prob-
lems, the Court resisted efforts to attack the practice of separate-but-
equal in public transportation as an outright violation of the Constitution.
In 1950, in the case of Henderson v. United States,56 the Court was con-
fronted with the same kind of issue. Elmer Henderson, an employee of
the federal Fair Employment Commission, was traveling by rail from
Washington to Birmingham to investigate discrimination in war pro-
duction. The railroad usually set aside two tables in the dining car near
the kitchen for African Americans, reserving the rest of the tables for
whites. However, if all of the white tables were filled, then whites could
be seated in the seats set aside for African Americans. When Henderson
arrived for dinner, whites had filled all but one of the seats designated
for African Americans, but he was not allowed to have that seat. Instead,
the railroad offered to serve him at his Pullman car seat, but he refused
and insisted on sitting in the dining car. No seats opened up before the
dinner ended at 9:00 P.M.
Henderson complained to the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) and then, dissatisfied with its handling of the matter, appealed to
a lower federal court. It sided with the ICC, so he appealed to the Su-
preme Court. In an unusual move that reflected the impact of Truman's
civil rights policies, the Justice Department, which had defended the
ICC in the lower courts, reversed its position and submitted an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of Henderson. Dennis Hutchinson, professor of
law at the University of Chicago, said that the brief submitted by the
Justice Department was significant in three ways. First, it asserted for
the first time that segregated facilities were unlawful; second, it argued
for the very first time that the Plessy doctrine should be overruled; and
third, it sought to explain that segregation itself, not the resulting in-
equality of facilities, violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the Con-
stitution by creating a "badge of inferiority" for those who were excluded.
Hutchinson said: "The importance of this argument cannot be overstated.
By emphasizing the actual harm to the individual black experiencing
segregation, the Government was expanding the focus of the constitu-
tional inquiry from the nature of the separate facilities to the nature and
impact of racial classification."57
Although the Justice Department wanted the Court to overturn Plessy,
the Court majority was not yet ready to go that far. Douglas was the lone
member of the Court who thought that segregated facilities were a vio-
lation of the Constitution. From the outset, Vinson thought the segre-
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gated practices were illegal, but he argued that they violated the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which prohibited "any undue or unreasonable preju-
dice" by interstate carriers. He thought the case should be resolved on
the basis of the statute and not the Constitution. In conference Black and
Reed agreed with this position, as did Burton, who was assigned to write
the opinion. Clark did not participate because the case had been heard in
a lower court while he was attorney general. Eventually, all of the par-
ticipating justices, except Frankfurter and Douglas, agreed to Burton's
draft opinion that segregated dining tables based on race violated the
Interstate Commerce Act. Burton had been careful to explain that the
Court's opinion was rooted in a precedent established in a 1941 case,58
which ruled that the Interstate Commerce Act prohibited the denial of
equal access on the basis of race to interstate rail passengers.
Frankfurter, who throughout the Court's consideration of the segre-
gation cases was reticent to move too fast in ending discriminatory prac-
tices, lobbied Burton for more narrow language than what he originally
wrote and was instrumental in getting him to limit the wording to refer
only to the unequal access to the dining car and not include language
that might be construed as outlawing discrimination in general. Douglas
wrote an opinion concurring in the result but arguing that segregated
facilities violated the Constitution, but at the last hour he dropped his
concurrence and agreed with the majority.59
The Henderson decision was one of three desegregation decisions
announced on June 5, 1950. The other two were about segregation in
higher education, Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma.60 Vinson
played a minimal role in negotiations over Henderson because, as the
author of the majority opinion in Sweatt and McLaurin, he was busy
trying to secure unanimous agreement for those opinions. Those two
opinions, along with his earlier opinion in the landmark restrictive-cov-
enant case of Shelley v. Kraemer,61 helped to establish Vinson's role in
facilitating the eventual demise of the separate-but-equal doctrine.
The Shelley case offered Vinson an opportunity to advance the cause
of civil rights in a way that was consistent with Truman's commitment
to end discriminatory practices. The report of the President's Commit-
tee had specifically recommended the abolition of restrictive covenants.
Shelley raised the question of whether state courts could enforce ra-
cially restrictive covenants when they were breached. This case was heard
together with a similar case from Michigan, McGhee v. Sipes.62 In both
cases state courts had issued injunctions, at the request of white
homeowners, to prevent African Americans from moving into homes
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purchased in violation of racially restrictive covenants. The petitioners
claimed that state court enforcement of the covenants violated their rights
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oral
arguments in these two cases were heard simultaneously with the argu-
ments for two restrictive-covenant cases from the District of Columbia,
Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge.63 The latter two raised a different
constitutional issue, because the Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion clause only restricts the power of states. The Hurd and Urciolo cases
challenged restrictive covenants under a federal statute and the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In accepting these cases for review, the Vinson Court deviated sharply
from the Stone Court, which three years earlier had denied certiorari in
a restrictive-covenant case. Adding to the drama of the Shelley case was
that the Justice Department, spurred by Truman's civil rights initiatives
and intense lobbying from liberal organizations, submitted a brief on
behalf of the petitioners. This was not the first time that the government
had intervened in a civil rights case, but it was the first time it had sub-
mitted a brief in a case outside the more traditional issues like the inter-
pretation of a federal statute. Underlying the import of the government's
action was the fact that both Attorney General Tom Clark and Solicitor
General Phillip Perlman signed the document.64 Another unusual aspect
of the case was that three justices—Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge—with-
drew from the case. In keeping with customary practice, they gave no
reasons for withdrawing, but later investigations by the news media re-
vealed that both Jackson and Rutledge owned property covered by ra-
cially restrictive covenants. Although Justice Reed never acknowledged
his reason for withdrawing from the case, he did own property in Mason
County, Kentucky, where many of the deeds contained racial covenants.65
The restrictive-covenant cases were accepted by the Court for re-
view in June 1947. One of Vinson's law clerks, Francis A. Allen, re-
called that he was "uneasy" about Vinson's commitment to reverse the
lower court rulings on the subject. His concern stemmed from his knowl-
edge of how Vinson made decisions. He said that Vinson's thought pro-
cesses relied more on oral exchange than on reading and private
meditation. "He possessed a remarkable talent for absorbing complex
ideas by ear, an attribute no doubt sharpened by his years in Congress,"
Allen said. What worried Allen about Vinson's commitment to revers-
ing the lower court was "that he had not gone through his characteristic
process of spoken language, so important to his decision making." Allen
labored "long hours" over the summer to prepare a memo to the chief
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justice that would persuade him to vote for reversal. He said that "by
summer's end the memo had grown impressively in size," along with
his "pride of authorship." He delivered the memo to Vinson when he
returned to Washington in September, and a couple of days later had
"one of the most deflating experiences of my professional life." Vinson
said to him, "You know when I left here in June I thought I was going to
vote to reverse in the covenant cases. After reading your memo, I'm not
so sure."66
Oral arguments in all four of the restrictive-covenant cases were
heard on January 15 and 16, 1948. Arguments for the petitioners were
presented by attorneys for the NAACP and Solicitor General Perlman,
who spoke for the government. Although oral arguments do not always
influence the final outcome of a decision, Allen thought they might have
"strengthened the Chief's resolve to reverse the lower court decisions."67
Mark Tushnet also said that these arguments actually "sharpened the
issues in the cases somewhat." Thurgood Marshall's response to a ques-
tion from Chief Justice Vinson may have hit its mark. Marshall argued
that restrictive covenants were not just a matter of agreement among
private parties. They had to have the assistance of the state. "The es-
sence of the contract," he said, "is its ability to be enforced. . . . The
parties cannot enforce the agreement against a recalcitrant promissor
without state aid." According to Tushnet, "Marshall's rhetorically pow-
erful argument cut away most of the analytic complexities of the case."68
Whether it was the force of Marshall's argument or his own sense of
fair play, or perhaps both, Vinson was convinced from the outset that
state court enforcement of restrictive covenants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment provision that no state could deny anyone within its juris-
diction equal protection of the law. He initiated the conference debate
by stating that he would reverse the lower court rulings upholding the
injunctions; he declared unequivocally that according to "the letter of
the Fourteenth Amendment," the injunctions issued by state courts con-
stituted state action. These petitioners, he said, "have been deprived of
their constitutional rights."69 Most of the justices at the conference agreed,
and Vinson drafted an opinion, which several of his colleagues strongly
endorsed. One of the most poignant notes was from Harold Burton, who
wrote, "If you can get unanimous action it will be a major contribution
to the vitality of the 14th Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, the general
subject of interracial justice, and the strength of this Court as the 'living
voice of the Constitution' (Bryce)."70
Vinson's opinion, delivered on May 3, 1948, was one of his longer
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and more eloquent opinions. Before he delivered it, he received a hand-
written note from Justice Murphy saying that the opinion was "as im-
portant as Dred Scott and other epoch making decisions." Murphy
counseled his colleague to "take his time."71 Vinson heeded that advice
and delivered a deliberate and verbatim reading of the full opinion. Allen,
his law clerk at the time, said Vinson thought that reading the full opin-
ion was justified, "given the portentous nature of the decision."72
Although Vinson's opinion might have lacked the flair of decisions
written by some of his more scholarly brethren, it contained some mov-
ing and imaginative phrases. It also bore his familiar characteristic of
relying on precedent to justify a decision. Given the potential impact of
the Court's opinion on a practice widely in use, Vinson thought it impor-
tant to show that the ruling did not represent a significant departure
from long-standing precedents, even though arguably it was just that.
First he noted that the ruling did not invalidate racial restrictive cov-
enants per se. Consistent with previous Court rulings, it left them squarely
intact. In these earlier cases involving restrictive covenants, Vinson said,
the court had never been asked to consider whether the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibited judicial enforcement by
state courts of racially restrictive covenants. He concluded that the equal
protection clause did prohibit such enforcement. He pointed to previous
court rulings that invalidated city ordinances that denied African Ameri-
cans the right to occupy houses in blocks where there were mostly white-
occupied residences because they were contrary to the equal protection
clause.73 To Vinson the distinction between a city ordinance and court
action was immaterial. He said, "That action of state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which
has long been established by decisions of this Court." According to
Vinson, there could be no doubt that there had been state action in these
cases "in the full and complete sense of the phrase."74
With a fervor not often found in Vinson's opinions, he wrote that
these were not cases in which the states had merely abstained from in-
terference in the decisions by private individuals to impose discrimina-
tions as they saw fit. Echoing Marshall's point in oral argument, he said
that in these cases states had made available to such individuals "the full
coercive power of government to deny petitioners, on the grounds of
race or color, the enjoyment of property rights. The difference between
judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive covenants is
the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property
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available to other members of the community and being accorded full
enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing" (19).
Vinson was not persuaded by the argument of the respondents that
"state courts stand ready to enforce restrictive covenants excluding white
persons from the ownership and occupancy of property." He dismissed
this argument by noting that the parties had failed to cite a single case in
which a state or federal court had been asked "to enforce a covenant
excluding members of the white majority from ownership or occupancy
of real property on the grounds of race or color." What was more impor-
tant, he asserted, was that the petitioners were claiming a "personal right";
to argue that "courts may also be induced to deny white persons rights
of ownership and occupancy on the grounds of race or color" is not a
satisfactory response. He said that "equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Driving
home his main point, he concluded, "The Constitution confers upon no
individual the right to demand action by the State which results in the
denial of equal protection to other individuals" (22).
In his opinions in Hodge and Urciolo, Vinson invalidated restrictive
covenants in the District of Columbia on the basis of a statute rather
than the Constitution. Showing his inclination toward judicial restraint,
he wrote, "It is a well-established principle that this Court will not de-
cide constitutional questions where other grounds are available and dis-
positive of the issues of the case."75 He argued that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and its subsequent amendments had provided "all citizens" of
the United States the same rights as whites to "inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold and convey real and personal property" in every state and ter-
ritory. The Fourteenth Amendment had made African Americans citi-
zens of the United States, and the District of Columbia was included in
the phrase "every state and territory." Given these facts, Vinson con-
cluded, judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants by courts in the
District of Columbia was prohibited by the Civil Rights Act. Although
he could have stopped with that point, Vinson went a step further by
relating the Hodge case to the Shelley case, decided at the same time. He
said: "It is not consistent with the public policy of the United States to
permit federal courts in the Nation's capital... to compel action denied
state courts where such state action has been held to be violative of the
guaranty of the equal protection of laws. We cannot presume that the
public policy of the United States manifests a lesser concern for the
protection of such basic rights against discriminatory action of federal
court than against such action taken by the courts of the States" (35).
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Vinson took great care to distinguish his opinion in the Hurd case
from one that he had written in 1942 in a restrictive-covenant case on
the circuit court of appeals in which he had ruled that racial restrictive
covenants were not only valid but also enforceable.76 However, the court
majority, consisting of Vinson and Chief Judge Lawrence Groner, had
refused to issue the injunction, because African Americans were the only
buyers in a neighborhood that was already partially black. Vinson and
Groner determined that white property owners would be disadvantaged
by a court order preventing them from selling to the only potential buy-
ers. In his Hurd opinion, Vinson said that in the earlier case the circuit
court had "refused enforcement of a restrictive agreement where changes
in the character of the neighborhood would have rendered enforcement
inequitable." What explains Vinson's change of heart is a matter of specu-
lation, but it was more than mere circumstance. Vinson was an astute
politician, and he could sense that Washington in 1948 was a different
place than it was in 1942. Attitudes of the average citizen may not have
changed significantly during those six years, but official Washington
had signaled that discrimination was no longer to be tolerated. In To
Secure These Rights, the President's Committee on Civil Rights main-
tained that not only did American ideals require an end to segregation,
but also America's reputation in the eyes of the world necessitated that
the nation set a good example in the area of civil rights. This argument
was highlighted in the brief submitted by Attorney General Clark and
Solicitor General Perlman, which stated that "the United States has been
embarrassed in the conduct of foreign policy by acts of discrimination
taking place in the country."77
Several scholars have devoted considerable attention to the influ-
ence of the Cold War on the battle against racism in the United States.
Mary L. Dudziak, a scholar whose work is prominent in this area,78 ar-
gued that as the United States emerged from World War II, it confronted
a dilemma. The rhetoric of the country's leaders was that the victory
over Hitler represented a victory over racism, but in fact life in Ameri-
can society was divided along racial lines, and government laws and
practices sanctioned the division. This aspect of American life received
increasing attention by other countries and proved embarrassing to the
nation's leaders who were trying to promote democracy and to contain
Communism. The contradiction between ideology and practice created
problems in American relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America—nations that were seen as crucial to our efforts to contain
Communist influence.79 Linking discrimination to the battle against
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Communism had a likely influence on Vinson's thinking about civil rights
issues.
The initial response to Vinson's restrictive-covenant opinions was
positive. He must have been gratified by the notes he received from his
colleagues. Murphy's was especially effusive. He wrote, "You will re-
ceive many blows for your covenant cases . . . but with time the cases
will make you immortal. It took not only wisdom about the law but also
vast courage for a Chief Justice from Kentucky to hold fast to his be-
liefs."80 Walter White, secretary for the NAACP, sent a telegram thank-
ing Vinson "most warmly for not only that magnificent decision today
but for the conviction with which you delivered the opinion."81 A former
Kentuckian, transplanted to Chicago, wrote Vinson that his "fearless
action has placed you along side Abraham Lincoln, Justice Harlan,
Theodore Roosevelt and the unforgettable Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and had liquidated a previous decision which asserted that the Negro
has no rights which a white man need respect."82
The scholarly community was more mixed in its reactions to Vinson's
restrictive-covenant opinions. One criticism of the opinion was that in
the short run the practical consequence would be small. The broad use
of the covenants, not confined to the deep South, coupled with extrale-
gal sanctions, meant that little would change in the way of segregated
housing. John Frank, a frequent Vinson critic, regretted the way that the
Court went out of its way to reaffirm the civil rights cases that limited
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action and to con-
clude that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be used to protect against
private conduct that was discriminatory. Frank thought the Court should
have addressed more squarely Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in
the Plessy case in which he declared that segregation was a "badge of
slavery" and therefore a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohi-
bition against slavery.83 Another critic, Irving Lefberg, claimed that the
emphasis on the concept of "state action" meant that Shelley would be
"an obstacle, rather than a spur, to future efforts at open housing legisla-
tion." Lefberg agreed with others that the decision was not "likely to
upset customary patterns of racial segregation [or] elicit widespread
political opposition."84 Yet any Supreme Court decision could be attacked
on the same ground, as Gerald N. Rosenberg argued persuasively in The
Hollow Hope, where he examined the question of whether courts could be
effective agents of social reform. Using the school desegregation cases as
one example, Rosenberg concluded that other factors, such as economic
and political change, are more important in facilitating societal change.85
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The merit of an opinion is always in the eye of the beholder, and
where critics like Lefberg took issue with the narrowness of the opinion,
others saw that as its virtue. Vinson's former law clerk Allen, speaking
about the Shelley case four decades later, explained the narrow nature of
the opinion in terms of the convictions and attributes of the chief justice.
As a man of strong institutional loyalties, Vinson was concerned about
how the divisions on the court had damaged its authority and prestige,
and one of his main objectives was to strive for a unanimous opinion so
that the Court could speak with one voice. This concern contributed to
Shelley's "minimalist posture." Allen said that was why "one may find
in the opinion an effort to limit what was said to the prevailing consen-
sus on the Court, to accomplish the reversal of judgments in the instant
cases, leaving for another day, when division and controversy might be
less damaging, the difficult problems of application to different facts."86
Allen claimed that it was important to Vinson "that the opinion not 'reach'
for its result, [and] that the argument of the Court, in so far as possible,
rely on familiar and established assumptions of constitutional law" (722).
Shelley was perhaps a more significant shift in the law than is com-
monly assumed. In his classic article "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law," Herbert Wechsler argued that Shelley emphasized
results over principle by failing to clarify why the state court enforce-
ment of a private covenant became state enforcement of discrimination
rather than a legal recognition of an individual right.87 Although Shelley
did declare, as Vinson emphasized, that the decision by a state court
constituted state action, what was not obvious, according to Wechsler,
was "that the state may be properly charged with the discrimination
when it does no more than give effect to an agreement that the indi-
vidual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely free to make" (29). Seen
through this lens, Shelley represented a sharp departure from existing
law, despite Vinson's attempt to claim continuity with the past. The tra-
ditional role of the state court as the enforcer of private contracts en-
tered into freely by the individual had been redefined as the agent of
discrimination. The problem, Wechsler said, was determining the prin-
ciple for application to other situations where the state perpetuated seg-
regation initiated through private action, for example, the state
enforcement of a will that draws a racial line.
The argument that Shelley represented a significant departure from
existing law is buttressed in an analysis by Michael J. Klarman of the
case of Buchanan v. Warley (1917),88 cited by Vinson in Shelley. In
Buchanan the Court had invalidated a Louisville ordinance providing
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that houses sold on city blocks that were owned by a majority of a given
race (e.g., white or black) could be occupied only by members of that
race. The Court had overturned the ordinance on substantive due pro-
cess grounds, namely, that in effect it deprived African Americans of
their individual right to own private property in accordance with their
choice. Klarman argued, however, that as a property rights case it could
not advance the cause of civil rights to any large extent.89 The Shelley
opinion, by placing the emphasis on the Court's role in enforcing the
equal protection clause rather than the protection of property rights, rep-
resented an important shift in the Court's thinking about what priority to
assign competing constitutional rights.
Those who argued that Vinson's opinion did not go far enough to
end racial segregation in housing failed to take note of several things.
First, the main thrust of the argument put forth by the petitioners them-
selves was that judicial intervention constituted state action. Whereas
the McGhee case put much more emphasis on the sociological and eco-
nomic aspects of the practice of restrictive covenants, in Shelley the
"sociological claims were subordinate to the legal and constitutional
claims."90 Second, no recorded conference notes indicated that any jus-
tice was pushing for the Court to go further than it did. Lefberg mistak-
enly presumed in his criticism of Vinson that it was he, along with Burton
and Frankfurter, who "took the most pains to limit the scope and impact
of Shelley and that "plausibly the Justices Douglas and Murphy argued
for reconsideration of the Civil Rights cases."91 In fact, none of the jus-
tices were observed to have made such an argument. As Allen has pointed
out, "Shelley was litigated before the civil rights movement entered the
phase of public protest... and the civil rights legislation was more than
a decade away."92 No public outcry propelled the Court to go further
than necessary.
As Klarman and others have maintained, the importance of the so-
cial and political context in which a case is decided cannot be over-
looked. Supreme Court justices are influenced by their contemporary
culture, and, Klarman argued, they are not likely to "coerce the nation
into adopting policies that such a substantial majority oppose." This is
partially because their values reflect the majority and partially because
of the possibility of inciting determined resistance. Klarman used as an
example the southern white resistance to the Court's decisions in Brown.9i
Just as Buchanan's emphasis on property rights was consistent with the
progressive ideology of the early part of the twentieth century, Shelley
can be seen as advancing the cause of civil rights in a manner that was
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consistent with the changing social and political climate at midcentury.
It may have been slightly in advance of broad public support for equal
rights, but it did not go so far as to incite popular protest.
In all of the debates about whether Shelley was a minimal step or a
significant departure from existing law, it should not be forgotten that
the opinion did bring relief to the families of the four petitioners who
brought the suits and to others in their neighborhoods and similar neigh-
borhoods across the country who were allowed at last to move into their
homes. Orsel McGhee of Detroit said he was "mighty happy.... We've
tried to be good neighbors. If some of them don't like us, we just can't
help it." A neighbor of James Hurd's in Washington, D.C., said: "Well,
what do you know? That is a great thing. I knew it couldn't stay that
way. This is America."94 Thurgood Marshall said the 1948 opinion gave
"thousands of prospective home buyers throughout the United States
new courage and hope in the American form of government."95
In the final analysis, the most significant impact of the decision was
its symbolic effect. It is easy, viewing the case from a distance of several
decades, to overlook the intangible effects of the case. Shelley was one
of many small but necessary steps toward overturning the separate-but-
equal doctrine. In removing the only legal means of enforcing restric-
tive-covenants, Shelley "marked a turning point in the Court's position
on racial discrimination."96 Lefberg agreed that "the theoretical signifi-
cance of the Shelley decision should not be understated, for Vinson up-
set a long held judicial attitude that had clearly favored the interests of
the white property owners."97 Most important, perhaps, was the impact
on the nascent civil rights movement. As Allen noted, it is easy, "look-
ing back over the last forty years, to believe that the destruction of legal
supports sustaining racial segregation in the United States was inevi-
table and foreordained. Not only does this easy assumption distort the
experiences by those participating in the case, but it also overlooks the
crucial importance of Shelley in bolstering the morale and providing
impetus for the civil rights struggles in the following decades."98 The
Shelley opinion gave those who were working in the trenches to advance
the cause of civil rights a ray of hope. White, of the NAACP, acknowl-
edged that "the fight was not over" because "vast interests" were at-
tempting to maintain segregation, but, he said, "we have moved forward
a long way through this decision and those who believe in democracy
are now on the offensive and have put the enemies of decency on the
defensive as they have never been before."99 Allen, framing a rhetorical
question, put Shelley into historical perspective. He asked: "What would
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the history of human rights in the United States have been had the Court
announced in 1948 that the great moral imperatives of the Fourteenth
Amendment were irrelevant to the system of racial discrimination cre-
ated and sustained by restrictive agreements? In short, what if Shelley
had been decided the other way?"100
The Shelley opinion came four months after the Supreme Court had
ruled in the case of Sipuel v. Oklahoma,m which was the opening round
in the NAACP's salvo against the separate-but-equal doctrine in public
education. Ada Sipuel, who was qualified for admission in every way,
was denied entry to the University of Oklahoma law school because
state law barred African Americans from attending the all-white univer-
sity. She appealed the school's refusal to accept her to the Oklahoma
courts, but she lost before the lower court and the state supreme court.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted her petition for certiorari in the fall of
1947, and the Court heard oral arguments on January 7 and 8. Within
four days of hearing the arguments, the Court reached a unanimous de-
cision that the state law violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and handed down a per curiam decision declaring
that the state had to provide her with a legal education "in conformity
with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and pro-
vide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group" (633). The
opinion cited as precedent Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938),102
which upheld the validity of separate-but-equal practices in higher edu-
cation but declared that the Missouri practice of sending qualified black
applicants to out-of-state schools failed to meet the test of equality.
What happened next in Sipuel revealed the fragility of the Court's
facade of unanimity. In response to the Court's initial ruling, Oklahoma
hastily set up a separate law school for African Americans in the state
capitol. It consisted of three rooms and was staffed by three local attor-
neys. Sipuel and the NAACP found this unacceptable and filed a motion
with the Supreme Court requesting that it order that Sipuel be admitted
to the existing white law school. As the justices debated the motion, the
underlying tensions rose to the surface. Vinson, hoping to avoid a
nonunanimous decision, wanted to dispose of the case as quickly and
simply as possible and sought to avoid the question of whether separate
law schools met the test of separate-but-equal. In a memorandum to the
conference, he argued that the only question before the Court was whether
the Court's order to Oklahoma had been followed, and he insisted that it
had.1(B He circulated a per curiam opinion denying the motion requested,
stating that the petitioners had not presented the issue of whether a state
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might not satisfy the equal protection clause by creating a separate law
school for blacks.
Although Vinson succeeded in keeping the opinion as narrow as
possible, even acceding to changes suggested by Frankfurter that helped
achieve that objective, he was not able to achieve a unanimous decision.
Murphy dissented because he thought there should have been a hearing
on the issue and Rutledge because he thought it was impossible to cre-
ate equality with separate schools. The Sipuel case was only a tempo-
rary setback for the NAACP's strategy of overturning the separate-
but-equal doctrine. Within four months it achieved a major victory in
the Shelley case, and at the same time it was working on two other cases
involving segregation in higher education that would lead the Court far
beyond its reticence in Sipuel to declare that separate schools failed to
provide equality. Sweatt v. Painter pertained to separate law schools in
the state of Texas, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma concerned separate treat-
ment in graduate education.
Herman Marion "Bill" Sweatt was a postal worker in Texas who
first became involved in civil rights by challenging a policy of the post-
master barring African Americans from being clerks. From this experi-
ence he developed an appreciation for the role of lawyers in helping to
remedy discrimination and decided to go to law school. He also became
active in the local chapter of the NAACP. His decision to pursue a legal
education coincided with the NAACP's quest for test cases to challenge
segregation in education, and he was happy to accommodate them. In
1946 he applied to the University of Texas Law School at Austin and
was rejected. Then, backed by the NAACP, he sued in state court to be
admitted to the law school. The state trial judge denied Sweatt's request
and gave the state six months to come up with a "substantially equal"
law school. After a couple of false starts, the state legislature established
Texas State University for Negroes in Houston. In the interim the state
set up a temporary law school in Austin, in the basement of a building
near the state capitol. Three law professors from the University of Texas
were assigned to teach the courses. The school opened in March of 1947,
but as a result of efforts by the NAACP to discourage enrollments, no
students applied.
Perhaps unknowingly, the state of Texas had played into the hands
of the NAACP. By creating a separate school, the state had made the
Gaines precedent, based on a situation in which no school for blacks
existed in the state, irrelevant. This opened the way to challenge the
Plessy doctrine of separate but equal. Marshall knew he was on solid
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ground in challenging the equality of separate law schools. He once told
his supporters, "It is easier to prove that a law school is unequal than it is
to prove a primary school is unequal." Having been trained in the law,
he understood what factors contributed to the quality of a legal educa-
tion, and he was certain he could find in his network of acquaintances
expert witnesses who would explain why it was not possible for a new
and segregated law school to be equal to an existing one, regardless of
the quality of the physical facilities.104
As the Sweatt case was taking form in Texas, another case was de-
veloping in the neighboring state of Oklahoma, which had just finished
litigating the Sipuel case. In January 1948 six African Americans sought
admission to several graduate programs at the University of Oklahoma.
The university chose not to create separate programs at the state univer-
sity for African Americans. George McLaurin, who wished to pursue a
doctoral degree in education, successfully sued to obtain admission. He
registered for four courses, all of which were promptly rescheduled for
a single classroom that contained an alcove, where McLaurin was re-
quired to sit so that he would be separated from the white students.
Marshall saw in this situation a good opportunity to show that separate
arrangements were humiliating and degrading. He decided that McLaurin
would be a good companion to Sweatt (130).
The NAACP filed petitions in the McLaurin and Sweatt cases in
March of 1949, but it was not until the fall of 1949 that the Court agreed
to hear the two cases, an unusually long period for the Court to wait
before responding. Tushnet suggested that the reason for the delay was
that the justices understood "that they were being asked to reconsider
and overrule Plessy v. Ferguson and needed time to decide how to re-
spond" (135). Another possible explanation might have been the lack of
time. As late as May, four weeks before the end of the term, the Court
was still receiving amicus curiae briefs in the Sweatt case.105 When the
Court finally agreed to hear the two cases, there had been significant
changes in its membership. Tom Clark and Sherman Minton had re-
placed Murphy and Rutledge, who had died within months of each other.
The latter two could be counted on to support the NAACP, but there was
uncertainty about how Clark and Minton would vote. In the end, all nine
justices voted in November of 1949 to grant certiorari, and oral argu-
ments in the two cases, along with the Henderson case, were set for
April 3 and 4, 1950.
Marshall, the lead attorney in the Sweatt case, decided the time had
come to make the Court confront Plessy, saying that the "issue of sepa-
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rate but equal was raised right from the beginning of the case."106 He
noted that the NAACP had been trying to get the basic question of seg-
regation before the Court for thirty years and that it was time for the
Court to decide the question. He also dealt with what had become a real
conundrum for the justices as well as the NAACP when wrestling with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Did the framers of that amendment intend
it to prohibit segregated schools? Marshall conceded in his presentation
that the history of the amendment "afforded arguments for both sides
and that it was not possible to make a clear-cut demonstration that the
framers . . . intended either to permit or forbid segregation" (141). In
their oral presentation, lawyers for the Justice Department argued that
Plessy should be overturned. They focused on the intangible inequali-
ties that result from separate schools, regardless of whether the facilities
are equal.
When the justices met in conference to discuss the two cases, una-
nimity in McLaurin developed rather quickly. All of the justices agreed
that the Oklahoma practice of segregating African Americans in the class-
room constituted unequal treatment. Vinson said that "Negroes were
entitled to enter the university without restriction if they are admitted at
all." In Sweatt the central point of discussion was the intent of the fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vinson spoke at length on the sub-
ject. He started by noting that there was clearly separate treatment in the
Sweatt case and that in the professional field that would not be equal,
but he was uncertain whether it was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Given the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, he said, it was not con-
ceivable that Congress "did not have the problem [of public schools] in
front of them." The District of Columbia and the states in both the North
and the South had separate schools. Vinson also commented on a pro-
posal circulated by Clark that the Court could apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to graduate education but not elementary and secondary
education. Vinson said he did not think it was possible to make that
distinction under the Constitution. At the end of his comments, Vinson
said he was leaning toward affirming the state court's ruling; he was the
only one of the justices to take that position. Vinson's initial reticence to
strike down the separate schools in the Sweatt case appeared to arise
from his concern about its possible application to elementary and sec-
ondary education. He said that all of the Court's decisions regarding
equal protection had "assumed that schools were different," and he re-
ferred to it as a "bothersome problem."
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Black offered up a long discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
He said he did not think the "Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
perpetuate a caste system [that was] a hangover from days when Ne-
groes were slaves." Frankfurter, who agreed that the separate schools
were not equal, thought that it was possible to limit the decision to gradu-
ate education. He argued that the Court "should abstain from saying
anything about segregation as such."107 He cautioned that no one could
say with certainty what was the original intent of the equal protection
clause. Jackson argued that there was no basis for finding that Four-
teenth Amendment applied to schools. "In effect," he said, "we would
be amending the Constitution."108 He agreed with Vinson that it was
impossible under the Constitution to distinguish between graduate and
elementary education. Nonetheless, he favored reversing the state courts
in both cases because the state practices in question were clearly un-
equal.
At the end of the conference, the Court was unanimous that McLaurin
should be reversed, but only seven justices were solidly in favor of re-
versing in Sweatt. Vinson, who spoke in conference before hearing the
other justices, was leaning toward affirming, and Reed had indicated
that he could affirm or support remanding the case for "further find-
ings." Black was the senior justice in the majority, and he assigned both
cases to himself. However, in early April, Vinson changed his position
in Sweatt and assigned both cases to himself. On May 17 he circulated
draft opinions in both cases. They were relatively short. Each explained
that separate educational programs at the graduate level failed to pro-
vide the equal protection guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Sweatt, Vinson wrote that the Court did not agree with the petitioners
that Plessy should be overturned. All justices except for Douglas indi-
cated support for the draft opinions. Black, who had relinquished writ-
ing the drafts at Vinson's behest, wrote a gracious note saying, "This is
written in beautiful style and I sincerely hope it can obtain a unanimous
approval Full acceptance of this would add force to the holdings."109
There was no doubt that Vinson wanted to achieve a unanimous opinion,
and he was amenable to most of the suggestions for changes in wording.
Both Reed and Frankfurter suggested revisions that would limit the scope
of the opinion. In the Sweatt draft, Vinson wrote that "no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed
from the interplay of ideas and the human relationships with which the
law is concerned." Reed asked him to change "human relationships" to
"exchange of views.""0 Frankfurter agreed that Reed's wording was
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preferable but thought that the paragraph should be dropped altogether.
Vinson agreed to adopt Reed's recommended wording but not to drop
the entire paragraph. Where Reed had recommended the wording "these
are handicaps to an effective education," Frankfurter asked that it read
"these are handicaps to a graduate education." Vinson agreed to that
change.
Vinson also agreed, with some reluctance, to change one other phrase
suggested by Frankfurter. Vinson had characterized state practices of
separate education as "expanding inequalities." Frankfurter thought that
"expanding" should be dropped. Such changes would "accomplish the
desired result without needlessly stirring the kind of feelings that are
felt even by truly liberal and high minded Southerners like Jonathan
Daniels.""' Vinson drafted a response to Frankfurter that apparently was
never sent, but it showed his pique at Frankfurter's badgering. He said
he "would not want to have anything in the opinion which would stir up
feelings of anger and resentment in any portion of the country." He ac-
knowledged that much progress had been made in the South's recogni-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment is part of the Constitution, but he
said "the devices used by Oklahoma, and the Texas action here are in the
nature of circumventions, and I would not be surprised but what there
are other techniques which are or might be used. It was this thought that
caused me to use the word 'expanding.'" Then, in reference to two other
sentences that Frankfurter wanted deleted, he said, "I have always en-
deavored to meet the suggestions of my Brethren, and if the Court de-
sires to delete the two sentences, they will be stricken."112 Shortly after
these changes were made, Douglas agreed to join the majority opinion
in each case, making the opinions unanimous.
On June 5 the Court announced the opinions in Sweatt, McLaurin,
and Henderson. Vinson read the Sweatt opinion first. In the first para-
graph he made it clear that the Court had chosen not to decide whether
Plessy should be overturned. He said that even though the petitioners
had urged the Court to consider "broader issues," the Court would ad-
here to its principle of deciding "constitutional questions only when
necessary to the disposition of the case at hand, and that such decisions
were drawn as narrowly as possible." Almost apologetically, he added
that the Court's "traditional reluctance" to extend constitutional inter-
pretations to situations or facts that are not before it made "much of the
excellent research and detailed arguments presented in these cases . . .
unnecessary to their disposition."113
To answer the narrower question of whether the separate law schools
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provided the equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment, Vinson
compared the two institutions. He said that the University of Texas Law
School was superior in every respect, including the number of faculty,
the variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, the scope of
the library, and the availability of law review and similar activities. Then
Vinson turned to the most significant aspect of the opinion, which was
the reference to intangible factors. "What is more important," he wrote,
"the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater extent
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school." These include the reputation of the
faculty, the experience of the administration, the position and influence
of the alumni, the standing in the community, and the school's traditions
and prestige. Vinson said, "It is difficult to believe that one who had a
free choice between these law schools would consider the question close"
(634). In dealing with the "qualities incapable of objective measure-
ment," Vinson opened the door for the consideration of intangible fac-
tors that would become a key aspect of the Court's 1954 Brown decision
overturning the Plessy separate-but-equal doctrine.
Then Vinson addressed other ways in which separate law programs
would affect students. He argued that the profession of law "is an in-
tensely practical one [and] the law school, the proving ground for legal
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individu-
als and institutions with which the law interacts. . . . No one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed
from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the
law is concerned." Vinson noted that the law school that Texas would
have allowed Sweatt to attend "excludes from its student body 85% of
the population of the state that includes most of the lawyers, witnesses,
jurors, judges and other officials with whom the petitioner will inevita-
bly be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar."
In response to the state's claim that excluding Sweatt from the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School was no different from excluding whites
from the new law school, Vinson said such a contention "overlooks re-
alities [for] it is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in the
majority, attending a school with rich traditions and prestige .. . would
claim that the opportunities afforded him for legal education were un-
equal to those held open to the petitioner." He cited from his Shelley
opinion: "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indis-
criminate imposition of inequalities" (635).
Vinson said that the rights claimed by Sweatt were "personal and
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present," which meant according to the precedent set in Sipuel that the
state had to provide him with a legal education "in conformity with the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as
soon as it does for applicants of any other group." Having established
that Sweatt had a constitutional right to a legal education equivalent to
that offered to whites, Vinson said "such education is not available to
him in a separate law school." Thus, he said, the Court did not agree
with the state that the Plessy doctrine required an affirmation of the
state court's ruling upholding the separate law school. "Nor," he added,
did the Court need to reach "the petitioner's contention that Plessy v.
Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge
respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of
racial segregation" (636). With those words he dashed the hopes of the
NAACP that Sweatt would be the vehicle for overturning the separate-
but-equal doctrine.
The McLaurin opinion was shorter and even more succinct than
Sweatfs. Vinson said that setting McLaurin apart from other students
"handicapped his pursuit of an effective graduate education. "Such re-
strictions," Vinson said, "impair and inhibit his ability to study, engage
in discussion and exchange views with other students, and in general, to
learn his profession." He argued that an increasingly complex society
created a corresponding need for trained leaders. McLaurin's case, he
wrote, "represents the epitome of that need." Vinson said that denying
him an equal educational opportunity meant that the education of those
who came under his influence would "necessarily suffer." Following
this was the line that he narrowed at Frankfurter's request: "State im-
posed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot be sustained."
The state had argued that even if the restrictions were removed,
McLaurin would still be set apart by his fellow students. This argument
carried no weight with the chief justice. He said, "There is a vast differ-
ence—a Constitutional difference—between restrictions imposed by the
state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the
refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such
bar." As in Sweatt, Vinson declared that the conditions under which
McLaurin was required to receive his education deprived him of "his
personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws."114
Assessments of the significance of Sweatt and McLaurin fall into
two categories. One group holds that the opinions were a very signifi-
cant step in overturning the practice of separate but equal even if they
did not do so explicitly. The second group argues that the Court's ruling
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was too narrow and had limited impact. In the first category are scholars
like Tushnet, whose 1987 work attributed significance to Vinson's refer-
ences to the intangible dimensions of education. He said: "Invoking the
intangibles committed the justices as much as any doctrine could to the
position that equality could not be achieved in separate graduate schools.
And [this] opened the way to the adoption of the sociological argu-
ment."115 The New Republic at the time agreed. It said that the rulings
bore "directly on segregated primary and secondary schools, since it is
impossible for them adequately to prepare the Negro for life in a pre-
dominantly white society."116 Another observed that the rulings left "sepa-
rate but equal a meaningless phrase" and that the opinions were "broad
enough to undermine all racial discrimination in public education."117
Erwin Griswold, dean of the Harvard Law School, wrote Marshall
the day after the opinions were announced that the NAACP "came out
pretty well, yesterday." Griswold told Marshall that even though he prob-
ably "would have liked to have the school decisions go further," it was
"more important that the decisions were unanimous." Marshall wrote to
friends and supporters that although he would have preferred the Court
to overturn Plessy, he still thought the opinions were "replete with road
markings," that Plessy "has been gutted," that "the end is in sight," and
that "we have at least obtained an opening wedge."118
Dennis Hutchinson strongly endorsed the view that Sweatt,
McLaurin, and Henderson, all announced on the same day, played a key
role in eventually overturning Plessy. Hutchinson said that to under-
stand how the Court reached its unanimous decision in Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954, it is necessary to look at the "1950 Trilogy." He
said, "It was there, not with Brown, that the Supreme Court developed
its attitude to statutorily imposed racial segregation and came to value
addressing the issue with one voice." Hutchinson said that although the
eventual outcome in Brown was not a foregone conclusion in 1950, the
cases decided then played "an enormous part in shaping the Court's
thinking about more broad-scaled attacks on segregation." Even though
the Court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of segregation per se,
Hutchinson said the Court's deliberations were far-reaching in scope
and began the internal process that culminated in the segregation cases
of 1954.119
Other scholars have been less laudatory about Vinson's opinions in
Sweatt and McLaurin. In their view the opinions were written in such a
way that they would have limited impact or could be construed in vari-
ous ways, leading to disparate results. For example, Pritchett has argued
The Dilemma of Due Process / 317
that by failing "to come to grips with the essential principle of segrega-
tion by reconsideration of Plessy v. Ferguson . . . the Court would con-
tinue to be besieged with cases in this area." The result, Pritchett said,
was that the constitutionality of any segregated practice would hinge on
the equality or inequality of educational facilities for each race, and
lower courts were bound to produce conflicting determinations, which
they did.120
Lefberg was highly critical of the opinions for similar reasons. He
attacked the "ambiguity of the Chief Justice's words." It was not clear,
Lefberg said, whether Vinson was saying that "separate law school fa-
cilities were presumptively unequal" or that the legal education in "the
particular Negro law school in Texas" was unequal because its tangible
facilities were factually inferior to its white counterpart.121 If Vinson
meant the former, Lefberg said, then clearly the Plessy doctrine was
weakened, but if it meant the latter, then Vinson had merely reaffirmed
cases like Gaines and Sipuel. Lefberg pointed to subsequent cases in
which both federal courts and state courts, and even the Supreme Court
itself, interpreted Sweatt and McLaurin "as merely a refinement of the
Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine." Lefberg argued that in none of the cases
he cited "were Vinson's opinions afforded a construction even remotely
anticipating the Court's revolutionary invalidation of elementary and
secondary segregation" (277).
Vinson himself, no doubt, would have agreed in large part with
Lefberg's assessment. Vinson's son Fred junior once said of his father
that he was "an evolutionary as opposed to a revolutionary."122 Allen, his
law clerk, offered a similar assessment. He said that in approaching is-
sues like the equal protection clause, Vinson "revealed no disposition to
attempt a revolutionary reconstruction of the constitutional law in this
area. He tended to move so far, and only so far, as required to achieve
the immediate objective." Despite this caution, Allen thought there could
be no doubt that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was significantly broadened during his tenure as chief justice.
Vinson sought to achieve this, Allen said, "insofar as possible, within
the traditional framework."123
The Court opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin were an important fac-
tor, although not the only factor, influencing Marshall to launch the next
phase of the NAACP's strategy—an all-out attack on segregation. Three
weeks after the opinions were announced, he convened a conference of
NAACP attorneys to plot the legal strategy that would end legally im-
posed segregation at the elementary and secondary level. Two cases that
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would become the major vehicles for challenging segregation in public
education were already brewing at the lower court level, Briggs v. Elliott
in South Carolina and Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka in Kan-
sas. On June 9, 1952, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
the two cases. Tom Clark recalled that the vote to note jurisdiction was
unanimous, but Burton's conference votes recorded that there were seven
justices who voted to "note" and one, Justice Jackson, who voted to
"hold." Lefberg saw something "mysterious" in the absence of a re-
corded vote for Vinson and concluded, without any corroborating evi-
dence, that the chief justice must have abstained or voted negatively on
the jurisdiction question. Richard Kluger, author of Simple Justice, a
detailed analysis of the Brown case, suggested, however, that not much
should be made of any justice's vote, because only four votes were needed
to grant jurisdiction. Moreover, Kluger cautioned against assuming that
a justice's disposition in a case could be predicted on the basis of his
vote on jurisdiction.124
During the 1952 October term, the Court became more and more
immersed in cases relating to segregation and discrimination. In Octo-
ber the Court consolidated a case from Virginia, Davis v. County School
Board, and a case from Delaware, Gebhart v. Belton, with the Brown
and Briggs cases and also invited petitioners in Boiling v. Sharp, a case
involving segregated schools in the District of Columbia, to file for cer-
tiorari. On December 9, 10, and 11, the Court heard oral arguments in
all of the school segregation cases. Vinson's questions revealed his cau-
tious nature and his concern about the potential effects of ruling that
segregation itself was unconstitutional. It is also evident that he would
have preferred to rely on precedents to address the demands for equal-
ity. To that end, Vinson's questions focused mainly on the issue of equal
facilities. In the Brown case he pressed Robert L. Carter, who argued the
case for the NAACP, on whether the physical facilities were the same in
the two Topeka school systems. Carter admitted that they were but said
that the heart of the case was that "segregation made educational oppor-
tunities inferior." To this Vinson replied, "That is all that you have to
base your segregation issue upon,"125 suggesting that the chief justice
was leery of addressing that issue.
In the Virginia case, he again pressed the counsel for the petitioners
about the issue of equal facilities. In that case the attorney for the peti-
tioner, Spottswood W. Robinson, claimed that the state had actually not
provided tangible equal educational opportunities and that it would be
some time before the schools were equal in this regard; he added that
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even if they were equal, that would not be acceptable. Instead, he ar-
gued, the segregation was the real issue, but the petitioners understood
that it would take time for administrative problems to be worked out to
end it. Vinson asked why he was willing to allow "reasonable time" to
be granted if segregation was held unconstitutional but not to allow the
state time to achieve equal facilities. Robinson replied that even though
there had been a violation of a legal right, it might be necessary for there
to be a delay "incidental to the affording of that remedy." He equated it
with a court order to tear down a house: "The man has got to have a
reasonable opportunity to get the house down." Vinson responded, "A
man might have to have a reasonable opportunity to get out of the house
before it is torn down" (105). In oral argument and in conference, he
kept returning to the idea of the "time factor" as an important consider-
ation in how to approach the question of school desegregation.
The conference on the school desegregation cases was held on De-
cember 13, 1952. Various efforts to document what transpired in the
conference have produced some conflicting stories, but some aspects of
the conference deliberations seem clear. The first attempt to document
the conference debate was Kluger's extensive work on the Brown case,
but since publication of that work, more data have become available and
subsequent investigations have provided different interpretations. Gen-
erally, the more recent interpretations by scholars, such as Hutchinson's
and Tushnet's, have been more generous in their treatment of Vinson's
role than Kluger's was.
One thing that is certain about the December 13 conference is that
there was no clear consensus among the justices about the issues raised
in the desegregation cases; had the justices been asked to decide that
day, odds are good that there would not have been a unanimous deci-
sion. However, the extent of disagreement among the justices is in dis-
pute. Black wrote later that had a vote been taken that day, the decision
would have been five to four to uphold segregation. Frankfurter thought
the Court would have reversed Plessy by a vote of four to five. Burton
and Jackson thought that if Plessy had been reversed, there would have
been between two and four dissenters.126 Another thing that was clear
was Vinson's concern about the impact of a decision declaring segrega-
tion to be unconstitutional. His presentation to the conference focused
on points that he had made in the 1950 graduate education cases. In the
District of Columbia case, Vinson pointed out that segregation had been
imposed there by a Congress of men who had also supported the Four-
teenth Amendment, leading him to believe that they did not consider
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segregated schools to be a violation of the Constitution. Two accounts
show that Vinson attached significance to the facts that Justice John
Marshall Harlan had failed to mention school segregation in his famous
dissent in Plessy and that Harlan had written for a unanimous Court
three years later in a case that inferentially upheld a Georgia state policy
classifying students by race.127 Recently some scholars have stressed
that Harlan's Plessy dissent was driven by the status of the railroads as
common carriers, not by concern for other forms of segregation.128
Vinson thought that Congress could abolish segregation in the Dis-
trict of Columbia but not in the states, but he did not "think much of the
idea," suggested by Jackson in oral arguments, that the Court should
wait for Congress to act. In the state cases, Vinson argued that schools
would have to be made equal and noted that in South Carolina the schools
had been made equal, but it had taken a long time. The problem for
Vinson was reconciling the university cases, where the Court had deter-
mined that the right was "personal." He said applying that doctrine to
the public schools would be more difficult because of the "large num-
bers" involved. He said the Court could not close its eyes "to problems
in various parts of the country" or to the seriousness of the time prob-
lem. Vinson noted that they were not supposed to take the possible reac-
tion into account, but he said, "I can't throw it all off. When you face the
complete abolition of public schools in some areas then it is most seri-
ous." Then, in a sentence often overlooked, but documented in at least
three accounts, Vinson said, "Boldness is essential but wisdom is indis-
pensable."129
At the end of the conference, at least four of the justices—Black,
Douglas, Burton, and Minton—had indicated a willingness to overturn
segregation, although each had some reservations about the speed with
which such a decision should be implemented. Reed was recorded as
saying that he would vote to uphold segregation. That left Vinson, Frank-
furter, Jackson, and Clark with reservations but no firm stand. Tushnet
concluded that there was in fact more unanimity than appeared, that
those who would have voted to overturn Plessy were not overly enthusi-
astic and that the rest were ambivalent. "If push had come to shove,"
Tushnet wrote, "a majority probably would have overruled Plessy. But
. . . no one was willing to push hard enough." Vinson, who as chief
justice was a likely candidate to assume such a role, was too ambivalent,
as was Frankfurter, the other likely justice to assume the leadership role.
Frankfurter's ambivalence stemmed from his concern about whether a
"legally satisfactory opinion overruling Plessy could be written."130
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Of all the justices with doubts, Jackson's views appeared to be the
closest to Vinson's, especially in terms of the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment and how the Court had interpreted the equal protection
clause over a long span of time. They both saw the issue as more a
question of politics than of law.131 As a lawyer, Jackson could not bring
himself to conclude that segregation was unconstitutional, even though
he doubted the fairness and wisdom of maintaining such a policy. He
was troubled by the petitioners' reliance on sociological and psycho-
logical arguments to make the case that segregation was inherently un-
equal, which did not seem to bother Vinson; but like Vinson, Jackson
was concerned about the effects of overturning a precedent of nearly
sixty years. Whereas Vinson agonized about the social turmoil that might
result, Jackson worried about the "the nation's respect for 'a supposedly
stable organic law'" (604). Like Vinson, Jackson was concerned about
the differences among the justices. Both men are reported to have asked
that no formal vote be taken at the conference.132
Frankfurter, who was Jackson's closest ally on the Court, was caught
in a dilemma. He personally thought that segregation was wrong and
that in the District of Columbia, the Court could outlaw it as a matter of
due process. The issue of segregation in the states was more problem-
atic. He also questioned how it was possible to say with certainty, as
Black did, that the Fourteenth Amendment intended to abolish segrega-
tion, and he too thought it would be a mistake to decide the issue on the
basis of sociological arguments.133 Frankfurter's biggest problem was
coming to grips with Jackson's arguments that segregation could not be
overturned as a matter of law and that thus the decision would be more
political than constitutional. Frankfurter, avowedly against the idea of
reaching a decision not based on the law, was unable to resolve his di-
lemma and suggested the idea that the cases be set for reargument.
Despite the reservations of these various justices, Tushnet concluded
after a careful analysis of the Court's discussion that all of the justices
except Reed were willing to "go along" with a desegregation decision if
it was based on gradual compliance and that even Reed's views would
have allowed him to join in that result. What stood in the way of una-
nimity was not differences over merits, "but division over how to justify
the results." Mainly the discussions were the justices "talking through
their concerns about what they knew they were going to do" (194). The
justices were aware that whatever they decided would have to be a united
vote and that it would take time to find a course they could all agree
upon. As the term was coming to an end, in May 1953, Frankfurter per-
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Vinson at a luncheon on February 6,1953, with President Eisenhower and other mem-
bers of the Court. (Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library.)
suaded his colleagues to set the cases for reargument in the next term.
He proposed to the conference a list of five questions for discussion at
reargument that would be submitted to both parties. On June 8, 1953,
the Court assigned all five segregation cases to the docket for argument
on October 12, 1953.
In the interim between the December conference on the segregation
cases and the announcement that the cases would be set for reargument
in October, the Court wrestled with two other highly visible issues of
racial discrimination—voting and housing. In Terry v. Adams (1953),134
the Court declared unconstitutional the all-white primary held by the
Jaybird Association, a county political organization in Texas. The Jay-
bird primary, held before the Democratic Party primary, allowed only
whites to vote. The nominees chosen by the association were automati-
cally put on the ballot for the party primary without any indication that
they had been nominated by the organization. The petitioners challenged
the Jaybird primary as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, which
prohibited states from denying the right to vote on the basis of race.
They determined that the actions of the Jaybird Association did consti-
tute state action and ruled that the primary held by the organization was
unconstitutional. Vinson agreed with the majority.
The Dilemma of Due Process / 323
Far more problematic for Vinson was the case of Barrows v. Jack-
son.n5 This was a restrictive-covenant case that represented the fallout
from the Shelley ruling. In Barrows one white property owner sued an-
other for damages because she violated the terms of a restrictive cov-
enant by selling her property to a non-Caucasian. In her defense the
second property owner claimed that it would be a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment for the state to award damages against her, because
in doing so they were upholding a policy that discriminated against non-
whites. For the petitioner to make a claim in behalf of a third party not
immediately embroiled in the suit raised the issue of standing, a rule
that allows only those persons directly affected by a situation to have
their concerns addressed by the Court. Unless the issue of standing could
be addressed, discrimination resulting from restrictive covenants would
continue. The Court's opinion in Shelley had held only that a state court
could not enforce a restrictive covenant. It had not prohibited a suit for
damages in a state court.
Minton, the lone dissenter in Terry, wrote the majority opinion in
Barrows, which concluded that the petitioner could invoke the rights of
a third party. Minton solved the problem of standing by relying on a
precedent from a previous case, in which private schools were allowed
to challenge a state statute requiring all parents to send their children to
public schools as a violation of the parents' constitutional rights, even
though no parent affected by the statute sought redress from the Court.
Minton drew the support of all the participating justices except Vinson.
Reed and Jackson did not participate.
The chief justice wrote a forceful and bitter dissent. He took excep-
tion to several aspects of the majority opinion. First, he said it had mis-
construed the Shelley decision, and he proceeded to distinguish between
the two cases. In Shelley, he said, the Court did not strike down restric-
tive covenants but rather the judicial enforcement of them to deny rights
based on race. In Barrows Vinson charged that the majority had identi-
fied no non-Caucasian who had been injured or could be injured if dam-
ages were assessed against the person who violated the covenant. He
accused the Court of reaching its decision in the case and then contriv-
ing a vehicle for hearing the case, which he thought the Court should not
have heard. Vinson was clearly irritated that the Court had violated what
he considered the long-standing principle that the Court should refrain
"from imposing a novel constitutional limitation" upon the power of the
state courts to enforce contract laws as they chose. He chided the Court
for cavalierly abandoning its principle of "self-restraint," saying he could
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not "assent to a manner of vindicating constitutional rights of persons
unknown which puts personal predisposition in a paramount position
over well-established positions of power" (267). He reiterated in the
conclusion of his dissent the idea that the majority had given in to their
personal predilections. He said, "We must rest our decision on the Con-
stitution alone, we must set aside predilections on social policy and ad-
here to the settled rules which restrict the exercise of our power of judicial
review—remembering that the only restraint upon this power is our own
sense of self-restraint" (269).
Vinson's critics point to his dissent in Barrows as strong evidence
that he was not truly committed to the cause of equal rights. Lefberg, for
example, described Vinson's dissent in Barrows as a "product of a con-
servative judicial mind. It is the decision of a Justice for whom 'racial
equality' occupied a lower position on the hierarchy of human values
than 'judicial restraint.'" In Lefberg's view, Vinson's behavior puts in
doubt any civil libertarian reputation he might have earned as the result
of Shelley. Lefberg concluded that Vinson "occupied the most conserva-
tive position on the Court among those deciding Shelley."136 It is ironic
that Lefberg took Vinson to task for defending the property rights of
those who form restrictive covenants by adhering to judicial restraint,
for only two decades earlier it was the liberals who attacked the Court
for judicial activism. Once the liberals gained control of the Court, how-
ever, they abandoned their animosity to judicial activism and began to
pursue an agenda that promoted activism in behalf of "personal rights."
Property rights, once considered the bastion of individual freedom, were
relegated to a lower rung on the hierarchy on individual rights.137
The Barrows opinion was handed down on June 15, one week after
the Court announced the school desegregation cases for reargument. On
the heels of these pronouncements, the Court became embroiled in the
numerous appeals over the pending execution of the Rosenbergs. The
bitterness generated by that dispute did not bode well for the coming
term of the Court, when it would have to take up once again the segrega-
tion cases. Fate intervened, however, to change forever the Court's course
of action. Chief Justice Vinson died of a massive heart attack at his home
on the morning of September 8, 1953.
The reaction among the justices varied. Sherman Minton was dev-
astated and had nothing but words of praise for his friend and colleague.
He said: "Fred Vinson was a great Chief Justice because he was a great
lawyer with a background of experience in government unexcelled by
anyone. He was a prodigious worker with a capacity for friendship which
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gave him leadership. He was ever kind and considerate, which endeared
him to all. His death is a great loss to the Court and the country and I
grieve for the death of a great friend."138 Minton wrote to Vinson's widow,
Roberta, that "outside of his family, no one loved him more than I."139
Harold Burton also wrote kind words about the chief justice. In his
diary for September 8, 1953, he wrote, "He was a great friend to me
[and] he contributed much not only to the stability of the court but to the
development and strengthening of the Conference of the U.S. (of Chief
Judges of the 11 Circuits)."140 The most widely reported response of any
of the justices, and without doubt the most uncharitable, was a state-
ment Frankfurter made to his former law clerk, Philip Elman, who met
Frankfurter at the train station when he returned to the capital for Vinson's
funeral service. "Phil," Frankfurter said, "this is the first solid piece of
evidence I've ever had that there really is a God." Elman at the time was
working in the Solicitor General's Office, and Frankfurter had kept him
apprised of how the justices were responding to the civil rights cases.
Elman, even less charitable than his mentor, said three decades later that
Frankfurter was right. "Without God," Elman said, "we never would
have had Brown, a unanimous decision that racial segregation is uncon-
stitutional. Without God, the Court would have remained bitterly di-
vided, fragmented, unable to decide the issue forthrightly.... God won
Brown v. Board of Education, not Thurgood Marshall, or any other law-
yer or any other mortal. God intervened.... He took care of the Ameri-
can people and little children and Brown by taking Fred Vinson when he
did."141
Elman's zeal in promoting God as the force behind Brown was al-
most matched in his praise of the role Frankfurter played in helping the
Court to reach a unanimous decision. The tenor of his remarks serves as
an example of why Vinson's role in expanding civil rights tended to be
denigrated in many of the earlier historical accounts of the Brown deci-
sion. Tushnet wrote a detailed analysis of what went on behind the scenes
at the Court as the justices struggled with how to respond to the cases
brought by the NAACP. Tushnet's interpretation examined the roles of
the key justices from two perspectives, the "standard version," which
favored Frankfurter's contributions, and the "alternative version" con-
structed by himself, which is more favorable to Vinson. According to
Tushnet, the standard interpretation relied heavily on Frankfurter's own
accounts and became the accepted version because Frankfurter produced
through numerous memoranda and letters more evidence than any of
the other justices. Although there was other evidence, it tended to be
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overlooked by those writing the standard version, many of whom were
Frankfurter's former clerks, with whom he maintained close personal
ties. Many of his clerks became academics and played an important role
in "conveying to the legal academy the sense that Frankfurter was a
wise and insightful man."142
Tushnet argued that Frankfurter's role is overblown in the standard
version and that what it failed to account for is that starting in 1952 and
continuing until 1954, Frankfurter was largely responsible for the Court's
delaying a decision. In the alternative version constructed by Tushnet,
Vinson is shown to be far less opposed to overturning segregation than
is usually assumed. For example, Tushnet pointed out that nowhere in
his conference statement did Vinson commit himself either to reaffirm-
ing or to overruling the separate-but-equal doctrine, "but on balance the
tone of his comments suggests that he would go along with a decision
by a majority of the Court to hold segregation unconstitutional, as he
had gone along in the university cases despite his initial inclination the
other way" (1903—4). Tushnet said Vinson's line that "boldness is essen-
tial but wisdom is indispensable" was a good indication that he under-
stood that the Court had to invalidate segregation.143
Following the Brown decision, several of the justices claimed that if
the decision had been made while Vinson was chief justice, it would not
have been unanimous, and possibly the Court would have upheld segre-
gation. Among those making such a claim was Frankfurter, who wrote
to his longtime friend Learned Hand that the road to unanimity in Brown
was long, but that "it would not have come to pass with Vinson." He
wrote similar statements to other colleagues.144 Tushnet suggested that
such conclusions were overstated because they failed to take into ac-
count the ambivalence shown by both Frankfurter and Jackson and to
recognize the possibility that potential dissenters might have been per-
suaded to go along with the majority. Tushnet saw Frankfurter as the
crux of the problem in reaching a decision. He could not be swayed by
the argument put forth by Jackson, who was willing to approach the
decision as a political one because he was convinced that overturning
segregation could not be grounded in the law. Frankfurter could not go
along unless he could be convinced that the ruling was based in law.
Caught between his desire to see segregation ended and his need to ren-
der a decision justified by law, Frankfurter wanted more time. His pro-
posal to reargue the cases was designed to stall for time, mainly so that
he could find a course that was satisfactory to him. In pursuit of that
objective, he had his clerk, Alexander Bickel, conduct extensive research
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on the origins and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bickel started
his research in the 1952 term but did not complete it until the summer of
1953. He reported to Frankfurter that the legislative history provided
"no evidence" that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
to outlaw school segregation. At the same time, Bickel said, the legisla-
tive history "did not foreclose future generations from acting on the
question either by congressional statute or by judicial review."145 Bickel's
memo proved critical to the eventual result in Brown, for it allowed
Frankfurter to see a way out of his dilemma. It allowed him to claim that
the decision to overturn desegregation would be a judicial decision rather
than a political one.
Although Vinson fared better in Tushnet's account, he does not come
off as one who played a leadership role in helping the justices find a
resolution for their dilemma. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say with cer-
tainty how the Court would have decided Brown under his tenure. The
available evidence does suggest that he was amenable to the idea of
overturning segregation if it could be done on a gradual basis. It was not
his intent, but Lefberg, one of Vinson's harshest critics, provided evi-
dence that Vinson eventually would have agreed to end segregation. He
classified Vinson as a conservative who was philosophically opposed to
expanding civil rights, and he sought to explain why Vinson voted as he
did in Shelley, Sweatt, and McLaurin. Finding nothing in Vinson's own
philosophy that would explain such votes, he offered two other explana-
tions. One was that Vinson voted out of loyalty to Truman, who pushed
for desegregation through the executive branch, and the other was
Vinson's strong stance against Communism. Lefberg thought that Vinson,
with his strong animosity toward Communism, was influenced by the
argument promoted by the President's Committee on Civil Rights as
well as others that the treatment of African Americans by the United
States was the key to our success in the battle against Communism.146 If
these were Vinson's reasons for ending segregation in higher education,
Lefberg offers no reason why they would have been less significant in
his decision in Brown.
If Vinson did finally conclude that segregation must end, then it is
reasonable to conclude that he would have worked, as he did in Sweatt
and McLaurin, to bring about a unanimous decision. After all, one of
Vinson's most strongly held convictions was the importance of unanim-
ity to the institutional integrity of the Court. Though he failed miserably
in unifying the Court on so many other issues, he deserves some credit
for working to achieve unanimity in the civil rights cases. Hutchinson
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argued that unanimity in the 1950 Trilogy "exercised a kind of hydrau-
lic pressure on the reservations expressed in 1950 by Reed and Clark—
two of the justices most uncomfortable with broad based challenges to
segregation." Hutchinson also concluded that "if Vinson could have over-
come his concern with the timing and scope of relief in Brown and its
companion cases, it is probable . . . that Vinson—not Warren—could
have authored the unanimous decisions in 1954."147 Certainly there could
be no doubt that the result in Brown would have been a far less likely
outcome in 1954 if Sweatt and Painter had not been unanimous or, worse
yet, if the decision had gone the other way.
Assessments of Vinson's brief tenure as chief justice, especially from
the scholarly community, have generally been more negative than fa-
vorable. Some of his harshest critics have branded him "a failure," a
label that has taken hold and frequently been perpetuated without more
thorough and objective analysis. Those who have examined his record
with more diligence have provided accounts that portray Vinson more
fairly and with greater balance.148 In important respects, he did not pro-
vide the kind of leadership that the divided court needed, but at the same
time he did leave an imprint on the institution at a crucial time in its
history.
Vinson's most visible failures were his inability to unite the Court
and his limited contribution to the ongoing philosophical debates among
the justices over the proper role of the Court in the political system and
the questions about incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vinson inherited a Court
wracked with personal rivalries and a reputation for divisiveness, as evi-
denced by the large number of nonunanimous opinions. Although Vinson
cannot be credited with ending the personal animosities altogether, they
at least receded into the background and ceased to be the subject of
journalistic fodder. Bolner observed that Vinson "engendered a healthier
atmosphere among the Court members [and] this made it possible for
the Court to carry on the discussion of the proper limits of judicial
power."149 However, if measured by the number of nonunanimous opin-
ions, the Court became even more divided under Vinson than under his
predecessor, Stone. The number of concurring and dissenting opinions
increased, from 64 per cent of all opinions written in Stone's last term to
81 per cent in Vinson's last term.150 He was continually troubled by the
lack of unity because he thought it damaged the reputation of the Court.
Vinson tried to lead by example, writing only three concurring opinions
and thirteen dissenting opinions during his seven years on the bench.
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However, he was unable to convince some of his colleagues to follow
his lead.
Vinson proved no more capable of effecting compromise among the
Brethren in the all-important debates over the proper extent of judicial
power in a democratic society and the fundamental issue of the extent to
which the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated
into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this task,
Vinson's role was hampered by the intellectual prowess of the protago-
nists, Frankfurter and Black and their allies Jackson and Douglas, and
the absence of a consistent judicial philosophy of his own. Vinson was
by nature a pragmatist, a problem solver, "a man of action," and these
traits that had served him so well in his previous experiences in govern-
ment did not fit so congruently with the intellectual sparring of the other
justices over constitutional interpretation and nuances in wording. He
was good at negotiating solutions to problems and was not given to specu-
lating about long-term consequences. To him a good decision was one
that could generate enough consensus to be acceptable. He was not in-
terested in breaking new ground. His opinions were narrowly drawn to
fit a specific situation, and he was not concerned with setting precedents
for the future. This trait is reflected clearly in three of his most famous
opinions—United Mine Workers, Dennis, and Youngstown. In each of
these cases, Vinson saw an urgent need and found a way to address it.
He was much more concerned with the practical consequences of the
decision than with long-term implications. As his law clerk Allen said,
"he was reluctant to sacrifice a clear present advantage in the interest of
a remote and speculative future gain."151
Vinson's pragmatism clashed, sometimes bitterly, with the inclina-
tion of his more intellectual colleagues to define issues in broader terms
even if it meant overturning an existing precedent or moving the Court
in new directions. Vinson liked to resolve cases whenever possible on
the basis of precedent, and reliance on precedent meant a cautious ap-
proach in determining the law. This trait antagonized some liberals who
wanted him to move more quickly to overturn the separate-but-equal
doctrine in public education. His adherence to precedent was prominent
in his rebuke to his colleagues in his dissent in Barrows, the only time
he ever dissented alone. It is also present in the Dennis decision, where
he struggled to fit his opinion into the Holmes-Brandeis "clear and present
danger" legacy.
Vinson's problem-solving approach led him to side with the gov-
ernment in most cases. He had a strong faith in the power of government
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to develop solutions to society's problems, and this belief was most pro-
nounced in cases where he thought social order was threatened. Vinson
had an unqualified belief that the only way to promote freedom was to
have order and security in society. Without order, there could be no free-
dom, and to this end Vinson thought that the first task of the Court was
to uphold the rule of law. This belief led him to support the government
in cases like the United Mine Workers, where he was incensed that Lewis
and the UMW had tried to defy a court order; in Dennis, where he thought
the nation's security was at risk from Communist activities; in Young-
stown, where he thought the president should have the power to protect
our national interest during a war; and in search and seizure cases like
Harris, where he thought law enforcement agents, acting on "good faith,"
were entitled to take evidence obtained incident to an arrest.
Vinson's strong support of the government was in large part a func-
tion of his philosophy of judicial restraint and the belief that in a demo-
cratic society judges were obligated to show deference to legislatures.
Given his own experiences, Vinson thought the legislative branch was
the best place for the resolution of society's conflict, and he was reluc-
tant to upset a consensus reached by representatives of the people. This
approach produced sharp conflicts with his more libertarian colleagues
like Black and Douglas in cases involving civil liberties and with Frank-
furter in the search and seizure cases. In all of these cases, Vinson tried
to balance the needs of government against the rights of the individual,
and he almost always came down on the side of government. It is in this
area of the law, more than any other, that Vinson's record generates the
harshest criticism. His decisions upholding government restrictions on
political speech of nonconformists such as Douds and Dennis have been
targeted as his worst decisions because of their antilibertarianism. Even
his supporters have found it hard to defend them. Yet, as it turned out,
Vinson's perceptions about the threat of Communist subversion in the
United States was not as far-fetched as his critics maintained. More re-
cent scholarship has shown that Communist infiltration of the govern-
ment was far more extensive than many liberals at the time believed to
be the case.152
Vinson has been criticized by some Court scholars for interrupting
the Stone Court's efforts to expand individual rights, but in reality the
picture is more complex. Urofsky described both the Stone and Vinson
Courts as transitional courts, caught in the changing perspectives among
conservatives and liberals about the virtues of judicial restraint and ju-
dicial activism. Before 1937 conservatives applauded judicial activism
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when the Court struck down economic regulations imposed by govern-
ment as violations of property rights protected under the Constitution.
Liberals decried this activism. Under Stone and then Vinson, the views
of activism began to shift. Activism in striking down legislative restric-
tion on civil liberties met with approval by liberals but not by conserva-
tives. Although Vinson himself was more inclined to follow restraint in
issues involving civil liberties, the Court under his tenure continued the
trend toward elevating civil liberties, such as speech and press, to a pre-
ferred position over economic rights.153 With the exception of Barrows,
Vinson showed no strong interest in defending the rights of property
owners.
Although Vinson was an advocate of relying on precedent and ad-
hering to judicial restraint and was favorably disposed to the government's
exercise of power, he was not completely rigid in his approach. He stated
many times in his opinions that he was leery of broad generalizations
and absolutist positions. Thus, he did not always follow judicial restraint,
adhere to precedent, or side with government. Further, Vinson recog-
nized that there were certain cases that required a different approach, a
political approach. According to Paul Kelley, who served as Vinson's
confidential secretary and aid for approximately seventeen years, the
chief justice distinguished between two types of cases—political cases
and ordinary cases. Political cases were those whose issues were the
topic of widespread public discussion and required the application of
different standards. As a result they "had to be decided with an eye to
the total situation or to as much of the situation as the judges could
grasp."154 Dennis, United Mine Workers, and the steel seizure case would
fall into the category of political cases.
What Vinson brought to the Court during his tenure as chief justice
was the mind of a politician. In that respect it was important to him that
the Court maintain the respect and support of the average citizen. That
is why he tried to nudge the Court toward greater unanimity in its opin-
ions, and it also explains in part the brevity and succinctness of his opin-
ions. Willard Pedrick, Vinson's law clerk on the circuit court of appeals,
recalled his boss's admonition that the court's opinions should not be
"too fancy.... We're trying to communicate so the folks back home can
understand it."155 In the end, Vinson's political instincts may have served
the Court well as it tried to steer a course through some of the most
politically charged issues ever to confront the Court. To the extent that
his cautious and pragmatic approach kept the Court from veering too far
from the realm of public acceptability, he helped to insulate it from pub-
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lie censure that might have undermined its effectiveness by generating
disobedience or outright resistance to its pronouncements. His goal of
maintaining continuity with the past through relying on precedent, while
inching forward in areas like equal protection, helped establish the legiti-
macy for the Warren Court to overturn the separate-but-equal doctrine.
Consistent with his view of how a democracy ought to work, Vinson
sought to balance the competing interests of society and the individual
and to weigh the benefits of an immediate solution against a long-term
advantage. Although his critics on and off the Court thought his scales
were weighted too often toward the government and short-term necessi-
ties, he himself believed that democracy was better served through a
moderate course than one of extremism. In Vinson's political view, leg-
islatures, with the give-and-take of competing interests, were better suited
to adopt social reforms, but that did not mean that the Court could avoid
the responsibility for resolving social problems in the proper circum-
stances. When those circumstances presented themselves, the Court had
to act, as it did in the cases involving equal protection. It is in those areas
of the law where Vinson's legacy was more long-term.
Why was Vinson less willing to show deference to the legislative
will in the matter of equal rights than in other areas of policy? A plau-
sible explanation is that Vinson sensed that the time had come, that there
was a certain inevitability about social reform that the Court had to ac-
commodate. Following World War II, the United States began to experi-
ence significant social, economic, and political changes that affected
the attitudes of Americans about race. Some of the influences on both
black and white attitudes during that period were the contradiction of
racial discrimination following a war fought against a country whose
leaders espoused racial superiority; the demands on American foreign
policy to demonstrate a commitment to egalitarianism at the height of
the Cold War; and the expansion of urbanization and industrialization of
the country that led to increased social and economic integration of the
nation, enhanced economic opportunity, and eroded southern insularity.
Klarman and Rosenberg, in separate works, examined these changes
and theorized that they offer the best explanation as to why the Supreme
Court could render its unanimous Brown decision in 1954, when a de-
cade earlier it would have been considered unthinkable.156 During
Vinson's tenure as chief justice, these forces translated into a political
imperative that drove the Truman administration's policies aimed at dis-
mantling segregation and ultimately influenced Vinson.
Epilogue
Baseball Commissioner Fred M. Vinson? President Fred M. Vinson? At
the midway point of the twentieth century, it seemed altogether possible
that yet another position of power and prestige, even the highest office
in the land, was in store for the folksy, bushy-browed man from eastern
Kentucky. Fred M. Vinson had been, after all, a man for all seasons
during the decade of the forties, frequently and effortlessly moving from
one job of importance to the next with calm and confidence. If a vacuum
on the national scene existed, the public had come to expect that it would
be filled by Vinson. He joked at one time, "If I were to be assigned to all
the jobs that the press had indicated I am to be appointed to, I would
have to be more than a single individual."1 Although he might have been
tempted by the prospect of becoming czar of the game he loved so pas-
sionately and flattered to be widely and prominently mentioned as a
possible Democratic presidential candidate in 1952, he declined to pur-
sue either venture, choosing instead to remain in the last office he would
ever hold—chief justice of the United States.
When Happy Chandler lost his job as commissioner of baseball in
1951, Vinson was on the list of possible replacements. To someone as
crazy about baseball as Vinson, the chance to while away lazy summer
afternoons in a box seat at the ballpark must have been alluring. It sure
had to beat presiding over long and contentious Saturday conferences at
the Supreme Court or listening to Felix Frankfurter drone on ad nau-
seam. The handsome salary, double what he made as chief justice, also
had to be appealing to Vinson, who was never very far removed from
indebtedness. In the end, though, he followed his mind and not his heart,
deciding that it would defile the dignity of the judiciary if its top officer
left to take a position in the slightly soiled and frivolous world of base-
ball.
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Resigning from the Court to run for president, something Harry
Truman fervently tried to get Vinson to do, would have been more un-
derstandable and more palatable to the public. But Vinson resisted his
friend's overtures and those of others, explaining that his wife was ada-
mantly opposed to the idea. She was concerned about his health, and
rightly so. Vinson was an old sixty-two in the election year of 1952. He
was overweight, devoured unfiltered Camels, disdained exercise, and
heartily ate high-fat meals that would sound the alarms by today's stan-
dards. Vinson himself was not all that keen on the notion of getting into
the race. As he explained to an old colleague from Congress who was
touting him as presidential material, "There is none of the virus of that
type in my blood. My sole desire and ambition is to assist in maintaining
and securing the respect of the country for the Court and its product."2
Whether another Democratic candidate would have fared any better
against the wildly popular war hero Gen. Dwight Eisenhower than did
Adlai Stevenson is, of course, unknown. Still, there was a certain logic
to a Vinson candidacy. He was the stuff of American legends: born in a
small town to parents of meager means; became a scholar and star ath-
lete at an elite, private college through raw intelligence, hard work, and
determination; married his hometown sweetheart; won election after
election with the support of Republicans as well as Democrats; sat at the
right hand of presidents to help them in times of war and peace; and
took on the job as chief justice to restore respect for a fractured Supreme
Court. A modern-day campaign strategist would have had a field day
extolling, without needing to resort to embellishment, the values and
virtues of Vinson, a man without enemies. He was the genuine article.
He had been near or at the throttle of power in Washington for almost
three decades, but he remained humble, unassuming, and approachable.
The essence of Vinson was captured by a photograph in a Life magazine
spread shortly after he was named chief justice. There on a Louisa street
corner stands the newly appointed head of the judiciary branch of the
federal government—in suit and tie, hat in one hand, cigarette in the
other—shooting the breeze with four just plain folks. His idea of a good
time was staying home in his hotel apartment on a Sunday evening to
play bridge with his son Fred and a few of Fred's friends.
"Ike" versus "Fred" would have been an interesting race, pitting
two men who were good friends and who had much in common. Both
were born in 1890 and both were imbued with the character, discipline,
and sense of purpose that came from being raised amid struggle in
America's heartland at the turn of the century. It is hard to conceive that
Epilogue / 335
these two dignified and reserved men would have engaged in anything
approaching negative campaigning, although Eisenhower's running mate,
Richard Nixon, might well have dredged up Harry Dexter White to tar
Vinson for not dismissing his former Treasury Department assistant over
allegations of Communist activities.
But by 1952, Vinson had not run in an election for sixteen years, and
it is highly unlikely that he would have had the energy and stamina to
wage a national campaign over the course of many months. Wisely, he
remained on the sidelines during the presidential season, content to re-
strict his participation to the swearing in of Dwight David Eisenhower
as the nation's thirty-fourth president on January 20,1953. Inauguration
Day was a bittersweet one for the Vinsons. They were thrilled to be with
the new president on the reviewing stand during the inaugural parade,
but then they had to dash off to Union Station to say good-bye to their
friends Harry and Bess Truman. Writing about the day to her son Jimmy,
then in army basic training, Roberta said, "We were heartbroken to see
the Trumans leave, and I wept a little after the train pulled out. It is the
end of an era for us."3 Still, she said, it had been quite a day for her. "The
new President called me darling, and the outgoing President kissed me
before some thousand people." Although Vinson's relationship with the
new occupant of the White House obviously was not to be on par with
the one he had enjoyed with Truman, he did occasionally go to the White
House to play bridge with Eisenhower.
No sooner had the exuberance of the inauguration subsided when
another cause for celebration graced the Vinson household. The news
came that Jimmy's wife, Peggy, was pregnant. And when a baby boy
arrived in early August, the Vinsons were elated to have "entered the
circle of grandparents," as the proud grandfather wrote in a letter to his
daughter-in-law. He noted that Roberta had "cried and cried with joy" at
hearing the news. "They have a saying down Kentucky-way," he contin-
ued, "that the Vinsons are wild about their children." He said he had
talked about wanting a girl, but, "Frankly, I always wanted a boy. I would
love it just as much if it hadn't been a boy, but I am particularly proud to
know that my name will be carried on."4
Sherman Minton, Vinson's colleague on the Court and friend, wrote
to welcome him into "the Ancient and Decrepit Order of Grandfathers,"
adding, "I can assure you there is nothing more satisfying than a grand-
child."5 In his reply of thanks, Vinson said he and Roberta "try to be
convinced that he is the only grandchild. However, in recalling the se-
raphic smiles which I have seen on the faces of Grandpas Black, Reed,
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Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Clark, and yourself, I realize that those of us
who are only Grandpa once must take a back seat."6
In late August the Vinsons went to Kentucky to see their grandson,
James Robert Vinson Jr. They returned to Washington a few days later
armed with glowing accounts of the baby and a stack of photographs of
the newest member of the Vinson clan. The joy that blessed event brought
to the family would soon be overshadowed by the devastating blow that
struck in the early morning hours of September 8, 1953.
Vinson, who had not been seriously ill, went to bed at his home in
Washington the night before, complaining of a slight attack of indiges-
tion. He woke at 2:30 the following morning in considerable pain and
breathing with difficulty. Roberta and Fred junior, who was staying with
his parents at their hotel apartment, called the family physician. But
before he could arrive, Fred M. Vinson, the thirteenth chief justice of the
United States, had died of a heart attack at age sixty-three.
As word spread of Vinson's unexpected death, heartfelt expressions
of shock and grief began pouring forth. His only surviving sibling, his
sister Miss Lou, was in seclusion at home in Louisa and was "torn all to
pieces," a relative said. In his statement, President Eisenhower, who
was vacationing at the summer White House in Denver, called Vinson
an outstanding citizen who had served "with efficiency, dignity and in-
tegrity" in all three branches of national government.7 He proclaimed a
thirty-day period of mourning and directed that the national flag be flown
at half-staff. From his home in Independence, former president Truman,
shaken by the news that his intimate friend had died, hailed Vinson as "a
great man and a great justice as well as a great citizen of the country."8 Vice
President Nixon, Cabinet members, fellow justices, and congressional Re-
publicans and Democrats added their tributes to Vinson. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles said, "The whole nation will rightly mourn his passing,"
adding that his was also a personal loss, "because I was honored to have
the Chief Justice include me among his friends." Republican senator
Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin said that although many might have dif-
fered with Vinson, including members of his own Court, "I haven't ever
met an American who didn't like Fred personally or who didn't respect
him for his personal integrity, his warm genial disposition, his love of
country." Justice Robert H. Jackson said Vinson brought to the court "the
practical viewpoint of the country lawyer, the legislative experience of
long service in Congress and the teaching of several important posts in the
executive branch." Senate Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson said Vinson's
concept of public service "should serve as a standard for all time to come."
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To honor his personal traits of modesty, simplicity, and humility,
Vinson's family decided that he would lie in state in the unpretentious
surroundings of a Washington funeral home rather than having the pomp
and ceremony of a state funeral in the Capitol rotunda to which he was
entitled. Hundreds filed past the open plain mahogany casket, which
was devoid of flowers, candles, or a flag, to pay their last respects. Ser-
vices followed in Washington Cathedral and then the next day in the
Louisa Methodist Church. Eisenhower, interrupting his vacation, flew
in from Colorado for the Washington funeral, and Truman came by train
from Missouri. It was their first face-to-face meeting since Inauguration
Day in January. Eisenhower, who had spent many hours playing bridge
with Vinson, was described as "grave but dry-eyed during the ceremony."
Truman, his face drawn and gray, stood silently as others in the cathe-
dral sang "Abide with Me," one of Vinson's favorite hymns. A newspa-
per account said that behind his gold-rimmed glasses, "Truman appeared
to be blinking back the tears."
A special train carried the body back to Louisa for a brief, simple
service at the small red brick church that was located across the town
square from where Vinson was born. Just two years before at the dedica-
tion of a monolith to him in the square, Vinson had said: "From where I
stand, I see my birthplace. I see my school and its playground, where
my education began. Over there is the temple of justice [the courthouse]
where my career in law began. And there is the temple of my faith,"
pointing to the church.9 On the afternoon of the funeral, schools were
closed and all businesses shut down. Supreme Court justices; Kentucky
governor Lawrence Wetherby; Kentucky's U.S. senators, John Sherman
Cooper and Earle Clements; House Speaker Sam Rayburn; and Alben
Barkley, former vice president and U.S. senator from Kentucky, were
among those who filled the three hundred seats in the tiny church for the
funeral. Hundreds of others stood outside on the square listening to the
service over loudspeakers. Kentucky congressman Noble Gregory, de-
scribing the services in a letter to Vinson's longtime House colleague
Robert Doughton of North Carolina, said, "I have never seen a tribute
more genuine or more American than that demonstrated by his friends
in Kentucky and elsewhere who gathered for the final rites. These people
represented all walks of life, all avocations, and all creeds." Besides the
dignitaries, the mourners were "farmers, laborers and plain citizens, men
in overalls and working clothes, but all with the same thought and ob-
jective—to pay tribute to a great man," Gregory said.
The minister officiating, a part-time preacher and part-time school-
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teacher, selected for his reading the first chapter of Joshua and its refer-
ence to Moses as servant and leader. Gregory said he "paraphrased this
biblical reference and compared it to Fred with the exhortation that even
though our leader is gone, we should move forward—that we should go
ahead." The trek to the local cemetery and the family plot on a hill over-
looking Louisa followed. "The grave side service was simple with hun-
dreds of people there paying tribute to one they loved, to a local boy
buried in judicial robe and one who started there sixty-three years ago
and who had reached the highest pinnacle in his profession, but still a
local boy," Gregory wrote. "This to me was and is America."10
A year after Vinson's death, according to tradition, the Supreme
Court and members of its bar held memorial services to honor him. A
host of prominent figures from the nation's legal fraternity, including
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, and So-
licitor General Simon Sobeloff, paid tribute to Vinson's government ser-
vice and personal virtues. Warren said, "Although he rose from humble
beginnings to the highest offices in all three branches of our govern-
ment, he never lost his understanding of people-—that common touch
and good judgment so essential in one who attains such heights."11 He
noted that Vinson "had devoted practically all of his mature years to
rendering valuable service for his country." In discussing Vinson's time
on the District of Columbia court of appeals, Brownell said that Vinson
"was a stickler for facts and studied each record with great care. Lack-
ing pretense and despising sham, he would not hesitate to pierce the
armor of any attorney who dared advance an untenable argument or one
not based on the record." Yet, he continued, Vinson was also so consid-
erate, gentle, and courteous that off the bench, "in meeting a young at-
torney, the 'Chief did not permit the occasion to pass without offering a
kind word of encouragement." Brownell said Vinson's most outstand-
ing quality was his complete devotion to duty. "When the country called
upon him to render service to it he responded without the slightest hesi-
tation or thought of personal sacrifice. The circumstances surrounding
his resignation from the Court of Appeals testify to the high sense of
duty which actuated him."12 Sobeloff, who traced Vinson's life from
beginning to end, said Vinson graced every role he held. "To each task
he gave his best with genial spirit, confident of the promise of the future.
A man of good will, friendly, approachable, genuinely interested in
'folks,' he has left behind him friends literally without number," Sobeloff
said.13
As evidence of the kind of respect and affection that Vinson could
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engender, the Vinson Club, an elaborate annual dinner that District of
Columbia lawyers started in 1943 as a way of honoring the achieve-
ments of their colleague, continued in existence long after Vinson's death.
A further tribute to Vinson came when the Northwestern University
Law Review devoted its entire March-April 1954 issue to a review and
an assessment of Vinson's thirty-year career in public service. The dean
of the law school, Harold C. Havighurst, said that since "most of his law
clerks were Northwestern graduates, it seems especially appropriate that
this Law Review should publish a commemorative issue." During his
time as chief justice, nine Northwestern graduates served as Vinson law
clerks, including Newton Minow and Howard Trienens. Vinson's con-
nection with the law school actually began earlier on the court of ap-
peals when he selected Willard Pedrick and Wilbur Lester, Northwestern
graduates, as his law clerks. Both later served as personal assistants to
Vinson in the Office of Economic Stabilization. Lester, in assessing
Vinson's three years in the executive branch, said Vinson was above all
else "a practical politician. He was a politician in that he thought it im-
portant to know—and he did know—how government works. He was
practical in that he had little interest in any abstract study of the art or
science of government, but he had great concern as to how the govern-
ment was run on behalf of the people."14
Amid the thousands of words of praise justly accorded Vinson upon
his death, perhaps a succinct two-paragraph tribute in the New York Times
captured as well as any the most salient point about his life. With his
knowledge of the law and tax matters and his personal connections,
Vinson probably could have made a fortune, "had he cared to leave the
small rewards of public life and turn his hand to business," the editorial
said. "Probably he could have been a millionaire more than once." That
he did not make that choice, the writer concluded, was "simply another
shining mark on the record of a fine American statesman and jurist."15

Notes
Introduction
1. "The Cover . . . , " Parade, Dec. 7, 1947. Bob Burchette was a Washing-
ton Post staff photographer.
2. FMV to Garland R. Farmer, Jan. 11, 1946, box 400, VCUK.
3. FMV to Brooklyn-Queens Political Society, Oct. 13, 1947, box 326,
VCUK.
4.Willard H. Pedrick, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Oct. 22, 1976.
1. A Long Journey from "Jail"
1. Truman, Memoirs, 2:215.
2. Bendiner, "Available Vinson," 18.
3. Pringle, "Sitter-on-the-Lid," 98.
4. Truman, Memoirs, 2:214.
5. Ely, Big Sandy Valley, 157-58.
6. The genealogy portion of this chapter is based on various correspon-
dence Vinson had with relatives and others seeking to learn of his ancestors;
Hatcher's Ph.D. dissertation, "Fred Vinson, pt. 1"; W.E. Connelley and E.M.
Coulter, History of Kentucky (Chicago: The American History Society, 1922);
Ely's Big Sandy Valley; Wolfford's Lawrence County; and entries on Vinson in
the National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York: J.T. White, 1956)
and George Lee Willis's Kentucky Democracy, vol. 2 (Louisville: Democratic
Historical Society, 1935).
7. Kornitzer, A me rican Fathers, 173.
8. Stewart, "Presidential Timber."
9. Bendiner, "Available Vinson," 19.
10. Fred M. Vinson to Billy Bagby, Mar. 4, 1927, box 2, VCUK.
11. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 61.
12. Ibid., 65.
13. FMV to Mrs. Gertrude Haney, Dec. 23, 1923, box 72, VCUK.
14. Kornitzer, American Fathers, 175.
342 / Notes to Pages 9-22
15. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 79.
16. Bendiner, "Available Vinson," 19.
17. FMV to Judge W.L. Watson, Apr. 19, 1924, box 17, VCUK.
18. George L. Alley, "An Error in Prophecy," newspaper article in box 325,
VCUK.
19. Speech by John Diederich, date unknown, in Vinson file in the Alumni
Office, Centre College, Danville, Ky.
20. "Centre Vinson Memorial Foundation," 1.
21. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 90.
22. Cardinal and Blue, 47.
23. FMV to J. Barbour Russell Jr., Sept. 27, 1924, box 12, VCUK.
24. Diederich speech.
25. The law school at Centre suspended operations three years after Vinson
graduated.
26. Kornitzer, American Fathers, 186.
27. FMV to R.A. Chiles, Oct. 8, 1938, box 307, VCUK.
28. "Portrait of Late Justice Vinson."
29. W.E. Crutcher, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Jan. 8, 1975, VOHP.
30. JudgeChesleyA.Lycan, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Jan. 9,1975,
VOHP.
31. Crutcher interview, VOHP.
32. Connelley and Coulter, History of Kentucky, 564.
33. Harry E. Ritter to FMV, Oct. 12, 1927, box 19, VCUK.
34. Kornitzer, American Fathers, 183.
35. Crutcher interview, VOHP.
36. Stewart, "Presidential Timber," 23.
37. Leonard Lyons, "Cracking the Self-Defense Chestnut," Apr. 14, 1947,
box 330, VCUK.
38. Biggs v. Commonwealth, 196 Kentucky Reports 655 (1922) 658, 659.
39. Rodell, "Chief Justice," 108.
40. Stewart, "Presidential Timber," 25.
41. Welcome address by Vinson, Sept. 1927, Fair and Home-Coming, Louisa,
box 389, VCUK.
2. The Capitol as His Oyster
1. Mrs. Althea Swinford Hutton, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Mar.
28, 1975, VOHP.
2. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives (1961), 256.
3. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 171, 172.
4. FMV to John and Mary Bahan, Mar. 3, 1924, box 2, VCUK.
5. Klotter, Portrait in Paradox, 274.
6. From a campaign speech Vinson made in support of Democratic guber-
natorial candidate J.C.W. Beckham in 1927, box 389, VCUK.
7. FMV to Grannis Bach, Nov. 24, 1923, box 72, VCUK.
8. Jewell, Kentucky Votes, 10.
9. FMV to M.F. Conley, Feb. 18,1924, box 3, VCUK. The other counties in
Notes to Pages 23-31 / 343
the Ninth District were Bath, Bracken, Breathitt, Boyd, Carter, Elliott, Fleming,
Greenup, Harrison, Lewis, Mason, Menifee, Montgomery, Morgan, Nicholas,
Robertson, Rowan, and Wolfe.
10. FMV to E.E. Shannon, Feb. 15, 1924, box 20, VCUK.
11. FMV to J.A. Moneyhon, Feb. 27, 1924, box 8, VCUK.
12. Galloway, History of the U.S. House of Representatives (1965), 127.
13. FMV to J.H. Testor, Mar. 24, 1924, box 3, VCUK.
14. FMV to Shannon, Feb. 1, 1924, box 20, VCUK.
15. Donald R. McCoy, Calvin Coolidge: The Quiet President (Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 1988), 223.
16. Vinson campaign speech for Beckham in 1927, box 389, VCUK.
17. Abels, In The Time of Silent Cal, 215.
18. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, vol. 65, pt. 3, 2602-
19.
19. Mooney, Roosevelt and Ray burn, 15.
20. Testor to FMV, Mar. 19, 1924, box 3, VCUK.
21. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, vol. 65, pt. 6, 6117,
6130-35.
22. J. Franklin Reynolds Jr. to FMV, June 6, 1924, box 12, VCUK.
23. Charles M. Cooper to FMV, Apr. 17, 1924, box 5, VCUK.
24. FMV to Dr. S.D. Laughlin, Apr. 23, 1924, box 7, VCUK.
25. Form letter from Ex-Service Men's Anti-Bonus League to FMV, box 68,
VCUK.
26. Vinson to Ex-Service Men's Anti-Bonus League, Feb. 9, 1924, box 68,
VCUK.
27. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, vol. 65, pt. 5, 4298.
28. In 1924 Congress passed pension increases for veterans of earlier wars
and the adjusted compensation bill for World War I soldiers. President Coolidge
vetoed the pension bill and it was upheld, but his veto of the compensation
measure was overridden.
29. FMV to J.T. Mercer, Apr. 19, 1924, box 2, VCUK.
30. FMV to George H. Geahart, Jan. 2, 1925, box 3, VCUK. In 1926 Con-
gress passed and President Coolidge signed a bill similar to Howell-Barkley,
although it was by then known as the Watson-Parker Railroad Labor Act.
31. G.R. McGuire to FMV, May 29, 1924, box 3, VCUK.
32. FMV to Charles M. Cooper, Mar. 3, 1924, box 5, VCUK.
33. FMV to Shannon, Mar. 12, 1924, box 20, VCUK.
34. FMV to W.E. Coleman, Mar. 25, 1924, box 4, VCUK.
35. FMV to Dr. T.D. Burgess, Feb. 8, 1926, box 2, VCUK.
36. Stanley Reed to FMV, Feb. 10, 1927, box 12, VCUK.
37. FMV to Clay W. Stamper, Apr. 19, 1924, box 16, VCUK.
38. FMV to Mrs. Elizabeth Sebastian, Mar. 6, 1926, box 12, VCUK.
39. FMV to Rev. John Cheap, Mar. 4, 1924, box 4, VCUK.
40. FMV to Mary Land Brunner, Dec. 6, 1924, box 2, VCUK.
41. John W. Langley to FMV, June 4, 1924, box 7, VCUK.
42. FMV to Virginia Vinson, Mar. 1, 1924, box 306, VCUK.
43. FMV to Joseph W. Morris, May 14, 1925, box 8, VCUK.
344 / Notes to Pages 31-48
44. FMV to Virginia Vinson, Feb. 3, 1927, box 306, VCUK.
45. FMV to Robert Dixon, Apr. 1, 1924, box 5, VCUK.
46. FMV to Virginia Vinson, Mar. 22, 1924, box 306, VCUK.
47. FMV to Chiles, June 9, 1924, box 4, VCUK.
48. Chiles to FMV, May 28, 1924, box 4, VCUK.
49. FMV to Chiles, June 2, 1924, box 4, VCUK.
50. FMV to Dixon, Apr. 1, 1924, box 5, VCUK.
51. FMV to J.T. Rees, May 22, 1924, box 12, VCUK.
52. FMV campaign letter, undated, box 69, VCUK.
53. Crutcher interview, VOHP.
54. FMV to Rees, Dec. 15, 1924, box 12, VCUK.
55. Cooper to FMV, Nov. 20, 1924, box 5, VCUK.
56. Octave P. Beauvais to FMV, Feb. 14, 1925, box 304, VCUK.
57. C.L. Kilburn to FMV, Feb. 14, 1925, box 304, VCUK.
58. Howard Gumm to FMV, Feb. 26, 1925, box 70, VCUK.
59. Van Antwerp to FMV, Feb. 14, 1925, box 304, VCUK.
60. FMV to Van Antwerp, Feb. 16, 1925, box 304, VCUK.
61. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., lstsess., 1926, vol. 67, pt. 11,12421.
62. Howard E. Coffin to FMV, July 19, 1926, box 13, VCUK.
63. Vinson to Dr. S.C. Smith, Jan. 13, 1928, box 3, VCUK.
64. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 1929, vol. 70, pt. 5, 4923.
65. FMV to Martin R. Rice, Apr. 7, 1928, box 3, VCUK.
66. Smith to FMV, Jan. 7, 1928, box 3, VCUK.
67. FMV to Smith, Jan. 23, 1928, box 20, VCUK.
68. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 1929, vol. 70, pt. 5, 5130-33.
69. J.H. Meek to Ben Williamson, Mar. 12, 1926, box 3, VCUK.
70. FMV to the U.S. Corps of Engineers Office, Huntington, W.Va., Sept.
30, 1925, box 12, VCUK.
71. Johnson, Illustrated History, 202.
72. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 1929, vol. 70, pt. 5, 5131—
32.
73. Klotter, Portrait in Paradox, 284.
74. Campaign speech for Beckham in 1927, box 389, VCUK.
75. Klotter, Portrait in Paradox, 286.
76. Bailey to FMV, Feb. 6, 1928, box 19, VCUK.
77. Ibid., Aug. 6, 1928, box 72, VCUK.
78. Underwood to FMV, Sept. 8, 1928, box 71, VCUK.
79. Howerton to FMV, Sept. 12, 1928, box 71, VCUK.
80. Pierce to FMV, Sept. 8, 1928, box 71, VCUK.
81. Michelson to FMV, Aug. 30, 1928, box 73, VCUK.
82. FMV to the Western Recorder, Sept. 13, 1928, box 73, VCUK.
83. "Chief Justice-Nominee Vinson."
3. Rapid Recovery and Rise
1. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 1929, vol. 70, pt. 5,5130-33.
2. FMV to J.A. Thompson, Oct. 30, 1929, box 73, VCUK.
Notes to Pages 48-60 / 345
3. FMV to Courtney Combs, May 15, 1930, box 73, VCUK.
4. "Vinson Makes Statement," Mt. Sterling (Ky.) Gazette, May 2, 1930,
box 74, VCUK.
5. "Fields' Opening Address," box 73, VCUK.
6. Garner to FMV, Nov. 7, 1930, box 73, VCUK.
7. FMV to Garner, Nov. 10, 1930, box 73, VCUK.
8. The long gap between elections and the time the president, vice presi-
dent, senators, and representatives actually assumed office was shortened con-
siderably by the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, the so-called Lame
Duck Amendment, which was ratified in January 1933.
9. FMV to Leonidas Y. Redwine, Mar. 8, 1927, box 12, VCUK.
10. FMV to Thompson, Nov. 10, 1930, box 75, VCUK.
11. FMV to Johnson, Dec. 3, 1930, box 74, VCUK.
12. FMVtoShouse, Jan. 17, 1931, box 76, VCUK.
13. Shouse to FMV, Jan. 20, 1931, box 76, VCUK.
14. FMV to Eudaley, Jan. 27, 1931, box 76, VCUK.
15. FMV to Thompson, Feb. 19, 1931, box 76, VCUK.
16. Pearce, Divide and Dissent, 33, 34.
17. Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 2,
12208.
18. J.N. Camden to FMV, Apr. 25, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
19. FMV to Camden, Apr. 30, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
20. Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 7, 7306.
21. Ibid., pt. 9, 9495.
22. Vinson's radio address is reproduced in Congressional Record, 72nd
Cong., 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 8, 9082.
23. Newell to FMV, Apr. 5, 1932, box 34, VCUK.
24. Vinson's radio address is reproduced in Congressional Record, 72nd
Cong., 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 14, 15049, 15050.
25. Mrs. L.B. Carrick to FMV, July 3, 1932, box 30, VCUK.
26. FMV to Carrick, July 19, 1932, box 30, VCUK.
27. Vinson press release, undated, box 29, VCUK.
28. "Find Double Taxes Weigh on Business," 21.
29. According to the Tax Foundation, total tax collections in the United States
in the late 1990s reached $2.7 trillion, with the federal government collecting
$1,805.8 billion of the total, or 67.7%, and state and local governments taking
$861.4 billion. The tax bill for every household in the country averaged $26,434
in 1998, and for every U.S. resident it averaged $9,881.
30. Logan Caldwell to FMV, Jan. 5, 1933, box 34, VCUK.
31. FMV to Caldwell, Jan. 10, 1933, box 34, VCUK.
32. Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 2, 1534.
33. House Committee on Ways and Means, "Payment of Adjusted-Compen-
sation Certificates," 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 1932, report no. 1252, 2.
34. Ibid., 3.
35. Ibid., 4.
36. Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 1932, vol. 75, pt. 12,12912.
37. Dixon to FMV, July 13, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
346 / Notes to Pages 61-70
38. Campaign letter, Aug. 1, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
39. "Remember Vinson," Cynthiana (Ky.) Democrat, Aug. 4, 1932.
40. "Vote First for Vinson for Congress," Carlisle (Ky.) Mercury, Aug. 4,
1932.
41. "Has Earned the Support of All Loyal Democrats," Bracken (Ky.)
Chronicle, Aug. 4, 1932.
42. G.L. Drury to FMV, July 28, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
43. Ed. L. Weathers to FMV, Aug. 2, 1932, box 79, VCUK; FMV to Weath-
ers, Aug. 4, 1932, box 79, VCUK.
44. W.M. Caudill to FMV, Aug. 17, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
45. FMV to Garner, Nov. 6, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
46. The others were John Y. Brown, A. J. May, Brent Spence, Virgil Chapman,
Glover H. Clay, W.V. Gregory, C.R. Carden, and Finley Hamilton.
47. FMV to Henry H. Curran, Sept. 9, 1930, box 73, VCUK.
48. FMV to Rev. W.C. Pierce, Oct. 10, 1930, box 74, VCUK.
49. FMV to Pierce, July 30, 1932, box 79, VCUK.
50. FMV to R.M. Bagby, June 18, 1932, box 78, VCUK.
4. The Loyal Lieutenant
1. Schlesinger, New Deal, 1.
2. Edsforth, New Deal, 121.
3. Herring, "First Session of the 73rd Congress," 65.
4. Schlesinger, New Deal, 23.
5. Stewart, "Presidential Timber."
6. "Assassin's Bullets," 4.
7. Walter Mayo to FMV, Mar. 15, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
8. FMV to Mayo, Mar. 24, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
9. Mayo to FMV, Mar. 27, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
10. Edmon Burgher to FMV, Mar. 14, 1933, box 23, VCUK.
11. V.V. Adkins to FMV, Mar. 27, 1933, box 23, VCUK.
12. Desha Breckinridge to FMV, Mar. 16, 1933, box 23, VCUK.
13. J.C. Courtenay to FMV, Mar. 13, 1933, box 23, VCUK.
14. Paul M. Ferguson to FMV, Mar. 12, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
15. FMV to Ferguson, Mar. 16, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
16. John C. Hatcher to FMV, Mar. 28, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
17. Joe T. Lovett to FMV, undated, box 24, VCUK.
18. FMV to Lovett, Mar. 24, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
19. Lovett to FMV, Mar. 28, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
20. FMV to Lovett, Apr. 3, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
21. FMV to J.T. Rees, Mar. 14, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
22. FMV to Howard E. Gumm, Apr. 3, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
23. FMV to Rees, Mar. 14, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
24. FMV to Breckinridge, Mar. 28, 1933, box 23, VCUK.
25. J.Q. Lackey to FMV, Mar. 14, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
26. Zeno F. Fisher to FMV, Mar. 21, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
27. Henry W. Sullivan to FMV, Mar. 13, 1933, box 24, VCUK.
Notes to Pages 71-83 / 347
28. Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933, vol. 77, pt. 1, 837.
29. Ibid., 841. Bingham was confirmed in 1933 as U.S. ambassador to the
Court of St. James, where he served until his death in 1937.
30. Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933, vol. 77, pt. 1, 882,
883.
31. FMV to Perry B. Gaines, Jan. 25, 1934, box 85, VCUK.
32. D. Bernard Coughlin to FMV, Mar. 16, 1934, box 85, VCUK.
33. A.B. Rosen to FMV, Mar. 16, 1934, box 85, VCUK.
34. Campaign letter dated Oct. 22, 1934, box 85, VCUK.
35. FMV to D.N. Rees, Aug. 13, 1935, box 86, VCUK.
36. FMV to Lindsey Douglas, July 8, 1935, box 86, VCUK.
37. Speech for 1935 gubernatorial general election, box 389, VCUK.
38. FMV to J.H. Armstrong, July 13, 1936, box 87, VCUK.
39. Ray Murphy to FMV, Feb. 11, 1936, box 88, VCUK.
40. Frank N. Belgrano Jr. to FMV, Feb. 7, 1936, box 88, VCUK.
41. John L. Lewis to FMV, July 1, 1936, box 88, VCUK.
42. "President Signs Coal Mining Bill," 8.
43. Blakey, Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 8, 113.
44. Joseph A. Fagan to FMV, Jan. 29, 1934, box 34, VCUK.
45. FMV to Fagan, Feb. 13, 1934, box 34, VCUK.
46. Primary campaign press release from Vinson, July 18, 1936, box 88,
VCUK.
47. FMV to Frank C. Taylor, Jan. 26, 1935, box 34, VCUK.
48. Keen Johnson to FMV, Apr. 2, 1934, box 34, VCUK.
49. FMV to James A. Farley, May 16, 1934, box 34, VCUK.
50. "Service the Farmers Do Not Need."
51. "Why Farmers Are against the Flannagan Bill."
52. FMV to Underwood, June 3, 1935, box 35, VCUK.
53. FMV to Nette McClanahan, Jan. 23, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
54. FMV to William C. Fox, July 7, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
55. William Johnson to FMV, June 13, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
56. FMV to Johnson, July 12, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
57. FMV to Evelyn R. Payne, May 1, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
58. FMV to J.B. Fannin, Jan. 31, 1934, box 82, VCUK.
59. M.J. Allen to FMV, July 23, 1934, box 84, VCUK.
60. FMV to Allen, July 26, 1934, box 84, VCUK.
61. FMV to Anna L. Bartlett, Oct. 27, 1938, box 307, VCUK.
62. A newspaper reporter, Tom Stokes, charged that Barkley was using WPA
workers in his campaign against Kentucky governor Happy Chandler, who op-
posed him in the 1938 Democratic primary for the Senate. A Senate investiga-
tion into the matter found improper use of public employees in both campaigns
but concluded that neither candidate had been aware of such activities.
63. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 449.
64. "Disappointing Veto."
65. Roosevelt to FMV, Oct. 6,1937, Official File no. 41, container 1, Roosevelt
Library.
66. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 351.
348 / Notes to Pages 84-95
67. Fred M. Vinson Jr., interview by Charles L. Atcher, May 22,1973, VOHP.
68. Eliot, "25 Years After," 72-75.
69. "See Vast Loan Use for Security Fund," 2.
70. Arthur Altmeyer, interview no. 2, Mar, 23, 1966, Oral History Research
Office, Columbia University.
71. Edwin E. Witte to FMV, Apr. 10, 1935, box 28, VCUK.
72. "Reflections on the Beginnings of Social Security," by Edwin E. Witte,
Aug. 15, 1955, remarks delivered at the observance of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the Social Security Act, Washington, D.C. Social Security Adminstration
website, <http://www.ssa.gov/history/witte4.html>.
73. The principle eventually became part of the Internal Revenue Code and
today is known as the accumulated earnings tax. Retained earnings above a
specified limit, set fairly high to benefit small companies, are taxed at the high-
est individual tax rate.
74. Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., 1936, vol. 80, pt. 8,10337.
75. "Conservative Democrats Were Tax Bill Framers," 22.
76. Graham and Wander, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 416.
77. "Profit Tax Relief Put at Top of List," 4.
78. Wesley Winans Stout to FMV, Aug. 17, 1937, box 30, VCUK.
79. FMV to Stout, Aug. 28, 1937, box 30, VCUK.
80. Philadelphia Record, Nov. 22, 1937, box 30, VCUK.
81. FMV to Harry T. Saylor, Nov. 25, 1937, box 30, VCUK.
82. Ballard and Ballard actually was acquired by the giant Pillsbury Mills in
1951.
83. Thruston Ballard Morton to FMV, Feb. 18, 1938, box 33, VCUK.
84. Thomas J. Davis to FMV, Dec. 6, 1937, box 32, VCUK.
85. Myron A. Loewen to FMV, Feb. 23, 1938, box 33, VCUK.
86. Fred Schrey to FMV, Oct. 22, 1937, box 30, VCUK.
87. John B. Berryman to FMV, Nov. 17, 1937, box 31, VCUK.
88. J.H. Long to FMV, Feb. 18, 1938, box 33, VCUK.
89. FMV to Long, Feb. 22, 1938, box 33, VCUK.
90. Herbert M. Goldsmith to FMV, Jan. 14, 1938, box 32, VCUK.
91. Paul H. Schollenberg to FMV, Nov. 17, 1937, box 31, VCUK.
92. Robert C. Clothier to FMV, Feb. 15, 1938, box 33, VCUK.
93. Mrs. Morton Prince to FMV, Dec. 3, 1937, box 32, VCUK.
94. Howard Van Antwerp Jr. to FMV, Nov. 24, 1937, box 31, VCUK.
95. FMV to Van Antwerp, Nov. 24, 1937, box 31, VCUK.
96. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, vol. 78, pt. 6,6692-98.
5. Vinson's Transition from Legislator to Jurist
1. Today members of the circuit court are called judges, but in 1938 they
were called associate justices. The head of the circuit court was called the chief
justice.
2. Memorandum from Bell to Attorney General Cummings, Nov. 23,1937,
OF-5 IS, Court of Appeals for D.C, 1933-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
3. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 26.
Notes to Pages 95-107 / 349
4. Stephens to Groner, Aug. 27, 1940, private papers of Harold Stephens,
box 125, Library of Congress.
5. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 57.
6. Hatcher, "Fred M. Vinson," 495.
7. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 61.
8. Cited in Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 34. Original source is
Cummings to Roosevelt, October 9,1937,OF51 sEND, U.S.Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia 1933-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
9. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 27. The original source is OF 51s,
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1933-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library.
10. Stephens to D. Lawrence Groner, Aug. 9, 1937, box 125, HSCLC.
11. Stephens to Henry W. Edgerton, Feb. 16, 1937, box 134, HSCLC.
12. Taken from an article published in the Cornell Law Quarterly and sent
by Edgerton to Stephens, Mar. 16, 1937, box 125, HSCLC.
13. Stephens to Groner, Aug. 11, 1945, box 125, HSCLC.
14. Maysville (Ky.) Daily Independent, Nov. n.d., 1939, box 401, VCUK.
15. Crawford and Stewart, "Fred M. Vinson," 407.
16. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 19.
17. Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 3rd sess., vol. 83, 6675.
18. FMV to Coleman Taylor, Aug. 27, 1938, box 308, VCUK.
19. FMV to Mrs. Robert Dixon, Jan. 12, 1940, box 308, VCUK.
20. FMV to Rev. J.S. Thompson, July 7, 1938, box 308, VCUK.
21. Pedrick, "From Congress to the Court of Appeals," 59.
22. Draft of tribute to Rutledge for a joint publication of the Indiana Law
Journal and the Iowa Law Review, ca. 1950, box 399, VCUK.
23. Stephens to Groner, Aug. 9, 1937, box 125, HSCLC.
24. Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 27. Original source is OF 51 s, Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1933-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Li-
brary.
25. Groner to the associate justices, Nov. 13, 1942, box 90, WBRCLC.
26. FMV to Stephens, May 14, 1941, box 90, WBRCLC.
27. Stephens to Rutledge, June 12, 1941, box 132, WBRCLC.
28. Rutledge to Stephens, June 13, 1941, box 132, WBRCLC.
29. Scharfield v. Richardson, 133 F2d 340 (1942).
30. Evans v. Ockerhausen, 100 F2d 695 (1938).
31. Groner to FMV, July 19, 1938, box 89, VCUK.
32. FMV to Groner, July 21, 1938, box 89, VCUK.
33. Miller to FMV, July 26, 1938, box 89, VCUK.
34. Stephens to FMV, Dec. 23, 1941, box 9, VCUK.
35. Pedrick, "From Congress to the Circuit Court of Appeals," 57.
36. Stephens, "The Chief Justice," 388.
37. Pedrick, "From Congress to the Court of Appeals," 58.
38. Stephens, "The Chief Justice," 388.
39. Washington Evening Star, May 12, 1938.
40. David J. Lewis to FMV, Feb. 27, 1939, box 90, VCUK.
41. Pedrick, "From Congress to the Court of Appeals," 56.
350 / Notes to Pages 107-115
42. Railroad Retirement Board v. Bates, 126 F2d 642 (1942).
43. Railroad Retirement Board v. Bates, 126 F2d 642 (1942), 645.
44. Rutledge to FMV, Feb. 17, 1942, box 95, VCUK.
45. National Association of Wool Manufacturers v. Fleming, 122 F2d 617
(1941).
46. The other two cases involving the power to establish wages were South-
ern Garment Mfrs. Association, Inc. et al. v. Fleming, Administrator, Wage and
Hour Division, 122 F2d 622 (1941); and Andree Seedman, Inc. et al. v. Admin-
istrator of Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, 122 F2d 634
(1941).
47. National Association of Wool Manufacturers v. Fleming, 122 F2d 617
(941), 622.
48. Switchmen's Union of North America et al. v. National Mediation Board
etal, 135 F2d 785 (1943).
49. Switchmen's Union of North America et al. v. National Mediation Board
etal., 320U.S. 297(1943).
50. Prevost v. Morgenthau, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 106 F2d 330
(1939).
51. Lewis Deschler to FMV, Nov. 15, 1939, box 90, VCUK.
52. McCord v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 123 F2d 164 (1941).
53. Groner to FMV, Oct. 21, 1941, box 94, VCUK.
54. Edgerton to FMV, Oct. 21, 1941, box 94, VCUK.
55. Stephens to FMV, Oct. 21, 1941, box 94, VCUK.
56. United States ex rel Denholm & McKay Co. v. United States Board of
Tax Appeals, 125 F2d 557 (1942).
57. Rutledge to FMV, Feb. 2, 1942, box 95, VCUK.
58. Miller to FMV, Feb. 2, 1942, box 95, VCUK.
59. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, Com'r of Revenue, 128
F2d 745 (1942). The other cases were The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company, Petitioner, v. Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
128 F2d 752 (1942); Connecticut General Insurance Company, Petitioner, v.
Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 128 F2d 752 (1942);
State Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 128 F2d 753 (1942); Equitable Life Insurance Company of
Iowa v. Guy T. Helvering, 128 F2d 753 (1942).
60. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 25.
61. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. v. Helvering, 128F2d745 (1942), 747.
62. National Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board,
110F2d529(1940).
63. Ibid., 538.
64. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
65. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
66. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
67. Viereck v. United States, 130 F2d 945 (1942).
68. History of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
69. Viereck v. United States, 130 F2d 945 (1942), 950.
70. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
Notes to Pages 116-130 / 351
71. Viereckv. United States, 139 F2d 847 (1944).
72. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (1940).
73. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For an excellent discussion
of the history of Fourth Amendment rights, see Bodenhamer, Fair Trial, esp.
76-80.
74. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (1940) 695.
75. Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F2d 642 (1941).
76. Ibid., 646.
77. Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F2d 642 (1941) 646.
78. United States v. Offutt, 127 F2d 336 (1942).
79. Ibid., 340.
80. Hatcher, "Fred Vinson," 110-12.
81. Rutledge to FMV, Apr. 4, 1942, box 95, VCUK.
82. Parmelee v. United States, 113 F2d 729 (1940).
83. Parmelee v. United States, 113 F2d 729 (1940) 741.
84. Rutledge to FMV, May 6, 1940, box 92, VCUK.
85. Edgerton to FMV, May 6, 1940, box 92, VCUK.
86. Frank Crowther to FMV, May 17, 1940, box 92, VCUK.
87. Speech to the District of Columbia Bar Association, Jan. 12, 3943, box
391, VCUK.
88. Speech by Judge Bolitha J. Laws to the District of Columbia Bar Asso-
ciation, Jan. 1944, box 391, VCUK.
89. Ely, "Property Rights and the Supreme Court," 20.
90. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, Price Administrator, 137 F2d 201 (1943).
91. Pedrick, "From Congress to the Court of Appeals," 60.
92. Stephens, "The Chief Justice," 388.
6. Available Vinson
1. Kefauver to FMV, Jan. 1, 1945, box 319, VCUK.
2. Proctor to FMV, Jan. 1, 1945, box 320, VCUK.
3. FMV to Proctor, Jan. 11, 1945, box 320, VCUK.
4. Robertson, Sly and Able, 326.
5. "O.W.M. Expected to Consult Roosevelt Soon."
6. "Man Who Does Not Make Promises He Cannot Keep."
7. "Vinson's New Job Thrills His Spouse."
8. "Vinson: Senate's 'Businessman,'" 17.
9. Copy of speech found in Harold M. Stephens Manuscript Collection,
box 40, Library of Congress.
10. Bendiner, "Available Vinson," 56.
11. Rodell, "The Chief Justice," 113.
12. "Another Progress Report," Jan. 12, 1945, box 319, VCUK.
13. FMV to Jacobs, Jan. 30, 1945, box 319, VCUK.
14. Willard Pedrick, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Oct. 22,1976, VOHP.
15. Crawford and Stewart, "Fred M. Vinson," 409.
16. Judge Marvin Jones, interviews, Apr. 3,20,24, May 8,14,1970, Truman
Library.
352 / Notes to Pages 131 -147
17. Prichard to FMV, Apr. 28, 1944, box 354, VCUK.
18. Campbell, Short of the Glory, 93.
19. In late 1947 Porter joined with Thurman Arnold, a former U.S. court
of appeals judge, and Abe Fortas, later a Supreme Court justice, to form
Arnold and Porter, which became one of Washington's most influential law
firms.
20. "Senate Votes Rise of 8C in Rail Pay," 1.
21. Press release from the Office of War Information, Oct. 2, 1943, box 109,
VCUK.
22. FMV to President Roosevelt, Mar. 8, 1945, box 108, VCUK.
23. "Heat on Textiles," 80.
24. "Vinson Hits Subsidy Foes," 28.
25. "President Upheld by House," 1.
26. Paul Porter, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Mar. 19, 1975, VOHP.
27.Ibid.
28. Bowles, Promises to Keep, 89.
29. FMV to Dr. A.M. Lyon, Aug. 10, 1944, box 316, VCUK.
30. FMV to Lou Urban, Dec. 23, 1944, box 316, VCUK.
31. Harrod, Life of John Maynard Keynes, 579.
32. Van Dormael, Bretton Woods, 218.
33. Weil and Davidson, Gold War, 10.
34. "Loan Rumors Raised by Wolcott," 10.
35. FMV to Roosevelt, Mar. 8, 1945, box 108, VCUK.
36. H.G. Hoffman to FMV, Feb. 19, 1945, box 319, VCUK.
37. Sgt. Robert Sikes to FMV, Mar. 6, 1945, box 321, VCUK.
38. Lt. (jg) Byron B. Berry to FMV, Mar. 11,1945, box 317, VCUK.
39. Porter to FMV, Mar. 5, 1945, box 320, VCUK.
40. "Jesse Jones's Successor," 114.
41. "Vinson: Senate's 'Businessman,'" 17-19.
42. "Judge Vinson Never Met a Pay Roll."
43. "Vinson's Executive Talent."
44. Somers, Presidential Agency, 87.
45. "Vinson Tells U.S. What It Faces," 17.
46. Peggy Crowther to FMV, May 26, 1945, box 317, VCUK.
47. FMV to Crowther, June 11, 1945, box 317, VCUK.
48. Bendiner, "Available Vinson," 61.
49. "The Road to Tokyo and Beyond," July 1, 1945, box 320, VCUK.
50. "Charter for Postwar America," 90.
51. "Economic Charter for America."
52. "Declaration of Our Interdependence."
53. "Jacob's Voice, Esau's Hands."
54. "Fostering a Cruel Illusion."
55. "We'll Appeal to Uncle."
56. Rodell, "The Chief Justice," 114.
57. "Friends Praise Vinson."
58. "Vinson Becomes Head of Treasury," 13.
59. FMV to Robert L. Doughton, July 26, 1945, box 318, VCUK.
Notes to Pages 148-161 / 353
60. Truman, Memoirs, 1:327.
61. FMV to Crowther, June 11, 1945, box 317, VCUK.
62. Paul, Taxation in the United States, 410.
63. Edward F. Prichard, interview by Paul E. Fuller, Oct. 11, 1974, VOHP.
64. "Vinson Has Trouble Explaining Tax Cuts."
65. Hamby, Man of the People, 367.
66. Crawford and Stewart, "Fred M. Vinson," 410.
67.Ibid.
68. "Vinson Campaigns for British Loan," 13.
69. "Vinson, Acheson Urge British Loan," 25.
70. "Vinson Calls Loan to Britain a 'Must,'" 8.
71. Truman to FMV, June 6, 1946, President's Secretary's Files, Truman
Library.
72. Harrod, Life of John Maynard Keynes, 630.
73. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, 265.
74. "Harry Dexter White."
75. Rees, Harry Dexter White, 411. Recent books by scholars Harvey Klehr
and John Earl Haynes provide convincing evidence that despite White's protes-
tations, he did assist Communist espionage against the United States by passing
information to the Soviet Union and by using his position to promote a number
of KGB sources within the federal government.
76. FMV to Truman, May 7, 1946, President's Secretary's Files, box 327,
Truman Library.
77. "Secretary Vinson Urges Granting of Loan to Britain," 1.
7. The Chief Justice and His Court
1. Louisville Times, June 24, 1946.
2. Gerhart, America's Advocate, 280-81.
3. This excerpt is quoted in a letter from Merlo J. Pusey, associate editor of
the Washington Post and author of a biography of Chief Justice Hughes, to
Truman, Apr. 24, 1952, WHCF, Official File, box 328, Truman Library.
4. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S.
161 (1945), 137.
5. Washington Evening Star, May 16, 1946.
6. Gerhart, America's Advocate, 260.
7. "Supreme Court Postscript," 5.
8. New York Times, June 7, 1946, 15.
9. Personal interviews with Jackson reported by Gerhart, America's Advo-
cate, 498 n. 8.
10. Jackson to Truman, June 8, 1946, box 216, VCUK.
11. Truman to Jackson, June 8, 1946, box 216, VCUK.
12. Jackson to Truman, June 11, 1946, box 216, VCUK.
13. Short to Pusey, Apr. 29, 1952, WHCF, Official File, box 268, Truman
Library.
14. Gerhart to Truman, Nov. 30,1951, WHCF, Official File, box 268, Truman
Library.
354 / Notes to Pages 161 -174
15. Hutchinson, "Black-Jackson Feud," 203, 216-17.
16. Tom Clark, interview by Jerry N. Hess, Oct. 17, 1972, OHPTL, 54.
17. Groner to Stephens, June 11, 1946, box 128, HSCLC.
18. Stephens to Groner, June 13, 1946, box 128, HSCLC.
19. Newman, Hugo Black, 344.
20. Kirkendall, "Fred M. Vinson," 2639.
21. McCullough, Truman, 507.
22. Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 238.
23. Matthew J. Connelly, interview by Jerry N. Hess, Nov. 28-30, 1967,
OHPTL.
24. Ferrell, Off the Record, 46.
25. Corcoran to FMV, June 11, 1946, TGCCLC.
26. Riggs, "Vinson Hates to Go Up."
27. Riggs, "Senate Group Gives Its Okay to Vinson."
28. New York Times, Oct. 6, 1946, E4.
29. Ibid., Oct. 8, 1946, 1.
30. Diary of Harold H. Burton (microfilm), Oct. 10, 1946, HHBCLC.
31. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, 769.
32. Frankfurter to Murphy, June 10, 1946, box 28, FFCLC.
33. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 151.
34. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right, 102-5. Ely provides an excel-
lent review of the history of the Supreme Court's decisions about property rights.
35. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 3.
36. West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 128 (1937).
38. One of Roosevelt's appointees, James Byrnes, left the Court to serve as
director of economic stabilization, and less than a year later he was appointed
to head the War Mobilization Board.
39. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
40. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
41. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), Sept. 17, 1945, HHBCLC.
42. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 6.
43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 454 (1969).
44. Hugo L. Black to Fred Rodell, Sept. 5, 1962, box 47, HLBCLC.
45. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 7.
46. Frankfurter, "Twenty Years of Holmes' Constitutional Opinions," 909.
47. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 4.
48. Danelski, "Influence of the Chief Justice," 497-508. Also see Robert J.
Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court (Columbia: Univ. of
South Carolina Press, 1986).
49. Steamer, Chief Justice, xi.
50. Danelski, "Influence of the Chief Justice," 497.
51. Lash, Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, 270-71.
52. Douglas, The Court Years, 248-49.
53. Lash, Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, 274.
54. Edward F. Prichard Jr., interview by Paul E. Fuller, Oct. 11,1971, VOHP,
55-56.
Notes to Pages 175-184 / 355
55. FMV to Felix Frankfurter, June 26, 1946, as cited in Hirsch, Enigma of
Felix Frankfurter, 189.
56. Lash, Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, 300.
57. See Hirsch, Enigma of Felix Frankfurter, 188-91.
58. Tom Clark, interview by Robert Ireland, May 8, 1973, VOHP.
59. Newton Minow and Howard Trienens, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell,
Feb. 27, 1975, VOHP, 38-39.
60. Minow and Trienens interview, VOHP, 13, 33.
61. Clark interview, VOHP, 50.
62. Douglas, The Court Years, 226.
63. Frankfurter, memorandum to Court, Nov. 23, 1951, box 209, VCUK.
64. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1950, box 198, WODCLC.
65. FMV, memorandum to Court, Jan. 30, 1950, box 198, WODCLC.
66. Frankfurter, memorandums to Court, Feb. 1,3,1950, box 198, WODCLC.
67. Frankfurter to FMV, Dec. 12, 1947, box 215, VCUK.
68. Handwritten note from Frankfurter to FMV, date not known, box 215,
VCUK.
69. Handwritten note from Frankfurter to FMV, dated 1946, box 215, VCUK.
70. Frankfurter, memorandum to Court, Oct. 10, 1950, box 198, WODCLC.
71. Frankfurter, memorandum for the conference, June 1, 1951, box 306,
HLBCLC.
72. FMV to Frankfurter, Oct. 11, 1951, box 209, WODCLC.
73. Fassett, New Deal Justice, 507.
74. Steamer, Chief Justice, 275.
75. Danelski, "Influence of the Chief Justice," 503.
76. Minow and Trienens interview, VOHP, 10-11.
77. Frank, "Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship," 212-13, 241.
78. Brenner and Palmer, "Time Taken to Write Opinions," 179-84.
79. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S.
194(1947).
80. Memorandum from Wiley B. Rutledge to Frankfurter, June 18, 1947,
box 55, WBRCLC.
81. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947,) 210.
82. Rodell, "The Supreme Court Is Standing Pat," 11.
83. Palmer and Brenner, "Determinants of the Amount of Time Taken," 147.
84. Frank, "Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship," 212-13.
85. Rodell, "The Supreme Court Is Standing Pat," 11.
86. Palmer and Brenner, 144.
87. James A. Thomson. "Frederick Moore Vinson," in Urofsky, Supreme
Court Justices, 492.
88. Minow and Trienens interview, VOHP, 24-25.
89. Lash, Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, Nov. 6, 1946, 288.
90. United States v. Alcea Band ofTMamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
91. Lash, Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, Nov. 23, 1946, 304.
92. Stanley F. Reed, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Nov. 12, 1975,
VOHP, 5-6.
93. Kirkendall, "Fred M. Vinson," 2642.
356 / Notes to Pages 184-192
94. Schwartz, History of the Supreme Court, 254.
95. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
96. Fassett, New Deal Justice, 422.
97. Rudko, Truman's Court, 66.
98. Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77 (1949).
99. Frankfurter to FMV, Nov. 29, 1948, box 215, VCUK.
100, FMV to Frankfurter, Dec. 1, 1948, box 215, VCUK.
101, Frankfurter to FMV, Dec. 2, 1948, box 215, VCUK.
102, FMV to Frankfurter, Dec. 3, 1948, box 215, VCUK.
103, Frankfurter to FMV, Dec. 3, 1948, box 215, VCUK.
104, Frank, "United States Supreme Court, 1948-49," 54-55.
105, Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1949-50," 49-50; Frank, "United
States Supreme Court: 1950-51," 165, 216; Frank, "United States Supreme
Court: 1951-52," 57.
106, Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1949-50; Jaffe, "The Supreme
Court, 1950 Term," 108; Harper and Rosenthal, "What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do," 293-325.
107, "Chief Justice Vinson and His Law Clerks," 28.
108, Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1950-51," 216.
109, Jaffe, "The Supreme Court, 1950 Term," 108.
110, Frank, "Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship," 214.
111, William Oliver, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Feb. 26,1975, VOHP, 6.
112, Jaffe, "The Supreme Court, 1950 Term," 114.
8. The Chief Justice, the President,
and the Politics Of Economic Stabilization
1. Hechler, Working with Truman, 23.
2. United Mine Workers of America v. United States 330 U.S. 258 (1947);
and Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In another
case, California^. United States 332 U.S. 19 (1947), Vinson wrote the majority
opinion upholding Truman's 1945 Continental Shelf Proclamation, which as-
serted federal jurisdiction over all mineral resources in the lands beneath the
ocean, out to the end of the continental shelf of the United States. Vinson's
ruling was a victory for the federal government over the states, which had fought
a vigorous legal battle to defend land that historically had been in their domain.
Some questioned whether Vinson, who typically sided with state powers, was
unduly influenced by his loyalty to Truman in this matter.
3. Truman, Memoirs, 1:327-28.
4. Clark Clifford, interview by Roger K. Newman, cited in Newman, Hugo
Black, 344.
5. Information derived from FBI wiretap of Corcoran, cited in Newman,
Hugo Black, 344.
6. Murphy, Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection, 7.
7. Hamby, Man of the People, 600.
8. Donald J. MacDonald, interview by Jerry N. Hess, August 3, 1970,
OHPTL, 24-25.
Notes to Pages 192-206 / 357
9. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 720.
10. Truman, Bess, 259.
11. McCullough, Truman, 11.
12. Truman, Bess, 349.
13. Hechler, Working with Truman, 113. Hechler said Roberta Vinson was
the only person he ever saw at Key West and that she did not stay very long.
14. Belair, "Mr. Truman's Friend."
15. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 215.
16. Truman, Memoirs, 2:213-14.
17. Truman, Bess, 352.
18. New York Times, Mar. 21, 1950.
19. Ibid., Dec. 10, 1950.
20. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), Dec. 13, 1950, HHBCLC.
21. Truman, Memoirs, 2:488.
22. Charles S. Murphy, interview by Jerry N. Hess, May 3, 1971, OHPTL,
341-42.
23. Truman, Memoirs, 2:490.
24. Truman's personal notes; Hechler, Working with Truman, 246 n. 13.
25. Hechler, Working with Truman, 246-47.
26. Truman, Memoirs, 2:489.
27. Truman, Bess, 351.
28. Truman, Memoirs, 1:502.
29. New York Times, May 5, 1946.
30. Ibid., May 10, 1946.
31. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1946.
32. Truman, Memoirs, 1:505.
33. New York Times, Nov. 18, 1946.
34. Ibid., Nov. 19, 1946.
35. Ibid., Dec. 8, 1946.
36. Transcript of Pearson broadcast, Dec. 8, 1946, box 228, VCUK.
37. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1946.
38. Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round."
39. Ibid.
40. Fine, Frank Murphy, 528.
41. New York Times, Dec. 17, 1946.
42. Ibid., Jan. 15, 1947.
43. Douglas conference notes, Jan. 20 1947, box 139, WODCLC.
44. Fine, Frank Murphy, 529; Douglas, The Court Years, 139.
45. John E. Lewis to FMV, July 1, 1936, box 88, VCUK.
46. New York Times, Oct. 21, 1946.
47. Douglas to FMV, Feb. 11, 1947, box 128, WODCLC.
48. Harper, Justice Rutledge, 221-22.
49. New York Times, Mar. 7, 1947.
50. Fassett, New Deal Justice, 429.
51. Frankfurter to FMV, Feb. 3, 1947, box 106, RCUK.
52. Douglas to FMV, Feb. 11, 1947, box 138, WODCLC.
53. Reed, memorandum to conference, Feb. 15, 1947, box 106, RCUK.
358 / Notes to Pages 206-218
54. Undated handwritten memo from Frankfurter to FMV, box 228, VCUK.
55. Reed, memorandum to conference, Feb. 15, 1947, box 106, RCUK.
56. Undated document, Feb. 24, 1947, box 106, RCUK.
57. Frankfurter, memorandum to Burton, undated, and Burton's handwrit-
ten reply, Feb. 24, 1947, box 102, RCUK.
58. Frankfurter, note to Reed, undated, box 102, RCUK.
59. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), Feb. 8, 17, 25, 26, 27, 1946,
HHBCLC.
60. New York Times, Mar. 7, 1947.
61. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), Mar. 6, 1947, HHBCLC.
62. Undated, unsigned memorandum, box 228, VCUK.
63. Time, Mar. 17, 1947,21.
64. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
270.
65. Time, Mar. 17, 1947, 22.
66. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
286-87.
67. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
68. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
293.
69. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 113.
70. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 194.
71. Fine, Frank Murphy, 532.
72. Gregory, "Government by Injunction Again," 368.
73. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 117.
74. Cited in Fine, Frank Murphy, 531.
75. Lester, "Vinson in the Executive Branch," 47-48.
76. Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1947, 8.
77. New York Times editorial, Mar. 7, 1946.
78. McClure, The Truman Administration, 152-53. McClure's work pro-
vides an excellent treatment of efforts to control labor disputes in the mid-
19405.
79. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, 19.
80. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman, 282.
81. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure, 59-60.
82. Ibid., 76.
83. Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 386.
84. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman, 374; Truman, Bess, 385.
85. John W. Snyder, interview by Jerry N. Hess, Nov. 8, 1967, OHPTL,
1072.
86. Howard Trienens and Newton Minow, personal interview by authors,
Aug. 23, 1994, Chicago, 111.
87. New York Times, Aug. 24, 1982.
88. Tom Clark to Elbert D. Thomas, Feb. 2, 1949, box 277, VCUK.
89. Truman's radio and television address, Apr. 8, 1952, 257, as cited in
Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure, 81.
90. Donovan, Tumultuous Years, 387.
Notes to Pages 219-233 / 359
91. New York Times, Apr. 30, 1952.
92. New York Times, May 3, 1952.
93. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), May 3, 1952, HHBCLC.
94. Ibid., May 10, 1952.
95. New York Times, May 13, 1952.
96. U.S. News and World Report, May 23, 1952, 25.
97. New York Times, May 13, 1952.
98. Story told to David N. Atkinson by Justice Minton's secretary in an
interview, Jan. 30, 1968, cited in Atkinson, "Minton and the Supreme Court."
99. New York Times, May 13, 1952.
100. FMV, memorandum to justices, May 16, 1952, box 10, WODCLC.
101. Douglas conference notes, May 16, 1952, WODCLC. Except where
noted, all information about what was said in the conference is based on
Douglas's handwritten notes.
102. Trienens and Minow, interview by authors.
103. Tom C. Clark, interview by Robert Ireland, May 8, 1973, VOHP.
104. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, 91.
105. Fassett, New Deal Justice, 521.
106. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 887.
107. Ibid., 635-39.
108. New York Times, June 3, 1952.
109. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 695.
110. New York Times, June 3, 1952.
111. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 701.
112. Truman, Memoirs, 2:477.
113. New York Times, June 3, 1952.
114. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, provides an excellent re-
view of the published scholarly opinions of the Youngstown opinions.
115. Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1951-1952," 12.
116. Freund, "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 104.
117. Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1951-1952," 2.
118. Freund, "U.S. Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 104.
119. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, 228-31.
120. Frank, "Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship," 217.
121. Howard Trienens and Newton Minow, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell,
Feb. 27, 1975, VOHP, 22.
122. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, 228-31.
9. Individual Rights in the Cold War Climate
1. Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. 22, 1947, box 395,
VCUK.
2. Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret World of American Communism, 16.
3. Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, Soviet World of American Communism.
4. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, is a good example of this
scholarship.
5. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, dated Feb. 1, 1946, forwarded by
360 / Notes to Pages 233-249
Harry Truman to FMV, Feb. 6, 1946. President's Secretary's File, box 140,
Truman Library.
6. Haynes and Klehr, Venona.
1. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
8. Ibid., 388-89.
9. Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1949-1950," 33.
10. Based on data presented in Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court,
184-85.
11. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
U.Dennisv. United States, 183F2d201 (1950), 211-12.
13. Memorandum on "Motion to Postpone Argument," circulated Nov. 24,
1950, cited in O'Brien, "Dennis v. United States," 617.
14. Douglas conference notes, Dec. 9, 1950, box 207, WODCLC.
15. Frankfurter, "Memorandum for Conference," box 215, VCUK.
16. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 499.
17. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), 52.
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
20. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 508.
21. Ball and Cooper, Of Power and Right, 144.
22. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 579.
23. Black notations on draft of Vinson opinion, n.d., Feb. 1951, box 306,
HLBCLC.
24. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 583.
25. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 377.
26. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 175.
27. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 191.
28. Michal R. Belknap, "Cold War in the Court Room: The Foley Square
Communist Trial," in American Political Trials, ed. Michal R. Belknap, 208.
29. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice, 4.
30. Belknap reviews the scholarly assessments of Dennis in ibid., 142-43.
31. Hook, Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No! 105-6, as cited in Belknap, Cold
War Political Justice, 143.
32. Bolner, "Vinson and the Communist Controversy," 389-90.
33. New York Times, June 5, 1951.
34. Washington Post, June 6, 1951.
35. New Republic, June 18, 1951, 5.
36. Press clippings cited in O'Brien, "Dennis v. United States" 651-52.
37. Morley, "Affirmation of Materialism," 3.
38. FMV to Rev. Wilfred Savard, Jan. 28, 1952, box 270, VCUK.
39. FMV to Raymond R. Cameron, Aug. 7, 1952, box 270, VCUK.
40. Sabin, In Calmer Times, 91.
41. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
42. Douglas, "Memorandum to the Conference," May 22, 1953, box 284,
VCUK.
43. Frankfurter, "Rosenberg Memorandum," June 4, 1953, box 65, file 1,
Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, as cited in Parrish, "Cold War
Notes to Pages 249-264 / 361
Justice," 825. Parrish provides a detailed account of the justice's responses to
each of the petitions presented in behalf of the Rosenbergs.
44. Parrish, "Cold War Justice," 827.
45. Douglas, The Court Years, 80.
46. Stern, "Rosenberg Case in Perspective," 83.
47. Radosh and Milton, Rosenberg File, 403-4.
48. William Oliver, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Feb. 26,1975, VOHP,
15.
49. Frankfurter's handwritten remarks can be found in his file of the
Rosenberg case, box 85, file 4, Frankfurter papers, Harvard Law School, cited
in Parrish, "Cold War Justice," 837.
50. Rosenberg et al v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953), 286.
51. See Parrish, "Cold War Justice," 839-40; Cohen, "Justice Douglas and
the Rosenberg Case," 211. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 183; and Radosh
and Milton, Rosenberg File, 453.
52. Cohen, "Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case," 211-52.
53. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
54. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
55. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 289.
56. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), 193.
57. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
58. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
59. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
60. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
61. Blau [Patricia] v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
62. Blau [Irving] v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
63. Another issue in the second Blau case concerned Irving Blau's refusal to
provide the grand jury with information about his wife's whereabouts on the
grounds that such information between husband and wife was confidential. The
Court upheld his right to withhold the information of his wife's whereabouts,
although Minton and Jackson dissented on this point.
64. Draft of Minton dissent, box 272, VCUK.
65. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
66. Jackson, memorandum to Vinson, switching his position, Dec. 21, 1951,
box 272, VCUK.
67. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), 371.
68. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
69. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
70. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), 341.
71. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
72. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
73. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 120.
74. United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
75. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
76. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
77. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) 533.
78. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel, Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
362 / Notes to Pages 264-281
79. One other alien case was handed down the same day. In Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), Clark wrote for a seven-man majority denying an
alien the right to a hearing before being deported.
80. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
81. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 444.
82. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
83. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
84. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
85. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
86. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
87. The Court declared in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568
(1942) that "fighting words" fell outside the bounds of constitutional protec-
tion.
88. Breardv. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
89. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
90. Douglas conference notes, Feb. 5, 1949, box 186, WODCLC.
91. Memorandum by the chief justice, Apr. n.d., 1949 (hand stamped April
8, 1949), box 269, VCUK.
92. Draft of memorandum by the chief justice, Apr. n.d., 1949, box 269,
VCUK.
93. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), 23.
94. Jackson doggerel, undated, Robert H. Jackson papers, in possession of
Philip B. Kurland, cited in Fine, Frank Murphy, 582.
95. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
96. Douglas conference notes, Oct. 21, 1950, box 204, WODCLC.
97. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 89.
98. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), 319.
99. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition, 89-90.
100. Frankfurter to FMV, Dec. 26, 1950, box 271, VCUK.
101. Ayres, Truman in the White House, 299.
102. Memorandum from Frankfurter to FMV about his vote in Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), box 252. VCUK.
10. The Dilemma of Due Process and the Promise of Equality
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
3. Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), 357.
4. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), 153-55.
5. Draft of Frankfurter's Harris opinion, Apr. (n.d.) 1947, box 227,
VCUK.
6. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) 161-162.
7. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) 198.
8. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 14.
9. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (1940). This case is
discussed in chapter 5.
10. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 187.
Notes to Pages 281-293 / 363
11. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 147.
12. Di Re v. United States, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)
13. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
14. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 700 (1948).
15. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
16. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 152.
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
18. In 1925, in Gitlow v. New York (268 U.S. 652), the Court extended the
protection of free speech to the states; and in 1931, in Near v. Minnesota (231
U.S. 697), the Court ruled that freedom of the press was also protected against
state encroachment.
19. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) 326.
20. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1948).
21. Bodenhamer, Fair Trial, 98.
22. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 219.
23. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
26. Douglas conference notes, box 228, WODCLC.
27. Newman, Hugo Black, 357.
28. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) 173.
29. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
31. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134
(1947); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948); Grygerv. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); and Quicksallv. Michigan, 339
U.S. 660 (1950).
32. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
33. Palmer v.Ashe, 342 U.S. 134(1951).
34. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
37. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
38. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62 (1949); and Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
39. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
40. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949)
41. Speech before the American Bar Association, Sept. 9,1949, box 395, VCUK.
42. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
43. Remarks to the Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work at the American
Bar Association Convention at Cleveland, Ohio, Sept. 22, 1947, Speech File,
box 395, VCUK.
44. Address to American Bar Association, Speech File, box 39, VCUK.
45. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
46. Douglas conference notes, box 228, WODCLC.
47. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), 432.
48. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
364 / Notes to Pages 293-305
49. Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1955).
50. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
5\.Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52. New York Times, Oct. 30, 1947, 14.
53. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
54. Bob Lo Excursions v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
55. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 128.
56. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
57. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 18-19.
58. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
59. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 27-30.
60. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339
U.S. 637(1950).
61. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
62. This case had been decided by the Michigan Supreme Court on Jan. 7,
1947, and accepted by review by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 1947.
63. Hard v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
64. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 13.
65. Fassett, New Deal Justice, 444-47.
66. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 720.
67. Ibid.
68. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 94.
69. Douglas conference notes, Feb. 2, 1948, box 160, WODCLC.
70. Burton to FMV, Apr. 25, 1948, box 241, VCUK. Burton's parenthetical
citation of Bryce was a reference to James Bryce, a British politician, historian,
and diplomat who was best known in the United States for his classic study of
the U.S. Constitution, The American Commonwealth (1888).
71. Murphy to FMV, May 3, 1948 (no date actually shown), box 216, VCUK.
72. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 73A.
73. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
74. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 14-15.
75. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), 30.
76. Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F2d 23 (1942).
77. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 13.
78. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights. Other scholars writing on this theme
include Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, 162-67; Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change,
and the Civil Rights Movement," 26-30; and Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics
of Desegregation," 297-304.
79. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 9-14.
80. Murphy to FMV, May 3,1948 (no date actually shown), box 216, VCUK.
81. White to FMV, May 3, 1948, box 205, VCUK.
82. James A. Mundy to FMV, May 12, 1948, box 205, VCUK.
83. Frank, "United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948," 24.
84. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation," 260.
85. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope. Klarman makes a similar argument in "Brown,
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement," 7-150.
86. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 721.
Notes to Pages 305-318 / 365
87. Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles," 1-35.
88. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
89. Klarman, "Race and the Court," 881-952.
90. Vose, Caucasians Only, 186.
91. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation," 267.
92. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 714.
93. Klarman, "Race and the Court," 883-84.
94. Reactions of petitioners and neighbors cited in Vose, Caucasians Only,
211.
95. Higginbotham, "45 Years in Civil Rights Law," 84.
96. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 343
97. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation," 256. An excep-
tion would be the Court's 1917 opinion in Buchanan v. Warley.
98. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 714.
99. White's comments are from his newspaper column, cited in Tushnet,
Making Civil Rights Law, 96.
100. Allen, "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer," 735.
101. Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
102. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
103. Vinson, memorandum to the conference, Feb. 13, 1948, Jackson pa-
pers, Library of Congress, cited in Urofsky, Division and Discord, 252.
104. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 131.
105. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 15.
106. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 140.
107. Douglas conference notes, Apr. 8, 1950, box 191, WODCLC.
108. Quote taken from notes of Justices Burton and Clark, as cited in
Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 24.
109. Black to FMV, May 18, 1950, box 262, VCUK.
110. Reed to FMV, May 18, 1950, box 262, VCUK.
111. Frankfurter to FMV, May 19, 1950, and draft memo, FMV to Frank-
furter, May 24, 1950, box 262, VCUK. Daniels was a newspaper editor from
North Carolina.
112. Draft memo, FMV to Frankfurter, May 24, 1950, box 262, VCUK.
113. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), 630.
114. McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), 641-42.
115. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy, 132.
116. "Jim Crow in Handcuffs," New Republic, June 19, 1950, as cited in
Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy, 133.
117. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 330.
118. Correspondence found in NAACP papers, as cited in Tushnet, Making
Civil Rights Law, 147.
119. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 3.
120. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 136.
121. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation," 273.
122. Fred M. Vinson Jr., interview by Charles L. Atcher, May 22,1973, VOHP.
123. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 8.
124. Kluger, Simple Justice, 538.
366 / Notes to Pages 318-334
125. Friedman, Argument, 18-19.
126. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 187.
127. Kluger, Simple Justice, 590.
128. For example, see Przybyszewski, Republic according to Harlan, esp.
90-102; and Maltz, "Only Partially Color Blind," 973-1016.
129. Conference notes of Justice Tom Clark, Dec. 13, 1952, included as an
appendix in Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 91.
130. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 188.
131. Kluger, Simple Justice, 591, 604.
132. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 187; Kluger, Simple Justice, 608.
133. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 193.
134. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
135. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
136. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation," 266.
137. James W. Ely Jr. provides an excellent discussion of the Court's shift,
starting in 1937, from protecting economic rights to protecting personal rights.
See Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right; and Ely, "Reflections on Buchanan
v. Warley"953-73.
138. New Albany Tribune, Sept. 8, 1953.
139. Minton to Roberta Vinson, Sept. 13, 1953,VCUK.
140. Diary of Harold Burton (microfilm), Sept. 8, 1953, HHBCLC.
141. Elman, "Solicitor General's Office," 840.
142. Tushnet, "What Really Happened in Brown," 1883.
143. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, 194.
144. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 35.
145. Tushnet, "What Really Happened in Brown," 1874.
146. Lefberg, "Vinson and the Politics of Segregation," 301.
147. Hutchinson, "Unanimity and Desegregation," 87.
148. Included in these more in-depth analyses are Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson" (1962); Urofsky, Division and Discord (1997); Hutchinson, "Unanim-
ity and Desegregation" (1979); and Tushnet, "What Really Happened in Brown"
(1991).
149. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson," 362.
150. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 21.
151. Allen, "Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government," 4.
152. See chapter 9, notes 2, 3, and 4, for a discussion of these works.
153. Urofsky, Division and Discord, 7.
154. Bolner, "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson." 355.
155. Willard H. Pedrick, interview by Terry L. Birdwhistell, Oct. 22, 1976,
VHOP.
156. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, 157-69; Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change,
and the Civil Rights Movement."
Epilogue
1. FMV to Thomas Graham, Jan. 11, 1945, box 318, VCUK.
2. FMV to Edgar Howard, Aug. 8, 1949, box 332, VCUK.
Notes to Pages 335-339 / 367
3. Roberta Vinson to James Vinson, Jan. 21, 1953, box 358, VCUK.
4. FMV to Mrs. James R. Vinson, Aug. 6, 1953, box 358, VCUK.
5. Minton to FMV, Aug. 22, 1953, box 56, VCUK.
6. FMV to Minton, Aug. 24, 1953, Minton Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana
University.
7. "Eisenhower Leads Tributes to Vinson," New York Times, Sept. 9,1953,1.
8. Truman's comments and the others that follow are from New York Times,
Sept. 9, 1953,22.
9. "Final Tribute to Chief Justice Vinson to Be Paid at Louisa Church,"
Lexington Herald, Sept. 11, 1953.
10. Gregory to Doughton, Sept. 21, 1953, box 358, VCUK.
11. "Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United
States," Oct. 25, 1954,58.
12. Ibid., 54.
13. Ibid., 52.
14. Lester, "Vinson in the Executive Branch," 36.
15. "A Man's Estate," New York Times, Sept. 25, 1953, 20.

Bibliography
Manuscript Collections
Margaret I. King Library, Univ. of Kentucky
Papers of Stanley F. Reed (RCUK)
Papers of Fred Vinson (VCUK)
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress
Papers of Hugo L. Black (HLBCLC)
Papers of Harold H. Burton (HHBCLC)
Papers of Thomas G. Corcoran (TGCCLC)
Papers of William O. Douglas (WODCLC)
Papers of Felix Frankfurter (FFCLC)
Papers of Wiley B. Rutledge (WBRCLC)
Papers of Harold M. Stephens (HSCLC)
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
Papers of Harry S. Truman
Fred M. Vinson, Oral History Project, Univ. of Kentucky (VOHP)
Tom C. Clark
W.E. Crutcher
Althea Swinford Hutton
Chesley A. Lycan
Newton Minow
William Oliver
Willard H. Pedrick
370 / Bibliography
Paul Porter
Edward L. Prichard
Stanley F. Reed
Howard J. Trienens
Fred M. Vinson Jr.
James R. Vinson
Oral History Project, Harry S. Truman Library (OHPTL)
Tom C. Clark
Matthew J. Connelly
Marvin Jones
Donald J. McDonald
Charles S. Murphy
John M. Snyder
Newspapers and Magazines
American Political Science Review, Atlantic Monthly, Big Sandy News, Busi-
ness Week, Collier's, Finance & Development, Lexington Herald, Life,
Louisville Courier-Journal, Louisville Herald-Post, Louisville Times, New
Republic, New York Times, PM Sunday Picture News, Washington Evening
Star, Washington Post
Books
Abels, Jules, In the Time of Silent Cat New York: Putnam's, 1969.
Abraham, Henry J. Justices and Presidents, a Political History of Appointments
to the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985.
Ayres, Eben. Truman in the White House: The Diary ofEbenA. Ayres. Colum-
bia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1991.
Ball, Howard, and Phillip J. Cooper. Of Power and Right: Hugo Black, William
O. Douglas, and America's Constitutional Revolution. New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1992.
Belknap, Michal. Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist
Party, and American Civil Liberties. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1977.
, ed. American Political Trials. Revised, expanded ed. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1994.
Berry, Mary Francis. Stability, Security, and Continuity: Mr. Justice Burton and
Decision-Making in the Supreme Court. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1978.
Blakey, George T. Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 1929-1939. Lexing-
ton: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1986.
Bodenhamer, David. Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in American History.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992.
Bibliography / 371
Bowles, Chester. Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-1969. New-
York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Campbell, Tracy. Short of the Glory. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1998.
Cardinal and Blue, Centre College Yearbook, Danville, Ky., 1909.
Clifford, Clark. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House,
1991.
Donovan, Robert J. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman,
1949-1953. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.
Douglas, William O. The Court Years, 1937-1975. New York: Random House,
1980.
Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000.
Edsforth, Ronald. The New Deal: America's Response to the Great Depression.
Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000.
Ely, James W. The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of
Property Rights, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998.
Ely, William. The Big Sandy Valley. Catlettsburg, Ky.: Central Methodist Press,
1887.
Fassett, John D. New Deal Justice: The Life of Stanley Reed. New York: Van-
tage Press, 1994.
Ferrell, Robert H. Harry S. Truman: A Life. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press,
1994.
, ed. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry Truman. New York:
Harper and Row, 1980.
Fine, Sidney. Frank Murphy: The Washington Years. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michi-
gan Press, 1984.
Friedman, Leon, ed. Argument: The Oral Argument before the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 1952-1955. New York: Chelsea
House, 1969.
Galloway, George B. History of the House of Representatives. New York: Tho-
mas Y. Crowell, 1961.
. History of the United States House of Representatives. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
Gardner, Richard N. Sterling Dollar Diplomacy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956.
Gerhart, Eugene C. America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.
Goldman, Sheldon. Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from
Roosevelt through Reagan. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1997.
Graham, Otis L., Jr., and Meghan Robinson Wander. Franklin D. Roosevelt:
His Life and Times, an Encyclopedic View. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1985.
Hamby, Alonzo. Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
Harper, Fowler V. Justice Rutledge: The Bright Constellation. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
372 / Bibliography
Harrod, Roy F. The Life of John Maynard Keynes. New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1969.
Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in
America. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1999.
Hechler, Ken. Working with Truman: A Personal Memoir of the White House
Years. New York: Putnam's, 1982.
Hirsch, H.N. The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
History of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in the Country's Bicentennial Year. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 1976.
Hook, Sidney. Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No! Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1953.
Jewell, Malcolm E. Kentucky Votes: Presidential Elections, 1952-1960; U.S.
House Primary and General Elections, 1920-1960. Lexington: Univ. Press
of Kentucky, 1963.
Johnson, Leland R. An Illustrated History of the Huntington District, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 1754-1974. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1977.
Kalven, Harry, Jr. A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America. New
York: Harper and Row, 1988.
Klehr, Harvey, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov. The Secret
World of American Communism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1995.
Klehr, Harvey, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson. The Soviet World of
American Communism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1998.
Klotter, James C. Kentucky Portrait in Paradox, 1900-1950. Frankfort: Ken-
tucky Historical Society, 1996.
Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education
and Black America's Struggle for Equality. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1976.
Kornitzer, Bela. American Fathers and Sons. N.p.: Hermitage House, 1952.
Lash, Joseph P. From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. New York: W.W. Norton,
1975.
Marcus, Maeva. Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential
Power. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977.
Mason, Alpheus T. Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law. New York: Viking
Press, 1956.
McClure, Arthur F. The Truman Administration and the Problems of Postwar
Labor, 1945-1948. Rutherford, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1969.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
McCune, Wesley. The Nine Young Men. New York: Harper, 1947.
Mooney, Booth. Roosevelt and Rayburn: A Political Partnership. Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1971.
Murphy, Bruce A. The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political
Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1982.
Bibliography / 373
Murphy, Walter, and Herman Pritchett. Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Intro-
duction to the Judicial Process. New York: Random House, 1961.
Newman, Roger K. Hugo Black: A Biography. New York: Pantheon Books,
1994.
Paul, Randolph E. Taxation in the United States. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954.
Pearce, John Ed. Divide and Dissent: Kentucky Politics 1930-1963. Lexington:
Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1987.
Pritchett, C. Herman. Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court. Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1954.
Przybyszewski, Linda. The Republic according to John Marshall Harlan. Chapel
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999.
Rabban, David. Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years. Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997.
Radosh, Ronald, and Joyce Milton. The Rosenberg File. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1983.
Rees, David. Harry Dexter White, A Study in Paradox. New York: Coward,
McCann, and Geoghegan, 1973.
Rehnquist, William O. The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is. New York:
William Morrow, 1987.
Robertson, David. Sly and Able. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.
Rosenberg, Gerald N. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991.
Rudko, Frances. Truman's Court: A Study in Judicial Restraint. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1988.
Sabin, Arthur J. In Calmer Times: The Supreme Court and Red Monday. Phila-
delphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Coming of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1958.
Schwartz, Bernard. A History of the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1993.
Somers, Herman M. Presidential Agency, the Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956.
Truman, Margaret. Bess W. Truman. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Tushnet, Mark. Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme
Court, 1936-1961. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994.
. The NAACP's Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925-
1950. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987.
Urofsky, Melvin. Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and
Vinson, 1941-1953. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1997.
, ed. The Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary. New York:
Garland, 1994.
Van Dormael, Armand. Bretton Woods, Birth of a Monetary System. New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1978.
374 / Bibliography
Vose, Clement. Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the
Restrictive Covenant Cases. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959.
Weil, Gordon, and Ian Davidson. The Gold War. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1970.
Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espio-
nage in America—The Stalin Era. New York: Random House, 1999.
Wolfford, George. Lawrence County: A Pictorial History. Ashland, Ky.: WWW
Co., 1972.
Articles
Allen, Francis A. "Chief Justice Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Gov-
ernment: A Tentative Appraisal." Northwestern University Law Review 49
(Mar.-Apr. 1954): 3-25.
. "Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private Worlds."
Washington University Law Quarterly 67 (1989): 709-35.
"Assassin's Bullets." Louisville Courier-Journal, Mar. 13, 1933.
Belair, Felix, Jr. "Mr. Truman's Friend—And His Nominee?" New York Times,
Dec. 16, 1951.
Bendiner, Robert. "Available Vinson." Collier's, Mar. 22, 1952.
Bolner, James J. "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and the Communist Conspiracy: A
Reassessment." Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 66 (1968): 378-
91.
Brenner, Saul, and Jan Palmer. "The Time Taken to Write Opinions as a Deter-
minant of Opinion Assignment." Judicature 72 (1988): 179-84.
"Centre Vinson Memorial Foundation to Be Tribute to Late Chief Justice." Lex-
ington Herald, Feb. 19, 1956.
"Charter for Postwar America." Collier's, Sept. 15, 1945, 90.
"Chief Justice-Nominee Vinson, in Lexington to Address U.K. Graduates, Sees
Old Friends." Louisville Courier-Journal, June 8, 1946.
"Chief Justice Vinson and His Law Clerks." Northwestern University Law Re-
view 49 (1954): 26-35.
Cohen, William. "Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case." Cornell Law Re-
view 10 (19S5):2U-52.
"Conservative Democrats Were Tax Bill Framers." New York Times, Apr. 23,
1936.
Crawford, Kenneth G., and Gilbert W. Stewart. "Fred M. Vinson." American
Mercury, Apr. 1946, 409.
Danelski, David. "The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Pro-
cess." In Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Pro-
cess, ed. Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, 497-508. New York:
Random House, 1961.
"A Declaration of Our Interdependence." Louisville Courier-Journal, July 4,
1945.
"A Disappointing Veto." Cincinnati Times-Star, June 29, 1938.
Bibliography / 375
"An Economic Charter for America." Chicago Sun, July 4, 1945.
Elman, Philip. "The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Legislation, 1946-1960: An Oral History." Harvard Law Review
100 (1987): 817-52.
Ely, James W., Jr. "Property Rights and the Supreme Court in World War II."
Journal of Supreme Court History 1 (1996): 19-34.
. "Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights and Race.
Vanderbilt Law Review 51 (1998): 953-73.
"Find Double Taxes Weigh on Business." New York Times, Jan. 16, 1933.
"Fostering a Cruel Illusion." Macon Telegraph, July 3, 1945.
Frank, John P. "Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship." University of Chicago
Law Review 21 (winter 1954): 212-46.
. "The United States Supreme Court, 1946-47." University of Chicago
Law Review 15 (1947): 1-50.
. "The United States Supreme Court, 1947-48." University of Chicago
Law Review 16 (1948): 1-55.
. "The United States Supreme Court, 1948-49." University of Chicago
Law Review 17 (1949): 1-55.
. "United States Supreme Court: 1949-50." University of Chicago Law
fiev/ewl8(1950): 1-54.
. "United States Supreme Court: 1950-51." University of Chicago Law
Review 19(1951): 165-236.
-. "United States Supreme Court: 1951-52." University of Chicago Law
Review 20 (1952): 1-68.
Frankfurter, Felix. "Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opin-
ions." Harvard Law Review 36 (1923).
Freund, Paul A. "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term." Harvard Law Review (1952):
89-184.
"Friends Praise Vinson As He Enters Cabinet." Courier-Journal, July 24, 1945.
Gregory, Charles O. "Government by Injunction Again." University of Chicago
Law Review 14 (1947): 363-69.
Harper, Fowler V., and Alan S. Rosenthal. "What the Supreme Court Did Not
Do in the 1949 Term—An Appraisal of Certiorari." University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review 99 (Nov. 1950): 293-325.
"Harry Dexter White and the International Monetary Fund." Finance and De-
velopment, Sept. 1998.
"Heat on Textiles." Business Week, Dec. 2, 1944, 80.
Herring, E. Pendleton. "First Session of the 73rd Congress," American Politi-
cal Science Review 28 (Feb. 1934): 65-83.
Higginbotham, A. Leon. "45 Years in Civil Rights Law." Ebony, Nov. 1990,
80-86.
Hutchinson, Dennis J. "The Black-Jackson Feud." Supreme Court Review
(1988): 203-43.
. "Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme
Court." Georgetown Law Journal 68 (1979): 1-87.
376 / Bibliography
"Jacob's Voice, Esau's Hands." Arkansas Democrat, July 3, 1945.
Jaffe, Louis L. "The Supreme Court, 1950 Term." Harvard Law Review 65
(1951): 107-83.
"Jesse Jones's Successor." New Republic, Mar. 19, 1945, 114.
"Judge Vinson Never Met a Pay Roll." Louisville Courier-Journal, Mar. 7,1945.
Kirkendall, Richard. "Fred M. Vinson." In The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed. Leon Friedman and
Fred L. Israel. 2639-2649. New York: R.R. Bowker and Chelsea House,
1969.
Klarman, Michael J. "Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement."
University of Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 7-150.
. "Race and the Court in the Progressive Era." Vanderbilt Law Review
51 (1998): 881-953.
Lefberg, Irving. "Chief Justice Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation." Emory
Law Journal 24 (197'5): 243-312.
Lester, Wilbur R. "Fred M. Vinson in the Executive Branch." Northwestern
University Law Review 49 (1954): 36-53.
"Loan Rumors Raised by Wolcott at Hearing on World Fund Bill." New York
Times, Mar. 17, 1945, 10.
Maltz, Eric. "Only Partially Color Blind: John Marshall Harlan's View of Race
and the Constitution." Georgia State Law Review 12 (1996): 973-1016.
"A Man Who Does Not Make Promises He Cannot Keep." Boston Daily Globe,
Sept. 14, 1945.
Morley, Felix. "Affirmation of Materialism: Chief Justice Vinson Questions the
Reality of Moral Standards." Barrons, June 18, 1951.
"O.W.M. Expected to Consult Roosevelt Soon; Vinson, Sworn In, Smiles 'For
Last Time.'" Louisville Courier-Journal, May 30, 1943.
Palmer, Jan, and Saul Brenner. "Determinants of the Amount of Time Taken by
the Vinson Court to Process Its Full Opinion Cases." Journal of Supreme
Court History (1990) 142-51.
Parrish, Michael. "Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs."
American Historical Review 82 (1977): 804-42.
Pearson, Drew. "Washington Merry-Go-Round." Louisville Courier-Journal,
Dec. 16, 1946.
Pedrick, Willard. "From Congress to the Court of Appeals." Northwestern Uni-
versity Law Review 49 (Mar.-Apr. 1954): 54-61.
"Portrait of Late Justice Vinson Is Presented to Centre College." Lexington
Herald, Jan. 8, 1954.
"President Signs Coal Mining Bill." New York Times, Apr. 27, 1937.
"President Upheld by House in Veto of Subsidies Ban." New York Times, Feb.
19, 1944, 1.
Pringle, Henry F. "Sitter-on-the-Lid." Saturday Evening Post, Mar. 18, 1944.
"Profit Tax Relief Put at Top of List." New York Times, Dec. 2, 1937.
Riggs, Robert L. "Senate Group Gives Its Okay to Vinson." Louisville Courier-
Journal, June 20, 1946.
Bibliography / 377
. "Vinson Hates to Go Up and Let Man He Fought Get the Treasury
Post." Louisville Courier-Journal, June 7, 1946.
Rodell, Fred. "The Chief Justice." Life, June 24, 1946.
. "The Supreme Court Is Standing Pat." New Republic, Dec. 19, 1949,
11-13.
"Secretary Vinson Urges Granting of Loan to Britain." Louisville Courier-Jour-
nal, Mar. 24, 1946, 1.
"See Vast Loan Use for Security Fund." New York Times, Feb. 9, 1935.
"Senate Votes Rise of 8C in Rail Pay, Overruling Vinson." New York Times,
Dec. 10, 1943, 1.
"A Service the Farmers Do Not Need Is Proposed in the Flannagan Bill." Lex-
ington Herald, May 22, 1935.
Stephens, Harold M. "The Chief Justice." American Bar Association Journal
32 (1946): 387-89.
Stern, Robert L. "The Rosenberg Case in Perspective—Its Present Significance."
Journal of Supreme Court History (1990): 79-92.
Stewart, Kenneth. "Presidential Timber: Amiable 'Available' Vinson." P.M. Sun-
day Picture News, Sept. 14, 1947.
"Supreme Court Postscript." Progressive, May 27, 1956.
Tushnet, Mark, and Katya Lezin. "What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of
Education." Columbia Law Review 91 (Dec. 1991): 1867-1930.
"Vinson: Senate's 'Businessman.'" Business Week, Mar. 17, 1945, 17-19.
"Vinson, Acheson Urge British Loan." New York Times, Jan. 13, 1946, 25.
"Vinson Becomes Head of Treasury." New York Times, July 24, 1945, 13.
"Vinson Calls Loan to Britain a 'Must.'" New York Times, Mar. 6, 1946, 8.
"Vinson Campaigns for British Loan." New York Times, Jan. 10, 1946, 13.
"Vinson Has Trouble Explaining Tax Cuts with Borrowed Specs." Cincinnati
Post, Oct. 17, 1945.
"Vinson Hits Subsidy Foes." New York Times, Oct. 21, 1943, 28.
"Vinson Makes Statement." Mt. Sterling (Ky.) Gazette, May 2, 1930.
"Vinson's Executive Talent, Poker Playing Win Friends." St. Louis Star-Times,
Apr. 4, 1945.
"Vinson's New Job Thrills His Spouse." Washington Post, May 30, 1943.
"Vinson Tells U.S. What It Faces against Japan, Eases Some Curbs." New York
Times, May 10, 1945, 17.
"We'll Appeal to Uncle." Ogden (Utah) Standard-Examiner, July 6, 1945.
Wechsler, Herbert. "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law." Harvard
Law Review 73 (1959): 1-35.
"Why Farmers Are against the Flannagan Bill." Lexington Herald, May 27,
1935.
Dissertations
Atkinson, David N. "Mr. Justice Minton and the Supreme Court, 1949-1956."
Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Iowa, 1962.
378 / Bibliography
Bolner, James J. "Mr. Chief Justice Vinson: His Politics and His Constitutional
Law." Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Virginia, 1962.
Hatcher, John H. "Fred Vinson: Congressman from Kentucky, a Political Biog-
raphy: 1890-1938." Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Cincinnati, 1967.
O'Brien, Kevin J. "Dennis v. United States: The Cold War, the Communist
Conspiracy, and the F.B.I." Ph.D. diss., Cornell Univ., 1979.
Court Cases
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1948).
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Andree Seedman, Inc. et al. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, U.S.
Department of Labor, 122 F2d 634 (1941).
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
Blau [Irving] v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
Blau [Patricia] v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
Bob Lo Excursions v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 454 (1969).
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
Briggs v. Elliott, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
California v. United States, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
Carters. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, Price Administrator, 137 F2d 201 (1943).
Davis v. County School Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Dennis v. United States, 183 F2d 201 (1950).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
DiRe v. United States, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
Evans v. Ockerhausen, 100 F2d 695 (1938).
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
Bibliography / 379
Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
Gebhart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
Gryger v. Burfe, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
//a/e>> v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Harris v. Sow/ft Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
/ /arm v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
//Mrd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
Jennings v. ///mow, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161
(1945).
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance. Co. v. Helvering, Com'r of Revenue, 128
F2d 745 (1942).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
A"ovac.y v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
Kunz v. New for*, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
McCord v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 123 F2d 164 (1941).
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
National Association of Wool Manufacturers v. Fleming, 122 F2d 617 (1941).
National Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board, 110 F2d
529(1940).
TVearv. Minnesota, 231 U.S. 697 (1931).
Nueslein v. Dwfnc? of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (1940).
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
iVL/?£ v. 7orte.y and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 128 (1937).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
Patto v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134(1951).
Parmelee v. United States, 113 F2d 729 (1940).
P/e^j v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Prevost v. Morgenthau, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 106 F2d 330 (1939).
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950).
Railroad Retirement Board v. i5ares, 126 F2d 642 (1942).
/?oc7z/« v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
380 / Bibliography
Rosenberg et al. v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
Scharfield v. Richardson, 133 F2d 340 (1942).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Sipue'lv. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
Southern Garment Mfrs. Association, Inc. et al v. Fleming, Administrator, Wage
and Hour Division, 122 F2d 622 (1941).
Speller v. Allen, 2>AA U.S. 443 (1955).
Stack v. Soyfe 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
Sweatt v. Pa/nfer, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
Switchmen's Union of North America etal. v. National Mediation Board, etai,
135 F2d 785 (1943).
Switchmen's Union of North America et al. v. National Mediation Board et al.,
320 U.S. 297(1943).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Trupiano v. t/mfea1 States, 334 U.S. 700 (1948).
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
United Mine Workers of America v. t/mfed States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
United States v. A/cea Sana7 ofTillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
United States v. (9#Mft, 127 F2d 337 (1942).
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
United States v. S/»>p, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 270 (1947).
United States ex rel Denholm & McKay Co. v. United States Board of Tax Ap-
peals, 125 F2d 557 (1942).
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
Viereck v. United States, 130 F2d 945 (1942).
Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
Viereck v. United States, 139 F2d 847 (1944).
Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F2d 642 (1941).
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Hfesf Coast Hotel Company v. Parm/j, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Whitney v. California, 71A U.S. 357 (1927).
Me/nan v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Yates v. C/mfea1 States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Index
Abraham, Henry, 162
Acheson, Dean, 194, 261
Adamson v. California, 284-85
Adjusted Compensation Act, 28
Adjusted Service Certificate payment
bill, 74
Adkins, V.V., 68
Adler v. Board of Education, 255
Agriculture Adjustment Act, 76, 82,
168
Aircraft Procurement Board, 38
Allen, Francis A., 280, 299-300, 305,
306,307,317
Alley, George L., 11
Altmeyer, Arthur I , 84-85
American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 151
American Bar Association, 232, 239,
290, 291
American Communications Association
v. Douds, 233-37, 241, 246, 330
American Federation of Labor, 112
American Legion, 40, 74
American Political Science Review, 65,
245
Anderson, Kyrill M., 232
Arkansas Democrat, 145
Ashland Daily Independent, 7, 45, 68
Atlantic Monthly, 84
Atomic Energy Act, 250, 251, 252
Avery v. Georgia, 294
Bagby, Billy, 7
Bailey, Clay Wade, 4 3 ^ 4
Bailey, Dorothy, 253
Bailey v. Richardson, 253-54
Ballard & Ballard Company, 88
Bankhead, William, 93, 106
Barkley, Alben W.: fractured Demo-
cratic Party of Kentucky, 21;
railroad legislation, 28; Vinson's
poem, 36; race for senate seat, 43,
62; chairman of Library Committee,
79; WPA, 81, 347n. 62; Little Steel
formula, 133; playing bridge with
Vinson, 137; speculation on Vinson
for higher office, 146; Vinson's tax
cut appeal, 150; Vinson's funeral,
337
Barkley-Vinson Bill, 82
Barron's, 247
Barrows v. Jackson, 323-24, 329, 330,
331
Bates, Joe, 144
Beckham, J.C.W., 43
Belgrano, Frank N., Jr., 75
Belknap, Michael R., 245, 246
Bell, Golden W., 94
Belts v. Brady, 287, 288
Bickel, Alexander, 326, 327
Big Sandy News, 19,33
Biggs, Jack, 18
Bill of Rights, 171, 284, 285, 328, 329
Bingham, Robert Worth, 21, 43, 67, 71
Bituminous Coal Act, 75, 168
Black, Hugo: Viereck v. United States,
116; conflict with Jackson, 156-62;
opening day of Vinson court, 164;
382 / Index
Black, Hugo (cont.)
voting bloc, 169; philosophy, 170,
171, 176; productivity, 181, 182,
184; connection to historian, John P.
Frank, 188; United Mine Workers v.
United States, 202-4, 206, 211;
Youngstown Steel and Tube v.
Sawyer, 220-24, 226, 227; views on
Communist threat, 232; American
Communications Association v.
Douds, 236, 237; Dennis v. United
States, 238, 239, 242, 243, 244,
247; Rosenberg case, 248, 249, 251,
252; Bailey v. Richardson, 254;
Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 254; loyalty
oaths, 255; Weiman v. Updegraff,
256; Blau v. United States, 256-57;
Rogers v. United States, 257-58;
Christoffel v. United States, 259;
United States v. Fleischman, 260;
Oyama case, 261; United States v.
ex rel Knauffx. Shaughnessy, 262;
Carlson v. Landon, 263; Meze;
case, 264; Kovacs v. Cooper, 266;
Breard v. G'ry of Alexandria, 269;
Terminiello v. Chicago, 270; Feiner
v. New Fort 273, 274; concerns
about inconsistent opinions, 275;
views on due process, 277; Harris
v. United States, 279; D/ fle v.
United States, 281; United States v.
Rabinowitz, 283; Pa/fa? v, Connecti-
cut, 284; Adamson v. California,
285; /?oc/iw v. California, 287;
right-to-counsel cases, 287;
Quicksall v. Michigan, 288; G/bfo
v. Bwrie, 288; G/deoM v. Wam-
wngfe, 288; //a/ej v. 0/wo, 288;
Srod: v. Nort/i Carolina, 292;
Henderson v. (/m'tet/ States, 298;
racially restrictive covenants, 306;
Sweatt v. Painter, 312; Brown v.
Board of Education, 319, 320, 321;
overview of the Vinson Court, 329,
330
Blau, Patricia, 265
Bta« v. United States, 256-57, 36In. 63
Blazer, Paul, 48
Bob Lo Excursions v. Michigan, 296
Boiling v. Sharp, 318
Bolner, James J., 212, 281,328
Bonus Army, 60
Bonus bill, 61
Bowles, Chester, 131, 136
Bracken Chronicle, 61
Brandeis, Louis D., 191, 234, 240, 241
Breard v. G'ry of Alexandria, 268-69
Breckinridge, Desha, 21, 43, 68, 275
Bretton Woods. See United Nations
Monetary and Financial Confer-
ence, 137-38, 150
Briggs v. Elliott, 318
Brock v. North Carolina, 292, 293
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of
America, 112
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 109
Brown, James B., 21, 43
Brown, John Young, 70-71
Brownell, Herbert, 250-51, 338
Brown v. Board of Education, 277,
295, 306, 314, 316, 318, 325-28,
332
Buchanan v. Warley, 305-6
Burton, Harold: opening day of Vinson
court, 164; Truman appointee, 168;
voting bloc, 169; productivity, 180—
81, 182, 184; Vinson for higher
office, 195; United Mine Workers v.
United States, 202, 206; Young-
stown Steel and Tube v. Sawyer,
218-20, 222, 225; views on
Communist threat, 232; American
Communications Association v.
Douds, 234; Dennis v. United
States, 239, 244, 246; Rosenberg
case, 248, 249, 251; Bailey v.
Richardson, 254; Joint Anti-Fascists
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
254; loyalty oaths, 255; Weiman v.
Updegraff, 256; Oyama case, 261;
United States v. ex rel Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 262; Carlson v.
Landon, 263; Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 264; Kovacs v. Cooper,
266; Terminiello v. Chicago, 272;
ffarrw v. £/m'/ed 5toes, 279;
v. 0/HO, 288; Upshaw v.
Index / 383
States, 288; Morgan v. Virginia,
296; Henderson v. United States,
298; racially restrictive covenants,
300; Brown v. Board of Education,
318, 319, 320; comments after
Vinson's death, 325
BusinessWeek, 135, 142
Bute v. Illinois, 287-88
Byington, Walter M., 10
Byrnes, James R: leaves Office of
Economic Stabilization, 125;
becomes director of Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion,
126; Federal Loan Agency, 128;
Montgomery-Ward seizure, 131;
Vinson's report to Roosevelt, 141;
resigns from the Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion,
142-43; secretary of state, 146;
disclosure about Harry Dexter
White, 154; determining the
presidency of World Bank, 164
California Alien Land Law, 260
California v. United States, 356n. 2
Cantrill, Campbell, 21
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 265-66
Cardinal and Blue, 11
Cardozo, Benjamin, 123-24, 284, 293
Carlisle Mercury, 61
Carlson v. London, 262-63
Carter, Robert L., 318
Catholic Standard, 247
Chambers, Whittaker, 194
Chandler, A.B. (Happy), 51, 52, 73, 333
Chapman, Virgil, 67
Chicago Law Review, 227, 245
Chicago Sun, 145
Childs, Marquis, 157
Chiles, Dick, 32
Christian Century, 247
Christojfel v. United States, 259
Cincinnati Times-Star, 82
Cisco, Allen N., 17
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 81
Civil Rights Act, 302, 311
Civil Service, 79
Civil Works Administration (CWA),
79,80
Clark, Tom C : disclosure about Harry
Dexter White, 154; Vinson's
appointment to Supreme Court, 161,
175; relationship between Frank-
furter and Vinson, 176; productivity,
186; voting bloc, 186; playing cards
with Vinson, 192; United Mine
Workers v. United States, 200, 202;
Youngstown Steel and Tube v.
Sawyer, 218, 220-22, 225, 226;
views on Communist Party as
attorney general, 231; views on
Communist threat as Justice, 232;
Dennis v. United States, 238, 239;
Rosenberg case, 248, 252; Bailey v.
Richardson, 254; Weiman v.
Updegrajf, 256; Christoffel v.
United States, 259; United States v.
Fleischman, 260; Feiner v. New
York, 273; United States v.
Rabinowitz, 283; civil rights
initiatives, 299; acts of discrimina-
tion, 303; separate-but-equal, 310;
Sweatt v. Painter, 311; Brown v.
Board of Education, 318, 320;
overview of the Vinson Court, 328
Clayton, William L., 150-51
clear and present danger, 234, 237,
239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 275, 329
Clements, Earle, 337
Clifford, Clark, 162, 191, 192, 193
coal, 42, 57, 75
Clothier, Robert C , 91
Coffin, Howard E., 39
Cohen, William, 253
Commission on Employee Loyalty, 231
Committee on Civil Rights, 327
Communist Party, 231, 232, 233, 276;
American Communications
Association v. Douds, 235, 236;
Dennis v. United States, 237, 238,
243^7; Rosenberg case, 248;
Weiman v. Updegrajf, 255-56; Blau
v. United States, 256-57; Rogers v.
United States, 257; Stack v. Boyle,
263
Congressional Record, 47, 70, 71
Connelly, Matthew, 163
Coolidge, Calvin, 27, 32, 36, 343n. 30
384 / Index
Cooper, Jere, 84
Cooper, John Sherman, 337
Corcoran, Thomas, 163
Courtenay, J.C., 68
Cropper, C.L., 72
Crow, Robert X, 43
Crowther, Frank, 92-93, 121
Crutcher, W.E. (Snooks), 15, 17, 33, 35
Cummings, Homer, 94, 100
Danelski, David J., 171
Davis, John W., 35, 220
Davis v. County School Board, 318
Defense Production Act, 226
Dennis v. United States, 170, 237^8 ,
253, 285, 329-31
Deschler, Lewis, 111
Diederich, John, 11,48
DiRe v. United States, 281
Dixon, Robert (Vinson's brother-in-
law), 60, 99
Dixon, Roberta. See Roberta Vinson
Dixon, Robert Porter (Vinson's father-
in-law), 19, 32
doctrine of incorporation, 171, 284-85
Domestic Allotment Plan, 57
Donovan, Robert J., 216-17
Doughton, Robert L., 54, 84, 93, 146,
337
Douglas, William O.: Viereck v. United
States, 116; Jewell Ridge case, 161;
voting bloc, 169; health, 171;
opinion of Vinson, 174; relationship
between Vinson and Frankfurter,
177; productivity, 181, 182, 184;
United Mine Workers v. United
States, 202-6, 211; Youngstown
Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 220-24;
views on Communist threat, 232;
American Communications
Association v. Douds, Til; Dennis
v. United States, 238, 239, 242, 243,
244; Rosenberg case, 248-53;
Bailey v. Richardson, 253-54; Joint
Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 254; loyalty oaths, 255;
Weiman v. Updegraff, 256; Rogers
v. United States, 257; Christoffel v.
United States, 259; United States v.
Fleischman, 260; Oyama case, 261;
Carlson v. Landon, 263; Mezei
case, 264; Saia v. New York, 265;
Kovacs v. Cooper, 266; Breard v.
City of Alexandria, 269; Terminiello
v. Chicago, 270; Feiner v. New
York, 273, 274; concerns about
inconsistent opinions, 275; Harris
v. United States, 279; Di Re v.
United States, 281; Johnson v.
United States, 281; Adamson v.
California, 285; Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 287; right-to-counsel cases,
287; Quicksall v. Michigan, 288;
Gibbs v. Burke, 288; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 288; Henderson v.
United States, 297-98; racially
restrictive covenants, 306; Sweatt v.
Painter, 312; Brown v. Board of
Education, 320; overview of Vinson
Court, 329, 330
Dudziak, Mary L., 303
Dulles, John Foster, 336
Duvall-Briggs murder case, 18
Eccles, Marriner, 149
Economic Security Bill, 83
Economy Act, 66-70, 73
Edelman, Irwin, 250
Edgerton, Henry White, 97, 98;
relationships on the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia, 99; praise
of Vinson's opinions, 111, 121;
Youngstown Steel and Tube v.
Sawyer, 219
Eighth Amendment, 263
Eisenhower, Dwight, 152, 251, 334,
336, 337
Eliot, Thomas H., 84
Elman, Philip, 325
Emergency Court of Appeals, 122, 123
Emergency Price Control Act, 122, 123
Employment Act of 1946, 150
Ernst, Richard P., 43
Espionage Act, 252
Eudaley, Maja, 51
Executive Order 9835, 231, 253
Ex-Service Men's Anti-Bonus League,
27,28
Index / 385
Fair Employment Practices Committee,
144
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 108
Fall, Albert, 25
Farley, James A., 77
Farmer, Fyke, 249-50
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
154, 250, 253
Federal Emergency Relief Administra-
tion (FERA), 80
Federal Loan Agency, 128, 141
Feiner v. New York, 272-73
Ferguson, Samuel, Sr., 3
Ferrell, Robert, 217
Fields, William J., 21-22, 41, 48-50, 72
Fifteenth Amendment, 322
Fifth Amendment, 166; Youngstown
Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 223;
Dennis v. United States, 238, 242;
Weiman v. Updegraff, 256; Kwon
Hai Chew v. Colding, 265; Rochin
v. California, 287
Finley, Charles, 57
Firsov, Fridrikh Igorevich, 232
First Amendment: American Communi-
cations Association v. Douds, 234,
236, 237; Dennis v. United States,
238, 240, 242, 243, 246; Bailey v.
Richardson, 253; Joint Anti-Fascists
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
254-55; Kovacs v. Cooper, 266;
Niemotko v. Maryland, 267; Kunz v.
New York, 267-68; Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 269; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 270; concerns about
inconsistent opinions, 275
Flannagan Bill, 78
Fleeson, Doris, 157-58
Forgey, B.F., 48
Fourteenth Amendment, 113, 166, 171,
277, 278; Niemotko v. Maryland, 267;
Harris v. United States, 280; Palko v.
Connecticut, 284; Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 287; Young v. Ragen, 289; Brock
v. North Carolina, 292; Avery v.
Georgia, 294; McGhee v. 5i/?es, 299;
racially restrictive covenants, 300,
302; Sweatt v. Pa/wte/; 311,313;
Vinson court overview, 327-29
Fourth Amendment, 117, 281, 286
Francis, Willie, 184
Frank, John P., 180, 181, 186, 188,
227, 228, 236, 304
Frankfurter, Felix, 130, 191;. opinion
on conflict on the Court, 165-66;
voting bloc, 169, 175, 186; philoso-
phy, 170, 171; relationship with
Vinson, 173-79, 185, 186, 188;
productivity, 180-82, 184; United
Mine Workers v. United States,
202-7, 210; Youngstown Steel and
Tube v. Sawyer, 219-20, 222, 224;
views on Communist threat, 232;
American Communications
Association v. Douds, 235-36;
Dennis v. United States, 238, 239,
242, 244; Rosenberg case, 248-53;
Bailey v. Richardson, 254; Joint
Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 254; loyalty oaths, 255;
Weiman v. Updegraff, 256; Rogers
v. United States, 257; Christoffel v.
United States, 259; United States v.
Fleischman, 260; United States v.
ex rel Knaujfv. Shaughnessy, 262;
Carlson v. London, 263; Mezei
case, 264; Kovacs v. Cooper, 266;
Niemotko v. Maryland, 267; A"M«Z V.
New Kor&, 268; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 269, 272; concerns about
inconsistent opinions, 274—75;
relationship with Black, 277; Harris
v. (Mted States, 280; Johnson v.
United States, 281; Adamson v.
California, 285; Wo//v. Colorado,
286; /?oc^i« v. California, 287;
Jennings v. Illinois, 291; Brock v.
/Vorf/i Carolina, 293; Henderson v.
(/mted States, 298; Sweatt v.
Painter, 312; McLaurin v. OWa-
homa, 315; Brown v. Board of
Education, 319, 320, 321, 326;
comments after Vinson's death, 325;
overview of Vinson Court, 329, 330
Friedman, Leon, 162
Garner, John Nance, 24, 25, 26, 49, 62
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 255
386 / Index
Gearhart, Bertrand W., 146
Gebhartv. Belton, 318
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections, 255
Gerhart, Eugene, 158, 160, 161
Gibbs v. Burke, 288
Gideon v. Wainwright, 288
Gitlow case, 240
Glass-Steagall banking bill, 52, 58
Go-Bart Importing Company v. United
States, 279
Goldman, Sheldon, 96
Goldsborough, T. Alan, 200, 201, 205,
209
Gregory, Noble, 337-38
Griswold, Erwin, 316
Groner, Lawrence, 95, 98; relationships
on the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia, 99; productivity, 100,
101, 181; early tensions, 102, 103;
opinion of conflict between Black
and Jackson, 162; racially restrictive
covenants, 303
Guerdini, Dominique, 18
Guffey-Vinson Coal Bill, 75, 76, 168,
203
Gumm, Howard, 37
Hager, Lawrence, 11,12
Haley v. Ohio, 288
Halifax, Lord, 150
Hamilton, Finley, 67
Hamilton, William C , 48, 49
Hand, Learned, 237, 239, 241, 326
Hannegan, Robert E., 163
Harlan, John Marshall, 247, 248, 304,
320
Harper, Fowler V., 204
Harris, Crompton, 157
Harris v. United States, 278-81, 282,
330
Harvard Law Review, 228, 245
Hatcher, John C , 69
Hatcher, Margaret, 7
Havighurst, Harold C , 339
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act, 57
Haynes, John Earl, 232
Henderson v. United States, 297-98,
310,313,316
Hill, Samuel B., 86
Hines, Gen. Frank T., 40
Hirsch. H.N., 175
Hiss, Alger, 194
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 163, 169,
209, 234, 240, 241
Hook, Sidney, 246
Hoover, Herbert, 45, 52, 193
Hoover, J. Edgar, 154
Hopkins, Harry, 79, 80
House Committee on Un-American
Activities, 154,231,258
House Ways and Means Committee,
50, 54, 58, 77, 146
Howell, Robert B., 28
Howerton, Davis M., 45
Hughes, Charles Evans, 157, 160, 161,
163, 195
Hull, Cordell, 143
Hard v. Hodge, 299, 302, 303
Hutchinson, Dennis, 297, 316, 319
Hutchinson, Henry M., 30
Hutton, Hubert, 20
Ickes, Harold, 66, 136
Immigration Services, 262, 264
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, 137-39, 152,
154, 164
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
137-39, 152, 153
Interstate Commerce Commission, 297
Israel, Fred L., 162
Jackson, Robert H., 110, conflict with
Black, 156-62; opening day of
Vinson court, 164; voting bloc, 169,
175, 186; productivity, 176, 184;
United Mine Workers v. United
States, 202-6; Youngstown Steel and
Tube v. Sawyer, 220-24, 226, 227;
views on Communist threat, 232;
American Communications
Association v. Douds, 235-36;
Dennis v. United States, 238, 239,
242, 243, 244, 284; Rosenberg case,
248-49, 251-52; Bailey v.
Richardson, 254; Joint Anti-Fascists
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
Index / 387
254; Weiman v. Updegraff, 256;
Blau v. United States, 257; Rogers
v. United States, 257; Oyama case,
261; United States v. ex re/ Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 262; Meze; case,
264; Kovacs v. Cooper, 266; Aimz v.
Afevv Kor&, 268; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 272; concerns about
inconsistent opinions, 275; Harris
v. United States, 280; Johnson v.
United States, 281; //a/ey v. O/i/o,
288; Upshaw v. t/mferf States, 288;
Bob Lo Excursions v. Michigan,
296; racially restrictive covenants,
299; Sweaff v. Painter, 312; Broww
v. Board of Education, 318, 319,
320, 321, 326; Barrows v. Jackson,
323; overview of Vinson Court,
329; comments after Vinson's death,
336
Jacobs, William P., 129-30
James, W. Frank, 38-39
Jaybird Democratic Association, 114
Jenkins, Thomas, 92-93
Jennings v. Illinois, 290
Jewell Ridge case, 157, 159
Voftn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Helvering, Com 'r of Revenue, 112
Johnson, Keen, 50-51
Johnson, Lyndon B., 131, 336
Johnson, Walter, 29
Johnson v. United States, 281
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee, 258, 260
Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee
v. McGrath, 254
Jones, Jesse H., 141
Jones, Marvin, 130
Kalven, Harry, 245, 254, 274
Kefauver, Estes, 125
Kelley, Paul L., 131,331
Kemmerer, Edwin W., 58
Kendall, Elva R., 44, 49
Kennan, Joseph B., 97
Kentucky Derby, 143, 154
Kentucky Post, 44
Keynes, John Maynard, 137, 150, 151,
152
King.WillifordL, 58
Kinner, Stephen Gerard, 5, 8
Kirkendall, Richard, 162
Klarman, Michael J., 305-6
Klehr, Harvey, 232
Kluger, Richard, 318, 319
Kovacs v. Cooper, 185-86, 266
Knauff, Ellen, 262
Krug, Julius A., 199
Krug-Lewis agreement, 202, 208
Ku Klux Klan, 36
Kunz v. New York, 267
Kwon Hal Chew v. Colding, 264-65
Laffoon, Ruby, 51,52
LaGuardia, Fiorello H., 26, 27, 54, 208
Langley, John W., 31
Lefberg, Irving, 304-7, 317-18, 324,
327
Lester, Wilbur, 213, 339
Lewis, John L., 75, 132, 198-205,
209-12
Lexington Herald, 21, 43, 44, 68, 78
Little Steel formula, 132, 133
Long, Huey, 85
Louisville Courier-Journal, 67, 73,
142, 145
Lovett, Joe T., 69
Luce, Robert, 36
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 60
MacDonald, Rear Adm. Donald, 192
Magruder, Calvert, 122
Mapp v, Ohio, 286
Marcus, Maeva, 228, 229
Mans, Albert B., 122
Marshall, Daniel, 249
Marshall, George C , 2, 193, 194
Marshall, Thurgood, 300, 307, 309-11,
316
May, Jack, 62, 67, 72
Mayo, Walter, 67
McCarthy, Joseph, 194, 248, 268
McCormack, John W., 26, 66, 93
McGhee v. Sipes, 298, 306
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 298, 309-17,
327
Medina, Harold, 237, 245
Mellon, Andrew W, 24, 25, 87, 149
Meyer, Eugene, 58, 164
388 / Index
Mezei, Ignatz, 264
Mezei case, 264
Michelsen, Charles, 45
Military Affairs Committee, 37, 38, 53
Miller, Justin, 97, 102-3, 111
Minow, Newton, 176, 179-80, 217, 339
Minton, Sherman; 175, 335; relation-
ship between Frankfurter and
Vinson, 177; voting bloc, 186;
productivity, 186; Youngstown Steel
and Tube v. Sawyer, 218, 220, 221-
23; views on Communist threat,
232; Dennis v. United States, 239,
244, 246-48; Rosenberg case, 248,
251; Bailey v. Richardson, 254;
Alder v. Board of Education, 255;
Blau v. United States, 257; Rogers
v. Unites States, 257; United States
v. ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy,
262; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
264; Feiner v. New York, 273;
United States v. Rabinowitz, 283;
Jennings v. Illinois, 291-92; Brock
v. Aforf/i Carolina, 292; separate-
but-equal, 310; Brown v. Board of
Education, 320; Barrows v.
Jackson, 323; comments after
Vinson's death, 324-25
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,
308-9,317
Mitchell, Gen. William, 37-38
Moore, E.H., 164
Morgan v. Virginia, 296
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 110, 139, 145,
146
Morrow, Dwight, 38
Morton, Thruston B., 89
Murphy, Bruce A., 191,217
Murphy, Charles, 195-96
Murphy, Frank: conflict on the Court,
165; voting bloc, 169; health, 172,
283; death, 175; productivity, 180,
181, 184; United Mine Workers v.
United States, 202, 206, 211, 212;
change in voting block, 237, 310;
Christoffel v. United States, 259;
Oyama case, 261; Kovacs v.
Cooper, 266; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 270; Harris v. United
States, 280; Johnson v. t/rafed
States, 281; Trupiano v. United
States, 281-82; Adamson v.
California, 285; right-to-counsel
cases, 287; racially restrictive
covenants, 300, 304
Murphy, Ray, 74
Musick, Ryland C , 23, 32, 35
National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP),
307-10,315-18,325
National Association of Legal Aid
Organizations, 291
National Association of Wool Manufac-
turers v. Fleming, 108-9
National Federation of Railroad
Workers, 112
National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), 168
National Labor Relations Act, 214
National Labor Relations Act of 1937,
233, 234
National Mediation Board, 112-13
Neace, Bob, 16-17
Nelson, Donald, 131
New Deal, xii, 64, 65-66, 74, 95, 169
Newell, D.P., 55
New Republic, 142, 246, 316
Newsweek, 98
New York Central Railroad, 109
New York Criminal Anarchy Law, 240
New York Post, 246
New York Times, 86, 87, 160, 164, 201,
203,205,213-14,227,339
New York World, 45
Niemotko v. Maryland, 266-67
Nixon, Richard, 335-36
Norris, James T., 48
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 201,
203, 204, 207-12
North American Aviation, 221, 226
Northern Pacific Railroad, 29
Northwestern University Law Review,
339
Nudism in Modern Life, 120
Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 116-17
Office of Economic Stabilization
Index / 389
(OES), 123, 125, 128-31, 134, 136,
139-41
Office of Price Administration (OPA),
122, 131, 134-36, 140
Office of the Alien Property Custodian,
24
Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion, 2, 98, 126, 163, 198,
199
Offutt, Dorsey, 119
Oliver, William, 251
O'Neill, Thomas P. (Tip), 23
Ormond Beatty Alumni Prize, 11,13
Osborne, George, 35
Oyama, Kajira, 261
Oyama case, 261-62
Padaway, Joseph A., 203
Paley, William S., 87
Palko v. Connecticut, 284, 293
Palmer v. Ashe, 288
Parade, xiii
Pari-mutuel betting, 21, 43
Parmeleev. United States, 120-22
Parrish, Michael, 249, 253
Patman, Wright, 66, 74
Pearson, Drew, 201
Pedrick, Willard, xiv, 99, 104, 106,
107, 123, 130,331,339
Pennsylvania Grit, 7
People and Politics, 36
Perkins, Frances, 83
Perlman, Philip, 220, 221, 299, 300,
303
Pierce, W.C., 45, 63
Pine, David A., 218, 219, 223, 227
Plessy v. Ferguson, 295, 297, 309-17
Porter, Paul A., 131, 136, 141
Praying Colonels baseball team, 12
President's Committee on Civil Rights,
295, 303
Prevost case, 110
Price, Eva, 22
Prichard, Edward F., Jr., 130-31, 149,
174
Pritchett, Herman, 281, 283, 296, 316-
17
Proctor, James M., 125
Progressive, 158
prohibition, 44-46, 63-64
Propaganda Agency Act of 1938, 114
Pusey, Merlo J., 157, 160, 161
Quicksall v. Michigan, 288
Rabban, David, 244
Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 107
Railroad Retirement Board v. Bates,
107-8
Rayburn, Sam, 26, 66, 99, 133, 136,
137, 147, 337
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
52,58,84, 135, 142
Reed, Stanley, 30, 110; voting bloc,
169, 175, 186; opinion of Vinson,
173, 183; productivity, 184; United
Mine Workers v. United States, 202,
206; Youngstown Steel and Tube v.
Sawyer, 220, 222-23; views on
Communist threat, 232; American
Communications Association v.
Douds, 234; Dennis v. United
States, 239, 244, 248; Rosenberg
case, 248; Bailey v. Richardson,
254; Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 254—55;
Oyama case, 261; United States v.
ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 262;
Carlson v. London, 263; Kovacs v.
Cooper, 266; Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 269; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 269-70; concerns about
inconsistent opinions, 275; Harris
v. United States, 279; United States
v. Rabinowitz, 283; Adamson v.
California, 285; Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 287; Haley v. Ohio, 288;
Upshaw v. United States, 288;
Henderson v. United States, 298;
racially restrictive covenants, 299;
Sweatt v. Painter, 312-13; Brown v.
Board of Education, 320, 321;
Barrows v. Jackson, 323
Revenue Act of 1936, 86
Revenue Act of 1937, 87
Revenue Act of 1938, 88, 92
Rhea, Thomas, 73
Ritter, Harry, E., 16
390 / Index
"The Road to Tokyo and Beyond," 144,
148
Robb, Charles, 97
Roberts, Owen J., 110, 158
Robinson, S potts wood W., 318-19
Rochin v. California, 286-87
Rodell, Fred, 158, 161, 181, 182
Rogers, Jane, 257
Rogers v. United States, 257-58
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, xii, 1, 62,
65; Vinson note on tobacco tax, 77;
appointments to circuit court, 94-
96, 100, 103; inflation and price
control, 125-26; mine seizure, 132;
report of the Office of Economic
Stabilization, 134, 139-41;
maintains agricultural and food
subsidies, 135-36; death, 139;
Henry A. Wallace appointed to
secretary of commerce, 141; Vinson
appointed to Federal Loan Agency,
143; discussion with Chief Justice
Hughes, 157; effect of appointees to
Supreme Court, 162, 167, 169;
relationship with justices, 193
Rosenberg, Ethel, 248-53, 324
Rosenberg, Gerald N., 304
Rosenberg, Julius, 248-53, 324
Rosenberg case, 248-53
Ruppert, Jacob, 87
Rutledge, Wiley; circuit court years,
97,99, 101; Supreme Court
appointment, 100, 110; praise of
Vinson on circuit court, 108, 111,
119-20; voting bloc, 169; death,
175, 187, 283; productivity on
Supreme Court, 180-81, 182, 184;
United Mine Workers v. United
States, 202, 206, 211-12; change in
voting block, 237, 310; Christoffel
v. United States, 259; Oyama case,
261; Kovacs v. Cooper, 266;
Terminiello v. Chicago, 270;
Johnson v. United States, 281;
Adamson v. California, 285; right-
to-counsel cases, 287; habeas
corpus from Illinois, 289; Bob Lo
Excursion v. Michigan, 296; racially
restrictive covenants, 299
Sackett, Frederic M., 35
Saia v. New York, 265, 266
Sampson, Flem, 43
Saturday Evening Post, 7, 87
Savannah Conference, 152-54
Sawyer, Charles, 218, 227
Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Chenery Corporation, 180-81
Selective Service, 119, 216
Shannon, Earnest, 22, 29
Shelley v. Kraemer, 113, 298, 302,
304-9,314,323
Short, Joseph, 160
Shouse, Jouett, 51
Simple Justice, 318
Sinclair, Harry, 25
Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 308-10, 315, 317
Sixth Amendment, 287
Sloan, Alfred P., 87
Smith, Alfred E., 44
Smith, S.C., 40
Smith Act, 231, 232, 237-40, 242, 247,
248, 256
Smith-Connally. See War Labor
Disputes Act
Snyder, John, 147, 163, 217
Sobeloff, Simon, 338
Socialist Party, 240
Social Security Act, xii, 83-84, 168
Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act, 77
Sopourn, Robert, 119
Soviet Union, 232, 233, 238
Stack v. Boyle, 263
Stalin, Joseph, 1, 193,248
Standard-Examiner, 145
Stanley, A.O., 35
Steamer, Robert, J., 171
Stephens, Harold, 95, 97, 98; Vinson's
philosophy, 95, 105; relationships
on court, 99, 103; importance of
circuit court, 100; praise of Vinson
on circuit court, 111, 123; conflict
between Jackson and Black, 162;
opinion of seizure of steel mills,
219
Stern, Robert L., 250
Stevenson, Adlai, 197, 334
Stewart, Forrest Lee, 15
Index / 391
St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7, 246
Stone, HarlanFiske, 115, 122, 155,
157, 165, 193,278,331
Sullivan, Henry, 15
Sweattv. Painter, 298, 309-17, 327
Switchman's Union of North America,
109
Swope, King, 73
Taft-Hartley Act, 214-16, 218-20,
222-26, 233
Taylor, E. Leland, 155
Teapot Dome, 23-24
Terminiello v. Chicago, 269-1 \
Terry v. Adams, 322
Tester, J.H., 26
Texas Pacific Railway Company, 112
Textile Workers Union, 129
Thompson, James A., 50-51
Tilson, John, 25
Time, 194, 207
To Secure These Rights, 295, 303
tobacco, 25, 54, 56, 76-78
Townsend v. Burke, 288
Treadway, Allen, 92-93
Trienens, Howard, 176-77, 179-80,
217,229,339
Truman, Bess. 192, 193, 335
Truman, Harry, xii, 1; reliance on
Vinson, 126; in senate, 133;
becomes president, 139; "The Road
to Tokyo and Beyond," 144; loans
to Britain, 150-52; appointment of
Vinson to Supreme Court, 156-63,
187-89; on role of the Court, 170;
relationship with Vinson, 189-93,
198, 275; Truman aspirations for
Vinson, 195-97, 334; United Mine
Workers strike and mine seizures,
199-205, 212-13; steel mill
seizures, 215-18, 226, 227, 229;
Communist threat, 231; civil rights,
295, 299; end of term, 335;
comments after Vinson's death,
336-37
Truman, Margaret, 154, 192, 195, 217
Trupiano v. United States, 281-83
Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of
Harry S Truman 1949-1953, 216
Tushnet, Mark, 300, 310, 316, 319,
321,325,326,327
United Nations Monetary and Finan-
cial Conference. See Bretton
Woods, 137-38, 150
Underwood, Thomas R., 44, 78
Undistributed Profit Tax, 87, 92, 94
United Mine Workers (UMW), 75,
132, 157, 201-4, 206, 207, 212, 218
United Mine Workers v. United States,
190,202-12,228-30
United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, 2;
Vinson's appointment, 94; impor-
tance to Roosevelt, 100; statistics
during Vinson's years on court,
103-5
United States Supreme Court, xii, 2;
Vinson's appointment, 156;
philosophical difference of justices,
164; productivity, 182-84; effect of
Roosevelt and Truman appointees,
188, 190; court in transition, 198
United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 183
United States v. Bryan, 258-59
United States v. ex rel Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 262
United States v. Fleischman, 260
United States v. Ojfutt, 119-20
United States v. Rabinowitz, 282-84
United States v. Shipp, 209
United Steelworkers of America, 215
University of Chicago Law Review, 212
Upshaw v. United States, 288-89
Urciolo v. Hodge, 299, 302
Urofsky, Melvin, 166, 245, 286, 330
Van Antwerp, Chiles B., 37
Vanderbilt Law Review, 245
Van Devanter, Willis, 168
Veterans Bureau, 24, 40
Viereck, Sylvester George, 114
Vie reck v. United States, 114-16
Vinson, Fred M.. Jr., (son), 48, 83, 126,
317
Vinson, Frederick M., xi-xiv, 1, 2;
birth, 3; early years, 4—8; college
392 / Index
Vinson, Frederick M. (cont.)
years, 9-13; law school, 13-14;
practicing law in Louisa, Ky., 15;
semi-professional baseball, 16;
military service, 16; elected
commonwealth attorney, 16-18;
marries Roberta Dixon, 18-19
—, United States House of Representa-
tives: special election victory; 20,
22; Kentucky politics, 21; re-
election campaign, 23, 33, 34, 4 3 -
44; tax issues, 24, 25; immigration,
26; defending the honor of Ken-
tucky, 27; veteran's bonuses, 27-28;
railroad labor legislation, 28; Public
Lands Committee, 29; Vinson's
support of constituents, 30-32; birth
of Fred Jr., 31; re-election victory,
35; "Cal's Hobby Horse," 36-37;
work on Military Affairs Commit-
tee, 38-39; War Department
Remount Service, 39; Lexington
veterans hospital, 40; 1927 floods,
41; bridge "recapture clause," 42;
Big Sandy River improvements, 42;
coal barges, 42-43; Alfred E. Smith,
44; prohibition; 44^-5; loses
election; 46; move to Ashland, Ky.,
48; stock market crash; 47; re-
election campaign, 4 8 ^ 9 ; election
victory, 49; thoughts of governor-
ship, 50-51; balancing the budget,
53; protecting tobacco, 54—56, 77-
78; double taxation, 55, 56;
Domestic Allotment Plan, 57;
protecting the coal industry, 57;
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act, 57;
veteran's compensation, 58-60; re-
election campaign, 60-61, 74;
redistriding, 60-61, 72; election
victory, 62-63; prohibition, 64;
Roosevelt and the New Deal, 65-
66; vote on the Economy Act, 66-
71; Adjusted Service Certificate
payment bill, 74-75; Guffey-Vinson
Coal Bill, 75-76; Agriculture
Adjustment Act, 76; Soil Conserva-
tion and Domestic Allotment Act,
76; requests for jobs from constitu-
ents, 78-79; Civil Works Adminis-
tration (CWA), 79; Works Progress
Administration (WPA), 80; Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC), 81;
flood control, 81; water pollution,
82; court packing, 82; Social
Security, 83-85; tax reform, 85-92;
praise for service in Congress, 92-93
—, United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia: swearing in, 94; Roosevelt's
selection of Vinson, 95-96;
transition to the bench, 98-100;
productivity, 100-101; early
tensions and levity, 102-3; court
statistics, 103-5; opinion writing
style, 106-7; Railroad Retirement
Board v. Bates, 107-8; National
Association of Wool Manufacturers
v. Fleming, 108-9; The Brother-
hood of Railway Trainmen, 109-10;
Prevostcase, 110; tax cases, 111;
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Helvering, Com'r of Revenue, 112;
racial discrimination case, 112-13;
Viereckv. United States, 114-16;
Nueslein v. District of Columbia,
116-17; contempt of court ruling,
117-18; United States v. Offutt,
119; Parmelee v. United States,
120-21; appointment to Emergency
Court of Appeals, 122; judicial
philosophy, 123-34
—, Executive Branch: appointment to
director of Office of Economic
Stabilization (OES), 125-26; CBS
broadcast, 128; William P. Jacobs
false claim, 129-30; relationship
with Edward F. Prichard Jr., 130-
31; pay increase for United Mine
Workers, 132; pay increase for
railroad unions, 133-34; report on
OES, 134, 139-41; clothing prices
134-35; food and agricultural
subsidies, 135-36; oil industry price
increase, 136; requests from
constituents, 137; Bretton Woods,
137-39; appointment to Federal
Loan Agency, 141-42; appointment
Index / 393
to director of Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion,
143; Kentucky Derby, 143; "The
Road to Tokyo and Beyond," 144,
148; appointment to Secretary of
Treasury, 145-46; tax cuts, 149-50;
loans to Britain, 150-52; Harry
Dexter White, 153-54
United States Supreme Court:
swearing in, 156; chosen as
peacemaker, 160-62; relationship
with Truman, 163, 189, 190-93,
198; opening day of Vinson court,
164; voting bloc, 169; philosophy,
170, 173; relationship with Frank-
furter, 174-76, 177-79, 185-86;
productivity, 179-84, 187; relation-
ship with Reed, 183; Truman's
aspirations for Vinson, 195-97, 333;
United Mine Workers v. United
States, 201-12; Youngstown Steel
and Tube v. Sawyer, 215-17, 219-
23, 225-30; views on Communist
threat, 231-33; American Commu-
nications Association v. Douds,
234-35, 237; Dennis v. United
States, 239-44, 246-48; Rosenberg
case, 248-53; Bailey v. Richardson,
253-54; Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 254; loyalty
oaths, 255; Weiman v. Updegraff,
256; Rogers v. United States, 257;
United States v. Bryan, 258-59;
Christoffel v. United States, 259;
United States v. Fleischman, 260;
Oyama case, 261-62; United States
v. ex ret Knauffw. Shaughnessy,
262; Stack v. Boyle, 263; Carlson v.
London, 263; Saia v. New York, 265;
Kovacs v. Cooper, 266; Niemotko v.
Maryland, 267; Kunz v. New York,
268; Breard v. City of Alexandria,
269; Terminiello v. Chicago, 269-
72; Feiner v. New York, 213,-1 A;
concerns about inconsistent
opinions, 275; record of opinions
276; civil liberties, 277-78, 304;
Harris v. United States, 279-80; Di
Re v. United States, 281; Johnson v.
United States, 281; Trupiano v.
United States, 281-82; United
States v. Rabinowitz, 282-83;
Adamson v. California, 285; Wolf\.
Colorado, 286; Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 287; right-to-counsel cases,
287-88; Townsend v. Burke, 288;
Palmer v. Ashe, 288; coerced
confessions, 288; Haley v. Ohio,
288; Upshaw v. United States, 288;
habeas corpus and Illinois, 289,
290; Young v. Ragen, 289; Jennings
v. Illinois, 291; Broot v. TVo/t/!
Carolina, 292-93; racial discrimi-
nation, 293; Zlvery v. Georgia, 294;
Morgan v. Virginia, 296; Bob Lo
Excursions v. Michigan, 296;
Henderson v. United States, 297;
racially restrictive covenants, 299-
303, 306-7; desire for unanimous
opinions, 305; Sipuel v. Oklahoma,
308-9; SWaff v. Pamter, 311-13;
separate-but-equal, 314, 318, 319,
320, 321; McLaurin v. Oklahoma,
315; Terry v. Adams, 322; Barrows
v. Jackson, 323-24; death, 324, 336;
overview of Vinson Court, 326-29,
332
Vinson, Georgia (sister), 4
Vinson, James (father), 4, 6, 31-32
Vinson, James (great-grandfather), 3, 4
Vinson, James R. (son), 48
Vinson, Lazarus (grandfather), 4, 6
Vinson, Lourissa (sister), 4, 10, 336
Vinson, Robert (brother), 4, 6
Vinson, Roberta, 18, 19, 20, 66, 126,
154, 192, 335
Vinson, Rhoda, (great-grandmother), 4
Vinson, Virginia (mother), 4, 6, 9, 13
Virginia Law Review, 245
Wage Stabilization Board, 215, 226
Wagner Act. See National Labor
Relations Act
Wallace, Henry A., 141
War Department Remount Service, 39
War Food Administration (WFA), 135,
137, 141
War Labor Board (WLB), 129, 141
394 / Index
War Labor Disputes Act, 133, 199,
200,208,211,215,216,218
War Production Board, 134
Warren, Earl, 338
Warring, Emmett, 117-18
Washington Post, 114, 157, 213, 246
Washington Star, 157-58, 160
Watson, Dr. Morton G., 10
Weschler, Herbert, 305
Weeks v. United States, 117, 278, 284
West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,
168
Western Recorder, 45
Wetherby, Lawrence, 337
Wheeler, William M., 253
White, Edward Douglass, 163
White, Harry Dexter, 137, 153, 154,
233, 335, 353n. 75
White, Walter, 304, 307
Whitney v. California, 241
Wieman v. Updegraff, 255-56
Wiley, Alexander, 336
Williamson, Ben, 48
Willis, Simeon, 48
Witte, Edwin E., 85
Wolcott, Jesse P., 135
Wolfv. Colorado, 286
Works Progress Administration (WPA),
80, 135
World Bank. See International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Yates v. United States, 247
Yazell, W.S., 22
Young Progressives of America, 272
Young v. Ragen, 289,291
Youngstown Steel and Tube v. Sawyer,
190, 220-28, 330


